(g) Every time President Amin appeared in the area of the terminal and before the passengers, he was closeted with the terrorists in a most friendly atmosphere.
(h) At the outset of the negotiations President Amin dismissed the French Ambassador and prevented him from establishing contact with the terrorists. This contact was conducted by him in person.
(i) President Amin warned the hijacked passengers not to dare to try to escape.
(j) Apparently for reasons of bravado and to frighten the hijacked passengers, two jet aircraft overflew from time to time the terminal in which they were being held. Near the building an armored vehicle armed with a heavy machine-gun was parked, and close to it stood two helicopters.
(k) A mixed guard of hijackers and Ugandan Army men guarded the hostages; contact between them was constant and free. The Ugandan soldiers were on guard both inside the hall, on the second floor of the terminal, and on the plane.
(l) The hijackers were unconcerned and very relaxed during the period on the ground. They left the airport building from time to time and acted with an obvious feeling of assurance that the Ugandan Army would not attempt to overpower them. Mr. Tony Russell, an official of the Greater London Council and one of the Britons freed from the hijacked Air France airbus, in an interview with the London Times on 5 July, said that President Amin had been in a position to release all hostages if he had wished. “Once we were moved from the aircraft”, he said, “the terrorists were not in a commanding position. I have the feeling that if Amin wanted to free us after we were transferred to the airport building, it could have been done. The terrorists had had no sleep for 30 hours and had no powerful weapons at their disposal”, said Mr. Russell.
(m) The commander of the hijackers in Entebbe spent all his time in the company of President Amin, who, incidentally, recounted this fact by telephone to a Colonel Bar Lev, who spoke to him from Israel.
(n) While the passengers were being held, Radio Uganda broadcast an announcement of the hijackers praising Amin for his stand against Zionism and imperialism.
(o) And finally, the hijackers were buried with full military honours together with soldiers of the Ugandan Army.
Uganda maintains close ties with the PLO, which has a large presence there. The PLO office, operating in Kampala under Khaled al-Shaykh, organizes propaganda activities throughout East Africa. The Popular Front, under George Habash, has an intelligence office in Kampala responsible for the activities of the Organization in the whole of Africa. This office is subordinate to Wadia Haddad, the head of the branch for overseas terror-strikes of the Popular Front. Hundreds of Palestinians are employed in administrative posts in the administration and public services in Uganda as substitutes for the Asians who were expelled from that State.
Uganda and the PLO maintain close co-operation also at the military level. In Uganda there is a centre for the military training of Palestinians. Palestinian pilots train in the Ugandan Air Force on MIG 21 planes. Members of the PLO are to be found among the bodyguards of President Amin.
The extent of Ugandan collaboration can be gauged from the news broadcasts in English on Kampala Radio after the aircraft landed at Entebbe. Records of these broadcasts are available from monitoring reports supplied by the British Broadcasting Corporation.
If the representatives will take the trouble to read the reports, they will reveal a complete identity of purpose with the hijackers and their demands on the part of the Ugandan authorities.
There is no attempt in the broadcasts to hide an atmosphere of euphoric ecstasy over the hijacking, and of identification with the hijackers on the part of the Government of Uganda.
Thus the enthusiastic broadcast on 29 June opens with:
“We now bring you the special announcement you have been waiting for. The following are the demands of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine”. The announcer then read out the six-point statement issued by the PFLP.
One does not really require all this evidence in order to prove that Israel was entirely justified by every norm of natural and international law in taking the action which it took. In viewing the facts of the case, one must reach one of two conclusions: either the Government of Uganda was directly implicated in holding as hostages innocent passengers, men, women and children, or the Government of Uganda does not exercise sovereignty over its territory and was incapable of dealing with half a dozen terrorists.
And what better evidence do we have to support this contention of ours than the fact that to date the Government of Uganda has not released a 75-year-old lady, Mrs. Dora Bloch, who was on her way to the marriage of her son in this country when the plane was hijacked? Moreover the refusal of the Government of Uganda to release the Air France plane immediately after the hijackers were eliminated tends only to confirm the fact of complicity.
What other reason should there be for the Government of Uganda to refuse to return the plane to the French Government, in violation of the Hague Convention of 1970, of which Uganda is a signatory?
If the Government of Uganda is not implicated in this crime, why was a 75-year-old lady, Mrs. Bloch, not released immediately after the hijackers were eliminated? Why was she held in custody under guard in hospital in Kampala?
Why was she not released to the British Consul when he called on her on Sunday, 4 July, after the rescue operation? Why have we suddenly been notified ominously that the Ugandan authorities, four of whose employees reportedly dragged her screaming from the hospital, are unaware of her whereabouts?
Either the Government of Uganda exercises national sovereignty, in which case it knows where she is, or it does not.
I ask my colleagues, Africans and others here, who are joined to condemn Israel for exercising its inherent right of self-defence, do you or do you not condone the horrifying behaviour which is reflected in this act of “chivalry” on the part of President Amin against Mrs. Dora Bloch, aged 75?
For once, have the courage of your convictions and speak out, or be damned by your own silence.
Here you have a plain, simple case which has no answer and cannot have any answer for decent people wherever they may be.
Here you have the unbelievable, macabre spectacle of a State waging a war against a 75-year-old lady, and supported, presumably, by those who would associate themselves with this despicable and cowardly behaviour. If the Government of Uganda is not implicated, let it now and forthwith produce Mrs. Bloch.
Does this Council propose to remain silent on the fate of Mrs. Bloch?
The disappearance of this old lady and the by now all-too-familiar picture of the terrifying happenings in Amin’s Uganda provide ample justification in themselves for the premonition which prompted the action taken by the Government of Israel.
This type of action, which in principle is not unprecedented, is dealt with at considerable length in international law, and there is no doubt whatsoever but that the weight of international law and precedent lies fully in Israel’s favour. However, the Israeli action at Entebbe came to remind us that the law we find in statute books is not the only law of mankind. There is also a moral law, and by all that is moral on this earth Israel had the right to do what it did. Indeed, it had also the duty to do so.
Uganda violated a basic tenet of international law in failing to protect foreign nationals on its territory. Furthermore, it behaved in a manner which constituted a gross violation of the 1970 Hague Convention on the Suppression or Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This Convention had been ratified by both Israel and Uganda. Article 6 of that Convention maintains that:
“Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting State in the territory of which the offender or the alleged offender is present shall take him into custody and other measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be continued for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.”
Article 9 states:
“1. When any of the acts mentione
d in Article 1 (a) has occurred or is about to occur, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
“2. In the cases contemplated by the preceding paragraph, any Contracting State in which the aircraft or its passengers or crew are present shall facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable and shall without delay return the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.”
The right of a State to take military action to protect its nationals in mortal danger is recognized by all legal authorities in international law. In Self-Defence in International Law, Professor Bowett states, on page 87, that
“The right of the State to intervene by the use or threat of force for the protection of its nationals suffering injuries within the territory of another State is generally admitted, both in the writings of jurists and in the practice of States. In the arbitration between Great Britain and Spain in 1925, one of the series known as the Spanish Moroccan claims, Judge Huber, as Rapporteur of the Commission, stated:
“ ‘However, it cannot be denied that at a certain point the interest of a State in exercising protection over its nationals and their property can take precedence over territorial sovereignty, despite the absence of any conventional provisions. This right of intervention has been claimed by all States. Only its limits are disputed. We now envisage action by the protecting State which involves a prima facie violation of the independence and territorial inviolability of the territorial State. In so far as this action takes effect in derogation of the sovereignty of the territorial State, it must necessarily be exceptional in character and limited to those cases in which no other means of protection are available. It presupposes the inadequacy of any other means of protection against some injury, actual or imminent, to the persons or property of nationals and, moreover, an injury which results either from the acts of the territorial State and its authorities or from the acts of individuals or groups of individuals which the territorial State is unable, or unwilling, to prevent. In the Law of Nations, Sixth Edition, page 627, Brierly states as follows: “Whether the landing of detachments of troops to save the lives of nationals under imminent threat of death or serious injury owing to the breakdown of law and order may be justifiable is a delicate question. Cases of this form of intervention have been not infrequent in the past and, when not attended by suspicion of being a pretext for political pressure, have generally been regarded as justified by the sheer necessity of instant action to save the lives of innocent nationals whom the local government is unable or unwilling to protect.”
He goes on to observe that:
“Every effort must be made to get the United Nations to act. But, if the United Nations is not in a position to move in time and the need for instant action is manifest it would be difficult to deny the legitimacy of action in defence of nationals which every responsible Government would feel bound to take if it had the means to do so. This is, of course, on the basis that the action was strictly limited to securing the safe removal of the threatened national.”
In support of this contention, O’Connell states in International Law, Second Edition, page 303:
“Traditional international law has not prohibited States from protecting their nationals whose lives or property are imperilled by political conditions in another State, provided the degree of physical presence employed in their protection is proportional to the situation. When the Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana attempted to formulate a legal notion of intervention in 1928, the United States pointed out that intervention would need to be clearly defined, for the United States would not stand by and permit the breakdown of government to endanger the lives and property of American citizens in revolution-ridden countries. Interposition of a temporary character would not, in such circumstances, it was argued, be illegal.”
The author continues:
“Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter should be interpreted as prohibiting acts of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of nations, and not to prohibit a use of force which is limited in intention and effect to the protection of a State’s own integrity and its nationals’ vital interests, when the machinery envisaged by the United Nations Charter is ineffective in the situation.”
The act of hijacking can well be regarded as one of piracy. Pirates have been hostis humani generis—enemies of the human race—since the early days of international law in the Middle Ages. During the war against the slave trade and piracy, certain norms were established in international law which permitted intervention in case of ships engaged in slave trade between Africa and America and against the centres of piracy in North Africa. The principle of national sovereignty was overruled by the higher principles of man’s liberty.
In this connexion it is perhaps appropriate to recall here that the United States Marine Corps was established for the purpose of waging war against the pirates. And one cannot fail to note that the Marine anthem refers to “the shores of Tripoli”. Apparently, that coast is not new as a haven for terrorists—then for pirates and ships and today for hijackers in airplanes.
Israel’s action in Entebbe was very similar to the humanitarian rescue operation which took place in those days. The slave trade then could have claimed that searching the slave ships was in violation of international maritime law. But civilized man defined a higher law, namely, that of human freedom, above which no national sovereignty can claim to be.
Had a Jewish State existed in the thirties, we might well have decided, with the rise of Nazism, to endeavour to undertake an operation to rescue the inmates of the concentration camps. The logic of those who criticize us today would maintain that by so doing we would have been in flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of the Third Reich. What would have been more important: Hitler’s sovereignty or rescuing innocent people from a holocaust?
May I recall General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV) of 1970, the consensus adopted by this Council in document S/10705 on 20 June 1972 on the subject of hijacking, and the 1970 resolution of the Assembly of the Council of Europe condemning acts of hijacking, sabotage, taking of hostages and blackmailing of Governments by Palestinian organizations utilizing the territory of certain Arab States as a refuge, training ground and base for action.
I draw those resolutions and many other relevant resolutions by the United Nations and other international bodies to the Council’s attention to remind it that the problem is not new, but that no practical and effective steps have been taken to combat it.
The problem of combating terror has exercised countries throughout the world. Thus the Soviet Union on 3 January 1973 published a new law on criminal liability for the hijacking of aircraft. That law was discussed at length by V. Ivanov in Izvestiya on 16 January 1973. Indeed, the mounting of Soviet official concern is evident in Soviet scientific and legal literature and also in a series of official actions.
On 4 December 1970 Pravda reported favourably on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Conference at The Hague to draw up a new convention concerning the prevention of hijacking of aircraft. In November 1970 Pravda published an article by O. Khlestov praising United Nations General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV) of 1970. There was a further article in Izvestiya on 16 January 1971 by O. Khlestov praising the Hague Convention of 1970.
Attention is drawn also to an article by P. Yevseyev and Y. Kolosov entitled “Air Bandits Outlawed”, published in International Affairs in Moscow on 8 November 1971, in which both United Nations General Assembly resolution 2645 (XXV) and the Hague Convention of 1970 are discussed and—I would remind the Soviet representative—supported.
The right of self-defence is enshrined in international law and in the Charter of the United Nations and can be applied on the basis of the classic formulation, as was done in the well-known Caroline Case, permitting such action where there is a
“necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation”.
That was exactly the situation which faced the Government of Israel.
In equivalent circumstances other States have acted in a manner similar to Israel. But a few months ago the Council discussed actions taken by France in freeing a busload of 30 children held hostage on the Somalia border. I refer the Council to the remarks of the representative of France to the Security Council on 18 February 1976.
The representative of France was addressing the Security Council on an incident which arose out of the holding of 30 French children 6 to 12 years of age in a school bus as hostages by a group of terrorists in Somalia. The representatives of these terrorists in Somalia made demands on the French Government and announced that if their demands were not met the terrorists would cut the throats of the children. The French forces thereupon took action against the terrorists on the Somali border, killing them; in the process one of the children was killed by the terrorists and five others were wounded. As the French soldiers rushed to save the children, fire was directed at them from the Somali frontier post, seriously wounding a French lieutenant. The French forces naturally enough returned fire into Somali territory, causing casualties and damage to the Somalis. In this case too one hostage was missing, and the child was found later to be held in Somalia by terrorists. He was happily later returned alive.
The debate is familiar to members of the Council. Suffice it, however, to say that France unequivocally rejected any accusation of aggression in this regard. France on that occasion rightfully exercised its duties under international law in a situation which is similar in many respects to the situation which we had in Entebbe.
In the Mayaguez incident last year, in which the United States acted to rescue merchant seamen and their ship, President Ford was quoted as saying:
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