Alternatively, many persons who are arrested will be approached by officers with a view to cultivating him or her as an informant. This side of the informant system has been present since Victorian times and probably many years before then. I operated in this way during my time as a detective and I still see officers doing it today it in my current line of work. Come what may, this process will not change.
Then we have members of the public who volunteer information to the police as they go about their daily routines. These persons would not be recorded as informants/sources. The officer would simply complete what is now known as an intelligence report, which would be handed to the intelligence office. As a result some positive action may then follow.
At this point I should say that from what I have seen of the registers there are many entries which fall within this category.
There are also members of the public who volunteer information via anonymous telephone crime lines. They of course may think that they are safe as a result of their actions but the truth is that if a person gets arrested or a house searched and stolen property found it doesn’t take that person long to work out that he has been informed upon and who that informant may be.
Finally there is the informant who by his own actions puts himself in the public eye. This more often than not would be a defecting member of a criminal group. In the 1970s and 80s these came to be known as “supergrasses”. The evidence of such persons can from time to time become an embarrassment to law enforcement agencies.
I again reiterate what I said earlier, that there is a real and present danger to persons from both ends of the informant’s spectrum who give information, that some harm may befall them should the persons being informed upon find out, or by other means other than police disclosure.
The reason for mentioning these different types of informants was to show to the tribunal that there have always been these categories of informants and there always will be and they will not be deterred from giving information come what may as the police were going to suggest as part of their case.
I felt that I also needed to show the tribunal that there were other various ways that an informant’s details could be made public. This I hoped would negate the statement of the police stating that even today informants are given strong or absolute guarantees that their names would never be disclosed. I knew they would say they do all they can to protect the identities of informants but the reality is that there are other potential and equally damaging ways the details of an informant can come into the public domain.
I would refer again to Lindsay Clutterbuck, who we have heard was a former high-ranking Metropolitan Police officer. He disclosed informant’s details in his thesis, and he admits in his thesis that he knew of the non-disclosure police policy. Whether or not he had official permission, at the time of his accessing the records and subsequent disclosure he was a serving police officer, and this does not detract from the fact that by publicly disclosing those informant details it appears he did so contrary to the police policy on disclosure.
This is the first of several clear examples of how informant details can be disclosed to the public, and illustrates the fact that, despite the non-disclosure policy, there can be no absolute guarantees that similar instances will not occur.
Moving on to the other various ways informant’s details can be made public and by whom. One such way is via Freedom of Information requests. Tribunals can order the police and other agencies to disclose records or documents, which contain details of informants. Each individual case is judged on its merits.
Another such way would be through members of the legal profession or their immediate staff who have access to files and records, which give details of informants. I am such a case; in the course of my current work I come in contact with current informants and also those who the police seek to recruit. So if I wanted I could quite easily disclose those details, I would hasten to say that I would not but I use myself to prove a point.
The press is another example. We are all well aware of the power of the press and at times wonder how they obtain some of the information, which they print, but it is a fact that they do obtain informant’s details and do publish that information from time to time. I discovered a number of examples both past and present. The present day examples I will refer to in due course. But one from the past is a high profile murder case from 1883 the Phoenix Park murders in Dublin. Two senior British government officials were murdered by members of “The Invincibles”, a splinter group of the Fenians who, as previously mentioned, were the Victorian equivalent of the IRA. As a result of the use of informants in that case a number of men were arrested, convicted and hanged.
The names of those informants were disclosed in various newspapers of the day along with the amounts of money they were paid. One of the informants named in one of the articles is Theo Farrell. His name also appears in “The Activities of Informants” document previously referred to which also makes mention of the Phoenix Park murders. Another named informant William Lammie aka Fenning is also mentioned in that same document. Another informant in the Phoenix Park murders was James Carey.
I now refer to the immense power of the World Wide Web. There are many social networking sites, which give everyone almost total freedom of speech and the ability to write and publish whatever they like. I refer in the main to Facebook and Twitter. Anyone can openly publish details of known or suspected informants on these sites, as has been the case, which I will shortly disclose. I should also make mention of the WikiLeaks site which openly published highly sensitive information leaked from government agencies around the world.
A court of law has the power to direct a party to disclose the name of an informant if a request has been made by one of the other parties. Such a request I suggest will not be a tentative request. The party making the request which is usually the defence will no doubt already be aware of whom the informant is in any event but will use this request as a ploy to damage the prosecution case and will be a direct attempt to try to get the prosecution to abandon the case.
It is a matter for the judge as to whether he accedes to that request. If he does then the prosecution is faced with a dilemma. Do they compromise the details of the informant or do they, as the police have nobly averred, abandon the case?
Abandoning the case may seem a noble gesture but the police may have another motive for abandoning a trial under those circumstances, that would be if an informant was identified, then he might tell the court or later the press that he had been tasked with infiltrating a criminal group by the police and had been encouraged by the police to take active part in the crimes committed by that group.
That in itself raises a number of serious issues, agent provocateur being one, incitement to commit crime being another or even perhaps conspiracy. As part of my evidence I would be urging the tribunal not to be taken in by such a statement when given by the police during the hearing.
Another way an informant's details could be made known is from other police and civilian staff who staff police station custody areas on a daily basis and have direct involvement in persons who are arrested and detained.
It is not uncommon for informants to get themselves arrested either by reason of the tasks they have been asked to undertake by their police handlers, which from time to time do not go according to plan, or simply the fact that because they are prolific criminals in their own right and as a result sometimes get caught committing crime.
When this happens they are taken to a police station as any other normal prisoner and given their legal rights, one of those rights is to have someone told of their arrest and detention. Most persons arrested opt for wives, girlfriends, mothers and fathers. Not so informants, they need to make contact with their police handlers, so they then ask to speak to them as soon as possible. It is then that it would no doubt become clear to other police staff and civilian custody staff on duty at that time, of the fact that the prisoner may be a police informant.
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sp; Further to that the prisoner may later receive a visit from his police handler, or may even be released without charge due to a sudden lack of evidence. This would quite clearly indicate to other officers and staff that the person may be an informant. As such any of those persons could subsequently reveal that person as an informant.
In addition to my written statement of evidence I would be required to submit to the tribunal a total of twenty-one document exhibits I had amassed. Some of which were made up of an assortment of material I obtained from the World Wide Web on informants and originated from newspaper articles, crime forums and dissertations.
One newspaper article described a man being shot on his doorstep for allegedly being a police informant after his and details of other alleged police informants were put up on the social networking site Facebook. The most important issue surrounding this case is that one of the persons shown as being arrested and charged in connection with disclosure was employed as a civilian at the police station and had computer access to police information.
Another article described how a list of informants together with family details and addresses was found at the home of a known criminal. All of this occurred six years after the new legislation was introduced, which was supposed to give more protection to informants and to ensure that informants receive total anonymity. Clearly this shows that the new system is not as watertight as the police would suggest.
Other documents I produced related to informants and informant-related issues together with information, which suggests named informants were actively engaged in the commission of crimes whilst working for the police together with statements from the police whereby they accepted there were failings in the new informants programme.
Another article described a Metropolitan Police case where the police actually named an informant. According to the article the named informant is supposed to have given the police unreliable information. The article suggests that this informant was also involved in the commission of crime whilst in the service of the police.
I also found a confidential informant’s source report marked “category high”. This is a security service document, which relates to a high profile case and gives details of information given by a source/informant. This document relates to what has come to be known as the Scappaticci case, which occurred during the IRA conflict. At the time this and other sensitive documents were leaked it sent shock waves through the security service.
In brief the names shown in that report relate to the following:
Freddie “Stakeknife” Scappaticci, who ran the IRA’s notorious “death squad” while working for the security services as an informer.
Joseph Fenton, codename “The Driver”, shot dead by Scappaticci’s squad in February 1989.
Charles McIlmurray, Special Branch agent “Sealink”, abducted and killed by Scappaticci’s gang in April 1987.
This report reveals how an IRA team set out to shoot McIlmurray and his two Special Branch handlers in Belfast, but aborted when they spotted a police traffic car.
A further article obtained which was relevant to that report which contains references to Scappaticci, contained details of another specific informant as disclosed by an unnamed security service handler. This also suggests that the named informant who was, in addition to providing information, alleged to have been actively engaged in criminal activities to which the security services turned a blind eye and encouraged him to continue. According to the article the information given by the handler had been corroborated by another unidentified handler.
All of these articles make it crystal clear the police cannot possibly give any guarantee strong or absolute to an informant that their details will never come into the public domain.
I had hoped that once the police had sight of my written statement and saw the content of my documentary evidence they may choose to consider their position in the appeal. I would doubt they would want some of my evidence being released yet again back into the public domain. It certainly would not show the police in a favourable light and could in fact have a negative impact on the recruitment, and retention of informants.
The police stated that if the names of informants are released from the ledgers and registers it may deter informants from coming forward or force current ones to desist and withdraw their services. However, I would suggest that some the aforementioned examples I have mentioned are far more likely to have a detrimental effect on informer recruitment and retention than the releasing of the surnames and pseudonyms of a handful of informants contained in 125 year-old ledger and register.
In the course of my case preparation I managed to obtain the details of the written policy on disclosure operated by MI5 in connection with amongst other issues the naming of informants. This contains no mention of the perception the Metropolitan Police seemed to have that releasing informants names would deter others from coming forward, nor was there any mention of any fears that might force current informants/agents to suddenly withdraw their services. I also ascertained that MI5 since 2000 have been constantly releasing files to The National Archives, which contain the names of informants/agents under what would appear to have been an unwritten 100-year rule. Against that Special Branch (Counter Terrorism) last released files to The National Archives in 2000.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION HEARING PART 2
Finally my file of evidence and my witness statements were complete and I submitted it to the Information Commissioners whose responsibility it was to prepare a full file based on all parties’ evidence and then to serve each party and the tribunal their full copy. However, I would not be allowed to get sight of any witness statements or any documents the police would be using in any closed session, or allowed to be present when any of that evidence was presented to the tribunal.
Eventually I had served on me a file of evidence from the police, which they were intending to rely on during the hearing. This was made up of correspondence and internal memos from the then Special Branch Office and most of it dated 2003. There were several internal memos from Clutterbuck to one of the previous police witnesses in the Butterworth hearing, Yvette Arnold who it would appear is now and was then a civilian member of staff.
In those memos to her Clutterbuck clearly states that in his opinion the names of informants from the register and ledgers should be made public and for them to be sent to The National Archives in accordance with the policy adopted by other security agencies. In her reply she is of the opinion that the non-disclosure policy should remain the same. Although she does say that if this policy is challenged then it should be reviewed in each individual case.
Clearly that didn’t happen in any of my requests. In one of the memos she also refers to a process known as “Privileged Access”. This is where privileged researchers are allowed to view unexpurgated documents on agreeing to sign a written undertaking. Clearly again I was not allowed to do this despite in my very first Freedom of Information request saying I was prepared to sign a written undertaking.
Another internal memo was from a Commander Pearce (now retired) who it would seem signed the memo and endorsed Clutterbuck’s views on the policy change and also the sending of the register and the ledgers to The National Archives. All of these memos were then forwarded to a Commander Black who replaced Commander Pearce as head of the department. It clearly can be seen that he also was in agreement that the Special Branch policy should be brought in line with the policies of other government agencies as far as public disclosure was concerned. It would appear that for whatever reason this was never applied.
Furthermore, the police were not producing any documentation, which corroborates any decision not to change their policy. I was very surprised that the police had served these documents on me as part of their case and they were intending to use this in evidence as some of the content of these letters and memos I felt would help to strengthen my case.
Having assessed and evaluated the contents of those memos an
d letters I still felt it vitally important to try to get Clutterbuck on my side. I could now see his integrity being questioned and with the press attending the hearing this might cause him problems with his current employers. In view of all of this I made one last-ditch attempt to try to get him to assist me and in doing so giving him the opportunity of answering the allegations being levied against him. Again he declined to reply to any of my emails or telephone calls.
I eventually had sight of the witness statements of witnesses the police would be calling to give their evidence in open session. They made it clear some parts would be given in closed session. There were no surprises, all the same police witnesses who gave evidence in the Butterworth hearing would be doing the same save for one police officer who they gave the name to me and later indicated that he was to remain anonymous and his evidence given behind a closed screen.
Having read the statements it was apparent that they were going to rely on nothing more than mere words to support their objections. To this end they were relying on each witness to corroborate other witnesses when identifying the concerns and personal beliefs they had highlighted in their witness statements.
In addition they were seeking to rely on relevant legislation to support their arguments that legislation being Sections 24 and 30 (2) of the Freedom of Information Act. Section 24 related to national security issues and is explained as follows:
Information is exempt from disclosure if the exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
The authority may obtain a certificate from a minister certifying that the exemption is required.
It is not sufficient for information to relate to national security matters; disclosure must pose a real threat to the interests of national security.
Jack the Ripper: The Secret Police Files Page 30