situation, they had to ‘guard against all possible events’.
Immediately after this conversation the RSHA’s deportation specialist,
Alois Brunner, arrived in Paris at the head of a command unit and, along
with Röthke and Hagen, drew up a plan for the deportation of the Jews who
were to be denaturalized. The plan was to deport the families of this group
as well, both Jews and non-Jews. A raid was scheduled for 24 June; but the
date was repeatedly postponed, as the legal precondition, the denaturaliza-
tion law, did not exist. 130 In June, when Röthke requested 250 members of the Security Police from Gestapo chief Müller for the implementation of the
raid, Müller refused; given the shortage of available manpower on the
German side, the planned action could only be executed with the support
of the French police.
On 20 July 1943, however, Laval resolved to sign a new, harsher version of the
denaturalization law, which had been produced in the meantime by the head of
the French Office of Jewish Affairs, Darquier, and, in line with Brunner’s plans, to
revoke French citizenship from the family members of those denaturalized since
1927, thus creating the precondition for deportation. 131 However, on 25 July, the day of the fall of Mussolini, Laval decided to suspend publication of the denaturalization law. 132 On 7 August Laval told Oberg and Knochen that he planned to revert the law to the state of Bousquet’s draft. 133 On further prompting by the Germans Laval gave formal reasons for the decision: Pétain himself had to sign the
396
Extermination of the European Jew, 1942–1945
law. 134 But on 24 August the French head of state declared himself unwilling to provide this signature. 135
By now, however, the Gestapo Jewish desk in Paris had developed an alternative
plan: in case the planned action against the French Jews who were to be denatur-
alized, as Röthke had said in July, brought in ‘only a meagre result’, ‘all traceable
Jews’ were to be rounded up ‘in a large-scale operation involving the forces of the
Security Police (SD) commando and Einsatzkommandos with the assistance of
German troops’. All Jews ‘were to be transported to the East out of the area
occupied by us in 1943, or taken back by the states still resisting this’. 136
Reservations Concerning Italy, Germany’s Chief Ally
Before September 1943, the Germans made no serious attempt to persuade the
Italian government to hand over the 40,000 or so Jews living in the country who
had been subjected to special racial legislation since 1938. 137 When Himmler discussed the persecution of the Jews of Eastern Europe with Mussolini in October
1942, his interlocutor avoided any further discussion of the subject with an evasive
turn of phrase. 138
The Italian policy of protecting the Jews against the German persecutory
measures in their occupied zones in Greece, France, and Croatia irritated the
Germans not least because their Italian ally was thus endangering the unified
nature of Judenpolitik throughout the whole of the German sphere of influence,
and thus encouraging other governments to deviate from their radical line. 139
Italy’s policy was, as Himmler pointed out to Ribbentrop in January
140
1943
‘for
many circles in France and throughout Europe the pretext for holding fire on the
Jewish question, because they point out that not even Italy, our Axis partner, goes
along with us on the Jewish question’.
In February Ribbentrop ‘urgently’ requested the Italians to be informed ‘that
the anti-Jewish measures of the Reich Security Head Office . . . must not be sabo-
taged any further. Our efforts with regard to the governments of Croatia,
Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia to deport the Jews resident in those countries
have also encountered great difficulties with those governments because of the
attitude of the Italian government.’141
During his visit to Salzburg, at the beginning of April 1943, Mussolini may have
voiced the prospect of interning the Jews in his country; that at least was what
Ribbentrop assured the Hungarian Ambassador, Sztojay, when he tried to con-
vince him a short time later that Hungary should tighten up its Jewish policy. 142
Visiting Rome in the spring of 1943, the ‘Jewish expert’ at the German embassy
in Paris, Carltheo Zeitschel, concluded that the German embassy in Rome would
never ‘be able to crack such a hard nut as the Jewish question in Italy in the
interest of the Axis alliance’. The SD in turn was not able to act autonomously in
Italy. 143
Murders and Deportations, 1942–3
397
The German Policy for the Further Extension of the
Deportations after the Collapse of Italy
After Italy’s departure from the Axis alliance and the occupation of much of the
former ally’s territory and its zones of occupation by the Wehrmacht, the policy of
the systematic murder of the Jews was once again extended to a number of
territories. The application of the extermination policy to the former Italian-
occupied zone of southern France also led to the radicalization of the persecution
in the rest of France, where no distinction was now made between French
nationals and non-French people. The decision to deport the Danish Jews is
also closely related to the radicalization of German policy after the secession of
the Italian ally even if its history lies before these events. The German interven-
tions in Slovakia and above all in Hungary in 1944 were finally exploited by the
Nazi regime into a ruthless further intensification of mass murder, even in the face
of military defeat.
Former ‘allies’ now made way for merciless regimes of terror that were com-
pletely dependent on the ‘Third Reich’, and which were bound to their German
masters to the bitter end.
The ‘De-Judaization’ of Denmark as the Turning Point in
German Extermination Policy
Werner Best, appointed Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark in November 1942,
continued the relatively restrained policy towards the Danish Jews. In a note of
January 1943, Best made it clear that an intensified Judenpolitik would inevitably
destroy the basis of the previous occupation policy, namely collaboration
with the Danish constitutional monarchy. No Danish government would pass
anti-Semitic legislation, and in the end the Germans would be forced to set up
their own occupying administration. 144 Best once again confirmed this position in April. 145 As the scenario outlined by Best was highly undesirable for the Germans at this point, Luther, Ribbentrop, and even Himmler agreed with
Best’s stance. 146
However, the acts of sabotage, strikes, and unrest that increased during the
summer of 1943 brought an end to the restrained occupation policy that they
recommended. Best now advocated a radical change of direction: he suggested
that the position of the Reich Plenipotentiary be strengthened. He should govern
the country in a kind of ‘personal rule’, based on the Danish administration (with
an ‘administrative committee’ or a cabinet of specialists at its head) as well as with
the help of increased powers in the sphere of internal security, namely his own
police units. This solution,
which Best had presented as a negative scenario in
398
Extermination of the European Jew, 1942–1945
January, now clearly struck him as a realistic alternative to the German policy of
occupation, which was by now losing its way. 147
For a time, Best’s plans were thwarted by Hitler’s decision, at the end of August,
to declare a military emergency in Denmark. A few days later, however, Hitler
once again gave Best full political responsibility for the German occupation in
Denmark. 148 Ribbentrop gave this mandate further concrete form by ordering the installation of a non-political cabinet of specialists. 149
However, this mandate proved barely possible to implement, as Best learned
from leading Danish figures a few days after his return to Copenhagen on
6 September. Danish politicians were no longer willing to compromise themselves
by collaborating further with the Germans at government level. However, the
head of the Danish administration was prepared to make himself available to the
Reich Plenipotentiary. This purely administrative solution did not correspond to
the mandate that he had received from Ribbentrop, but in the given situation it
struck Best as the only possible solution. 150
To be able to explain the failure of the formation of a government to Berlin, and
to provide a motive for a transition to a police regime under his leadership, Best
had to be interested in intensifying the existing crisis. Such a controlled radical-
ization, however, could be achieved most simply by activating the ‘Jewish ques-
tion’ in Denmark. The deportation of the Danish Jews was precisely the means
with which the change of policy from a policy of collaboration to a police regime
could be secured; on the other hand, the Germans assumed that such a measure
would affect a relatively small minority in Danish society, so that it might later be
possible to calm the situation.
On 8 September 1943, Best suggested to the Foreign Ministry that it use the state
of emergency to attempt a ‘solution of the Jewish question’ in the country. If one
waited until the lifting of the state of emergency, one would have far greater
difficulties with the hostile reaction on the part of the Danish population, which
was to be expected at any event. ‘If the measures were taken during the present
state of emergency,’ Best argued, ‘the possibility remains that a constitutional
government can no longer be formed, so that an administrative committee under
my direction would have to be formed and I would have to legislate by decree.’ By
this time, in fact, Best already knew that there was no longer any chance of
forming a constitutional government, and that he would be forced to take over
power in Denmark himself, with the help of the administrative committee. Best
also stressed that in order to implement the deportations he would need the police
units he had already requested. Thus the deportation of the Jews would also open
up the way for a transition to a police regime, and it would immediately provide
Best with the troops he needed. 151
Best’s proposal for the deportation of the Danish Jews—presented on the day of
the announcement of the Italian-Allied ceasefire—was approved by the German
leadership. Hitler’s decision that the Danish and Italian Jews be deported,
Murders and Deportations, 1942–3
399
conceived as a warning to two insubordinate nations, thus occurred more or less
simultaneously. However, it transpired relatively quickly that the preparations for
the deportation of the Danish Jews had not been kept secret, and that failure was
likely. Best thus decided, after unsuccessfully presenting his concerns to the
German leadership, 152 to let the date for the wave of arrests leak out. If this happened, a week-long ‘head-hunt’153 would be obviated by the escape of the Jews, and further complications for the already difficult situation in Denmark
would be avoided. In the meantime, Best’s plans for the future form of occupation
rule (a strong Reichkommissar utilizing the Danish administration) had assumed
concrete form, leading him to envisage an imminent end to the state of emer-
gency. 154 In other words, if the ‘Final Solution’ in Denmark had seemed like the ideal instrument for the accomplishment of a radical change of course in occupation policy, it had now become counter-productive to the further operation of
the system of occupation. The will to accomplish the policy of extermination
reached its limits where Judenpolitik threatened to lose its function within the
system of occupation.
Thus, in the interest of the general occupation policy, Best was able to allow
the great majority of Jews living in Denmark to escape to Sweden as the result of
an unprecedented rescue action. 155 If we consider Judenpolitik in Denmark within this larger context, it can come as no surprise that early in October
Best, pre-emptively represented the flight of the Jews to the Foreign Ministry as
a success: ‘Since the objective goal of the Jewish action in Denmark was the
de-Judaization of the country and not the most successful head-hunt, it must be
recognized that the Jewish action achieved its goal. Denmark is free of Jews, as
no Jew who falls under the relevant regulations can legally live and work here
any longer. ’156
Compared with the situation in other countries with a greater collaborative
potential, in Denmark, a country largely free of anti-Semitism and one with very
little sympathy for the Nazi regime, the implementation of Judenpolitik did not
serve to integrate native forces into the German policy, but rather the opposite.
It had the function of excluding the Danish parties from the system of ‘supervised
administration’, and of consolidating its transformation into a police state.
Within the Judenpolitik that the Nazi regime pursued within its sphere of
influence, the action in Denmark in autumn 1943 represented a turning point.
Until now Judenpolitik had fulfilled an important integral function within the
German collaboration and alliance policy, by involving the respective ‘partner’ in
the German policy of a racist reorganization of the continent and making it an
accomplice in a crime on a massive scale. But this policy did not go entirely
smoothly. When the deportations were set in motion, the attitude of the allied or
collaborating government had to be taken into account, which meant that the
deportations happened slowly or not on the desired scale (Slovakia, France) or not
at all (Old Romania, Italian occupied territories).
400
Extermination of the European Jew, 1942–1945
After the turning point of the war in the winter of 1942/3 it became more and
more difficult to implement deportations in cooperation with allied or collabor-
ating governments (to a limited extent this ocurred in Bulgaria and France; efforts
with regard to Hungary and the Italian-occupied territories remained ineffective
at first). However, the Germans did not abandon their policy, since precisely in
view of the worsening military situation they saw the intensification of the
persecution of the Jews and the associated compromising of their ‘partners’ as
an important safeguard for the cohesion of the block under their rule. At
titudes
towards the ‘Jewish question’ became an important gauge for the German side, on
which they could read the loyalty of their partners.
Goebbels’s diaries document this way of thinking on the part of the German
leadership with regard to the allies Romania157, Italy, 158 and Bulgaria159: too ‘lax’ a treatment of the persecution of the Jews was seen as an indication of the weakness
and lack of loyalty of the allies. But that meant, according to the logic of German
Judenpolitik, that a radicalization of the persecution on the German model bound
the allies irreversibly to the German Reich.
‘Most of our contemporaries’, Goebbels wrote in March 1943, recording
remarks made to him by Hitler, ‘failed to realize that the wars of the twentieth
century were racial wars, and that in racial wars there has only ever been survival
or extermination, and that we must therefore understand that this war too will end
with just such a result. ’160
Three weeks previously he had noted of a conversation with Goering, ‘Goering
is completely clear about everything that would threaten us all if we were to
weaken in this war. He has no illusions about it. Particularly in the Jewish question
we are so locked in that there is no escape left for us. And that is as it should be.
From experience, a movement and a people that have broken the bridges behind
them, fight much more relentlessly than those who still have the possibility of
retreat.’161
It should not be overlooked that it was the three states that successfully resisted
German Judenpolitik—Italy, Romania, and Bulgaria162—that succeeded in leaving their alliances with Germany with separate ceasefires between September 1943 and
1944. This stepping out of line on the part of—from the German perspective—the
‘pro-Jewish’ allies must have served as a confirmation of their policy that any kind
of compromise on Judenpolitik was to be avoided at all costs.
In other words: if Judenpolitik had originally (along with economic policy and
military security and cooperation) been one of the main axes of German occupa-
Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Page 71