During the afternoon, two men in Section 2 were detailed to fetch water from where it had been cached with their boats, and to report on the situation in the area. They took with them a German prisoner. Neither of the LRDG pair (presumably Troopers John Bowler and Douglas Davison) was seen again. Their fate and that of the German prisoner of war is unknown.
At about 3.15 p.m., Captain Olivey on the east side of Point 130 was surprised to hear a familiar voice calling on him to surrender. Seeing Lieutenant Kay, escorted by two German soldiers, Olivey drew his revolver and opened fire before fleeing with Rhodesian Gunner Rupping. They took with them only their rifles, a set of binoculars and a map case. The LRDG on Segnale had been taken totally by surprise, outmanouevred by just four men: Obergefreiter Berndt, and Gefreiten Kucza, Kriegsmann and Gebhardt. Reinforcements arrived, who then proceeded to ambush a returning patrol led by an unsuspecting Gunner Patch:
As we approached our H.Q at about 4.30 pm, we observed some of our own men walking freely about round the outside wall of the house & therefore approached without caution. As we drew near, however, we found ourselves covered by two Spandau MGs manned by Germans who had been concealed behind a low wall. A German then came out of the building and called upon us to surrender and at the same time the rest of the enemy party numbering about fifteen men appeared from their hiding places. The men from our own party who we had seen near the building were Lt Kay and 3 or 4 Rhodesians who were already prisoners when we saw them. They informed me that Harris’ patrol had all been made prisoners. I was then marched down to the German H.Q. where Harris & his patrol were being held. This H.Q. was in a small group of stone houses situated in the centre of the island. Harris told me that his patrol had been attacked simultaneously from two sides by two enemy patrols each of which outnumbered his own. In the skirmish that followed Gnr Federman [sic: Gunner Herbert Federmann] had been killed before the patrol was forced to surrender. Pte Gunn, however, did not surrender but lay low & made his escape. The Germans were very friendly towards us, and their commander, a lieutenant, saluted us formally and told us that his sergeant had reported to him that we were “good soldiers”.28
The LRDG in Section 2 had been prevented from advancing further due to ongoing attacks by Ju 87 Stukas and Arado seaplanes. The way forward was also swept by German machine guns. German mortar fire aggravated the situation. During the mid-afternoon Stukas covered the approach of German troops as they moved up to assault the LRDG in their defensive positions along the south-east coast. Ron Hill:
At about five o’clock I noticed that the mortaring of Captain Olivey’s positions had practically ceased whilst our own positions were being more heavily shelled. By this time the two wounded NZs were in exceedingly poor shape & the medical orderly, on his own initiative, arranged with the Germans to surrender them under a white flag. I helped to carry the two men down to a boat waiting in the inlet (by two journeys) & here a German NCO took them over. The medical orderly also surrendered to this NCO. The German told us that about 12 of Captain Olivey’s force had been captured & more Stukas were on their way from Rhodes.29
During the truce it was proposed that the Germans hand over the island. Not surprisingly, the offer was declined.30 Hill, who had not agreed to surrender, was free to go. He saluted the German NCO, about-turned and strode back the way he had come.
As I drew nearer I noticed little fireflies darting past and it took me some time to realise that I was being fired on by some other Germans on the higher ground. I was too engrossed in trying to work out what to do next to take evasive action …31
Fortunately for Trooper Hill, none of the shots found their mark. When he reached his comrades it was dusk and German forces were closing in. Section 2 had dispersed between three locations: Sutherland’s headquarters was on relatively low ground close to the landing place in the area of Mount Tromba; Sergeant Dobson’s party was situated centrally, and a few men under Corporal Gill were holding out on high ground (probably on Mount Calasuria).32 The surviving LRDG were in a hopeless situation, having to defend themselves with captured weapons after running out of ammunition, with their backs to the sea, and outnumbered by the enemy. Hill describes the final outcome:
The mortaring had now stopped but the enemy was now close enough to subject the area to fire from rifle grenades. It was now somewhere around six o’clock. Captain Sutherland then said he would surrender to save further bloodshed as no useful purpose could be served by holding on. From the position of the enemy at this time he concluded the boats had already been captured. This was confirmed later by the NZ sergeant who attempted to reach them & was brought in the next day by the Germans. Our ammunition had also been expended & we were by this time using captured arms. By the time Capt. Sutherland made this decision it was too late for any one in our party to take evasive action especially as our position was in full view of the enemy prisoners. Captain Sutherland thereupon sent out a German prisoner to inform the attackers & displayed a white flag. Whilst this was going on I threw what arms I could including the captured machine gun & mortar over the cliffs into the sea. The German prisoners we had taken earlier in the day then took over …33
Writing about events years later, Hill was more elaborate, recalling that he had stood at the cliff edge gazing wistfully out at the empty sea:
I turned and found myself looking down the barrel of a German machine gun. I froze. My terror at that moment can only be described by the old clichés – my blood ran cold; my knees turned to water; the hairs on the back of my neck bristled. My gaze riveted on the finger on the trigger – one little squeeze and I would be lying, broken, at the bottom of the cliffs with my useless rifle and Tommy gun. I looked up and saw to my relief a grim faced Austrian from the “Gebirgsjager” (mountain troops) with the edelweiss as his cap badge. I thanked my lucky stars it wasn’t the infamous SS. He motioned me away from the cliff edge to join the others who, with their hands above their heads, were being searched by their captors.34
Hill and his comrades were escorted to the centrally located German Headquarters, where they were reunited with the majority of Olivey’s party:
One of the two NZs who had been wounded in the face [Trooper Mallett] died the next morning & was buried by the Germans with guard of honour. One other NZ was wounded in the foot & two others killed but by the time we were evacuated their bodies had not been recovered.35
After nightfall on Sunday, Olivey and Rupping made their way to the coast where, at around midnight, they were rescued by a motor launch. Five other escapees were picked up, all from Olivey’s section, including Bradfield, Captain Dick Lawson, one of the former prisoners escort and a signaller (probably 1 Regiment Special Air Service).
Had the LRDG held out for another night, their fate would surely have been decided the following day. Reinforcements had been ordered from Naxos to Levitha on the armed trawler GA 54 (ex-Greek Gláros), which reached the island notwithstanding a surface attack by HMS/M Surf. Jim Patch recalled:
On the morning of 25th we were taken down to the island’s main bay where the wreck of H.M.S. Hedgehog was still lying. A small gunboat had just pulled in and disembarked 150 German Alpine troops who wore the Edelweiss on their sleeves and spoke openly of going to invade Leros. The gunboat had been attacked by a British submarine and had suffered damage & casualties including 7 killed.36
Olivey returned to Levitha by motor launch on Monday night, but failed to locate any more survivors. Gunner Herbert Federmann in Section 1 had been killed in an ambush. In Section 2, four New Zealanders lost their lives: Trooper John T. Bowler and Trooper Douglas A. Davison (who have no known grave), Trooper Hector L. Mallett and Trooper Archibald J. Penhall. Thirty-seven were taken prisoner.37
The Long Range Desert Group never fully recovered from the disaster of Levitha. For the remaining New Zealanders, there would be far-reaching repercussions. The outcome of the battle undoubtedly influenced the New Zealand government’s decision to withdraw its countrymen from LRDG service. Two m
onths later, on 31 December 1943, the New Zealand Squadron was disbanded.
6
The War at Sea
October 1943
On 1 October the Royal Navy dispatched from Alexandria all available Fleet class destroyers to escort to Malta HMS Howe and King George V. This left only Hunt class destroyers in the Aegean at a time when it was known from intelligence reports that a German invasion of Kos was likely. Only after the German landing were destroyers and other warships at Malta and Taranto, Italy, ordered to proceed to the Levant. Six Lightning squadrons of the United States Twelfth Air Force were also released from the central Mediterranean and based at Gambut, in Libya, in support of the Royal Navy. This draining of resources from the main theatre of operations was precisely what General Eisenhower had hoped to avoid. On 6 October he wrote to Air Chief Marshal Tedder and agreed to continue to support the bombing of enemy airfields in Greece, which was beneficial both to Allied operations in the Aegean and the security of Adriatic ports in Italy, but stressed that he was currently unable to make further commitments to the Middle East:
Since the matter of assisting the Middle East has not been referred to me by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but has been handled as a matter of co-operation and upon suggestions from London, I suggest that you explain to the Chief of the Air Staff our whole situation so that he will understand that we are sympathetic to the needs of the Middle East but cannot possibly afford to meet them at the expense of jeopardising our own important campaign in Italy. If the decision to undertake Accolade depends upon a firm commitment for the diversion from our own operations of a material portion of our air force, then Accolade will have to be postponed. We will be inferior to the enemy in ground strength throughout the winter. Our air force is the asset that we count on to permit us taking the offensive in spite of this fact. Our first purpose must remain.1
Next day the British Prime Minister cabled President Roosevelt of the United States to outline his concerns and to petition his support for British efforts in the Aegean:
2. I believe it will be found that the Italian and Balkan peninsulas are militarily and politically united and that really it is one theatre with which we have to deal. It may indeed not be possible to conduct a successful Italian campaign ignoring what happens in the Aegean …
3. I have never wished to send an army into the Balkans but only by agents supplies and commandos to stimulate the intense guerrilla [activity] prevailing there. This may yield results measureless in their consequence at very small cost to main operations. What I ask for is the capture of Rhodes and the other islands of the Dodecanese. The movement northward of our Middle Eastern Air Forces and their establishment in these islands and possibly on the Turkish shore which last might well be obtained would force a diversion on the enemy far greater than that required of us. It would also offer the opportunity of engaging the enemy’s waning air power and wearing it down in a new region. This air power is all one and the more continually it can be fought the better.
4. Rhodes is the key to all this. I do not feel the present plan of taking it is good enough. It will require and is worth at least up to a first class division which can of course be replaced by static troops once the place is ours. Leros which for the moment we hold so precariously is an important naval fortress and once we are ensconced in this area air and light naval forces would have a most fruitful part to play. The policy should certainly not be pursued unless done with vigour and celerity requiring the best troops and adequate means. In this way the diversion from the main theatre would only be temporary while the results may well be of profound and lasting importance.
5. I beg you to consider this and not let it be brushed aside and all these possibilities lost to us in the critical months that lie ahead. Even if landing craft and assault ships on the scale of a division were withheld from the build-up of OVERLORD for a few weeks without altering the zero date it would be worthwhile. I feel we may easily throw away an immense but fleeting opportunity.2
Two days later, at a meeting between Eisenhower and the commanders-in-chief in the Mediterranean and Levant,3 it was argued that resources in the Mediterranean were insufficient to allow the Allies to undertake the capture of Rhodes and at the same time secure their immediate objectives in Italy. The postponement of Accolade was recommended until such time as weather conditions were favourable and sufficient forces became available subsequent to the capture of Rome. As to be expected, there were dissenters in the British camp who believed that Leros, Samos and Kastellorizo should continue to be held, together with other island outposts. However, by 10 October even the British Prime Minister had dramatically altered his stance. In a message to Roosevelt and Eisenhower, in which he reluctantly concurred with the overriding view, he appears to have virtually written off Leros:
2. I have now to face the situation in the Aegean. Even if we had decided to attack Rhodes on the 23rd [as General Wilson intended] Leros might well have fallen before that date. I have asked Eden to examine with General Wilson and Admiral [Sir Andrew] Cunningham whether with resources still belonging to the Middle East anything can be done to regain Kos on the basis that Turkey lets us use the landing grounds close by. If nothing can be worked out on these lines and unless we have luck tonight or tomorrow night in destroying one of the assaulting convoys, the fate of Leros is sealed.
3. I propose therefore to tell General Wilson that he is free if he judges the position hopeless, to order the garrison to evacuate by night taking with them all Italian officers and as many other Italians as possible and destroying the guns and defences. The Italians cannot be relied upon to fight and we have only 1200 men, quite insufficient to man even a small portion of the necessary batteries, let alone the perimeter. Internment in Turkey is not strict and may not last long; or they may get out along the Turkish coast.
4. I will not waste words in explaining how painful this decision is to me.4
While Allied military commanders and politicians debated, the German High Command concentrated on the practicalities of securing the rest of the Aegean. On the successful conclusion of Operation Eisbär (Polar Bear), Generalleutnant Müller prepared for Operation Leopard – the assault on Leros – using essentially the same units already on Kos. However, before they could be redeployed, the assault troops had to be relieved. Accordingly, on Wednesday, 6 October, IX./Festungsinfanteriebataillon5 embarked on the steamship Olympos and six Marinefährprähme (M.F.P) and set sail from Piraeus with the submarine-hunter UJ 2111 as escort. Allied aircraft spotted them shortly afterwards. An enemy report was also transmitted by T1 Patrol of the LRDG from an observation post on Kythnos in the Cyclades. At 4.01 a.m. on the 7th, HM submarine Unruly sighted the convoy off Kos and proceeded to Diving Stations. Exactly one hour later she fired four torpedoes, all of which missed their target. Unruly surfaced and at 6.00 a.m. opened fire with her deck gun. Fifty-four high-explosive rounds were expended; up to three landing craft were believed sunk, and hits were registered on at least two other vessels.
According to the after-action report of Oberleutnant zur See Schunack, commanding UJ 2111, the Olympos and an F-lighter were hit; the former veered away and the latter was set on fire and immobilised. When the rest of the convoy came under fire from the port side, the escort vessel led the five remaining landing craft in taking avoiding action by turning to starboard. Air support was called for, although the attacker had not yet been identified. Minutes later, the escort vessel began taking hits, resulting in a number of casualties. It was not until first light, some sixteen minutes after the first shots were fired, that two submarines were reported on the surface close to Levitha at a distance of 7,500 metres (8,200 yards). They were engaged by an F-lighter and UJ 2111 and ceased firing when one was apparently hit and began to emit smoke. The other dived (Unruly’s Log records that she dived at 7.05 a.m. when four aircraft were reported overhead – if there was a second submarine, her identity remains a mystery).6 UJ 2111 and the five undamaged F-Lighters continued at speed towards Kos
, by which time neither the Olympos nor the damaged landing craft were visible.
Meanwhile, the Royal Navy cruisers Sirius and Penelope in company with the destroyers Faulknor and Fury were racing towards the scene in response to an enemy report by Unruly. The destroyers intercepted and sunk Olympos and rejoined the cruisers in attacking the rest of the convoy. Schunack was alerted to the sight of the four warships approaching through the morning mist; UJ 2111 opened fire minutes later. The British warships responded by pairing off for a flanking attack. UJ 2111 continued firing, this time concentrating on the cruisers, before Schunack realised the hopelessness of the situation and gave the order to divert to Astipalaea in order to use the coast as cover. It was already too late. The cruisers concentrated on the U-Jäger while the destroyers turned their guns on the F-Lighters. In desperation, the Germans ignited a smoke buoy, but this did little to conceal their movements. UJ 2111 swerved as shells landed 200 yards on either side. The situation on board was desperate. The vessel was severely damaged, and with so much shrapnel covering the decks it was impossible to carry ammunition forward to keep the last remaining gun firing. The noise of battle was such that shouted orders could no longer be heard. As the opposing forces closed to 750 yards, Schunack had to accept the inevitable:
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