Churchill's Folly

by Rogers, Anthony; Jellicoe, Lord;

  Due to the encounter with BYMS 72 meanwhile, much time was lost before the western force could continue. With the coast defences alerted, the flotilla began taking artillery fire while still some 7 miles from Leros. Eighteen-year-old Fahnenjunker-Feldwebel Jürgen Bernhagen was i/c schwerer Zug (heavy weapons platoon) of 7./Gren.Rgt.16. He recalled the intense shelling and the ineffective return fire of escorting warships; how naval forces laid a smokescreen behind the landing craft, inadvertently silhouetting the vessels and thus presenting an easier target for the island batteries. And what might under normal circumstances be considered an auspicious omen was viewed very differently, when dolphins were seen accompanying Bernhagen’s landing craft. The harmless creatures were misidentified as sharks, promising fearful consequences for anyone forced to abandon a stricken vessel.

  After three attempts to reach Gurna Bay, with no let-up in the fire from onshore, Weissenborn withdrew the force to Kalymnos. Further attempts to reach Leros that day resulted in casualties, and increasing damage to assault craft and escort vessels. Each time, the convoy endured a gauntlet of deadly artillery fire. Soldiers and seamen were helpless as one shell after another roared through the air before detonating with a terrific crash. Every explosion sent up a hissing sheet of cold spray, and an otherwise calm sea was churned into a boiling fury. Dipping and rolling through the troughs, vibrating and shuddering as waves slammed against their hulls, the three flat-bottomed F-Lighters pressed on; the occupants off-balance, some overcome with the awful inescapable nausea of seasickness. Those crammed on board the two smaller I-Boote hardly fared better. Air support was requested, but even Stukas could not silence the guns. The situation was hopeless and eventually Weissenborn was forced once again to return to Kalymnos.

  Shortly before 6.45 a.m., Kampfgruppe Dörr turned back under heavy fire from shore. During a second attempt at 9.30 a.m., the leading F-lighter received two direct hits which left at least eight men dead and up to forty-nine wounded. When the guns switched fire to the accompanying Pi-La-Boot, it, too, was forced to veer away. Unable to press on under such conditions, the force withdrew towards Pharmako.

  Those landing craft that had managed to disembark their troops faced a hazardous return trip to Kalymnos. Some were unable to break out and instead had to seek shelter close to the coast of Leros where, at least, they were safe from artillery fire.

  It had been the intention of Generalleutnant Müller to land each group simultaneously and to seize control of central Leros before defending forces could recover from their initial surprise. Instead, only part of the invasion force had been put ashore and not necessarily at the designated areas.

  With troops prevented from landing on the southern coast, the proposed drop zone for the Fallschirmjäger could not be secured. Kampfgruppe Kühne, with approximately 430 men, was en route from mainland Greece when the air armada was met over Levitha by two Arado floatplanes and advised with red flares to abort the drop. The feelings of the paratroopers inside the aircraft can hardly be imagined. To sit in cramped discomfort, weighed down with parachute and equipment, awaiting the stomach-churning order to prepare to jump is one thing. To be told that the jump has been postponed is another: indescribable relief is mixed with the awful realisation that one will almost certainly have to repeat the whole process before long. Sure enough, no sooner had the Ju 52 transports landed than they were ordered to take off and return to Leros.

  At Appetici, the Küstenjäger had begun their ascent. The Germans remained unseen by observers on the summit until they neared their objective, at which point they began to attract small arms fire. The second-in-command at Battery Lago, Sottotenente Corrado Spagnolo, led the defence until he was mortally wounded later in the day. When the seriousness of the situation became evident, a navy platoon under Tenente ‘Ercole’ Rocchi rushed to assist from nearby Pandeli Castle. The Germans called for air support and by 9.30 a.m. two of the gun emplacements had been taken. Under the battery commander, Capitano Ernesto Nasti, the two remaining guns continued firing.

  As the Küstenjäger were struggling up the steep slopes of Appetici, Lieutenant Ted Johnson of the Royal Irish Fusiliers was informed by his runner, Fusilier Roberts, that he was wanted at ‘C’ Company Headquarters. This was situated in a cave on the side of Meraviglia overlooking Pandeli Bay. There, Johnson was told by his company commander, Major Ben Barrington, that as part of the battalion reserve company, 13 Platoon was to spearhead a counter-attack and re-take Appetici. This would have been a daunting prospect even for an experienced officer. Johnson would be taking his company into action for the first time. Furthermore, no one had reconnoitred likely routes to Appetici, or seen the ground that was to be fought over. The platoon moved out at about 8.45 a.m. In an effort to avoid being spotted by the enemy on Appetici and due to the ever-present Ju 87s, Johnson led a cautious descent towards the outskirts of Leros town (Platanos) before ascending the lower south-western slope of Appetici. As pre-arranged, he was met by an Italian officer, and together with Fusilier Roberts escorted further up the slope in order to assess the situation. Little was achieved by this, so Johnson brought forward his men and the platoon made its way to the summit, took up fire positions and awaited the arrival of the rest of the company. It was already 10.00 a.m. and although they had been subjected to air attacks, the Faughs had still not contacted enemy ground forces. When Major Barrington arrived he ordered Johnson to push on towards Battery Lago whose four gun emplacements were by then reported to be in German hands. Johnson recalled:

  My immediate task was to take the first and nearest emplacement and thereafter go for the next one if possible. While one of the other platoons went for ground on my left flank the third platoon was kept in reserve at this stage. After much unaimed covering fire I found myself with one of my sections in possession of the first emplacement. Until this moment I had still not seen any of my opponents, nor could any of my men give me any accurate reports of sightings in spite of much hostile fire cracking past us. Suddenly my section commander Lance/Sergeant John Caldwell, who was beside me and who was trying to get a sight of a target, fell back. He was shot cleanly through the forehead and had died instantly. My immediate reaction was to push on out of that unhealthy gun emplacement and take John Caldwell’s section further down the slope in the direction of the next gun emplacement with all weapons blazing.

  This second emplacement was not occupied by the enemy nor did I see any of its former Italian gun crew. It was not a place to hang about in, as it had already been well hit by dive bombing and I recall running and jumping over the boulder and scrub strewn ground in a frenzy of zigzag movements to cover another thirty yards or so of ground before diving into scrub and rocks where we reorganized and remained. The platoon on my left had a similar experience. Its platoon sergeant, Sergeant [Daniel J.] O’Connell, was badly wounded during this action and later died of his wounds. The action as a whole had the effect of taking back the summit area of Appetici and at least two gun positions.15

  Lieutenant Johnson and his men stayed in the area for the rest of the day under constant Stuka attack, but without suffering further casualties. Lower down, the Küstenjäger took advantage of the sparse cover afforded by the rocky terrain to avoid exposing themselves to British sharpshooters – and as a precaution against their own bombs.

  Three miles north-west of Appetici, there was fighting for several hours as 18 Platoon ‘D’ Company of the Buffs attempted to repel the half-company of II. Gren.Rgt.65. The heights overlooking the east side of Palma Bay were defended by 8 Section led by Corporal Bertie Reed. When the Germans attempted to break out of the confined beachhead, Corporal Reed was killed. The section withdrew inland to the area of Point 95.

  The platoon commander, Lieutenant Eric J. Ransley, was with the remainder of his men at Blefuti Bay. That morning, an overhead shell burst had left the officer with shrapnel injury to his left arm. He would have the wound treated later. Now Ransley was about to confront an enemy twice the strength of his own forc
e, for which he would later be awarded the Military Cross:

  Leaving 7 Section behind to continue covering Blefuti Bay the rest of 18 Platoon was dispatched to Della Palma [Palma Bay] to restore the situation making its way to the track junction just below Pt 95 and meeting up with 8 Section where Pte LAMBERT informed the Platoon Commander of the death of CPL REED and of the substantial numbers of the enemy.

  An initial probe over the crest of Pt 95 met with fierce resistance from the enemy and CPL [Ernest C.] COWELL was lost. Radio communications through 38 set to Company Headquarters were not working and indeed throughout the battle communications were exceedingly difficult. Following a message by runner to Company Headquarters reinforcements and additional 2 inch mortar bombs arrived.

  Subsequently in conjunction with mortaring the enemy in the area south of the beach an attack was launched north and east of Pt 58 at the same time holding the ground just west of Pt 95 … As the flanking attack went in and the section under CPL WHITE went forward from Pt 95, a German Officer appeared …16

  As he advanced, Ransley took in the scene: the enemy officer, all but deafened by mortar fire stood without bothering to raise his hands, and closeby, the bloodied corpse of a young German soldier. Keeping his Thompson sub-machine gun levelled, Ransley requested the officer’s surrender. The exchange was witnessed by Feldwebel Wehrs, whose account continues:

  The British were positioned a short distance from us further uphill [on Clidi] and gave us a hard time. Sometimes, you could even see them as they handled their guns. They had trouble depressing the gun barrels to aim at us. The shells went whizzing past closely above our heads. But they succeeded with their mortars and light weapons. A runner a few metres from me was hit. ‘Herr Feldwebel, I am dying’, he said to me with blood gushing from his mouth after each word – a truly extraordinary situation. Eventually, Feldwebel Steinbach managed with another comrade to climb on to the ledge on the right side and once there had to defend himself with pistol and hand grenade against the Tommies, who … all of a sudden were among us. ‘Wehrs, now what?’ Lt. Drabant exclaimed in his characteristic Silesian accent. ‘I suppose this might be the end,’ I replied. Then Lt. Drabant said to the British: ‘You are surrounded by 2,000 Germans.’ This was met with a ready response: ‘Yes, and behind them there are 10,000 English.’17

  Afterwards, a rumour circulated among the British that there was a misunderstanding over who should be surrendering to whom. However, Ransley refutes this:

  there was no argument between myself and the German Officer (who understood English). My exact words were “You are completely surrounded and I must ask you to surrender” upon which he handed me his Luger [pistol]. I do however recall that in a later conversation with our IO [Lieutenant P.F.] FIELDEN he said that during his interrogation the German Officer said that or suggested that someone had displayed a white flag. If so this could only have been the Italian gunners holed up in their underground gun emplacement [P.L. 899 west of Palma Bay] and of which we would have been unaware.18

  The Buffs were credited with taking at least forty-seven prisoners, including three officers. However, Leutnant Drabant was the only German officer known to have landed at Palma Bay. He and his men were escorted off the battlefield, and the latter incarcerated in a tunnel used as a temporary holding area. Wehrs recalled of his captors:

  They did not seem to be used to this kind of situation as they allowed us to throw into the sea behind us the bolts of our rifles, MPs and machine guns, thus rendering our weapons useless. I still had my pistol but while on our way into a tunnel, I managed to get rid of it. Soon, Lt. D. became separated from us. Naturally, a Tommy was posted outside our tunnel. But these sentries did not feel comfortable at all, and one of them indicated to me: Tomorrow, maybe you will be on guard here, and I will be sitting in there, pointing at the tunnel.19

  In the meantime, the rest of the Bataillon and the remainder of II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 had pushed inland towards Mount Vedetta, from where Captain Olivey’s force atop Clidi was targeted by sniper, mortar and machine-gun fire. In view of the strategic importance of Clidi, Brigadier Tilney had earlier decided to strengthen the position with the Fortress Reserve ‘C’ Company of the King’s Own. With insufficient transport available, most of the reinforcements arrived only after a tiring march. After conferring with Olivey, the company commander, Major W.P.T. Tilly, positioned 13 Platoon with two Vickers guns atop a ridge in front of an Italian barracks situated some 350 yards west of Battery Ciano. No sooner had the defence plan been implemented than the area was subjected to mortar and machine-gun fire and low-level dive-bombing. An attempt was made to counter the enemy advance, as 14 Platoon was directed left and 15 Platoon right to Point 192. The plan went awry almost from the start. Olivey recalled:

  The platoon to the left hardly got forward at all, before they were under fire and withdrew to the hill at the rear. The platoon on the right were far too far back and I asked if they could not go forward – this was ordered … about half an hour later, I saw them about 1000 yds. to the right and quite 800 ft. below us. They would never be on the neck in time and would come under the direct fire of the enemy when they started to climb up again. I offered to send my Sgt. down to show them the best way up, but Major M. [sic: Major Tilly] thought they would find it themselves. What happened to this party eventually, I do not know, but I know they never got round to the right. The platoon on the left was now brought over to the right and got forward as far as the trenches. Some mortar fire rather upset them and I found the whole lot streaming back to the hill in the rear. I pleaded with their officer, but to no effect I fear.20

  Olivey conveyed the situation to his CO, Lieutenant Colonel Jake R. Easonsmith. In response, a signal was received advising the infantry to conduct a forward reconnaissance. According to Olivey, ‘no-one wanted the job’ so he took it on himself, returning to report enemy locations and troop movements.21 At 10.45 a.m. Fortress Headquarters acknowledged the presence of German troops on Points 217 and 188 on the Vedetta feature, as well as on Point 192. The latter is part of a prominent ridgeline that extends from the coast, north-west to Point 278 and Clidi. Indicating, perhaps, the whereabouts of 15 Platoon and lead elements of Kampfgruppe von Saldern, half an hour later, ‘a considerable amount of small arms fire and mortar’ was reported around Point 278 and on the southern face of the feature.22

  Fortress Headquarters now ordered Clidi to be held at all costs. Most of the Italians had fled their posts, and most of the King’s Own were occupying positions further west. At Battery Ciano, only number 2 gun remained in action, manned by Sottotenente Ferruccio Pizzigoni and an Italian OR. Olivey detailed three men to assist them. The Germans seemed to sense victory. From a forward trench they could clearly be seen – and heard – as they called on their adversaries to surrender:

  The Commander of their detachment was standing in the open shouting “Hi, Aussie”. Bennett got his Bren trained on him and we saw him drop. I left Bennett with his M.G. and promised to send another man to support him. I sent [Rifleman Louis] Oelofse. Not long afterwards, Bennett received a bullet in the flash eliminator of his gun. This sprayed him with bits of metal and blood was pouring from his face.23

  Rifleman Andy Bennett was sent to the dressing station. Before long, the LRDG suffered another casualty:

  Sgt. C.P. [Calder-Potts] was now with Ox [Lance Corporal Don Coventry] in the trench on the right and was able to engage the enemy on the hill opposite. The enemy soon spotted his position and had a sniper trained on him. Sgt. C.P. received a splatter of rock in the face which necessitated his withdrawal for the time being.24

  At some point, Battery Ciano received welcome reinforcements when 13 Platoon of the King’s Own was moved up, occupying trenches overlooking enemy positions. The move did not go unnoticed by the Germans, however, and soon attracted the attention of snipers.

  Closeby, Pizzigoni, who seemed impervious to danger, continued to harass the enemy, having temporarily exchanged his artillery piece f
or a machine gun:

  2nd Lieut. P. [Pizzigoni] was fighting like a demon. He had now carried the Scotti out into the part where he could engage the enemy in front and he was busy firing this gun completely in the open and with great courage. An enemy gun jammed this gun shortly afterward, however, and he returned to his number 2 gun …25

  On the lower northern slopes of Point 112, south-west of Clidi, Captain Ashley M. Greenwood, liaison officer between the LRDG and Major Jellicoe, had that morning joined Major Alan Redfern and three LRDG patrols. These were operating in conjunction with SBS, both formations having been tasked by Brigadier Tilney with providing a mobile force for reconnaissance, patrolling and to combat paratrooper landings. Shortly afterwards, Captain Alan Denniff, commanding Y Patrol, was dispatched with four ORs to Partheni Bay on an unproductive search for enemy activity. Soon, Lieutenant Keith A. Balsillie and several SBS arrived, after having landed at Leros that morning just ahead of the invasion fleet. The combined force comprised about twenty-eight LRDG officers and ORs, some thirty SBS, three Greek officers and two Greek ORs. Experienced soldiers all, they watched and waited, listening to the firing echoing around the hills north and east of their position, knowing it was only a matter of time before the battle reached them, too.

  Second Lieutenant R.F. (Frank) White of ‘A’ (New Zealand) Squadron LRDG was in command of ten men at an observation post near Battery San Giorgio on Mount Scumbarda. Although not directly affected by the fighting in the north, the area was subjected to dive-bombing attacks. At about midday, White reported:

  During the lull in the bombing on our end of Island I went with Pte GREGORY to see what the position at the A.A. battery was. Their barracks had been completely destroyed. The easternmost gun had had a direct hit the barrel lying up against the gun pit and the rest of the guns had all been put out of action with punctured barrels or elevating and traversing gear destroyed. Except for the gun on the N.W. face which only required stones and debris removing from it. Two M.G’s were also alright: The battery had had heavy casualties some badly wounded had already been brought down to a cave near our post. We counted 7 dead around their guns and shelters. Interviewed the Officer in Command of the battery who refused to fire the remaining gun. So I took him under escort across to the SAN GORGIO [sic] battery and through Gnr [William] MORRISON (Signaller) as German interpreter and ITALIAN Cpl MAREO [sic], who showed considerable co-operation the whole time I was on the post. I got the ITALIAN to understand they had to get the gun in action again. This they did until the afternoon of the 13th …26