On 23 September, the merchantman SS Donizetti with 1,576 Italian prisoners of war on board was sunk by HMS Eclipse off south-west Rhodes. An ex-Italian torpedo boat, the former French La Pomone, renamed TA 10 by the Germans, was immobilised, drifted inshore and deliberately sunk by her crew. Allied aircraft also struck at a convoy bound for Crete, sinking the transport Dithmarschen.
The loss of the Donizetti was a tragedy that could probably have been avoided. According to one source an Italian clandestine wireless station on Rhodes advised the British that the ship was transporting Italian prisoners, but the attack proceeded regardless.4 The enemy was justifiably concerned about British activity in the Aegean, not least because of the increased threat this posed for their convoys, the War Diary of the Operations Division of the German Naval Staff noting:
The situation in the area of the Dodecanese has grown very serious since 18 Sept.5
Clearly, something had to be done. As had been demonstrated in the central Mediterranean, control of the sea-lanes was dictated as much by air superiority as by naval power. Aircraft played an important transport and re-supply role and were essential for any offensive operation. Air cover was also crucial for the safe passage of shipping. The British intended to use Kos as a base for single engine fighters to provide short-range cover for a proposed landing at Rhodes scheduled to commence in late October, and to protect British warships operating out of Leros. By 17 September, the Germans had been alerted to the presence of British forces on Kos. Without an air base the British had no hope of maintaining their presence in the area, and the enemy wasted little time before commencing bombing operations.
On Saturday morning 18 September, a 216 Squadron Dakota (serial FD806) struck the water during a low-level flight and ditched off the Turkish island of Kara Adia. It had been transporting personnel of the Durham Light Infantry. All passengers and crew survived and were interned temporarily in Turkey. Further transports landed at Antimachia and had just been offloaded when Messerschmitt Bf 109s swept across the aerodrome in a strafing attack. At least one soldier died and three were wounded; three Dakotas were burnt out and one was badly damaged. Another Dakota that arrived during the raid made an emergency landing near Lambi, north of Kos town. On this date, 7 Squadron (SAAF) suffered its first combat casualties while operating from Kos, when Spitfires flown by Lieutenants A.G. Turner (in JK148) and A.E.F. Cheesman (JK140) were shot down offshore.6 In turn, two Bf 109Gs of IV./Jagdgeschwader 27 (IV./J.G.27) were lost; Oberfeldwebel Wilhelm Morgenstern (flying 10463/white 1), was reported missing and Unteroffizier Gustav Dettmar (18470/white 5) was taken prisoner.7 The latter was, in fact, captured and during interrogation maintained that he had been hit by anti-aircraft fire. That night, two Beaufighters of 46 Squadron from Cyprus patrolled the skies over Kos without incident.
Thereafter, the Luftwaffe continued to target Kos and Antimachia airfield in particular. The outnumbered South African Spitfire pilots flew one sortie after another, but whatever they achieved was outweighed by enemy successes. For those in the Durham Light Infantry the experience was all too reminiscent of their time in Malta, where the unit had endured nearly a year of air attacks. Then, as now, the men had been virtually powerless to fight back, having to rely instead on anti-aircraft gunners and whatever fighters the RAF could muster. For soldiers accustomed to facing the enemy on the ground, it was a frustrating and trying period. As in Malta, many were employed as labourers filling in bomb craters and otherwise helping to maintain the island as an air base – instead of concentrating on training in preparation for the inevitable German assault.
As a consequence of events on 18 September, the remainder of the Durham Light Infantry were transported to Kos by sea. Daylight air deliveries were curtailed, but not in time to prevent two Dakotas from being dispatched from Nicosia on the morning of Sunday the 19th. Within minutes of landing, one was burnt out in a strafing attack and the wireless operator/air gunner, Sergeant Gerard E. Newall, killed. The other aircraft was refused permission to land and returned with its load to Cyprus. The Dakota damaged in the previous day’s raid was hit again, caught fire and burnt out. Thereafter, supply flights were nearly all carried out under cover of darkness. Another fighter pilot was also lost when a Spitfire flown by Lieutenant Isadore M. Seel crashed after failing to recover from a spin during a dogfight with Bf 109s.8
An airfield engineer, Lieutenant Colonel W.J. McDowall, arrived on the 19th. He was soon at work on a second landing ground at Lambi, inspired, no doubt, by the Dakota landing there the day before. With virtually no machinery for the job, his work force set to with picks and shovels. Until the delivery of two bulldozers a few days later, a tractor and oxen were also used to drag an improvised trammel! Nevertheless, an airstrip 1,100 yards long by 50 yards wide was ready by the morning of the 21st and by nightfall the width had been increased to 100 yards. It was an incredible feat, accomplished under the most trying conditions. The construction of a second strip, suitable for nighttime landings by Dakotas, took some of the pressure off Antimachia, although its use necessitated considerable maintenance work the day after.
In the Athens area there was activity of a different kind as the Luftwaffe increased its bomber force. Notwithstanding Allied air attacks against their airfields, the Luftwaffe intensified efforts against Kos during the last few days of September. Raids took on a depressingly similar pattern as enemy bombers pounded airfields and installations. On the 27th a Spitfire was damaged at Antimachia by enemy bombers operating at an altitude beyond the range of Bofors guns, which had recently been delivered and installed for airfield defence. In the course of the day, 7 Squadron (SAAF) accounted for at least one Bf 109 for three Spitfires shot down: Lieutenants Kenneth W. Prescott and John H. Hynd were killed during the first raid at about 11.30 a.m. In the afternoon Lieutenant A.L. Basson was forced to bale out over the sea; he was rescued by LRDG on board a caique.9 Another, unarmed, caique picked up a pilot of IV./J.G.27 – only to have him snatched at gunpoint by the crew of a German seaplane.
The next day, eight reinforcement Spitfire Vs of 74 Squadron arrived from Egypt via Cyprus; a ninth (ES204) developed engine trouble some 15 miles off Kastellorizo. Flight Lieutenant Albert G.S. ‘Andy’ Anderson, an experienced fighter pilot who had survived ten months in Malta in 1941–42, baled out too low for his parachute to open. His body was never found. Spitfires from both squadrons were soon in action, but again it was the hapless South Africans who came off worst when Lieutenant Taylor and Captain E.A. Rorvik were shot down. The former baled out and was rescued, and the latter (in EE786) was posted missing.10 On the same day, the Luftwaffe acknowledged the loss of a Bf 109G-6 of 8./J.G.27, although the cause was stated to have been an engine problem. The pilot, Unteroffizier Otto Mühlbauer, survived.
Early on the 29th, three pilots of 74 Squadron were scrambled to intercept another raid. Flight Sergeant W.J. Wilson met three successive waves of Ju 88s over Antimachia. He was credited with shooting down one bomber in the first formation before diving through the second and third formations and damaging two more aircraft. He was then set upon by five Bf 109s, which he successfully evaded, causing two to collide, one of which allegedly fell in flames. In spite of the glowing report in the squadron Operations Record Book (ORB), Luftwaffe records fail to substantiate these claims: two of the crew were injured when a Ju 88 of II./Kampgeschwader 6 (II./K.G.6) was written off after crash landing at Larisa (Greece) with engine trouble, and at least three more Ju 88s and one Ju 87 were damaged in take-off or landing accidents. However, the destruction caused by the Luftwaffe is beyond doubt: Antimachia aerodrome was so damaged that two of the returning Spitfires had to land at an airstrip under construction at Tingachi salt pans. The airstrip at Lambi was also rendered unserviceable. Subsequent air deliveries had to be dropped by parachute, until the ground could be repaired sufficiently to allow Dakotas to land during the night of 2–3 October.
At the same time that 7 Squadron (SAAF) was being decimated on Kos, Luftwaffe strength i
n the Greece/Aegean area had increased to an estimated 362 operational aircraft.11 The Luftwaffe had two good airfields on Rhodes just 70 miles or so from Kos, and two more on Crete. There were also well-equipped bomber bases on the Greek mainland at Larisa, Salonika and in the Athens area, and dive-bomber bases at Megara and Argos. As the number of German bombers in the region increased, so too, did the risk to Allied warships. The British were disadvantaged in that most of their air and naval bases were situated far from the scene of operations. This placed an intolerable strain on destroyers, especially Hunt class vessels, the endurance of which was severely restricted by fuel limitations. Furthermore, effective air cover was impossible without long-range fighters, due to the distances between the operational area and Allied airfields in Cyprus and at Gambut in Libya. Not all aircraft types were affected, however, and during September the southern Aegean was covered by frequent reconnaissance flights. Anti-shipping strikes were also undertaken and night raids carried out against land targets. Airfields in Crete and Rhodes, which had received considerable reinforcements, were attacked frequently during the latter half of the month.
By 2 October, the air defence on Kos consisted of a handful of operational Spitfires. Air force personnel numbered around 500 officers and men. Half were divided between 2901 and 2909 Squadrons of the RAF Regiment at Antimachia and Lambi. There were about 680 army personnel on the island, including at least seventy-six officers and men of 4th Battery Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery, and 540 or so all ranks of the Durham Light Infantry. The latter had just been redeployed, with Battalion Headquarters and ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘HQ’ Companies disposed mainly in bivouac areas extending for a mile from the coast to the north-west outskirts of Gherme (Platani). ‘C’ Company was allocated Kos town; the Anti-tank Platoon held the nearby landing ground at Lambi, and ‘D’ Company with two detachments of the Mortar Platoon and one section of the Carrier Platoon held Antimachia. The battalion was woefully under equipped for its role: with no Bren gun carriers (instead, jeeps were made available for night patrols), no anti-tank guns (but for some Boys anti-tank rifles) and without most of its 3-inch mortars.
On Kos there were already around 3,500–4,000 Italians. They comprised the majority of II and III battaglione (battalion) of 10o reggimento di fanteria (infantry regiment) of Divisione Regina equipped with heavy weapons including a company of 81mm mortars of I battaglione; 252a compagnia cannoni anticarro (anti-tank company), 10a compagnia mitraglieri costiera (coastal machine-gun company) and 403a compagnia mitraglieri ex-Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (ex-‘Blackshirts’ machine-gun company); there were three units of 36o raggruppamento: XXXI gruppo artiglieria (artillery group) and LXXXII gruppo artiglieria contraerea (anti-aircraft group), both with three additional batteries, and 136a batteria of XXIX gruppo. Also available was 295a batteria mitragliere (with 20mm cannon), and various support units. Even so, the questionable effectiveness of Italian-manned coastal and anti-aircraft batteries convinced the British that they could only count on twenty-five of their own 40mm Bofors and twenty-four 20mm Hispanos. These were distributed mainly at Antimachia and around Kos town. Plans were afoot to improve the island’s defence capabilities but any proposals were purely academic, for events were taking place that would soon place Kos firmly under German control.
4
Operation Eisbär
3 October 1943
On 23 September, Generalleutnant Friedrich-Wilhelm Müller, commanding 22. Infanteriedivision, was ordered by Heeresgruppe E (Army Group E) to make preparations for the seizure of Kos and Leros. Due to its importance as an offensive Allied air base, Kos was selected as the first objective. Müller’s plan was to take the island in a surprise assault. A long, narrow beach at Marmari on the north coast was chosen as the landing site for his staff and Kampfgruppe (Battle Group) von Saldern, the latter commanded by Major Sylvester von Saldern and comprising his own II. Bataillon/Grenadierregiment 65 (II./Gren.Rgt.65), together with III. Bataillon/Grenadierregiment 440 (III./Gren.Rgt.440, with just 250 men), 3. and 4. Batterien/Artillerieregiment 22 (3 and 4./Art.Rgt.22), 3. Batterie/-Flakbataillon 22 (3./Fla.Btl.22) and 2. Kompanie/Pionierbataillon 22 (2./Pi.Btl.22) less one Zug.
II. Bataillon/Grenadierregiment 16 (II./Gren.Rgt.16) with one Pionier Zug under the former’s CO, Hauptmann Philipp Aschoff, was to come ashore on the steep south coast below Point 428 (Eremita) with the primary task of seizing gun emplacements south of Platani, thus preventing their being trained on Kos town and port and the north-western coast. Because the terrain was unsuitable for vehicles, the Bataillon 7.5cm Paks (Panzerabwehrkanone – anti-tank guns), tow-trucks and extra ammunition were to come ashore with Kampfgruppe von Saldern. Until the two groups could link up, II./Gren.Rgt.16 would have to rely on mules as their only means of transport.
In order to neutralise Antimachia as an effective air base, a joint amphibious/air landing was to be made in the narrow southern coastal strip just east of Cape Tigani. The troops entrusted with the task included units of the Division Brandenburg: 15. Kompanie (Fallschirmjäger)/4. Regiment “Brandenburg” (15./4.Rgt. “Brandenburg”) commanded by Oberleutnant Oschatz, and 1. Kompanie/Küstenjägerabteilung- “Brandenburg” (1./Küstenjäger-Abt. “Brandenburg”) led by Hauptmann Armin Kuhlmann and under whose authority the combined force, to be known as Kampfgruppe Kuhlmann, would operate.1
As troop transports there were the steamships Trapani, Catherine Schiaffino, Kari, Ingeborg and Citta di Savona, nine Marinefährprähme (M.F.P. or F-lighters) and three Pioniersturmboote. Escort vessels comprised the minelayers Drache and Bulgaria, five Unterseebootjägern (U-Jägern were seized enemy vessels taken on by the Kriegsmarine as so-called submarine hunters), three motorboats, two Kriegsfischkutter (K.F.K. or motor fishing vessels) and four G.A.-Boote (coast defence vessels) under the command of 21. Unterseebootjagdflottille (21. U-Jagdflottille), as well as three Räumbooten (minesweepers) of 12. Räumbootflottille (12. R-Flottille).
By Friday morning, 1 October 1943, the assault troops had gathered at their departure points. In Crete, II./Gren.Rgt.16 and Kampfgruppenführungsstab (Battle Group Staff officers) embarked at Heraklion, and II./Gren.Rgt.65, 3. and 4./Art.-Rgt.22, 3./Fla.Btl.22 and 2./Pi.Btl.22 at Suda. The remaining units assembled on the mainland near Athens: III./Gren.Rgt.440 and 1./Küstenjäger-Abt. “Brandenburg” prepared to depart from Piraeus, and Fallschirmjägerkompanie “Brandenburg” stood by to emplane at Athens-Tatoi aerodrome.
Embarkation was completed that evening, and the vessels departed to rendezvous the next day in the Cyclades. There, the relatively inexperienced F-Lighter crews carried out landing exercises in a last minute effort to prepare them for the daunting task ahead. In the afternoon of the 2nd, the force divided and set deception courses for Rhodes and Ikaria. It was precisely the right move. Although the Germans were aware that their presence had been detected by Allied air reconnaissance, there was no way of knowing that the British had already been fooled into thinking that the convoy was Rhodes-bound. Only after dark did the convoy change direction towards Kos. An unexpected squall resulted in rough seas and a miserable passage and threatened to jeopardise the entire operation. However, early on the 3rd the weather improved. The convoy proceeded to their designated disembarkation points north and south of Kos, unimpeded either by Allied warships or submarines.
Late on 2 October, Force 292 received a signal from Captain Edmund H.B. Baker, RN, Senior British Naval Officer, Aegean. This stated that during the afternoon an enemy convoy, including three transports, had been reported steering east, south of Naxos. It was assumed that the vessels were heading for Rhodes.
That night, five Dakotas of 216 Squadron took off from Lambi after offloading supplies. They left just in time. At 3.00 a.m. on the 3rd, Major C.F. Blagden took a telephone call from RAF Headquarters at Antimachia. He was informed that an enemy convoy had been sighted at 11.20 a.m. on 2 October approximately 12 miles south of Melos, heading east at 12 knots. Blagden could not have known that th
is was the flotilla from Suda. He, too, misread the enemy’s intentions:
Assuming the course and speed to have remained constant this should have brought the convoy to Rhodes during the night 2/3 October. I roused Colonel Kenyon immediately and passed on the information. After some discussion and in view of information contained in recent Force Sitreps [situation reports] coupled with the fact that no further news of the convoy had been received after 1120 hours on 2 October, in spite of ideal reconnaissance weather, Colonel Kenyon decided that it was a Rhodes reinforcement. I was in agreement – no action was taken other than repeating the message to Leros.2
For Kenyon, all was about to become clear:
A few minutes later, ITALIAN H.Q. asked if we were expecting a convoy, as shipping had been sighted near the SALTPANS. Unfortunately, much shipping arrived without notice in COS [Kos], and we were expecting supplies. I decided however that we must risk that, and ordered the ITALIANS to open fire. This they did very promptly, but without any effect.3
The first wave of Kampfgruppe von Saldern landed by F-lighter on schedule at 5.00 a.m.4 After encountering minimal resistance, II./Gren.Rgt.65 established a beachhead while the F-Lighters returned to the transports waiting with the next wave south of Pserimos. Feldwebel Gustav Wehrs, in 5. Kompanie, had been nominated to supervise the transhipment of his soldiers:
The three Fährprähme left first and after a while the sound of fighting could be heard coming from Marmari on the island of Kos – it was still dark at this point. Our ‘barge’ anchored and had to wait until a Fährprahm returned. It came alongside and we began to transfer from the relatively high Trapani on to the flat Fährprahm down below which kept moving to and fro in the waves. With an MP [sub-machine gun] or a rifle hanging around the neck, one had to climb down the rope ladder (or Jacobs ladder) on the outside of the ship and then try to pick the right moment to leap on to this wobbly thing. Surprisingly, it worked quite well, even with our lack of practice.5
Churchill's Folly Page 5