58
Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
same event Goebbels had already made an unambiguous demand for an end to
marriages between Jews and non-Jews. 26 On 20 August Franz Gürtner, the Minister for Justice, also declared that legal measures would shortly be put in
place. 27 What was originally planned was to declare a ban on ‘mixed marriages’
together with a ban on marriages considered undesirable for eugenic reasons in a
law against ‘marriages detrimental to the German people’. After the Blood Pro-
tection Law (Blutschutzgesetz) was passed in September the second issue was left
to the Marital Health Law (Ehegesundheitsgesetz) in October. 28
The second major legal anti-Semitic assault demanded by the National Social-
ists with increasing vigour in the spring and summer of 1935 was the deprivation of
citizenship. This was one of the NSDAP’s most long-standing demands and had
been included in their Party programme of 1920.29 Following an initiative from the Reich Ministry of the Interior work had begun on a Reich Citizenship Law as early
as July 1933, and it was intended to demote ‘non-Aryans’ to the level of second-
class citizens. Preliminary activities were suspended in September 1933, evidently
in response to international criticism of these plans. 30
However, from early 1935 onwards demands from within the Reich Ministry of
the Interior were being voiced publicly with increasing urgency. On 26 April Frick
announced the new version of the Citizenship Law. 31 The Immigration Law passed in May 1935 had already created room for refusing citizenship to Jews and others
who were unwelcome for reasons of race by removing existing immigration rights
and transferring responsibilities for decisions to the state authorities.
Under pressure from the continuing boycotts, the third of the National Social-
ists’ key anti-Semitic demands—the judicial restriction of the economic activities
of the Jewish minority—took a particular turn in summer 1935.
The way in which the organized street violence was instrumentalized is made
clear in a situation report by the section of the SD, the Party intelligence service,
responsible for Jewish affairs in August 1935. 32 ‘It will not be possible to tackle the Jewish problem thoroughly as long as there are no unambiguous laws in place. This
is the situation which gives rise to the individual operations that have so often been
condemned. . . . In order to put a stop in future to these acts of terror, which are
committed by National Socialists out of inner conviction, or to be able to identify
when operations are undertaken by groups hostile to us, it is desirable, as soon as
possible: (1) that a unified policy is developed for all the ministries handling the
Jewish question, and (2) that effective laws are passed that will demonstrate to the
people that the Jewish question is being dealt with from the top.’
In a speech delivered in Königsberg on 18 August the Reich Minister for
Economic Affairs, Schacht, protested against further ‘individual operations’. 33
What is more, the speech contained remarkably forthright criticisms of the
methods by which Jews were excluded from the economic life of the country. It
was, however, in no sense opposed to economic discrimination against Jews, as the
interdepartmental meeting held two days later at Schacht’s invitation was to show.
Segregation and Discrimination, 1935–7
59
At this meeting there was general agreement about the need to put a stop to the
violence and the infringements and to pass instead a series of anti-Jewish laws. In
line with the discussions that had been held for months, the ban on ‘racial
defilement’, restricted citizenship rights for Jews, and targeted economic measures
were at the forefront of the talks. 34
The anti-Jewish violence only began to recede in September 1935 after Frick had
circulated a decree which was dated 20 August but only reached some of the local
authorities in early September. In Hitler’s name, further ‘individual operations
against Jews’ were forbidden and infringements of this ban would result in the
perpetrators being treated as ‘agents provocateurs, rebels, and enemies of
the state’. 35 In addition, the Party also began to show its clear opposition to the
‘individual operations’—Himmler, for example, in an order of 16 August, 36 and the National Socialist Organization of Small Businesses in a statement on 17
August, 37 various of the Gauleiter towards the end of the month, 38 and Streicher in a series of mass meetings39—in order to convince the Party activists of the seriousness of the ban on ‘individual operations’, even though the process of
enlightenment took several months.
In August, in the run-up to the Party Conference the campaigns against the
Catholic Church and the ‘reactionary forces’ were scaled down. The decision to
step down the campaign against ‘political Catholicism’ and the Stahlhelm was
announced by Hitler on 17 August at a meeting of the official Party speakers in
Nuremberg, which was part of the preparations for the Party rally. 40
Shortly before the start of the rally the Nazi leadership had decided to call a
special meeting of the Reichstag in Nuremberg to pass a special ‘Flag Law’ and
have the swastika declared the only legitimate national flag. 41 On 13 September, after the Reich Party Conference had begun, the spontaneous decision was taken
to use the session of the Reichstag to pass the long-awaited ban on ‘racial
defilement’, which had already been drafted by civil servants. 42
On the evening of the same day the ‘Jewish expert’ of the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, Bernhard Lösener, was summoned to Nuremberg where, according to his
own report, he was told the following day by Pfundtner and Stuckart, both joint
State Secretaries for the Interior, that he had to have ready for proclamation at the
Party rally the day after a ‘Jewish Law’ that would regulate ‘mixed marriages’ and
sexual relations between Jews and non-Jewish Germans.
Lösener portrays graphically how the group of ministerial advisers spent that
Saturday producing several drafts of the law that were all sent back by Hitler, who
was heavily influenced by Gerhard Wagner, leader of the Reich doctors’ organ-
ization. The pressure on this group must have increased to an almost intolerable
level on the Saturday evening when Hitler suddenly demanded in addition a Reich
Citizenship Act or Reichsbürgergesetz by the following morning.
Some historians in the past have tended to interpret Lösener’s memoirs as a
vivid depiction of the largely improvised style of government that characterized
60
Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
the ‘Third Reich’, but they are quite evidently a document of self-justification.
Lösener caricatured the unusual circumstances in which the Nuremberg Laws
were finally formulated to distract attention from the fact that their substance
corresponded closely with what had been planned for months by the bureaucrats
in the ministries, and in a more general form from as early as 1933. 43
The Reich Citizenship Law eventually passed by the Reichstag put a definitive
end to the equality of citizenship enjoyed by Jews in the whole of Germany since
1871, but signific
antly hollowed out since 1933, by introducing a distinction
between ‘nationals’ (Staatsangehörige) and ‘citizens of the Reich’ (Reichsbürger).
‘Citizens of the Reich’, or in the words of the law ‘bearers of full political rights in
accordance with law’, were ‘those nationals of German or related blood who
demonstrate by their behaviour that they are willing and suitable to serve the
German People and Reich faithfully’. The law did not therefore make access to
‘citizenship of the Reich’ dependent solely on racial criteria but left room for
imposing political conditions for the acquisition of such citizenship. The rights of
a ‘citizen of the Reich’ were to be conferred by a ‘Certificate of Reich Citizenship’,
but more detailed criteria were never formally established. 44
The ‘Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour’ prohibited
marriages and extramarital sexual relations between ‘Jews and nationals of German or
related blood’. Jews were not permitted to employ female Aryan servants under 45 in
their households and were not permitted to raise the Reich flag or the national flag. 45
Hitler stated at the Party rally that the Blood Protection Law was ‘an attempt at
the legal settlement of a problem, which, if this proved a failure, would have to be
entrusted by law to the National Socialist Party for a definitive solution’ and this
made it perfectly clear that the street violence of the Party activists had only been
suspended and could at any point be resumed so as to continue escalating the
persecution of the Jews. 46
The reports on the public mood that focused on the reception of the two anti-
Jewish laws by the population at large offer a mixed picture. They contain
enthusiastic approval (especially amongst Party members), acceptance, indiffer-
ence, and rejection (above all in Catholic and socialist circles). The laws were
quietly accepted by the overwhelming majority of the people, but to a varied
extent, and this acceptance was noticeably often linked with the expectation that
the anti-Jewish ‘individual operations’ would henceforth cease. At the same time
some reservations were voiced about the racist ideology that lay at the root of the
laws’ conception. 47
On the other hand, however, the reports also show an increasing distance from
the Jewish minority and a lack of interest or indifference towards the fate of the
Jews. In particular the reports of the Social Democratic Party in exile make it plain
that the anti-Semitic propaganda was aiming for a deeper, more subtle effect: the
idea that there might be such a thing as a ‘Jewish question’ was beginning to gain
in resonance amongst the people, the working class included. 48
Segregation and Discrimination, 1935–7
61
The National Socialists’ attempts to restructure the public sphere in conformity
with racial norms via its campaigns of 1935 was successful in that the policy of
segregation initiated by the Nuremberg Laws was evidently gaining in at least
passive acceptance by the majority of the people, in one form or another. From the
point of view of the regime, it was important that the principle of judicial
discrimination against, and the separation of the Jewish minority had been
established—without any particular enthusiasm outside Party circles, but also
without meeting with notable resistance from the population. Sufficient condi-
tions for continuing the persecution of the Jews had thus been achieved.
An Apparent Lull in Anti-Jewish Policy 1936–1937
Debates about the Definition of Jews
After the promulgation of the anti-Semitic laws of September 1935 two prob-
lems occupied centre-stage in further discussions about anti-Jewish policy.
These were first the economic measures against German Jews that had long
been called for but were not put into law in the Nuremberg Laws, and
second—but closely related—the exact and conclusive definition of ‘Jewish
half-breeds’ (Mischlinge). 49
As early as 23 September Ministers Frick and Schacht agreed upon a catalogue
of suggestions for further constraining the economic position of the Jewish
minority by judicial and administrative means. Schacht was concerned above all
to ensure that all planned measures were put into practice as quickly as possible
and for the future position of the Jews to be fixed once and for all, in order to
minimize superfluous economic unrest. It was important in this context to define
clearly and precisely the group known as ‘Jewish half-breeds’. 50
There was disagreement on this question between the stance adopted by the
Ministry for the Interior—where the general feeling was that ‘half-Jews’ should be
made citizens of the Reich—and the Führer’s Deputy (represented by Gauleiter
Wagner)—who wished in general to treat this group as Jews. After lengthy
negotiations (Hitler avoided making a decision) there was eventual agreement
on a compromise enshrined in the ‘First Decree Pursuant to the Reich Citizenship
Law’ of 14 November 1935.51
According to this ordinance a person was defined as a Jew if he was
descended from ‘at least three racially wholly Jewish grandparents’; a Jew was
not permitted to be a citizen of the Reich. However, provisional Reich citizen-
ship (although there were regulations discussed in 1936 and 1937,52 they were not actually passed) was also to be granted to ‘Jewish half-breeds’, which is to say
those with one or two Jewish grandparents, as long as they were not ‘Jews by
definition’ (Geltungsjuden).
62
Racial Persecution, 1933–1939
People were in future to be treated as ‘Jews by definition’—and thus equivalent
to Jews—if they were ‘half-breeds’ with at least two grandparents to whom one or
more of the following criteria applied: that they were members of the Jewish
religious community, that they were in a marital partnership with a Jew, or that
they were descended from a marriage with a Jew that had been joined after the
Nuremberg Laws came into force or from a non-marital partnership that had been
begun after this point.
On the same day the ‘First Decree Pursuant to the Blood Protection Law’ was
passed, amongst the provisions of which was that ‘Jewish half-breeds’ with two
Jewish grandparents required special permission to marry an ‘Aryan’. 53 This permission could be granted by a Reich Commission for Marriage Permits,
which was to be established by the Reich Minister for the Interior and the Führer’s
Deputy. In reality, however, the Party representatives on this body—which
immediately changed its title to ‘Reich Commission for the Protection of German
Blood’—almost always voted against, so its meetings were suspended in 1936 and
applications were thenceforth treated as a purely administrative matter. 54
After the ‘Jewish half-breeds’ were officially defined, there were further discus-
sions about legislation for anti-Jewish economic measures but they did not result
in any concrete action. On the contrary, as the Olympic year of 1936 grew ever
closer, a lull in anti-Jewish policy began to set in. Neither more drastic anti-
Semitic legislation nor more radical pers
ecution took place. Even the murder of
the NSDAP National Group Leader (Landesgruppenleiter) in Switzerland,
Wilhelm Gustloff, by David Frankfurter in February 1936 did not result in any
immediate acts of revenge on the part of the National Socialists. 55
Nevertheless, even without the more spectacular acts of persecution, continuing
attempts to marginalize German Jews in the public sphere still left them in a
steadily worsening situation. In particular, the wave of boycotts did not diminish
after the Nuremberg Laws, and because Party activists believed that anti-Jewish
economic laws were about to be passed they pressed on with the boycotts in the
furthest corners of the German Reich. 56
The Four-Year Plan: Intensifying the Displacement of
Jews from Economic Life
Once the Olympic Games were over, and thus once Berlin was no longer in the
international spotlight, the regime immediately set about intensifying the persecu-
tion of the Jews, and the plans for displacing Jews from the economic life of the
country that had been put on hold in the autumn of 1935 were now once more at the
heart of planning. Those involved, however, could not get round the fact that in 1936
the Reich was facing a very precarious situation regarding raw materials and a
Segregation and Discrimination, 1935–7
63
currency crisis, and in these circumstances anti-Jewish measures would certainly
damage foreign trade and thus have negative effects on the rapid pace of rearma-
ment. Goering was appointed Commissioner for Raw Materials and Currency in
April 1936, and in October of the same year was put in charge of the Four-Year Plan,
and this showed that the regime was making attempts both to manage the crisis and
somehow to mediate between the desire to displace the Jews economically and
forcibly expel them and the need to increase the momentum of rearmament.
It is important not to overlook the close link between the Four-Year Plan (the
centralized direction of the regime’s rearmament plans) and the anti-Jewish
policy. This link was present from very early on, and for Hitler rearmament
within the context of the Four-Year Plan was the decisive instrument for waging
Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Page 12