29.Interview of Kursa Flight leader by this author on June 10, 1992, at Tel Aviv.
30.There are many different accounts of the Liberty incident, and the times of the start of the first air attack vary from 1358 to 1405 local time. The Liberty’s “smooth” deck log, which was prepared after the attack, reflects the attack at 1400. The quartermaster log, which was usually written as events occurred, has 1358. At Israel Air Force headquarters all communications between air control and the pilots are recorded. The recording equipment has a woman’s voice in the background repeating the time (hours and minutes) in Hebrew. When a voice transmission is made, the transmission blocks or records over the woman’s voice citing the time. The Israel Air Force audiotape shows the Kursa flight leader commencing his dive at 1357.
31.Testimony of Cdr. William McGonagle at the U.S. Navy court of inquiry (record p. 37, JAG pagination p. 141).
32.These pictures form part of the exhibits to the U.S. Navy court of inquiry record. See U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, Liberty Incident, Record of Proceedings, exhibit 9, pictures 16, 22, 27, and 29.
33.Testimony of Radioman Chief Smith, U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry transcript, 94. See also message NAVCOMUNIT Naples to CNO and CINCUSNAVEUR 112310Z July 67.
34.Message from USS Saratoga to COMSIXTHFLT 081358Z June 67: “This station received attack report from station Rock Star [Liberty] at 1210Z.” See U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits 23 and 24, Liberty’s radio logs.
35.The Liberty rough and smooth radio logs reflect the first transmission of the distress call at 1158Z/1358 Sinai time and the first response from the Saratoga two minutes later, at 1200Z/1400 Sinai time. The time noted for the entry about switching transmitters was 1204Z/1404 Sinai. There is no question that the first report of the attack was received from the Liberty by the Saratoga. It seems doubtful that the first transmission from the Liberty occurred at the instant the first gun fired at the ship, 1358 Sinai time. Although the substance of the log entries is correct, it appears the times of the entries are not. This is quite obvious from the fact that the torpedo strike occurred at 1235Z/1435 Sinai, but it is reflected in the log as occurring at 1218Z/1418 Sinai. U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry exhibits 23 (rough log) and 24 (smooth log).
Chapter 5. The Air and Sea Attacks
1.According to William Green, The World Guide to Combat Planes, vol. 1 (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1967), the Mirage could have carried two air-to-air missiles, one each on the outer wing pylons. The inner wing pylons normally carried a 137-imperial-gallon (164 U.S. gallons) drop tank on a combat air patrol mission. Whether any other missile was hung on the center line pylon is unknown.
There is a debate over whether the aircraft fired rockets or missiles at the Liberty. The pilot of the first aircraft, the Kursa Flight leader, told this author that his aircraft was armed with a couple of air-to-air missiles. If the aircraft had missiles, they were most likely AIM-9 Sidewinders, which are heat seekers. The use of this missile against a surface-ship target is questionable. Gun-camera film shows two distinct gunsights. Kursa Flight leader explained that one was for the 30 mm cannon and one was for the missiles.
Several persons who went on board the Liberty after the attack, including Rear Adm. (then Lt. [jg]) Paul E. Tobin Jr., USN (Ret.), have advised this author that they saw no sign of missile or rocket hits. Also, an Israeli naval officer, Capt. Yaacov Nitzan, advised this author that the Israel Air Force was concerned about its 30 mm shells passing through enemy aircraft without exploding and that to resolve this concern it employed a proximity fuse, which exploded the shells near, rather than upon, impact with the target. It is likely that some of the large holes attributed to rockets, or missiles, were in fact due to the 30 mm proximity-fuse explosions. It should also be remembered that the MTBs fired 20 mm and 40 mm cannons.
Capt. R. L. Arthur, fleet material officer, Service Force, COMSIXTHFLT, reported in a message from COMSIXTHFLT to COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT 091954Z June 1967, “H. Cannon holes from 2 inches to one foot in diameter throughout topside area, with associated cable damage in way of holes.” Arthur made no mention of missile or rocket damage in his message.
2.The Kursa Flight leader went on to become a squadron commander then a base commander and ultimately achieved the rank of general in the Israel Air Force. He became the ace, with the second-highest number of victories of all Israeli fighter pilots.
3.U.S. naval officers who went on board the Liberty the following day reported little or no sign of any serious fire damage. The damage caused by the gasoline fires was limited, owing largely to the timely manner in which her crew brought the fires under control. The Israelis thought that one napalm canister struck the Liberty, but it may be that none actually hit. It is possible that one napalm canister hit the Liberty a glancing blow to the starboard bridge structure, forward of where the motor whaleboat was stored. Commander McGonagle makes no mention of being hit by a napalm canister. In fact, he does describe what may have been a napalm canister missing the ship. U.S. Court of Inquiry testimony of Commander McGonagle, beginning at p. 35: “On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank.”
Dr. Richard F. Keifer, the ship’s doctor, in his testimony said, “But I didn’t treat anyone that I would think of as having a napalm burn.” U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, Liberty Incident, Record of Proceedings, testimony of Dr. Keifer, p. 86.
4.COMSIXTHFLT to COMSERVFORSIXTHFLT 091954Z June 1967.
5.Royal Flight leader described the attacks by Royal Flight in an interview with this author on July 2, 1992, in Tel Aviv. At p. 39 of the testimony to the U.S. Navy court of inquiry by Commander McGonagle, he said he elected to steer 283° during the torpedo attack. He also testified that during the air attacks, “I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig zag or not.” It is suggested that the ship did turn during the air attacks. A turn to port would not have been prudent, as it would have taken the ship toward the shore and shallow water. Thus a turn to starboard was no doubt made. This is further supported by the picture McGonagle took of the Super-Mystère flying from stem to bow across the ship. This coincides with the description given by Royal Flight leader. It also fits his description of making a 270° turn to west and crossing the ship from west to east with the sun behind him and the enhanced light on the bow that permitted him to read the bow marks. If Liberty had remained on the 283° heading during the air attack, then Royal Flight would have been attacking into the sun, which is a very unlikely choice when all the options were with the attacking aircraft.
6.Interview of Royal Flight leader on July 2, 1992, at Tel Aviv.
7.Official press release of the U.S. Department of Defense, June 28, 1967.
8.Thames TV transcript, Attack on the “Liberty,” item 194, 36, 39, 40.
9.During the 1967 war, Israel Air Force Mystère IV aircraft were assigned two-syllable radio call signs named after world leaders, such as Churchill, Roosevelt, Nixon.
10.The straight-line distance from Tel Nof Air Base to the vicinity of EL Arish is about 138 nautical miles. The Mystère IV had a maximum speed of 696 miles per hour and a cruise speed of 488 mph. A Mystère could easily have flown to the Liberty in this time. Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to the Israeli Air Force (New York: Arco, 1982), 62.
11.James M. Ennes Jr., Assault on the “Liberty” (New York: Random House, 1979), 51, 52.
12.Immediate confidential message from CINCUSNAVEUR to COMDESRON ONE TWO 132335Z June 67.
13.Immediate confidential message from USS Liberty to SECNAV 140306Z June 67.
14.Message from SECNAV to CINCUSNAVEUR 192026Z June 67.
15.Message from NAVCOMUNIT NAPLES to CNO 061222Z July 67.
> 16.Testimony of Commander McGonagle at U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, 39.
17.Secret message from USDAO Tel Aviv to CINCUSNAVEUR 191200Z June 67, sequence no. 0933 June 1967.
18.This press conference is reported in Clifford Hubbard, “Liberty Brings in Memories,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, July 30, 1967, 1, 4. The Thames TV production Attack on the “Liberty” erroneously indicates that this press conference took place on board the aircraft carrier America a few days after the court of inquiry.
19.Thames TV, Attack on the “Liberty,” script, item 94, p. 19.
20.There is testimony in the U.S. Navy court of inquiry that one unoccupied gun tub was burning and the heat from the fire caused the ammunition to detonate and the gun to fire.
21.Division 914 war log, 8.
22.Israel Defense Forces, History Department, Research and Instruction Branch, The Attack on the “Liberty” Incident, June 1982 [hereafter cited as IDF History], 16.
23.Testimony of Commander McGonagle, U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, 39–40.
24.See U.S. Department of the Navy, Hydrographic Office, International Code Signals, U.S. ed., pub. 102 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968).
25.The Red Book got its name because it was first printed and bound with a red cover. Since then, the book has been reissued with a dark-green cover, but it is still called the Red Book. U.S Navy message from USDAO to CINCUSNAVEUR 191200Z refers to the book by the color of its cover, Green Book. When this author obtained copies of the contents of the book from Israel Navy headquarters at Tel Aviv, it had a green cover but was still referred to as the Red Book.
26.The name of the commanding officer of MTB 203 is not disclosed per agreement with Field Security, Israel Defense Forces.
27.Interview of Uri “Chera” Tsur by the author on January 18, 1990, in Tel Aviv.
28.Israel Navy headquarters war log, June 8, 1967.
29.Telephone conversation with Cdr. Moshe Oren on August 31, 2001. This author was in Miami, and Oren was in Tel Aviv.
30.U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, 39.
31.Interview of MTB 203 commander by this author on January 11, 1990, at Tel Aviv.
32.During the 1973 war the Israel Navy sank eighteen Syrian missile boats without the loss of a single Israeli missile boat. The navy is also reported to have sunk a few neutral ships and a Soviet resupply ship.
33.The Israeli ship that was struck by it own torpedo was the Nogah, a patrol vessel that was a former U.S. patrol vessel (submarine chaser) of the steel-hulled PC type. It is identified in Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1966–67, as the former PC 16 and in the 1968–69 edition as former PC 1188. The date of the event is not established.
34.Testimony of Lt. (jg) Lloyd Painter at U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, 57: “We then filed out to our life rafts which were no longer with us because they had been strafed and most of them were burned, so we knocked most of them over the side. All during this time in Repair Three, my men were fighting fires and knocking burning life rafts, etc.”
35.Liberty deck log, June 8, 1967, and Israel Navy Division 914 war log, June 8, 1967.
36.Interview of the pilot (name not to be disclosed) by this author on April 29, 1998, in Israel. The helicopter was an SA-321K Super Frelon. It arrived on the scene following the air and torpedo attacks.
37.Translation of transcript of Israel Air Force audiotape of conversations of air controllers re: Liberty, June 8, 1967, Channel 14, time entry 1512. Shimon says to Kislev, “There is an American flag on board.”
38.USDAO TEL AVIV message 151615Z June 67, U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry document 45, exhibit 48.
39.Sde is Hebrew for “field.”
40.The Super Frelon helicopter flew from Sde Dov 230° a distance of forty-nine miles to 31-31.11° N latitude and 34-06.32° E longitude. This position was calculated from the bearing and distance information reported by Commander Castle in 1967. This author and Castle repeated the flight twenty-five years later within minutes of the 1967 times. On the 1992 flight a global positioning system, which is accurate to within a few hundred feet, was used for navigation. The 1967 position was computed by dead reckoning and therefore may have been less accurate than if calculated by the more precise navigational aids available in 1992.
41.Interview with Cdr. (now Capt.) Ernest Castle on January 14–15, 1989, at Columbia, S.C., telephone conversations between Castle and the author in March 2001, and a letter from Castle to this author dated March 10, 2001.
42.See U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry document 45, exhibit 48, message 151615Z June 67, from USDAO TEL AVIV ISRAEL to CINCUSNAVEUR: “7.(C) On return Embassy, ALUSNA informed that Genl Getty of NMCC requested phone report which was made at approx 082100Z. Substance of phone con same as para 5 above.”
Chapter 6. In the Aftermath
1.Word was passed to the NSA at 0915 EDT (1515 Sinai time).
2.National Security Advisor W. W. Rostow, as was his custom, made a memo of the conversation, which he marked Thursday, June 8, 1967, 9:50 a.m. See also COMSIXTHFLT message 081250Z June 1967.
3.Telephone interview of George Christian by this author on July 19, 1991. Christian was in Austin, Texas.
4.Ultimately, four hotline messages were sent on June 8, 1967: at 0948, from Kosygin to Johnson, on the status of the Middle East cease-fire; at 1100, from Johnson to Kosygin, about the aircraft en route to the Liberty; at 1135, from Johnson to Kosygin, about the cease-fire; and at 1220, from Kosygin to Johnson, about the Liberty. All times are EDT.
5.Hotline message from President Johnson to Chairman Kosygin on June 8, 1967. Received by the Soviets at 1124 Washington time.
6.Tom Johnson came to the Washington as a White House fellow in 1965. In 1966 he was hired as assistant press secretary to President Johnson. In 1967 he became deputy press secretary and ultimately, in 1928, became special assistant to the president.
7.Marvin Watson served as special assistant to President Johnson from January 1965 to April 1968. During this period he was appointments secretary, political adviser, and chief of staff. In April 1968 Johnson appointed him postmaster general.
8.White House Daily Log, June 8, 1967.
9.Phil G. Goulding, Confirm or Deny: Informing the People on National Security (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 97.
10.About twenty Soviet intelligence gatherers of the Mirnny class were built between 1962 and 1967 (Norman Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5th ed. [Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991], 290–91), and 4th ed. (1986), 333–35. Many pictures of these ships taken after 1967show hull marks as “CCB,” which is the Cyrillic for their designation, “SSV.” This author has not been able to locate a picture taken in 1967, but numerous IDF officers have advised him that the Soviet intelligence gatherers were marked thus in 1967.
11.MTB Division 914 war log: “1520—Identification of the vessel—American. Lyingon its right [starboard] side.”
12.Interviews of Lt. Col. Michael Bloch by this author on August 14, 1989; January 14, 1990; June 16, 1990; June 10, 1992; and June 6, 1993—all at Tel Aviv.
13.From Castle to the White House and others, 081414Z (1614 Sinai/1014 Washington).
14.Interview of Dean Rusk by this author on April 5, 1989, at Athens, Georgia.
15.JCS flash message 081529Z June 1967. The text of the message states that before the message was generated, a transatlantic telephone call had been placed from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to Deputy USCINCEUR. It can be assumed that the purpose of this call was to convey the first word down the chain of command that force was no longer needed and that a confirming message would follow. It is also likely that the Vice CNO learned that COMSIXTHFLT had already issued the recall orders for the aircraft.
16.COMSIXTHFLT flash message to CINCUSNAVEUR 081439Z June 1967.
17.It is more likely that this memory was of a day other than June 8, 1967, as none of the interviewed A-1 pilots recall doing Soviet destroyer (DD) overflights on June 8 (a scheduled nonflying day), while there are other reports of the A-1 aircraft
conducting this type of countering the Soviet DDs on other days.
18.There is no documentation indicating that the Sixth Fleet or the Soviet ships went to general quarters (battle stations) when word was received regarding the Liberty. It is known that the fleet increased its readiness status to Condition III when the fighting broke out on June 5 and that the situation had become more relaxed by June 8. The America had resumed training operations, including a Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) drill (an exercise involving training for delivery of nuclear weapons) that had been in progress when first word of the attack on the Liberty was received.
19.Interview with Francis Snyder on April 6, 1995, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
20.Interview of Ambassador Richard B. Parker by author on September 8, 1997, in Washington, D.C.
21.Goulding, Confirm or Deny, 102, 103.
22.Department of Defense news release 550–67 of June 6, 1967.
23.Incoming telegram, Department of State 101415Z June 67 from American embassy, Madrid, to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. (author’s collection of State Department documents no. 452 and repeated as no. 458). The telegram is signed “Walker.” At the time, the U.S. ambassador to Spain was Angier Biddle Duke. In the absence of the ambassador, the deputy chief of mission or chargé d’affaires would normally sign messages. It has not been possible to identify the “Walker” who signed this message.
24.The National Security Council held a special committee meeting at 6:30 p.m. on June 9, 1967, in the Cabinet Room of the White House. A typewritten memorandum for the record is supplemented by handwritten minutes of the meeting scribbled on the memo. The document is no. 100 National Security Council Document from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Clark Clifford is recorded as saying, “My concern is that we’re not tough enough. Handle as if Arabs or USSR had done it.” Dean Rusk is recorded as saying, “Do what is normal.”
25.Interview of Eugene V. Rostow by this author on April 29, 1992, at Washington, D.C.
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