Generally Speaking

by Claudia J. Kennedy

  As a leader, another important lesson I learned from this difficult episode was not to run roughshod over soldiers' vital bonds of loyalty to one another, but to guide them toward their loyalty to the Army's higher values. And the soldiers of the battalion also learned a lot about the intricate web of loyalty that connects us all. They gained a renewed awareness that there was a process that worked well to build and maintain the institution we all sought: a sober, hardworking, honest group of soldiers whose word could be trusted.

  7

  Fairness and Equality

  In the fall of 1996, I was a major general, serving in the Pentagon as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. I was well satisfied with my professional position and hoped that I would reach three-star rank and be considered for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) before retiring. I thought that service in that position would allow me to meet several goals that I considered critical to Army intelligence, including strengthening the foreign language program and helping the Army revitalize its intelligence doctrine and equipment.

  My optimism about this productive future stemmed from the professional advice I had received upon being promoted to brigadier general four years earlier. I was one of the most junior colonels on that year's list. The expectation for the list's most senior colonels was that this would be their last promotion. But for those of us who were the most junior, it was probable that we would continue to serve as general officers for several years and retire after additional promotions. With this in mind, I had been asked whether I would prefer my last job in the Army to be Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel or DCSINT, both three-star assignments.

  I was not prepared for this discussion, having hardly adjusted to the news of my selection as a brigadier general. So I simply said that I'd prefer my first position as a general officer to be in Military Intelligence. After that, I would serve where the Army needed me. But when I was assigned as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, I had renewed confidence that I would retire as the Army DCSINT.

  This would mean I'd be the first woman in the Army to earn the rank of lieutenant general. I couldn't think of a better way to round out a deeply satisfying career than by having the authority to pursue my long-standing goals for Army intelligence.

  That fall, my staff received a call from the office of Brigadier General Larry Smith, who was serving as the manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, requesting an appointment when he visited Washington from overseas. The meeting was scheduled for Friday, October 11, 1996.

  I had first met Larry Smith when we were colonels serving together on a selection board, but he was no more than a nodding acquaintance at that time. In 1993, when I'd been assigned as the FORSCOM director of intelligence at Fort McPherson near Atlanta, I had moved into the Army quarters next to Larry Smith and his wife, Ann. Larry Smith was an Armor officer and helicopter pilot with combat experience in Vietnam who had served as both a battalion and a brigade commander later in his career. The Smiths were very kind, often inviting me for supper at their house on the spur of the moment; Larry prepared my lawn mower for winter storage in the garage. In turn, I had helped with the arrangements of keeping a car for their son, who was away at school, and had turned it over to him when he returned. This was a typical Army neighbor relationship: One doesn't know the other well, but is ready to help when needed, especially when a family is being reassigned.

  So I certainly anticipated nothing unusual during Smith's office call on October 11. Like all professional officers, he was prompt, arriving exactly at the appointed time. We sat across from each other at a coffee table in my office with the door open. The discussion was purely official business, other than a brief initial social exchange about his family. Smith had served in his assignment to Saudi Arabia for over a year and was able to recount a great deal about the military and political leadership, as well as the often complex decision-making dynamics of the region. I found his perspective helpful and planned to have one of our regional analysts call on him and officially obtain his assessment.

  Then, when Smith rose to leave my office, he suddenly committed an act of inappropriate contact that two attorneys on different occasions have informed me constituted sexual assault and battery. (In May 2000, the Army Inspector General substantiated that Smith's act was an “assault consummated by a battery.”)

  I have decided not to discuss in detail the nature of this act. As one might imagine, it is unpleasant for me to dwell on the event. Also, I do not want that incident to become the focal point of this book, which I hope young people will read as they consider their professional options. But it is important to clarify that, even though the incident fell within the legal definition of sexual assault and battery, people should not conclude that I was deeply affected either physically or emotionally.

  It is an understatement to say, however, that I was shocked. More accurately, I was very angry. Smith had absolutely no right to do what he did. His act occurred without provocation on my part. The fact that the incident had taken place in my Pentagon office with the door open made his behavior even more inexplicable.

  After he had left, I weighed my options. Over the weekend I carefully considered whether to report the incident to Army authorities. I had complained of a similar, though less egregious situation involving another officer several years earlier at Fort McPherson. That complaint resulted in an Article 15 investigation of that officer during which two of his women subordinates had come forward to disclose acts on his part that were far more serious than his actions toward me. That officer had received nonjudicial punishment, was fined, and retired early. So I knew that when someone behaves in this manner once, it often turns out to be a part of a behavior pattern.

  In my mind, reporting Smith's actions now did not seem necessary. I outranked him and I could control his future access to me now that I knew he could not be trusted. The matter was something I could deal with individually, so I decided to tell no one in the Army about it either officially or unofficially at that time. Although I had no proof that Smith had acted improperly in the past, I was aware that I might be failing in my duty to protect more junior women by not reporting the incident. What I did know with complete certainty was that he had assaulted me and that I could protect myself from him in the future. Additionally, I was concerned that the Army would not find my report credible and that my complaint would somehow harm the cause of women soldiers of all ranks who came forward to report sexual misconduct.

  There was another reason influencing my decision. For several weeks, the Army leadership had been concerned with a growing scandal at the Ordnance Center and School at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Although details had not yet publicly emerged, it was evident that NCO drill instructors and one officer were under criminal investigation, charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse of young junior enlisted women trainees. From the reports I had heard, it appeared several drill instructors had systematically preyed on young women assigned to them. When the story broke, I knew the Army would have a serious public relations problem, so I made the decision not to distract from the Aberdeen investigation by reporting the Smith incident.

  What had happened in my office was not on the same scale as the situation at Aberdeen. Yet I knew the news media would have found an incident in which one general officer accused another of sexual misconduct to be so explosive that the resulting publicity would have been a major embarrassment at a time when the Army was already engaged in damage control and trying to correct the underlying leadership problem.

  There was also little chance I would see much of Smith during my remaining Army career. Although my anger remained, I decided to try to put the incident behind me.

  Less than three weeks after the incident with Larry Smith, the situation at Aberdeen burst into the headlines. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer called a press conference to announce that the Army would thoroughly investigate every allegation of sexual misconduct at
training bases. General Reimer also stated that the Secretary of the Army, Togo D. West, Jr., would appoint an advisory panel to examine the prevalence of sexual harassment and abuse Army-wide. He reiterated that the Army had a “zero tolerance” policy toward sexual harassment of any kind and that “consideration of others is a fundamental principle upon which the Army operates.”

  The Chief of Staff cited the Consideration of Others Program that Major General Robert Foley, the commander of the Military District of Washington, was instituting in his command. General Foley, a Vietnam War Medal of Honor winner, had helped create the program while commandant of cadets at West Point in the early 1990s. A major feature of the Military Academy's four-year curriculum, the program formed an important part of future Army leaders' education and professional development. General Reimer cited it to show the deplorable situation at Aberdeen lay far outside acceptable Army norms.

  As the investigation proceeded, other instructors faced sexual misconduct charges. The events at Aberdeen did prove truly appalling. On November 15, 1996, the Army announced court-martial charges against two drill instructors and an officer at the Ordnance Center and School. Captain Derrick Robertson, a training company commander, was charged with rape and other forms of sexual abuse of a female soldier. Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson, a drill instructor in Robertson's company, faced nine counts of rape and multiple counts of forcible sodomy, assault consummated by battery, and related charges, involving a total of eight young women soldiers. Another drill instructor, Staff Sergeant Nathaniel Beach, faced lesser charges. The victims, whose average age was twenty-one, were provided with counseling through the Aberdeen Community Health Clinic and the chaplain. In the wake of the revelation, the Army established a toll-free number for military personnel who were victims of sexual abuse. Almost 2,000 calls were logged within days; over 200 were referred to investigators. Of these, fifty-six involved Aberdeen Proving Ground.

  By the time the courts-martial were concluded in the spring of 1997, a shocking pattern of sexual abuse of trainees had emerged involving additional defendants. It became clear that a relatively small number of drill instructors had used their authority over young junior enlisted women undergoing Advanced Individual Training at Aberdeen either to rape them or to coerce them into sexual relationships. This coercion was often accompanied by physical abuse and threats, leaving the trainees terrified. The drill instructors went so far as to have contests with each other as to who could dominate the largest number of trainees.

  Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson, the most serious offender, was found guilty of eighteen counts of rape and twelve counts of indecent assault, as well as lesser charges. Army prosecutors proved that Simpson coerced and dominated the young women trainees for whom he was responsible. In one case, where Simpson discovered a trainee was having an illegal but consensual relationship with another drill instructor, Simpson ordered the woman to his office, raped her, and told her if she reported the attack, authorities wouldn't believe her because of her relationship with the other NCO. Simpson received a twenty-five-year prison sentence after the military jury found him guilty of rape and other sexual misconduct charges.

  In all, ten Ordnance Center and School personnel had charges preferred against them. The only officer charged, Captain Derrick Robertson, pleaded guilty to adultery and other charges, including conduct unbecoming an officer. He was sentenced to serve one-year confinement, followed by dismissal from the service with a loss of total pay and benefits.

  It is fair to say that as the Aberdeen sexual abuse scandal unfolded, it became one of the Army's most devastating leadership failures since the Vietnam War.

  Then, in February 1997, another shocking allegation exploded in the media. Sergeant Major of the Army Gene McKinney was suspended from his duties pending resolution of allegations[$$$ MS page no 170] of sexual misconduct a recently retired soldier made against him. Only a moral leader beyond reproach is considered for the position of the top enlisted soldier in the service. The Army investigation of the original charges, which paralleled the Aberdeen investigations and courts-martial, eventually led to McKinney's own court-martial. He was charged with adultery, indecent assault, making threats, and maltreatment of soldiers, allegations involving four women during the 1990s.

  During a pre-court-martial hearing in the summer of 1997, McKinney's former public affairs NCO, retired Sergeant Major Brenda Hoster, testified McKinney had forcibly kissed her and made unwanted sexual overtures. Other witnesses, all enlisted women in the armed services, testified McKinney had solicited them for sex or tried to coerce them into sexual relationships. One witness cooperated with investigators who taped a telephone conversation between her and McKinney in which he urged her to change her earlier statements to the Army.

  The investigation and court-martial proceedings dragged on for over a year, keeping McKinney's name in the news media and inevitably harming the Army's reputation as an institution that provided a fair and equitable environment for women soldiers. In March 1998, the court-martial convicted McKinney of only one of the nineteen specifications of misconduct with which he was charged, finding him guilty of obstruction of justice related to his efforts to have the witness withdraw her testimony. McKinney was sentenced to a reduction of one grade and was reprimanded. The Army allowed him to retire without further punishment.

  I watched these troubling developments unfold with a sense of combined anger and deep concern. Young women who joined the Army had a right to feel safe, to serve as soldiers with dignity, not to be preyed upon by drill instructors who saw them as mere sexual objects they could brutalize. And the Army had the right to expect much better leadership than Sergeant Major McKinney had shown. I knew, however, that the sordid Aberdeen and McKinney episodes did not represent a true picture of the Army as a whole.

  I had only two contacts with the Smiths during this period. There was a Christmas reception that they and I both attended, but I stayed away from Larry Smith, speaking briefly to Ann but not to him. At the end of the reception, I was looking for a place to put my glass down and he appeared from somewhere, lifted my glass and said, “I'll take that for you.” I remained silent.

  Several months later, I was caught in a receiving line behind the Smiths at a large farewell dinner. I found this situation very awkward. And I could see that both Ann and Larry felt awkward as well. Ann recognized from my silence that a rift had developed between us, and I would guess that she did not know why.

  Meanwhile, I had been busy with responsibilities far more important than my individual grievance with Larry Smith. On November 22, 1996, two weeks after General Reimer voiced the Army's determination to thoroughly investigate the situation at Aberdeen, Secretary of the Army Togo West announced formation of the Secretary of the Army's Senior Review Panel on Sexual Harassment, of which I had been appointed a member.

  The Review Panel had an unprecedented charter: Conduct a thorough, Army-wide investigation into the perceived and actual levels of sexual abuse, harassment, and discrimination at all levels. Secretary West also gave the Review Panel the mandate to recommend concrete changes in any existing Army policies in order to improve the human relations environment. Finally, he asked the members to determine how Army leaders throughout the chain of command viewed and exercised their responsibilities to prevent sexual harassment, specifically addressing actions that failed to acknowledge the dignity and respect to which every soldier was entitled.

  The Secretary recalled two retired general officers to active duty to head the Review Panel. Major General Richard S. Siegfried, an Infantry officer with a distinguished combat record who had last served as acting Inspector General, U.S. Army, was the chair. The vice chair was Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, who had been an Army Deputy Inspector General and commanding general of Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Among the other panel members was Major General Larry Ellis, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (later the commander of the 1st Armored Division and, when promoted to lieutenant general, Depu
ty Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans). Command Sergeant Major Cynthia A. Pritchett, a former drill sergeant and instructor at the Army Sergeants Major Academy, was the senior enlisted woman member.

  The Review Panel, which in many ways paralleled the ongoing effort of the Army Research Institute, was backed up by a large professional staff that employed the most rigorous polling techniques to elicit the soldiers' opinions on how sexual harassment or misconduct impacted their lives and their units' missions. We used four methods of collecting data: surveys, focus groups, personal interviews, and observation. In all, we contacted over 30,000 soldiers during our investigation. And the specific data analyses involved a cohort of 14,498 men and women soldiers, selected as the most representative sampling. Then the data was subjected to scientifically verified analysis processes to determine its validity.

  Working in teams between January and May 1997, Review Panel investigators fanned out to Army units stationed worldwide, interviewing troops at forty posts in the United States and eighteen overseas. I helped interview soldiers and their leaders at a number of these posts, including Fort Lewis, Washington, Fort Polk, Louisiana, and Fort Clayton, Republic of Panama. The Review Panel visited units forward-deployed in the Balkans, in German garrisons, at training sites on sprawling bases in the American West, and in classrooms at a variety of Army schools. In view of the highly publicized priority the Secretary and the Chief of Staff had placed on our mission, we were given complete access to inquire into the human relations environment surrounding soldiers in every conceivable location, performing every type of mission.