by Ken Coates
Human extinction: the logic of anti-natalism: One of the main characteristics of Benatar’s philosophy is its attempt to follow through the implications of his stance on existence. Thus the logic of his anti-natalism, i.e. the imperative of stopping procreation, is the gradual disappearance of humans from the world. Benatar is fully aware of this and considers how the cessation of human race could be managed to minimize the additional suffering involved in the process.
However, he starts from a different position. His premise – and he claims this is based on scientific grounds – is that the human race is sure to go extinct, sooner or later. It is not a question of whether it will but rather when and how (194-5). For Benatar the sooner this happens the better since it will save millions, if not billions, of human lives from suffering the harm of existence. Thus at the current (2006) rate of reproduction, a billion people would have been added to the number of Homo Sapiens in just twelve years (165). Immediate extinction could save a great deal of suffering. But this is unlikely, short of an astronomical accident, e.g. strike by an asteroid, or some other cataclysmic natural event. It is more likely to be a messy, drawn out process – as a result of our action such as a nuclear warfare or environmental degradation.
In Benatar’s view a phased extinction, planned in a way so as to reduce suffering should be the more humanitarian and compassionate way. Planned and gradual extinction can take care of or at least reduce the adverse impact of non-procreation, e.g. the decline of younger population and a major shift in the ratio of the young to the old, producers to non-producers. Demographic changes will create problems of maintaining a functioning and viable society. If procreation were to stop altogether some additional people may have to be created than would otherwise be the case in order to sustain some measure of quality of life for the later generations as the process of human decline continues. Even in such a situation, however, there is no doubt that the last generation of humans will likely undergo a great deal of suffering (197). Although their situation will be a bleak one indeed, it is hard to know ‘whether their suffering would be any greater than that of so many people within each generation’ in the normal course of events (198). In order to determine whether the regrettable future of impending extinction is bad, all things considered, we have to take into account not only the final people’s interests but also of the harm avoided by not producing new generations. It is undeniable that whenever humanity comes to an end there will be serious costs for the last people. But all things being equal nothing is gained if this happens later (198).
One of the arguments against the extinction of human species is that as a result much that is valuable and unique will be lost. For example morality, reasoning, diversity (Benatar does not mention the appreciation of beauty, creativity and other aspects of human culture and civilization) will disappear. But, asks Benatar, ‘what is so special about a world that contains moral agents and rational deliberators?’ (199). Humans attribute value to many things including the presence of beings such as themselves and their achievements from an ‘inappropriate sense of self-importance’ .If humans disappear then these things will also disappear and no one will be there to regret their absence. For seen sub specie aeternitatis these things do not appear to have any value. In any case ‘it is highly implausible that their value outweighs the vast amount of suffering that comes with human life’ (200). The concern about the non-existence of humans is ‘either a symptom of human arrogance that our presence makes the world a better place or is some misplaced sentimentalism’ (200). However Benatar is under no illusion that human species will take the path of voluntary extinction. He emphasizes that his approach is one of principle and theory. He is spelling out the implications of his viewpoint including what might be involved in its practice (184).
Benatar, an assessment: Let us begin with Benatar’s view of existence. It is similar to those of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. The emphasis is on the pain and suffering entailed by existence, felt most keenly by sentient beings. For Benatar, too, the immense suffering that life inflicts on sentient beings can in no way be justified by its pleasures and other positives. However in one respect Benatar goes further. For him any suffering, however small, rules out bringing new lives to being. Since all beings suffer some harm by coming into existence starting new lives can never be justified. In other words since Benatar is mainly concerned with procreation, sparing the unborn the pain of existence is not a question of the calculus of pain and pleasure. The unborn cannot be deprived of any pleasure. On the other hand bringing a being to life is sure to inflict some harm on it. This ‘asymmetry’ between pain and pleasure is one of his major contributions to anti-natal thought.
Prevention of suffering through non-existence: If Benatar’s view of existence is not dissimilar to those of Schopenhauer and Hartmann it differs quite sharply from their thinking about liberation from existence. This in turn is related to a fundamental difference between Benatar and his predecessors which underlines his modern approach to the question of existence and liberation. It is that his thought is free of metaphysical assumptions. It does not presuppose any fundamental reality behind empirical phenomena, e.g., the Will (Schopenhauer), the Unconscious ( Hartmann), transmigration of souls and rebirth (Hinduism and Buddhism). It is also free of any mysticism or mystique, e.g. those associated with the notions of moksha, nirvana, and arguably also willlessness. What he advocates is liberation through non-procreation. This route or mode of emancipation is secular and realistic.
His anti-natalism is informed by compassion for and empathy with all living things, especially human beings, that are born to suffer and in this it resonates with Buddhism. His emphasis on life as gratuitous suffering and the imperative to liberate humans from it are also in harmony with the Buddhist approach. Where he differs is in his concern with future lives rather than present lives and hence also in the path to liberation that he advocates. It involves no asceticism and makes no demand for abstinence from sensual including sexual gratification. Given contraception sexual needs can be fulfilled without giving rise to reproduction. One can lead a ‘normal’ life in every way but one, i.e. not having children. His clear distinction between present lives, which do not need termination, and future lives which ought to be prevented from coming into existence and thus spared life’s agony makes for a modern, secular and practical approach which, however, mirrors the older conception of moksha and nirvana. It is this modernity that is both Benatar’s appeal as well as his major contribution to the principle and practice of the prevention of suffering to human beings. It may be seen as a form of modernization and democratization of the notions of moksha and nirvana. To refrain from procreation is within the reach of every individual, and compassionate concern for future lives is a morally worthy basis for such action. Since it is not self-centered but rather oriented towards others it is altruistic rather than egoistic. Except for the philosophies of Hartmann and Zapffe, the others examined above involve ego-centrism and elitism. Only a very small select group of virtuosi are capable of the asceticism - bordering on self-torture - and the dedication required for liberation. With Benatar the situation is very different and the ‘sacrifice’ demanded is far more modest.
Prospects of anti-natalism: However, despite the strength of his arguments and the compassion and altruism underlying his approach Benatar believes that his ideas will have little influence, and that ‘baby-making’ will go on as before (62). Although he does not spell out the reasons for his belief, clearly the assumption is that false consciousness regarding existence, the Pollyanna principle, the ‘instinct’ for survival and reproduction, social norms and their constant reinforcement will make the vast majority continue on the conventional path.
Although he is right in his broad assessment of the situation he appears to underestimate the potential for an increasing awareness of the harms of life and the acceptance of anti-natalism. A variety of factors are involved here. First, there is the greater ease of worldwide communication of ideas esp
ecially through the internet. Thus Benatar’s book has received wide publicity and generated a good deal of discussion through this medium. Second, there is greater freedom of choice and awareness of existential choices available to us. Third, there is a declining taboo against voluntary childlessness. Benatar pays insufficient attention to the fact that for several decades now anti-natalism has been on the rise. Increasing number of women and men are deciding not to procreate. True, much of voluntary childlessness is motivated by factors other than philosophical. Often it is a life-style choice, the wish to remain ‘child-free’ in order to follow wholeheartedly some personal objective or goal or simply on account of the feeling that one is not interested in being a parent. For many women voluntary childlessness is a road to freedom. It involves rejecting the historic female role of a mother and wife, and having the opportunity that men have always had to do other things. Despite social pressures, despite government attempts in the developed countries - where voluntary childlessness has made rapid advance - to provide financial and other inducements it is unlikely that the tide of anti-natalism can be turned back.
Ideas, technology and economic development are all playing their part in promoting anti-natal attitudes and choices. In particular we should mention secularization, the decline of religious control of reproductive freedom, advances in contraception, and finally economic and educational development in enhancing women’s opportunities for employment and the pursuit of a career. We may reasonably assume that philosophical anti-natalism is also making progress though unfortunately we have no idea of the number of individuals or couples who have chosen not to reproduce on philosophical grounds. As far as one can surmise philosophical childlessness is likely to be a very small percentage of voluntary childlessness which itself remains a small proportion of natalism and involuntary childlessness taken together8. However we must not think of this as a static situation but rather as an evolving state of affairs. In sum, Benatar may be right to be somewhat ‘pessimistic’ in the short-run regarding the influence of his ideas and the spread of anti-natalism. But in the long run the prospects are definitely better, or at least more promising.
It is important to remember that throughout the ages only a small minority of people have refrained from procreation, and the acknowledged vehicle of such rejection has been religious, usually taking the form of a celibate priesthood or monkhood. However in early Christianity, early Buddhism and in Hinduism more generally, it took the form of wandering monks or holy men. But we know very little about lay people, whether in India or in the West, who have on the quiet followed a similar path on philosophical grounds. It would have meant remaining unmarried and childless while in other ways leading a regular life. Benatar’s book, for example, brought forth responses from people who have come to conclusions similar to his and have refrained from procreation without publicizing their principles and practice9 . Indeed we would argue that non-procreation would be far more practicable and likely today, in the context of the social change we outlined above, than in the past. Again lacking any studies of the phenomenon of philosophical childlessness we have virtually no idea of the number of people involved, whether at present or in the past. True, we know of many intellectuals and philosophers who have in principle rejected procreation. But they too generally prefer to remain silent about their choice. The few exceptions we come across, e.g. Flaubert (quoted in Benatar 2006, 93) and Cioran (see above), seem to prove the rule. What we can say, however, is that refraining from procreation, often linked to the rejection of existence itself, has a long history involving both religious and lay people. We have chosen to call this the philosophy of Rejectionism. True, this view of life has been restricted to a small minority of people but, we believe, it is a minority likely to grow in coming years.
In this context we need to acknowledge the prescience of Hartmann’s thought. The relevance of his ideas for Benatar’s anti-natalism should not be ignored. He may have been utopian in looking for a world-wide move to reject existence but his belief that progress, which includes the spread of education, communications, and secularization, will lead to the growing strength of reason over will and undermine the latter’s grip on life has a good deal of credibility.
Anti-natalism as a Social Movement: Of course Benatar is not concerned with the sociology of anti-natalism or its advance as a social movement. His focus is almost entirely on the philosophy of anti-natalism, i.e. with reasoning and evidence in support of his arguments against procreation. We should note however that he does pay some attention to issues concerning the practice of anti-natalism. For example, he writes that ‘foregoing procreation is a burden (italics added) – that it is a lot to require of people, given their nature’ (101). His choice of the word ‘burden’ suggests that non-procreation does mean hardship and deprivation, including psychological, for the individuals concerned. Although he does not spell out the nature of the burden, his earlier remarks (98) indicate that children are created to serve a variety of significant interests of the would-be procreators. Indeed even those who accept the argument that existence entails significant harm, not redeemed by anything that is positive about existence, may find it difficult to lead a childless life given that children serve a wide variety of functions for the parents. True, thanks to contraception and legalization of abortion coital interests can now be satisfied without involving procreation. With a partner who accepts one’s view of life it is also possible to lead a married life. Adoption too is available as a substitute to procreation.
However in so far as the childless must rely on other people for practically everything they may also feel that they are being ‘free riders’ (see Smilansky 1995, 46 ). They are enjoying the benefit of having other people’s children serve their needs. Others have, so to speak, done their ‘duty’ to reproduce and replace the population but they have not. They are benefitting from others’ sacrifice and hard work of reproducing and parenting - although the latter have also reaped the reward and satisfaction that comes from raising a family. Quite apart from this, there is also the deprivation and isolation that the childless may feel in old age when, perhaps also disabled and ill, they cannot turn to their children for help and support. True, they may have siblings, nephews and nieces and other relations or friends to provide them with care. Moreover studies show a somewhat mixed picture in respect of aging and childlessness. Having children does not guarantee care of the aged nor is the converse true10. Moreover the childless, as indeed others, may quite legitimately look to the welfare state and voluntary organizations for personal care. And in this regard the situation of the childless is far better today than in the past. Nonetheless it is still the case that the family is expected to play an important part in the care of the ill and frail elderly albeit in partnership with the state. Here again the childless may feel being a ‘free rider’. The point is that once you come into being you are enmeshed in interdependencies and are subject to social norms that are difficult to ignore.
Admittedly one can easily exaggerate these problems. Clearly the childless make their contribution to society. They work, they may be more active in the community, they pay more in taxes not having the benefit of child tax credits and the like, they do not burden the state with the health and education costs involved in child birth, child health care and the costs of schooling and post-secondary education of children. Furthermore, they may be more inclined to leave a legacy to philanthropic and other charitable organizations which benefit society at large. So clearly there is a trade off involved and there is scarcely any objective basis to feel guilty about voluntary childlessness. The childless have every right to have their needs met. Moreover they also have the satisfaction of acting unselfishly, i.e. not inflicting life and suffering on another in order to serve one’s own interests. And seen from a global perspective not adding to the world’s population is an act of altruism
However there are other problems faced by non-procreators. True, if you are deeply convinced of the evil of existence you may be pr
epared to face the difficulties – some of which we noted above - entailed by your decision. But consider some other issues raised by the practice of non-procreation. The average age at which a young couple may typically ‘fall in love’ and decide to get married is likely to be in the twenties or early thirties. Youth, by its very nature (physical instincts and life force) is full of hope and the promise of happiness. Sexual attraction and the urge to reproduce is strong. Having a child may be a part of the sexual union and bond between the partners. As Schopenhauer noted, romantic love is a ruse of nature to make people reproduce and continue the species. Many fall victim to this ruse. Can the appreciation of the evil of existence, with all its pain and suffering, come easily at an early age? Again we know very little about this. Anecdotal evidence suggests that lifestyle-based anti-natalism can come at a young age. And in this regard there is evidence of a generational shift. The young generation is far more likely to eschew procreation. On the other hand philosophical anti-natalism, If it comes at all, is likely to be a product of a more mature age. And by then for many the deed is already done. Enlightenment may come too late to forestall procreation11.
Benatar is not unaware of the many difficulties that lie in the way of the progress of philosophical anti-natalism, both as belief and as practice. His ‘pessimism’ regarding the scant influence of his ideas shows this clearly. All the same we must note that his accent is on the beliefs and ideologies that are available to humans to justify continuing ‘baby making’ rather than on the problems facing the rejectionists. As regards the former, put simply it is a blend of the natural will to live, parental interests, socialization, and the Pollyanna principle. Benatar’s notion of people being in a state of false consciousness about life being a good thing - in the face of much evidence to the contrary - is a result of these beliefs and ideologies. But how to counteract these ideas and norms? There are a number of issues here. First, how many people are likely to be aware of the philosophy of anti-natalism, e.g. through reading Schopenhauer, Benatar or other rejectionists and visiting the relevant websites? How many reading lists, undergraduate or graduate for that matter, in the universities would feature Benatar’s book? Judging by the critical reviews of his book, and especially his key arguments, it appears that most academic philosophers are unsympathetic if not hostile to Benatar’s philosophy. Second and more generally, how many people would be convinced by the arguments and evidence advanced in these books and other sources? And as pointed out above, by the time people are ‘ready’ for the message it may be too late as far as they themselves are concerned. However the widespread publicity and attention received by Benatar’s book suggests that it has played an important part as a catalyst in stimulating awareness and debate, and many more people may be ready to accept rejectionist beliefs. Finally there is the problem of putting such beliefs into practice, a problem to which Benatar is unable to pay much attention.