The subsequent methods taught at Rohr’s courses also constituted a radical departure from the initial trench-clearing tactics of 1914. Squads were now treated like tactical entities in their own right, moving as individual units towards their predesignated objectives. In their movement across no-man’s land, no attempt was to be made for the squads to maintain any sort of connection with each other. Neither was there to be any sort of predetermined formation within the squad. The men would move so as best to take advantage of the terrain.
While this approach might seem haphazard, meticulous preparations went into each assault. To ensure detailed knowledge of the battlefield and its many obstacles, the men were provided with large-scale maps, while a full-scale model of the enemy position, complete with trenches and barbed wire, was also built in the training area behind the lines for dress rehearsals, some of which included the use of live ammunition.
To ensure stealth, equipment was also modified. The heavy hobnailed leather jackboots, long associated with German infantrymen, were replaced by lace-up half-boots and puttees of the kind used by Austrian mountain troops. To facilitate crawling, the field uniform was reinforced with leather patches on the knees and elbows. The leather belt and shoulder harness that had supported rifle ammunition pouches were discarded in favour of a pair of over-the-shoulder bags to carry hand grenades, the stormtroopers’ weapon of choice.
However, that’s not to say that the rifle wasn’t still a key part of their armoury. Initially, Rohr had adopted the Russian 76.2mm field guns for his troops. A large number of these had been captured in Poland and the Ukraine in 1915, and were then modified to optimise them for mobility. As such, barrels were cut down and long-range sights, superfluous on a weapon expected to hit enemy targets less than 1,000 metres away, were removed. In time, these were, however, replaced with a Mauser carbine, which was lighter and easier to handle.
For close-quarters fighting in the enemy trenches, the stormtroopers used an artillery model Luger, which boasted a much-increased 32-round magazine. As Erwin Rommel observed, ‘In a man-to-man fight, the winner is he who has one more round in his magazine.’ Eventually, the storm troop battalions would also receive the world’s first effective sub-machine gun, the MP18, which introduced most of the features that were to make it the key close-quarters weapon of the Second World War. However, these were to arrive in 1918, after most of the fighting had been done.
Despite the many guns at their disposal, it was the flamethrower that proved to be the stormtroopers’ most terrifying weapon of all. Crossing no-man’s land, one man would carry the fuel tank on his back, while a second man aimed the tube at the enemy, spitting 40-metre-long streams of burning oil at them. First tested against the French at Verdun, the terror inspired by the jets of liquid flame enabled the German assault troops to capture their objectives with relative ease. Unsurprisingly, no man was prepared to remain in a trench with blazing fuel oil cascading over the parapet.
To defend his stormtroopers, Rohr experimented with various kinds of body armour. The portable steel shields that were already in the inventory of the assault detachment were initially utilised, as well as steel breastplates reminiscent of those of the late Middle Ages. However, Rohr soon found that they did not allow his stormtroopers to move fast enough. As such, the only piece of armour that Rohr adopted for all operations was the ‘coal scuttle’ helmet, which was to become the trademark of the German soldier of both world wars.
In early October 1915, the storm troop was put to the test in an assault on a French position in the Vosges mountains, known as the Schratzmannle. After a detailed rehearsal, flamethrowers led the assault, followed by stormtroopers clearing trenches with hand grenades. They were then supported by German trench mortars and artillery to silence the French guns. This combination proved to be irresistible.
However, it wasn’t until 10 January 1916 that the storm troops would be used as a complete unit for the first time, with an assault on the Hartsmannsweilerkopf, a ridge in the Vosges mountains. The attack had all the same elements as the assault on Schratzmannle – a detailed rehearsal, individual squad movement and the close co-ordination of flamethrowers, machine guns, infantry guns and trench mortars. It also achieved similar results, as French positions were cleared with only light casualties. Later, in the Italian mountains of Caporetto, stormtroopers enabled a German–Austrian offensive to capture 265,000 Italians and nearly knocked Italy out of the war in the process.
It was now abundantly clear that storm troops could be the key to victory in trench warfare. As such, by the beginning of December 1916 the 1st, 2nd and 5th German armies each had an assault battalion, and the other fourteen German armies were to establish one during the course of the month.
However, the British tank attack at Cambrai in November 1917 had the German command rocked. Its only means of response was through the stormtroopers, but with time of the essence neither the storm troops nor the ordinary infantry that followed them had the opportunity to rehearse the attack. Rapid improvisation, and instinctive execution of battle drills, would have to suffice. Even so, was a unit of men really going to be of much use against the might of the tank? Its armour appeared impregnable and there appeared to be no way into the hold. But, after studying them relentlessly, the Germans soon had a breakthrough. They realised that, if they tied hand grenades together and targeted the tank’s tracks, they might just be able to stop them dead.
Commencing their counterattack just ten days later, the stormtroopers raced across no-man’s land launching a hurricane barrage of explosives and gas shells. Cloaked by smoke, gas and fog, they infiltrated the British strongpoints and cut off the dazed defenders, quickly overrunning the first trench system and then pushing forward, leaving the waves of ordinary infantry following behind to finish them off.
But then the British hit back. Taking up defensive positions in each village, wood or old communications trench, they were determined to make the Germans pay for every mile. Meanwhile, their tanks roared onto the battlefield, intent on forcing them back.
This time, the stormtroopers were ready for them. Tying their grenades together, the nimble troops raced either side of the tanks and placed their explosives on their tracks. The subsequent explosion saw the tanks judder to a halt and become stuck in the mud. Their guns were also silenced soon after, as stormtroopers stuffed grenades inside to blow them up. Following this, they dragged the drivers and gun operators out of the hatch and shot them dead.
Over the next forty-eight hours, the stormtroopers not only managed to recover all of the territory that had been lost to the British tanks, but they also took a considerable piece of ground that the Allies had held since the autumn of 1914. These gains were monumental, especially after what the British had achieved with their tanks. Just days after facing total defeat, the Germans now believed the stormtroopers might actually help them win the war. At this, the German High Command looked to further improve its tactics with a series of large-scale training exercises, led by General Oskar von Hutier, now commanding the 8th Army.
This refined approach involved the following procedure:
1. A short artillery bombardment, employing heavy shells mixed with numerous poison-gas projectiles, to neutralise the enemy front lines, and not try to destroy them.
2. Under a creeping barrage, the stormtroopers would then move forward, in dispersed order, avoiding combat whenever possible, infiltrate the Allied defences at previously identified weak points, and destroy or capture enemy headquarters and artillery strongpoints.
3. Next, infantry battalions with extra-light machine guns, mortars and flamethrowers would attack on narrow fronts against any Allied strongpoints the shock troops missed. Mortars and field guns would be in place to fire as needed to accelerate the breakthrough.
In the last stage of the assault, regular infantry would mop up any remaining Allied resistance.
By the spring of 1918, with their tactics refined and hope restored, the Germans prepared to use
their stormtrooper units for what they hoped would be their final breakthrough, ironically called the ‘Peace Offensive’.
Following von Hutier’s training, the operation began at 4.40 a.m. on 21 March 1918, with a preparatory bombardment of shells and gas on British positions, followed by a salvo from the light field batteries. From here, the stormtroopers went into action, with their goal to penetrate the 8,000 metres or so that stood between no-man’s land and the British field artillery emplacements. They only had twelve hours of daylight to accomplish this, but they were aided by the thick fog and gas that had lain over most of the battlefield for most of the morning. As such, the British machine-gun teams could not see the grey-clad attackers until a few seconds before they were overrun. Like ghosts they moved through the mist at speed, taking down anyone who stood in their way, whether it be via gun or knife. They knew from their training where the British were meant to be stationed and relentlessly picked them off.
However, while the stormtrooper units again achieved startling successes in the days that followed, it was not enough to sustain victory. If anything, the tactics had been too successful. The German infantry was unable to keep up with them, leaving them isolated, while the stormtroopers became so exhausted that fatigue severely affected them at a time when they needed all their stealth and cunning. A tired man could be put in a dense formation and pushed into battle – that was one of the virtues of close-order tactics. The stormtrooper, on the other hand, had to provide his own motive force. By the third day of the attack, that motive force was wearing thin and troops were observed not only stopping to loot the British supply depots that were falling into German hands, but also getting drunk on captured rum.
By the ninth day of the attack, the will of individual German soldiers to push forward collapsed, and the British were finally able to reconstitute a line and start building a new defensive system. For six more days, the Germans tried, without success, to break through this new line, before the operation came to an end on 5 April 1918.
The gains that the Germans made during the Peace Offensive were impressive by the standards of the Western Front – 90,000 prisoners and 1,300 guns were taken, 212,000 enemy soldiers were killed or seriously wounded, and an entire British army (the Fifth) was destroyed. However, the cost had still been high. Casualties totalled 239,800 officers and men, with some divisions reduced to half-strength.
The failure of the Peace Offensive marked the beginning of a long, slow retreat, which lasted until November 1918 and heralded the end of the First World War. Germany lost the war but its stormtroopers had totally revolutionised military tactics and proven that man could still be effective against machine. Indeed, this was a lesson that many in the west continue to ignore, as seen by the disastrous forays into Vietnam and Afghanistan, where clever guerrilla tactics proved more than a match for top-class technology. Yet, when conflict was again to darken the skies of Europe just twenty-one years later, it would initially be a battle of two machines that would ensure the fate of the war for the years to come . . .
19
THE RAF AND THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
AD 1940
Although Europe had been at war since Hitler’s invasion of Poland a year before, London had remained relatively untouched by the conflict. While the Nazis had rampaged their way through the continent, Britain had so far stood firm, even in the face of Hitler’s stated intention to invade the British Isles in an operation codenamed ‘Sealion’.
And on this day the war could not seem further away. As the last of the summer sun shone brightly over England’s capital city, it shimmered off the Thames and illuminated the great sites of Buckingham Palace, St Paul’s Cathedral and Tower Bridge. Revellers soaked up the rays in Hyde Park, while the West End theatres continued to do brisk business. The novelist, William Sansom, recalled it as ‘one of the fairest days of the century, a day of clear warm air and high blue skies’. But the peace was about to be shattered. Almost 300 years earlier, the Dutch had raided the city by boat and now the Germans looked to do so from the sky. It was the start of the Blitz.
Suddenly, air-raid sirens screamed out, sending London’s citizens clamouring for shelter. Soon the shadows of hundreds of German bombers and fighters covered the ground, the distinctive roar of their engines filling the air. Opening their bellies, they proceeded to empty their steel shells of their loads. Seconds later, hundreds of bombs hurtled to earth and slammed into the factories on the Thames. Within moments, London was ablaze. American newspaperman Ben Robertson, who watched the attack, wrote that London, which ‘had taken thirty generations of men a thousand years to build’, was now in the process of being destroyed. It was the city’s worst fire since the Great Fire of 1666.
With such devastating consequences, this attack only marked the start of Hitler’s quest to cripple Britain and commence an invasion that would see him rule all of Europe. Unless Britain could defend its skies then it would soon be in German hands. But, against the might of the Luftwaffe, many thought Britain didn’t stand a chance.
While the Germans had been banned from operating a military air force following the First World War, the subsequent rise of the commercial airline Lufthansa had allowed Germany to continue to train pilots and be at the forefront of aviation technology. Moreover, they had also defied the Treaty of Versailles by secretly training pilots in glider clubs or in the Soviet Union. The rise of Hitler in the 1930s saw him ignore the prohibition altogether and proceed to rapidly expand the German air force.
Hermann Goering, a First World War fighter pilot, was appointed aviation minister, while Erhard Milch was appointed State Secretary of the Reich Ministry of Aviation. Under their command, Germany had a fleet of Dornier bombers and Me109 fighter planes, which were the envy of the world. Its pilots were not only highly trained, with candidates tested unrelentingly for months on end, but many had also picked up crucial experience in 1937 during the Spanish Civil War. On top of all this, by the summer of 1940, the Luftwaffe outnumbered the British fighter defenders by almost five to one.
Unsurprisingly, Hitler and Goering looked towards an invasion of Britain with increasing confidence. In the face of this threat, Joseph Kennedy, the American ambassador to London, evacuated his children back to the United States, while General Weygand, the defeated French commander-in-chief, dismissively commented, ‘In three weeks, England will have her neck wrung like a chicken.’ But Winston Churchill did not share this pessimism.
In a speech to the House of Commons on 18 June 1940, just days before France signed an armistice, Churchill famously roared, ‘We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.’ But, for now, it was in the air that Britain needed to fight, with Churchill optimistic that they could actually prevail:
The great question is: can we break Hitler’s air weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans . . . I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots – these splendid men, this brilliant youth – who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of attacks.
Britain had first deployed a military air force, known as the Royal Flying Corps, at the start of the First World War. With aviation technology still in its infancy, the corps was initially a small force of just sixty aircraft, but by the end of the war it boasted a fleet of over 23,000 new machines, as well as a new name – the Royal Air Force.
Over the coming years, Britain seemed to take the furthering of its air force seriously, with the world’s first military air academy opened at Cranwell in 1920, complemented two years la
ter by the creation of an RAF Staff College at Andover. In 1923, an ambitious if not realistic target was even set to establish fifty-two squadrons for the purposes of home defence.
However, this rapid progress soon ground to a halt. With the memories of war slipping away, by the end of the 1920s the RAF still only consisted of twenty-five home-based regular squadrons, supplemented by eleven auxiliary and reserve units.
Desperate to jump-start the process, in 1934, the government voted for a five-year general expansion plan for the RAF. In 1936, the service was subsequently divided into four key commands: Bomber, Fighter, Coastal and Training. Hugh Dowding was appointed commanding officer of Fighter Command and would have direct control over the fighter force, anti-aircraft and balloon commands, as well as the Royal Observer Corps.
Dowding had been an aerial prodigy almost from the moment aircraft were invented. Having attended the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, after which he was commissioned as an officer in the Royal Garrison Artillery, he had soon developed a keen interest in flying. Going on to join the Royal Flying Corps, he received his wings after just three months’ tuition and was soon thrown into action in the First World War. With regular combat in France, his rise within the fledgling RFC was meteoric. After commanding No. 16 Squadron, he was posted to Training Command, where, in the post-war RAF, he gained experience in departments of training, supply, research and development, before his promotion to the rank of air marshal in 1933.
Yet, despite all of this, Dowding’s promotion to Fighter Command was not universally welcomed. He was accused of not being a ‘people person’, and it was this alleged inability to charm that subsequently saw him overlooked as candidate for the role of chief of the air staff, the most senior position in the RAF. Meanwhile, his junior in both age and experience, Cyril Newall, was promoted ahead of him. Dowding was soon seen as yesterday’s man and he was earmarked for retirement in June 1939. However, he was to be reprieved. Due to the looming threat of war, Newall asked him to stay on for an additional year. As such, when Germany looked to invade during the summer of 1940, Britain’s defences were in the hands of someone who had been all but consigned to the scrapheap just a few months before.
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