The Israel Defense Forces History Department reports that on the morning of June 8, 1967, Dayan went to Jerusalem, where he had Maj. Gen. Uzi Narkiss transport him to Hebron.5 It is about a fifteen-minute drive from the Kirya to Sde Dov Airport, located on the north side of Tel Aviv, on the coast. It is a little over thirty miles from Sde Dov to Jerusalem as the crow, or helicopter, flies. A Super Frelon helicopter cruises at between 138 and 155 miles per hour; thus Dayan’s flight time to Jerusalem was about twelve to fifteen minutes. His route then went south less than three miles from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, then another five miles to the Gush Etzion site, or Etzion Bloc,6 where he and his entourage stopped for lunch, and finally on to Hebron, about ten more miles.
Is there any evidence that supports Dayan’s alleged evil deed? Gen. Uzi Narkiss stated that on June 8 he was at his headquarters in Jerusalem when Dayan arrived by helicopter. Narkiss remembered that he was with former prime minister David Ben-Gurion and was about to take Ben-Gurion to the Western Wall, which had just been captured from Jordan.7 Dayan said, “No, we are going to Hebron,” so Narkiss got his command car, a few half-tracks, and some jeeps, and they started out for Hebron. Narkiss then told this author, “But don’t take my word for it. . . . Life magazine published a special edition about the 1967 war that included a picture of Dayan having lunch that day on the road to Hebron.”
A few days later, not knowing if the photo could be found, this author mentioned the Life magazine photo to Eitan Haber, a noted Israeli journalist.8 Haber said, “Yes, I remember the picture, I am in it. I was with Dayan that day.” In the photo Dayan was seated on the ground next to an Israeli brigadier. Further research identified the brigadier as Rehav’am Ze’evi.9 This author interviewed Ze’evi, who remembered the trip and identified the site of the luncheon as being on the foundation of a building at the Etzion Bloc.10
Another officer standing in the rear of the Life photo was identified as Yitzhak Rager, who served as a battalion commander in 1967. This author interviewed Rager when he was the mayor of Beersheva, and Rager confirmed his identity in the picture.11 Thus, there are corroborating witnesses to Dayan’s location and inability to have given an order to attack the Liberty on June 8, 1967, between 1300 and 1400.
This author also learned from General Narkiss that on June 8, 1967, Narkiss had with him Pvt. Yaacov “Cobie” Sharett, whose duty was to keep a diary for the Central Command. Yaacov Sharett, son of Moshe Sharett, the second prime minister of Israel, confirmed making the trip with Dayan on June 8, 1967, and corroborated the story told by Uzi Narkiss.12
In an effort to learn more about Dayan, this author interviewed Dayan’s longtime friend and confidant Shlomo Gazit.13 Gazit stated that he and Dayan never discussed the Liberty. He went on to tell a story about an occasion when Dayan could not remember some details of an event. Gazit told him, “Dayan, you are cheating history, you should keep a journal.” Dayan agreed and the next morning spent an hour writing about the previous day. Gazit said that Dayan never did it again. Instead, he appointed a man named Chaim Israeli to write the journal for him. This author found Chaim Israeli still working for the Defense Ministry and learned that he had nothing in his journal about the Liberty on June 8, 1967. Israeli remembered that the military secretary assigned to Dayan on June 8, 1967, was Col. Itzhak Nissyahu.
Defense Minister Moshe Dayan eating lunch at Etzion Bloc on the road to Hebron at 1335 June 8, 1967. Photo from Life magazine special edition, June 1967. David Rubinger/Time-Life
Nissyahu lives in Ramat Gan, Israel. He recalled flying with Dayan on June 8 to Jerusalem and, in the early afternoon of that day, traveling with Dayan and Narkiss to Hebron in a convoy arranged by Narkiss.14 Nissyahu rode in the lead jeep. On the way, they stopped for lunch at the Etzion Bloc and then drove on to Hebron, where Dayan visited the Cave of Machpelah. The convoy then drove to Beersheva, which is farther to the south. They returned from Beersheva to Tel Aviv in the early evening. Dayan first heard of the Liberty incident when he reached Beersheva in late afternoon. From there they flew by helicopter back to Tel Aviv. Upon arriving they went to the Kirya. Shortly thereafter, Dayan left headquarters at the Kirya to spend the night with his girlfriend in Tel Aviv. He returned early in the morning and began reading messages that had come in during the night. Suddenly, he came upon a cable from Nasser to Syrian president Nur el Din Attasi, intercepted at 3:30 a.m., stating, “I think that Israel is interested in concentrating its forces against Syria, in order to crush the Syrian Army. . . . I would like to advise you to agree to end the hostilities and let U Thant, the [UN] Secretary General, know in order to keep the Syrian Army intact. We have lost this battle. God will be with us in the future.”15
Dayan flew into a rage at the night duty officer for not having called him when that message came in, for he interpreted this message as meaning that the war was over on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts. He called Maj. Gen. David Eleazer, in charge of the Northern Command, who had been pressing for authorization to attack Syria for several days, and ordered him to launch an attack against Syria at once. He then called Prime Minister Levy Eshkol and advised him that he had ordered the attack on Syria, though he could still call it back. Eshkol was highly displeased that Dayan had acted without consulting him and immediately called a cabinet meeting, but the attack on Syria was not halted.
This author’s research indicates that Dayan’s total lack of involvement in the Liberty incident seems to be clear enough, based on the evidence discussed above. However, one additional material witness was discovered. In arranging for the use of the Life magazine photograph, this author learned that its photographer was David Rubinger, who twenty-five years later still worked for Time-Life. Rubinger’s diary supports his memory that he met Dayan at Sde Dov Airport on June 8, 1967, flew with him to Jerusalem in the Super Frelon helicopter, then rode with Dayan and Narkiss in the command car, stopping for lunch at Gush Etzion. He recalled the command car as being an open vehicle with no radio. (Cellular telephones were not yet in existence.) He recalled that Dayan and his party were without the ability to communicate with the rest of the world from midmorning until they arrived in Beersheva.
Enlargement of picture of Dayan’s wristwatch made from another negative on the same roll as the preceding picture of Dayan. David Rubinger/Time-Life
A close examination of the picture shows at least three people wearing wristwatches. This author asked Rubinger if the photo could be enlarged to show the time on the watches when Dayan was eating lunch. In the Life magazine picture Dayan’s watch was at an angle and could not be effectively enlarged, but Rubinger advised that he had taken multiple shots of that same scene, all within a minute or two. Those pictures could be enlarged along with the pictures of the other watches.16 The time on the watches, including Dayan’s own watch, was 1325, about seventeen minutes before the first order was given sending Mirage IIICJ aircraft in search of a warship off El Arish.
Dayan did not do it!
Chapter 12
AMERICA INVESTIGATES
Regulations of the U.S. Navy require an investigation of all incidents involving any death or injury or loss of, or damage to, Navy property.1 The Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Adm. John S. McCain Jr., ordered a court of inquiry to be convened on the Liberty attack. Rear Adm. Isaac C. Kidd Jr., who was then serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, Logistics, for Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, was named president of the court.2 Capt. Bert M. Atkinson Jr., USN, a Naval Academy graduate, and Capt. Bernard J. Lauff, USN, a highly respected veteran of Wake Island in World War II, were designated members. Kidd requested Capt. Ward Boston Jr., USN, as counsel for the court.3 Boston brought two special assets in addition to his skill as a Navy lawyer. He had been a naval aviator in World War II and therefore had insight beyond that of one qualified only in the law. Also, Kidd knew him as a man of integrity. On an earlier matter Boston had been willing to bump heads with Kidd when Boston felt it more important to do the right thing than
to curry favor with the senior who would write his fitness report.
The court convened in London at forty-six minutes before midnight on June 10, 1967, two days and a few hours after the attack. Testimony was taken in London from Capt. Leonard Robert Raish, the assistant chief of staff for Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. The court remained in session until 0250 June 11. Rear Admiral Kidd then traveled with Captain Boston and a court reporter to Souda Bay, Crete, and boarded the Liberty at sea on June 12, while she was en route to Valletta, Malta. The other members of the court met the ship on June 14, 1967,4 at the port of Valletta, Malta, and at 0730 the court went into session on board the Liberty.
The inquiry took testimony from nineteen witnesses;5 transcribed testimony ran 158 pages; forty-nine exhibits, consisting of hundreds of documents and pictures, were received into evidence. The court completed taking evidence in Malta on June 15 and returned to London, where it took additional evidence. The court was closed at 1645 London time on June 16. The court concluded its deliberations two days later and presented its fifty-two findings, together with the record of its proceedings, to Admiral McCain.6 The more important findings were:
1.Available evidence combines to indicate the attack on Liberty on 8 June was in fact a case of mistaken identity.
2.The calm conditions and slow ship speed may well have made the American flag difficult to identify. . . .
6.There are no available indications that the attack was intended against a U.S. ship.
Admiral McCain’s lawyer, Capt. Merwin Staring,7 was not happy with the form of the untidy, bulky document, which contained typographical errors, but Admiral McCain and his staff prepared a five-page “First Endorsement” and ordered “Ike” Kidd to deliver the findings and endorsement to the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. David McDonald, in Washington.8 The endorsement of Admiral McCain includes the following statement: “15. The foregoing comments by the convening authority lead to an overall conclusion that the attack was in fact a mistake.”9
The record of proceedings and the first endorsement by Admiral McCain, plus two copies, were placed in a briefcase that was chained to the wrist of Rear Admiral Kidd. Also, he strapped a .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol in a shoulder holster to his chest. He was driven to Heathrow Airport and boarded a Pan American airliner bound for New York. He was booked first class. As soon as he got into his seat, he fell asleep. He remembers waking in the middle of the night to find a flight attendant trying to cover him with a blanket. He asked what she was doing, and the attendant explained that she was trying to cover the huge pistol on his chest, as the lady in the opposite seat was terrorized by it. He wondered ever after why he had been given the pistol, since he probably could not have used it effectively with the briefcase chained to his wrist.
He then fell back asleep until the plane arrived in New York. A Navy plane awaited him there and flew him to Washington. He was met upon landing and driven to Bethesda Naval Hospital in the nearby Maryland suburbs, where he arrived at dawn. Admiral McDonald was recovering from a bout with pneumonia. Kidd felt it prudent not to awaken him and waited outside his room.10 As soon as McDonald awakened and heard that Kidd was there, he sent for him. As Kidd walked into the room, McDonald said, “Ike, was it intentional?” He replied, “No, Admiral.” Then they went through the record of the proceedings.11
In July 1967, almost a month after the U.S. Navy court of inquiry completed its report, Admiral Kidd added an amplification addendum to the Liberty inquiry in a secret message, U.S. eyes only, 061222Z July 67, which stated:
1.Req add following amplification as appropriate Addendum to Liberty inquiry pursuant your req for amplifying facts.
2.Following attested to by CO Liberty Cdr McGonagle; CTC Thompson; and Signalman David through Cdr McGonagle.
3.[deleted because not relevant]
4.Alleges AA from PTS was not repeat not read by Liberty prior to torpedo hit.
5.[deleted because not relevant]
6.[deleted because not relevant]
7.Thompson says first identifiable visual transmission from PTS read by anyone on Liberty was “Do you need help” followed by “Do you want us to stand by.” . . .
8.Thompson states after Aldis lamp unlimbered, which was after he got to bridge which was after torpedo attacks, the only thing sent by light to PTS was “No thank you” in reply to offer of help.
The U.S. Navy court of inquiry did a remarkably competent and accurate job of collecting and analyzing evidence relating to the Liberty attack and arriving at conclusions. While the investigation was thorough and the court had the resources of the United States at its disposal, it did not hear directly from Israeli witnesses. Nevertheless, the conclusions of the court have stood the test of time and are supported and corroborated by later data that became available from Israel.
In the United States, by tradition, human life is treasured. In normal times any single life lost is a tragedy. But 1967 could not be considered normal times. The United States was engaged in armed conflict in Vietnam and was in the process there of losing the lives of 55,000 of its military personnel. During the week of June 5, 1967, 187 more U.S. military personnel died in Vietnam. The numbers of wounded were astronomical. Thus the loss of lives and the woundings during the week of June 5, 1967, were neither unusual nor unfamiliar to an American public that had been experiencing these terrible human losses week by week for several years.
The Navy wanted to know what had happened. This concern was operational: How and why had it happened, and what could be done to prevent similar events in the future? The relationship of the U.S. military and the Israeli military in 1967, though cordial, was neither strong nor close, except perhaps at the most attenuated points of each military where personal contact was made. For example, there was a friendly relationship between Air Force colonel Anthony Perna, the U.S. defense attaché in Tel Aviv, and his counterpart, Lt. Col. Y. S. “Shaike” Bareket, the Israel Air Force chief of intelligence. Likewise, there was a friendly relationship between Navy commander Ernest Castle, the U.S. naval attaché, and his counterpart, Lt. Col. Michael Bloch, the IDF foreign military liaison officer.
The court was not permitted, nor did Navy regulations require it, to take evidence from the Israeli side.12 The court took testimony only from U.S. personnel and studied the ship and physical exhibits. If, as some critics suggest, the court’s decision was controlled for political motives, it is difficult to understand why that report was then classified for nearly ten years. It is much more reasonable to assume that the report was classified for security or operational reasons than that its conclusions were made under political pressure. The United States was concerned about the fact that the ship was an intelligence gatherer, a fact that neither the Department of State nor the Department of Defense wanted disclosed. Also, the Department of State had no desire to reinforce the Arab perception, from a political point of view, that the United States had provided direct military support to Israel.
For reasons never explained, the findings of the court of inquiry and the McCain endorsement were classified top secret and not declassified until June 29, 1976, over nine years after the event. A news release was issued by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) on June 28, 1967. The “Summary of Proceedings” attached to the news release is strange. It omits court of inquiry findings 1 and 6 as well as paragraph 15 of Admiral McCain’s endorsement. The summary appears to go out of its way to say things not in the actual proceedings of the court. It also contains errors of fact that are contradicted by the record of the proceedings. For example it says, “Liberty fired her .50-caliber machine guns at the aircraft and torpedo boats, but only after she had been attacked and hit.” She did fire her guns at the torpedo boats, but before they attacked. The transcript of Commander McGonagle’s testimony confirms this.
One paragraph of the press release even seems to contradict the court’s findings 1, 2, and 6: “Her configuration, as shown in the international standard
naval identification book Jane’s Fighting Ships, and her standard markings, were clearly sufficient for the aircraft to identify her properly as the non-combatant ship Liberty.”13 Two paragraphs later, the summary relates that this “non-combatant” ship was exercised at general quarters during most of the hour just prior to the air attack. When general quarters is sounded on a U.S. Navy ship, the boatswain’s mate of the watch announces, “All hands man your battle stations.” It is not possible to have it both ways. The Liberty may not have been adequately armed for combat, but she was a warship by international-law definition. One can only speculate as to why the press release called her a noncombatant and omitted, or distorted, a number of significant aspects of the actual findings of the court.
While the U.S. Navy conducted the court of inquiry, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted its own investigation of the Liberty attack, issuing a report on June 13, 1967, five days before the Navy court of inquiry completed its work.14 The CIA report is accurate and is an excellent piece of work to have been assembled in only five days. However, in its rush to complete the report, the CIA overlooked the fact that while Washington was observing daylight savings time in June 1967, Israel was not. As a result, the times in the CIA report, although essentially accurate, are one hour off. That is, the attack began about 1400 Sinai time on June 8, 1967, but the CIA report reflects the time as 1500.15 The CIA investigation was supervised by the chief of station in Tel Aviv and used U.S. sources in both Israel and the United States. The initial conclusion was that the attacks on the Liberty were a mistake.16 The June 13, 1967, CIA intelligence memorandum has been declassified, but a subsequent memorandum dated June 23, 1967, remained classified until January 12, 2004. Although the reason for the continued classification is not known, the conclusion of the CIA that the attack was a mistake was reinforced in 1977 in an exchange of letters between the director and Senator James G. Abourezk of South Dakota. The agency was queried by the senator on behalf of Carl Marcy in a letter to the director dated November 18, 1977.
The Liberty Incident Revealed Page 20