Although two of its platoons had disappeared during the night, having no doubt lost their way in the dark, ‘A’ Company had managed to get as far as the first gun position before German machine gunners found their range. Progress was slow. ‘D’ Company had also got into difficulties, having to resort to platoon attacks under machine-gun and mortar fire. On top of the feature close fighting only served to confuse the situation. Just before dawn, the Kommandeur of 9./Gren.Rgt.440 led a counter-attack, pushing back the King’s Own.
At least one officer and seventy or so ORs remustered afterwards. Fifty-five British and forty-five Italians were taken prisoner. The death of Lieutenant Colonel French was a devastating blow and not just for his own battalion. Brigadier Robert Tilney later wrote:
… when we lost Maurice we lost the battle. That sounds, maybe, something rather big to say, but I think it would be confirmed by the majority of my command at the time. I recommended him for a posthumous “Mention in Dispatches” which is the utmost one can do for one who died in circumstances when the award of a Victoria Cross is only forgone for lack of positive evidence to support it – I believe he probably earned it.2
In war, it is not unknown for men to anticipate their own death, and it is evident from a letter to his family before the battle that Lieutenant Colonel French had a sense of foreboding (see Appendix 6). The battalion adjutant, Captain H.W. Dougall, also noticed a change in his commanding officer:
I think he had a presentiment that he would not come back. Before going out on the operation we persuaded him to rest and he slept for about 40 minutes – the first sleep for 48 hours. When leaving Bn HQ he looked at me and said “Goodbye, Dougie”. This worried me for our usual greeting when he was going anywhere was “Well, Faugh a Ballagh”. I do believe he knew something would happen.3
At 6.00 a.m. on Sunday morning, Kampfgruppe von Saldern prepared to push from Rachi towards Meraviglia with 2. and 4. Kompanie of the Fallschirmjäger reinforced by two Züge of II./Gren.Rgt.16. Troops from II./Gren.Rgt.65 were also deployed along the coast road of Alinda Bay, while the larger part of II. Gren.Rgt.16 was tasked with securing a line from Point 22, on the road between Quirico and Germano, through Germano and Rachi. II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 with elements of III./Gren.Rgt.440 and 6./Gren.Rgt.65 was to establish a line from Mount Vedetta through Clidi, Quirico and the area south. The paratroopers were covered during their assault by a captured Italian anti-aircraft gun (almost certainly P.L. 211 on Rachi), and by 7.00 a.m. had reached Points 108 and 113 north and west of Meraviglia’s summit. Two Kompanien of II./Gren.Rgt.65 also advanced east and established a line from Santa Marina on the coast to Point 108.
Further moves by the Germans were thwarted when they were forced to call off their offensive and re-deploy in response to a simultaneous effort by the British to recover lost ground with the intention of destroying German forces in the Rachi area and containing those on Appetici. Even as the Fallschirmjäger battled their way along the western slopes of Meraviglia, Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden’s attack against Hauptmann Gawlich’s force on Clidi was already underway. Led by Major Ernest A. Hole, and supported by artillery and mortars, ‘B’ Company of the Buffs advanced east from Point 252 and by 7.25 a.m. had taken the height and with it some forty prisoners.
For their part, the LRDG were tasked initially with clearing a cave just below the east side of Point 320. Captain John Olivey ordered three of his men to keep the occupants busy while he attempted to flush them out with grenades:
It didn’t quite work out like that, as a Jerry with a sub-machine gun engaged me while another engaged them. Still, I was able to see where he was and reach him with grenades. I prepared four and had them, ready, next time Jerry came out I dropped a grenade at his feet. It exploded after the correct time, I dropped another with the same results. This brought cries of ‘commarade’ [sic: ‘Kamerad’] – I dropped another. They now set up a shout – I dropped another, this time with the pin in so it would not explode, gave them time to all be shouting again and dropped myself in front of them. They all put their hands up and looked surprised as I picked up the grenade. We had captured 15 Germans in this cave and we trooped them all up to the top. Some of them were badly wounded and all were very shaken. It was a good bit of work and we felt pleased with ourselves.4
Olivey’s patrol was then divided into three-man teams to guide the Buffs in an area sweep. The British took a number of casualties, including Second Lieutenant Thomas L. Morgan, who was killed. By this time, Olivey had decided to return to Point 320:
I contented myself in now defending the fort and visited my old office again. Everything had been turned upside down. My photos and frames had gone – everything of any value had been taken. The place was full of dust, grenades and dead – some Jerry had spilt a tin of fish over my bed and it stank of rotten oil. I put on two men to clean the dead out and clean the place up a bit.5
During the day Olivey had been joined by additional LRDG who arrived with Second Lieutenant Cross. When the subaltern returned to the Gurna Bay area, five of his men remained as reinforcements at Clidi.
It had been originally intended for ‘B’ Company of the Buffs to continue down to the north shore of Alinda and link up with the battalion’s ‘C’ Company pushing east via Quirico. Instead, ‘B’ Company would spend the day trying to dislodge the enemy from the high ground, for as soon as Clidi was overrun, II./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 was ordered to re-take the height. An assault troop was formed with eighteen men (mainly wireless operators, clerks and kitchen personnel) under the command of Oberleutnant Kleinert and at 11.00 a.m. launched an attack from Mount Vedetta, south past Point 228 and towards Point 278. While passing a trench line south-east of 228, one man was badly wounded by sniper fire from the dominating massif of Point 320; the rest of the force immediately went to ground. Soon they were joined by another Stosstrupp led by Leutnant Klein. He agreed to try to reach Clidi from the south. No sooner had Klein’s men moved out, however, than they were engaged from the southern slopes of 228. Kleinert’s force responded by providing covering fire, which, in turn, attracted the attention of a machine gunner who accounted for three men killed and four wounded. The survivors withdrew from the exposed valley and ascended the rocky slopes leading to the razor-edged Point 278.
After regrouping, Leutnant Klein’s Zug together with a ten-man Stossreserve launched an assault on 228 and pushed the British into a nearby ravine south-west of the height. The British on 320 responded with mortar and machine-gun fire, forcing the Germans to seek cover on a hill behind 228. Although the enemy had failed to recapture Point 320, neither did the Buffs manage to advance past Point 192. Several Germans had been wounded, three of them seriously, including Leutnant Klein. Among the British dead was Major Ernest Hole. Lieutenant Bill Taylor took over as company commander for the remainder of the day. Eventually the Buffs fell back on Olivey’s position, which was to remain in Allied hands for the duration of the battle.
By midday, ‘C’ Company of the Buffs under Major V.G. ‘Pistol’ Bourne had taken nearby Quirico and a number of prisoners (accounts vary from ‘over 30’ to more than seventy).6 The company proceeded east to Alinda Bay before changing direction towards Villa Belleni and, after skirmishing through the gardens and houses on the west side of Alinda, penetrated the line held by I. Zug of 7. Gren Rgt.16. Bourne recalled:
When we reached the coast we turned south. We encountered small pockets of Germans and took a few prisoners. It was at this time that 15 platoon commanded by Lt. Gore was fired upon by Germans from inside the hospital at Alinda Bay [Villa Belleni]. Lt. Gore asked me what he should do. I told him that he must silence them and told him to fire one round from his P.I.A.T. at the building. This was done and enabled us to clear the Germans out. The Doctors naturally objected strongly. We gathered more prisoners and I had their arms collected and thrown into the sea.7
Prevented by communication problems from requesting close artillery support, the Buffs were unable to exploit the situation, and i
n the face of determined resistance the advance inevitably faltered.
In the morning, Brigadier Tilney had briefed the commanding officers of the King’s Own and the Faughs – the latter now led by Major Bill Shephard – for an attack on Rachi. Details of the plan vary depending on the source, but essentially called for ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies of the Faughs, assisted by ‘B’ and ‘HQ’ Companies of the King’s Own, to clear the ridge north-west to Point 100, while ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents, with 16 Platoon of the Faughs attached, advanced west past the feature to Germano. Once Rachi was clear, the Fortress Commander proposed personally to coordinate its organisation. Tilney recorded that the attack commenced at 9.30 a.m., with ‘C’ Company of the Faughs as spearhead making good headway and taking a number of prisoners. The battalion’s ‘B’ Company and the Royal West Kents were ordered to advance along either side of Rachi, while the brigadier went forward with an artillery OP party to the southern end of the ridge. However, the two King’s Own companies were delayed by enemy pockets overlooked by ‘C’ Company in the haste to move forward. The focal point of resistance was a small knoll between Rachi and Meraviglia – Point 97 (‘Searchlight Hill’). According to Tilney, when he went ahead to reconnoitre he became caught up in the battle, and a company commander of the King’s Own who was with him was killed.8 The fighting ended that evening with the feature in British hands. An effort to take the adjacent Point 109 failed when it met with a counter-attack by German paratroopers together with Headquarters staff and 8. Kompanie of II. Gren.Rgt.16.
Lieutenant Ted Johnson recalled that ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies of the Faughs were detailed to advance from ‘Charing Cross’ along the low ground west of Rachi. ‘B’ Company had a separate objective to that of ‘C’ Company, whose task was to occupy a former position of ‘D’ Company at the western end of the ridge. H-Hour was originally set for 8.00 a.m., but put back to allow company orders to be held. In the interim, the Faughs were spotted and bombed by Ju 87 Stukas, albeit without incurring casualties. At last, the order came to move out:
We advanced down the road at a steady double to the Italian barracks on the corner. As prearranged ‘B’ Coy then swung out to the R. flank & I brought my Pl on to the L. flank. There was the hell of a noise going on & people seemed to be shouting from all angles. The pace was pretty fast but I was determined to get on down the road. We were being given good support by M.G.s & Bofors firing at ground targets, the shots seemed to be just passing over our heads, but I don’t suppose they really were anywhere near us. By now we were half way down the road with our men rather badly strung out. There were only about six men up to the fore so we checked the pace, gathered up a few extra men & made a final push on to 16 Pl D. Coy’s old positions just below pt 100. We occupied the positions & waited for Barrington to follow us up with the rest of the Coy. My force was now numbering about seven. Sgt Fitzgerald, Sgt. Wallace, Fus Long, Cpl Neill are the only names I can recall.9
Corporal Vic ‘Taffy’ Kenchington was a stretcher-bearer in the Faughs with no prior experience of an infantry assault against a real enemy:
I was feeling very nervous and shaky and wishing I was somewhere else, as suspense and fear of the unexpected took hold. The troops in front of us went forward at a steady trot, with weapons at the high port. We could hear the ‘swish-swish’ of the German mortars and the buzzing of the spandau bullets coming our way. Red Verey lights from the German positions signalled the Stukas to come in with 50 kilogram bombs and MGs. A bomb landed about three yards from me – we had taken cover behind a small wall – and I felt a bang on my back, and I really thought that I had been hit, but the bomb fin had hit the wall above me and then landed on my back, so I just got a singed shirt and bruising. The Stukas seemed to be lined up just like a ‘taxi-rank’, awaiting the Verey lights and down they would come.10
Lieutenant Clifford Clark observed proceedings from a vantage point on San Giovanni. He noted that the operation involved a company of the Faughs together with a company of the King’s Own, and the majority of ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents under Captain Percy Flood, who was directed to attack north and link up with the Buffs:
Percy collected the Company and moved down the hill. He left me behind with the six Vickers, and the spare Bren L.M.G. in each section, nine in all (we had two Brens per section for defence), to cover the attack of the R. I. F. Coy. and King’s Own Coy. along the ridge, and also, if necessary, our own Company. I was feeling particularly bloody [Clark was suffering with malaria], but helped myself a bit by manning one of the Vickers and belting anything I could see. We got some grand shoots.
The two Company attack along the ridge was fierce going, the parachutists time and again directing the bombers overhead on to the attacking troops, using their dive bombers as artillery. They used a system of coloured Verey lights and coloured smoke. Eventually the ridge was cleared, except for a few men holding out in a ruined building on the top. We mortared it heavily, and I put a thousand rounds into it, but they clung on. They were tough babies! We let up on it for a bit, and I saw a few of our chaps crawling up to within a few yards of the building. Jerry had seen them, however, and a couple stood up and threw grenades into the middle of our chaps. They must have been hit, as when the smoke had cleared they remained motionless. I couldn’t help them at all, they were too near …
Percy and the Company got into the valley, and half way across, before they came under fire, but they were in good cover and only a couple were wounded. I was in touch with him by wireless the whole time, and he reported back fully, including names of casualties. Percy was slightly wounded in the leg, but not enough to put him out.11
It was not long before Taffy Kenchington was responding to the urgent need of the wounded:
Soon, we got the call: ‘Stretcher bearers!’ We ran forward to our first wounded, passing men in statuesque postures who we knew would never get up again. They had that grey-ish white, or pale blue-green tinge with blood seeping from nose or ears, although we could see no real wound. They had been killed by blast. We reached our first wounded man. He was from the Buffs [sic: the Buffs as a formation were not involved in this attack] and had a very bad scalp wound. It took a shell dressing to cover it. I gave him a shot of morphine, as he was babbling a lot of gibberish, and was relieved to get him back to the R.A.P. as he had lost control of his bowels.
Soon, we were off again, treating the badly injured first and then bringing the walking wounded back with us, including Germans and the odd Italian. We had to treat the really badly injured with extra care. Some were calling for their mothers and were in a pitiful state.12
In response to the Allied threat, Hauptmann Philipp Aschoff had ordered III. Zug of 7./Gren.Rgt.16 to secure the western side of Rachi. Lieutenant Johnson and his party could advance no further:
When Barrington finally joined us I told him that the top of pt 100 was held strongly by M.G.’s & in view of our small numbers he asked O.C. 1/K. Own to send a Pl. to attack. Meantime he brought a 3” Mortar detachment down to our position & throughout the day it mortared under great difficulties, having to use Fitzgerald & Wallace as spotters. When 1/K.O. came down the road & were preparing for their attack they were heavily sniped & as chaps approached one corner of the feature in particular they fell in their tracks. The road was now well covered by the enemy & although Wallace, Fitzgerald & myself crawled up as near as possible to the enemy to try & pick one or two off, we were shot at by another position further round RACHI & had to retire. I don’t quite know how one particular burst missed my foot. Barrington then sent me to contact O.C. 1/K.O. & find out his plan for the capture of this feature. I was away for about 2 hours, having to take a fairly roundabout route to avoid the road area. O.C. 1/K.O. held his o. group on the west slopes of S/L hill & decided to attack pt 100 using 2 Pls at dusk, our small force was to be ignored except for what supporting fire we could give by observation. It was at the o. group that somebody [Lieutenant Robert King of the King’s Own] gave
me half a tin of cold M&V [stew] & I thought it was the most wonderful thing I’d tasted for ages. I got back to our little force about half an hour before the attack was due to go in. We gave the feature all we’d got & a damn good mortar barrage of smoke & H.E. We couldn’t see the attack go in or for that matter hear it but soon after zero hour we withdrew back to our Coy area again as from O.C. 1/K.O.’s orders we were being ignored except for supporting fire.13
Elsewhere on the feature, ‘B’ Company of the Faughs made good progress until being slowed by close-quarter fighting, and by late afternoon both it and ‘C’ Company had returned to their original positions. There were considerable losses in ‘B’ Company, with at least three men killed and several wounded, including the OC, Captain C.R. Mason, who was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant T. West. Major Ben Barrington was also wounded and command of ‘C’ Company now passed to Lieutenant Johnson.
Earlier in the day, two SBS patrols had been sent to Germano in order to protect the right (east) flank. It would seem that enemy forces also occupied part of the feature. For at dawn, ‘D’ Company of the Buffs under Major E.W. Tassell had advanced southward before encountering strong resistance in the area. ‘D’ Company attacked and took the position shortly before midday. Soon after, ‘D’ Company was able to marry up with ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents, which was then placed under Lieutenant Colonel Iggulden’s command. Subsequently, both companies were directed to nearby San Nicola, with ‘D’ Company on the right, and ‘B’ Company left. Wireless problems meant there was no close artillery support during the attack against an enemy who had made a strongpoint of every house in the area. The British infantry were prevented even from penetrating the village outskirts.
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