House Armed Services Committee, 1991/1992
Conclusion: No support for theory of intentional attack.
United States Department of State, 2004, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
Conclusion: After extensive investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency concluded that there was “little doubt” that the attacking Israeli units “failed to identify the Liberty as a US ship before or during the attack” and that they had mistakenly identified the ship as Egyptian.
Israeli Reports
Ram Ron Commission of Inquiry, June 16, 1967
Conclusion: “The attack on the ship by the Israeli Defense Forces was made neither maliciously nor in gross negligence, but as a result of a bona fide mistake.”
Preliminary Inquiry, July 21, 1967
Conclusion: No sufficient amount of prima facie evidence justifying committing anyone for trial.
State of Israel—IDF History, June 1982
Conclusion: Attack on American intelligence ship came about as a result of innocent error.
Israel Air Force Report—2002
(This report was released to the Author by the IDF spokesperson as a Hebrew document. There is no official translation and was translated for the author by a person not a certified translator.)
Conclusion: There is only one new item of information in the report, which is the disclosure of meetings between the Israel Air Force and the Israel Navy in 1968 to establish protocols for better communication between the services to prevent a repetition of the tragedy. Pages 2, 3, 27, and 31 are redacted.
Appendix 2
ISRAEL AIR FORCE AND NSA AUDIOTAPES: COMPARED
The NSA tapes and the Israel Air Force (IAF) tapes coincide or dovetail with respect to multiple reported events. Both confirm that the target (or ship) was presumed to be Egyptian until an American flag was first observed—at 1512 on the NSA tapes and 1512 on the IAF tapes—forty four minutes after the attack was over.
Israel Air Force Tapes
During the 1967 war, Israel Air Force headquarters, at the Kirya in Tel Aviv, routinely made audiotape recordings of radio transmissions by Israel Air Force pilots on UHF frequencies. It also made audiotape recordings of telephone conversations, including one between the chief air controller, Col. Shmuel Kislev, at headquarters and controllers at Air Control Central, Air Control South, and Air Control North. To provide continuity and understanding of the two tapes, this author has integrated them into one continuous transcript and added bracketed explanatory comments. Portions of the tapes on unrelated subject matter have been omitted.
The IAF tape states in the background, in a female voice speaking Hebrew, the time of speaking. Voice transmissions block the time announcement. The tapes can thus be compared to a chronograph, and this sequence is accurate to the second.
This author first obtained access to the IAF transcripts and translations on June 18 and 19, 1990, and had the opportunity to listen to the tapes on those days together with two Hebrew language speakers, one a native-born Israeli and the other an American fully qualified in Hebrew, as well as six of the original air controllers. The transcripts and translations had previously been released by the IAF to Thames TV in 1987.
In September 2001, the Israel Air Force provided access to the tapes of the air controller’s telephone conversations (commencing at 1342 Sinai time) and pilots’ transmissions on the attack channel frequency (commencing at 1329 Sinai time), as well as a transcription of the air controllers’ telephone conversations. An additional listening session took place on September 7, 2001, which this author attended together with three Hebrew speakers, two native-born Israelis and one American. All emphasis is by this author.
Key players in the Israel Air Force tapes are:
Air controllers
“Homeland”: Call sign of the air controllers
Kislev: Shmuel Kislev, chief air controller at the Kirya, in Tel Aviv
Giora: deputy chief air controller at the Kirya
Robert: chief air controller at Air Control Central, twenty-five miles south of Tel Aviv
Shimon: deputy chief air controller at Air Control Central
Menachem: chief air controller at Air Control South, near the Sinai border
Yigal: deputy chief air controller at Air Control South
L.K.: a weapons system officer.
Aircraft
Kursa: Two Mirage IIICJs that made the initial air attack run
Royal: Two Super Mystères that made the second air attack run
Menorah: Flight of four Mirage IIICJs, armed with five-hundred-pound iron bombs
Nixon: Flight of two Mystères loaded with five-hundred-pound iron bombs
Chalon: One Mirage IIICJ
Ofot: Helicopters, referred to as “Ofot 1,” “Ofot 2,” etc.
Watercraft
“Pagoda”: MTB Division 914, consisting of MTBs 203, 204, and 206 and led by Lt. Cdr. Moshe Oren
Migdal: MTB 206, the only MTB with a working UHF radio.
All times are Sinai times unless otherwise indicated. 1343 Sinai = 1143 GMT = 0743 in Washington, D.C. There were no NSA intercepts until 1430, and therefore the IAF tapes are presented, to that time, without comparisons.
Author’s Note
A careful examination of the transcripts of translations of the NSA tapes suggests that some of the text describing which source broadcast a transmission to the receiving entity were either incorrectly transcribed or incorrectly attributed.
The NSA tapes show for each transmission the sender and the receiver. For example, Tribune to 810: Tribune is the Hatzor Air Base controller broadcasting to Israel Air Force helicopter number 810.
Several examples are:
At 1438:810 to Tribune: “Where are you?” 810 to Tribune: “Where are you now?” It seems unlikely that a helicopter in flight and moving would be asking Hatzor Air Base, a fixed point on the ground, “Where are you?” Much more likely Hatzor was asking the moving helicopter, “Where are you?” “Where are you now?”
This is supported by the answer: Tribune to 810: “Ashdod, altitude 1000 feet.” It is difficult to imagine that Hatzor Air Base was at an altitude of one thousand feet over the Port of Ashdod; it is more likely that this was an answer of helicopter 810 advising Tribune (Hatzor) that it, helicopter 810, was at an altitude of one thousand feet over the Port of Ashdod, approximately twenty-five miles south of Hatzor.
Likewise, directions from the helicopter telling the Hatzor air controller, “You will try to take the men from the water,” was much more likely an order from Hatzor to the helicopter.
Again at 1441 the order from helicopter 810 to Tribune to “Take the men to El Arish” and the reply by Tribune, “Roger, okay,” was also more likely a reversal of transmitter and receiver.
At 1502 the request of helicopter 815 located miles out to sea near the USS Liberty to have the controller at Hatzor tell the helicopter the nationality of the ship or to have the controller at Hatzor telling the helicopter about the size of the ship, the status of the smoke, the three small vessels nearby—it seems more likely that the helicopter was passing this information to the controller and that this was a typographical reversal of the transmissions sources.
At 1503 the controller at Hatzor transmits to helicopter 815, “I’m heading for the big one [LIBERTY].” Surely it was helicopter 815 advising the controller that the helicopter was heading for the ship, [The big one], not the controller at Hatzor, heading for the ship.
There are numerous other places throughout the NSA transcript of translation where it is obvious that the transmitter and receiver described in the text are reversed. These misprints in no way detract from the value of the voice transmission intercepts but merely reflect errors in translating or constructing the transcript.
1343
Unknown: The navy received a report that two miles at sea, off El Arish, there is something that’s pounding El
Arish. Their torpedo boats are going towards there.
Giora: I heard. I took helicopter from El Arish. I spoke with him. He went out to have a look and says he doesn’t see a thing.
Unknown: There’s contact with the [El Arish] field but not with the city. [El Arish airport is located inland several miles south of the city of El Arish. At this time the airport was in Israeli hands.]
Kislev: Yigal, have Chalon take a look.
Yigal: Chalon.
Kislev: Clear.
Shimon: Robert, have him take a look. He’s circling the same area.
Kislev: Can you see him, Shimon?
1344
Shimon: Yeah. Sure, Yigal, can you see route 4? Have you informed him of 20,000 feet of altitude?
Unknown: Do you have Tiyeh 39 10? [Tiyeh is phonetic for tet, the ninth letter of the Hebrew alphabet. The numbers are grid coordinates.]
Unknown: Tiyeh 39 10, one moment.
1345
Kursa: We’re switching to military power. Affirmative, northern direction. [Kursa has just been given a vector to a target.]
Kursa: Fuel okay, 3,000 [liters].
1349
Yigal: Robert, where is Menorah now?
1350
Kislev: Forget about Menorah. Yigal, you have a ship at 26 [A site designation.] Take Kursa over there. If it’s a warship, then blast it. [At this point, the air force has a request from the navy to assist the chase of the vessel and, on urging from General Hod, via Cdr. Pinchas Pinchasy, has obtained authority from Capt. Issy Rehav, who has tactical command of the navy at headquarters at Stella Maris, Haifa, to attack the ship “if it’s a warship.” Attack is thus conditionally authorized by Kislev at 1350, subject to Kursa identifying the ship as a warship.]
Yigal: Clear.
1351
Unknown: Wait a minute, Kislev. The navy says that there are two [sic; there were three] torpedo boats of ours in the area, called Pagoda. They are on frequency 186. [A minute later the navy warns of its own boats in the area. There appears to be more concern for preventing the aircraft from attacking the Israeli navy boats than for further identification of the target, which has been identified as enemy under existing Israel Navy rules of engagement (ROE). The Israel Navy ROE were quite similar to those of U.S. Navy ROE for 1967.]
Kislev: If it’s a warship, you can throw [attack]. There are two torpedo boats of ours. They want to know. They want [the pilots) to see them or call them on 86. Robert, do you have Royal?
[Kislev knows that Royal has already taken off from an air base in the north.]
Robert: Royal?
Shimon: He’s at Hava 16 10 [Hava is phonetic for het, the eighth letter of the Hebrew alphabet. Again, grid coordinates.] That’s track 15.
Kislev: Robert, take Royal along the coast so that if Kursa identifies, he can go in. [Kislev positions Royal to prepare to follow Kursa on the attack.]
Robert: Okay.
Kislev: Menachem, how much fuel does Kursa have?
Menachem: He’s got a lot. A minute ago he had 3,000 [liters].
1352
Kursa: What is the range? Seven turns. 040 degrees. Roger. [Kursa asks the distance to the target. Confirms a slight right turn to point at the target.] I’ll stay on 19 and 9 [two radio frequencies, or channels.] How do you call the torpedo boats? Pagoda? Kursa 9 and 3.
1353
Kursa: Homeland, keep on directing me to the place.
Homeland: 045[°], 20 miles. Ah, can you see them at the moment?
1354
Kursa: Affirmative, it looks longer [i.e., more distant] by eyesight. L.K.: What is that? Americans? [No one had any data on the location for Americans. Without hard data, the subject was not pursued further. Following the tragedy, L.K. was called on July 4, 1967, before the examining judge and testified in the second Israeli investigation. On October 1, 2001, this author obtained the declassification of L.K.’s testimony before the examining judge. The following is his sworn response to a question asking why he mentioned Americans:
I was on duty and I was on the [communications] line K.M.NK. (Weapons Systems Officer). . . . It is clear to me that I threw in [i.e., posed] the question—a shout which is written [in the transcript?]. It does not relate to the conversation that was conducted on the line at that same moment. Since at the time the conversation was about an attack on missile bases.
In relation to this there are two possibilities:
It is possible that this question was asked during a conversation with Lieut. [——] of his [probably a typo for “my”] unit with whom I spoke about the ship that purportedly was shelling El Arish, and the air force was about to attack it jointly with the navy. I at that time expressed an opinion that we had taken only one action, that is to say, we had ascertained it was not an Israeli ship, and we did this through the naval representatives who were sitting with us.
The hour was approximately 1350.
I was not the officer who would have been able to decide on an attack, but it was my duty to be as a passive party on the line in order to absorb information that might have helped, but like any officer I wanted to help, and therefore I wanted to suppose to the ears of [i.e., alert] those [officers] who were managing the war to a possibility—supposition that it was an American ship. That was only my supposition, since it was my assessment that it was not [an] Egyptian [ship], for they would not dispatch a solitary ship to our coast, and therefore I thought there was such a possibility.
All those who were connected on this line were able to hear me. Of course, all of them were overcome by this and they began to ask [questions] and then I did not want to delay the attack on the ship [because] they said it was shelling El Arish. And since the supposition was not based on data but on an assessment—supposition—therefore I did not want to delay the thing. Therefore I immediately retracted. Today I understand that had I persisted in my supposition, it would have been possible to prevent the tragedy. I did not know about the existence of an American ship in the morning.]
Shimon: What Americans?
Kislev: Robert, what did you say?
[No one answers.]
Unknown: I’m putting Squadron (Palga) 116 on alert. [Squadron 116 is a reference to Nixon Flight.]
Kislev: Okay.
Kislev: Does he see more torpedo boats north of him?
1355
Kislev: Menachem, if there are three torpedo boats, it’s a possibility that they are ours. [Note that Kislev now has the correct number of torpedo boats, three rather than two, as stated incorrectly above at 1351, four minutes earlier.]
Shimon: Pay attention, Kursa.
Kursa: Pagoda from Kursa. Are you Migdal? [Because Migdal, MTB 206, possesses the only functional UHF radio in Pagoda, MTB Division 914, Kursa must relay communication to division commander Moshe Oren, on board MTB 204, through Migdal.]
Migdal: Affirmative.
Kursa: Are you attacking some ship now?
Migdal: We’re on our way to one.
Kursa: Okay . . . I’ll come and give you a hand. Where are you?
Kursa: Migdal from Kursa, are you three? [Kursa sees the three MTBs and asks if they are a formation of three.]
Kursa: There’s no need. Bring yourselves up some 10–15 kilometers from the boat. Is it in the direction of your (garbled) home?
Kursa: I see you on a right turn. Why are you turning? It’s not in that direction.
Migdal: Okay, all right. Affirmative. . . . Affirmative.
1356
Migdal: Kursa, can you identify the target? [At 1351, Kursa was authorized to attack the ship “if it’s a warship.”]
Kursa: Can you identify his target, Migdal? [The MTBs and the aircraft are each asking the other to identify the ship.]
Kursa: She’s running from you in the direction of El Arish, excuse me, Port Said. What is it? What is it? A destroyer? A patrol boat? What is it?
Migdal: Kursa, can you manage to identify it?
Kursa: I can’t identify it, but in any case it’s a mil
itary ship.
Migdal: Okay, what is it?
Kursa: It has one mast and one smokestack.
Migdal: Roger.
Kursa: It has one mast up front.
Shimon: Menachem, Kursa is calling you.
Shimon: He says he is starting strafing them.
Menachem: I told him that if it’s a warship, he can start to attack. That was the last command.
Kislev: Menachem.
Menachem: Does he have authorization to attack?
Kislev: He does. If this is a warship, then yes. Royal is to be turned there.
Menachem: Okay.
Kislev: Send Royal over there with bombs [ptzatzot—Hebrew for bombs]. [Kislev believes at this point that Royal has iron bombs.]
Robert: On what frequency are you attacking?
Shimon: She’s running away from them. [At this point Shimon apparently sees the ship on his radar.]
Kislev: Menachem, after he attacks have him explain to Royal how to find her.
Shimon: She’s running fast.
Kislev: Okay, attack.
Shimon: Robert, have Royal call us on 19. [At this time Royal is on another channel or frequency. Royal is arguing with his controller about the fact that he is carrying napalm, not iron bombs.]
Robert: Royal to you on 19.
1357
Shimon: Just a minute, Kislev, we see the ship. [Shimon sees the ship on his radar scope.]
Shimon: That’s one hell of a ship. [Shimon commenting on the radar signature of the ship.]
Robert: Menachem, I’m passing [code words for Royal Flight] to you on 19. Royal. El Arish at 20,000.
Kislev: Menachem, have them tell us if there is Nun Mem [the Hebrew letters for NM, representing neged metosim, meaning antiaircraft fire].
1358
Kursa: . . .
Kislev: Menachem, nu? [An idiom, “So or well, what is happening?”]
Menachem: We’re asking him. She’s not shooting back.
Kislev: Not shooting? Give me 19. [Kislev is puzzled by the report that the ship is not shooting at the attacking aircraft.]
1359
Kursa: We’ve hit her a lot. . . . But maybe she is doing it [putting out smoke] on purpose, I don’t know. Oil is spilling out into the water. I’m in eye contact. Great, wonderful. She’s burning. She’s burning.
The Liberty Incident Revealed Page 33