Then came a sudden reversal of the situation. An enemy mortar barrage opened up on this feature, supported by automatic fire aimed at surrendering Germans and advancing British alike. Those of 15 platoon who had reached the top of the ridge also came under short-range small arms fire from prepared positions which the ridge had concealed from us. Several of us were wounded, and those who could withdrew to the relative safety of the coast road. We were lucky to have reached our objective, but had no chance to consolidate possession of it.
All this happened in a very short time. At least twenty Germans were disarmed and escorted away as prisoners, and I understand that they were embarked the same day with some of our wounded on a ship for Alexandria. But our triumph was short-lived.
I was shot through the chest and through the right thumb. Neither wound caused any pain at the time, but the chest wound flattened me with a thump like the rap of a hammer, and left me gasping for breath, believing that my end had come …15
The remnants of the platoon attempted to escape, withdrawing down the east slope – and directly into an Italian minefield, incurring further casualties.
On Rachi the Royal West Kents had persevered in their attacks on Point 100. No more than a dozen or so men reached their objective. In the final assault, Captain Grimshaw was wounded in the wrist, and Major Butler was shot and paralysed in his right leg. Realising that he could not hope to hold the position with a handful of riflemen, Butler dispatched a runner to chase ‘A’ Company’s Bren gunners, who by then should have been following up the advance.
The runner returned to report that the C.O. of the regiment [King’s Own] through which I had attacked had refused to allow my men and their Brens to leave his Battalion area. I was absolutely shattered. I had been obliged to leave my Brens to provide my covering fire because the men of the regiment supposed to support me had been fighting more or less continuously for three days without sleep and seemed reluctant to put their heads up; and now their C.O. was keeping my men and their Brens to protect his own positions.16
Left with little choice, Butler called for stretcher-bearers for the wounded and ordered those who were able to withdraw. At dusk, 7./Gren.Rgt.65 re-occupied Point 36, enabling German forces to regain their hold along a line south to Points 100 and 109.
Events on Rachi and along Alinda’s shore overshadowed a follow-up attack at 2.00 p.m. by the Germans on Appetici. After fighting for more than two hours, and supported by Stukas and mortar fire, the Küstenjäger, 6./Lw.-Jäger-Rgt.22 and 9. Gren.Rgt.440 overran 9 Platoon of the Faughs and took Pandeli castle. Lieutenant Colonel C.W.M. Ritchie, G1 at Brigade Headquarters, was inspecting defences at Meraviglia at the time:
I appeared to be the only living soul at the SE end of the hill top and in fact was the only person firing at the enemy who were entering the Castle unopposed at 1615 hrs. (If the very dirty Bren I was using had not kept jamming I could have caused a lot of casualties).17
With the enemy now in control of the castle feature, the scene was set for a link-up with Kampfgruppe von Saldern, whose forces were preparing to push east via Platanos to Pandeli for an assault on Meraviglia from the north and north-east.
It was an altogether different picture for the Royal West Kents. With the remnants of 13 and 15 Platoons scattered between the coast and Rachi, and with no sign of the whereabouts of 14 Platoon, Tarleton was unable to press on. He therefore ordered a withdrawal to the area of Battalion Headquarters – situated on a spur that ran north from the defended slopes of Meraviglia to the sea. Among those left on the battlefield was Lieutenant Browne:
It was getting dark and cold. Germans were wandering around, assuming, I suppose, that we were all dead. I have never been more thankful for my limited knowledge of German as I was able to catch occasional snatches of conversation. I tried to reach my water-bottle, but it was too difficult. As a soldier came by I said, “Wasser”. He felt around in my equipment and took my revolver and my water-bottle, but made no attempt to give me a drink. I heard his voice say “Hier ist ein Englander der spricht deutsch.” A group of soldiers gathered around. Then I heard the authoritative voice of an officer saying “Er muss liegen blieben”, and they all moved away. By now it was nearly dark and all hope was receding. But then again the situation was reversed. Two orderlies loosed my equipment, bandaged my wound, and led me, with infinite care, a few yards down the slope to the backyard of the nearest house.
They brought two other wounded men – Privates [John] Chuter and Mountford – and made us as comfortable as they could on the floor of this one-roomed chalet. A few hours before we had been shooting at each other. The ordinary people, of whom armies are made up, experience immense relief in being able to return to their ordinariness.18
As for the expected push by the Buffs: Colonel Tarleton would later claim that Brigadier Tilney had altered this aspect of the battle plan without his knowledge so that, ‘the operations by the BUFFS were now to be limited to demonstrating only, in the direction of ST. NICOLA and ALINDA BAY HOSPITAL.’ He goes on to state that at 4.00 p.m. ‘D’ Company of the Buffs and ‘B’ Company of the Royal West Kents resumed their attack on San Nicola, but progress was slow and the troops were recalled after two hours and relieved by LRDG.19 Second Lieutenant Pav Pavlides of the LRDG noted that the Buffs had been warned to expect a series of Verey lights, indicating that Rachi was in British hands, whereupon ‘D’ Company was to have moved east to the outskirts of San Quaranta/San Nicola. ‘C’ Company would then advance and clear the Villa Belleni area. No signals were forthcoming, however, and the Buffs still occupied the same positions that evening, by which time the strength of the battalion’s three forward companies was reported to be just 160 men. Later still, a patrol from ‘C’ Company was directed towards Villa Belleni, only to return to Point 81 after meeting with strong resistance.20
That night, as the Royal West Kents’ padre, Captain G.M. Young, assisted with the wounded, he unexpectedly encountered a column of enemy troops. Captain Young was in the process of identifying himself when he was interrupted by the arrival of a stretcher party carrying Major Read. On being challenged, one of the stretcher-bearers, Private Bett, immediately opened fire causing the column, which he later estimated at company strength, to break up in disarray. Bett seized the opportunity to escape, and subsequently reported the incident to the former 2 i/c ‘C’ Company, now OC, Captain Eddie Newbald. In the meantime, the Germans reassembled and continued on their way, taking with them the Regimental Medical Officer, Captain J.C. Seddon, presumably to help with their own casualties. The Padre was allowed to resume his work, and subsequently reported having seen over a thousand lightly equipped troops pass by.
Battalion Headquarters received regular situation reports via Captain Newbald, but was prevented by ongoing communication problems from keeping the Fortress Commander informed. At 8.00 p.m., an exasperated Colonel Tarleton placed the adjutant, Captain Donald J. Cropper, in charge of the whole defensive position and with his Intelligence officer, Lieutenant Richard A. ‘Jimmy’ James, left by jeep to see Tilney. Just after their departure, someone arrived from Fortress Headquarters with new wireless frequencies and test call times, none of which made any difference to communications.
There was no let-up in enemy troop movements. At about 8.30 p.m. Lieutenants Ardill and Duffy arrived at Captain Cropper’s location with a number of men from the Faughs forward position. They brought alarming news, claiming to have been bluffed by English-speaking Germans who had captured or scattered two thirds of their number. The Faughs took up a new defensive position nearby. It was an unusually clear night and before long, enemy soldiers were seen approaching along the coast road. On being engaged with rifle and Thompson fire by a party of the Royal West Kents, they took cover behind houses just off the road. The Faughs joined in with rifle and automatic fire, causing the unfortunate Germans to move into the open and straight into renewed fire from the Headquarters area. At least eight were killed. The remainder withdrew northward.
&
nbsp; In the neutral waters off Turkey, shortly before 6.00 p.m., several MTBs each transhipped from HMS Belvoir twenty-five troops of the Royal West Kents. The remainder, including ‘D’ Company, were taken on board other vessels. The faster torpedo boats reached Lakki after nearly three and a half hours. On arrival, the senior naval officer was instructed to disembark all troops and then to proceed immediately to Alinda to engage surface vessels entering the bay. Just before the MTBs got under way, the order was countermanded. Puzzled, the force commander decided to ignore instructions, and at 10.06 p.m. set course for Alinda.
At Lakki, the new arrivals shouldered their packs and marched north towards the Anchor. A steady drone of low-flying aircraft heightened a noticeable air of tension, before it was realised that most were Dakotas dropping supplies to the beleaguered garrison.21 Flashes lit the night sky ahead, and all around the hills reverberated with the noise of battle. Peering at unfamiliar surroundings from beneath the rims of steel helmets, the men trudged on. At night, senses are especially acute and imagination can amplify one’s worst fears. And if he could not visualise what might lie ahead, even the least-experienced soldier recognised the fearful sound of those fighting for their lives. None could have known, however, that this included their own Battalion Headquarters.
Within half an hour, the HQ position was outflanked and German troops closed to within grenade throwing range. Captain Cropper ordered a withdrawal to an RV further uphill. Before long, Cropper and Captain C.M. Bernard were among those suffering from shrapnel wounds. Cropper sustained a serious eye injury and set out to try to reach the Regimental Aid Post, only to be taken prisoner (he later escaped). A series of short withdrawals brought Bernard, the remnants of Battalion Headquarters together and a few stragglers to a machine-gun post manned by the Faughs. By this time, the total strength of Bernard’s party was little more than a dozen. They were spared a follow-up attack, as the intention of the Germans seems to have been to clear the way for a link-up with their comrades on Point 189.
After being ferried overnight from Athens, III./1.Rgt. “Brandenburg”, assembled at Kalymnos. On Monday, these latest reinforcements embarked on four Pi-La-Boote and one F-lighter for passage to Leros, with orders to liaise with Kampfgruppe von Saldern and safeguard the landing of heavy weapons in Pandeli Bay. Three Flak (anti-aircraft), six Pak (anti-tank) and two light guns were loaded aboard two Pi-La Boote which were to follow the troop transports and stand by off Leros, beyond reach of the coastal batteries.
In order to prevent further German reinforcements from arriving by sea, HM ships Penn, Aldenham and Blencathra had remained at readiness in Turkish waters throughout the day. At dusk, Blencathra left Turk Buku to take Rockwood under tow to Cyprus. Later still, Penn was advised of enemy craft south-east of Kalymnos, steering northward for Leros (evidently the Brandenburg reinforcements). By the time the information had been relayed through Alexandria however, an hour had already passed. The captain of HMS Penn, Lieutenant Commander James Swain, decided it was too late to act, and to carry out instead previous instructions to sweep the east coast of Leros at dawn. It was a fateful decision, which would result in a reprimand for Swain from the Commander-in-Chief, Levant (see Appendix 7).
Under heavy fire from coastal batteries, the first wave of enemy landing craft with 280 men of III./1.Rgt. “Brandenburg” reached Leros at 9.40 p.m., just as the port authorities at Lakki were supervising the disembarkation of the Royal West Kents. The second wave with heavy weapons remained offshore when it was realised that Pandeli Bay was not yet in German hands. The Brandenburg reinforcements came ashore on the east side of Appetici and but a short march from Pandeli town. This was reached by the point troops at the same time as those of Kampfgruppe von Saldern, subsequent to their link-up with Kampfgruppe Dörr and the Küstenjäger at Castello di Bronzi. With enemy forces massed around the north and north-east slopes of Meraviglia, the scene was set for the final chapter in the battle for Leros.
After leaving Lakki, the British MTBs had proceeded to Alinda, but reported seeing nothing amiss. The three boats withdrew towards Kalymnos, eventually reaching Turkish waters without incident. German forces off Pandeli observed their departure with interest, but made no effort to follow.
At 8.30 p.m., Tarleton had reported to the brigadier with details of the afternoon attack. Also at Fortress Headquarters were Lieutenants Groom and Norris, who briefed their commanding officer on events at Rachi. Norris had an extraordinary tale and maintained that after joining ‘C’ Company’s attack, he had continued unopposed all the way around Rachi and back towards Meraviglia. Others were of the opinion that the officer, having become disorientated by the bombing and mortaring, had actually led his platoon over the ridge south of Searchlight Hill and towards Gurna Bay, before finally reaching Meraviglia. Norris was instructed to return to the Anchor and report to the battalion 2 i/c, Major Gavin Shaw, newly arrived from Samos. Groom also left, with verbal orders for the King’s Own to support yet another attack against Point 100 at 9.00 a.m. the next day.
As the noose tightened around Meraviglia, Tilney issued orders for the 16th: Colonel Tarleton was to direct ‘D’ Company of the Royal West Kents in an attempt to secure Point 100, while the Buffs/Royal West Kents launched a simultaneous attack to clear San Nicola and the hospital area. As soon as Point 100 was taken, Tarleton was to take charge of all troops on Rachi and drive the enemy eastward into the sea. Tilney was interrupted by the arrival of two signallers with a situation report that had been dispatched by Captain Cropper shortly before he was wounded. It included news of a suspected enemy landing at Alinda Bay. Tilney, who could not possibly have realised the implications of the latest events, decided that the attack on Point 100 would continue regardless.
That night, Captain Mike Rochford, the battalion Intelligence officer, briefed Lieutenant Ted Johnson. His depleted company – now less than platoon strength – was to join ‘A’ Company in the morning in providing fire support for the attack against San Nicola. The main defence of Meraviglia was dependent on two platoons of ‘A’ Company situated on the spur projecting from the north-east towards Platanos, and fifty or so officers and men from Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Ritchie covering the eastern approaches. It was considered that there was little likelihood of the enemy launching an attack from the west, which was virtually devoid of cover, and that any attempt to take the feature would come from the east. Accordingly, before midnight, Lieutenant Colonel Jake Easonsmith, commanding the Long Range Desert Group, was ordered by Tilney to send two patrols down either side of the east face towards Platanos in order to deny the area to the enemy. Both parties ran into German troops en route to Pandeli. Among the casualties was Easonsmith, who was killed, following which Colonel Prendergast reassumed command of the LRDG.
After dark, 177 German prisoners of war embarked at Partheni Bay on an Italian F-Lighter under the command of Lieutenant Hugh W.S. Stowell, RNVR, for passage to Tigani (Pythagorio) in Samos, and, ultimately, Egypt. Among the prisoners were Feldwebel Gustav Wehrs and Unteroffizier Andreas Hutter, who were to spend the next four years in captivity. Arranging their departure was Lieutenant Commander Frank Ramseyer:
Whilst loading the lighter the Italians brought in some more Germans, from a neighbouring island where they had been sitting for some days since their barge had been sunk. As the island was no more than a large rock, they were wet, very hungry and devoid of any ‘Master Race’ touch. When the lighter was loaded, hatches were made fast and M.Z. 722 left at approximately 1930B.22
At Lakki, the evacuation of wounded also continued. One of the last to be shipped from the port was Major Robert Butler, who was half carried onto a waiting ship by two casualties from his unit. He had been on Leros for just twenty-seven hours, a period that ‘seemed like two lifetimes’.23
As usual, during the day the Leros defenders had seen little or no evidence of their own aircraft, whose crews were prevented by the Luftwaffe from venturing too close to the island.24 Nevertheless, there were a
number of sorties by RAF Beaufighters and USAAF B-25s. During the afternoon, Mitchells of 310th Bombardment Group carried out a cannon attack on two warships, leaving one with a rising column of black smoke. Those on the ground had more respect for the Royal Navy, whose efforts could often be seen and at least produced tangible results. During transit, many soldiers had also experienced something of what their colleagues in the senior service had to endure. But, as with the air forces, many deeds passed unnoticed. In the evening of 15 November, the German U-565 registered a torpedo hit on a submarine south-east of Kos: her victim was undoubtedly the British submarine Simoon, which was reported missing with all hands.
Less was known about the clandestine war of Raiding Forces, whose disruptive efforts met with a minor success during the night of 15–16 November, when a detachment of SBS raided Symi. An ammunition dump was destroyed, the power station and several caiques were damaged, and nearly two dozen occupation troops were killed before the attackers withdrew without loss to themselves.
12
Day Five
Tuesday, 16 November 1943
When Lieutenant Colonel B.D. Tarleton rejoined his battalion at the Anchor, at about 1.00 a.m. on the 16th, he deployed his men to cover likely approach routes from the north, and to support any move by ‘D’ Company. Lieutenant Richard Norris was ordered to take his platoon to a road 500 yards north-east of their present location. Accounting for the possibility that ‘D’ Company’s task was liable to change, Tarleton took the added precaution of placing the new arrivals in some deep Italian trenches east of the Anchor road junction, which afforded some cover from air attack while enabling them to counter any threat from the direction of Appetici. The Mortar Platoon was sited to cover the approaches from Platanos and Appetici and to support ‘D’ Company as required. The Anti-Aircraft (AA) Platoon under Captain M.B. Rickcord was tasked with moving as a fighting patrol along the road to Alinda Bay, to contact any members of the battalion en route, and to watch for and report any signs of enemy movement south.1 Rickcord returned at 4.45 a.m., having lost three men who were wounded when they entered an Italian minefield. No British troops other than Lieutenant Norris’s platoon had been encountered, and no Germans were observed in Platanos.
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