As the weather worsened, and no further big raids appeared on the radar screens, the pilots of Fighter Command could finally relax. They had seen off one of the biggest air assaults that had ever been launched. But it had come at a cost. During the course of the day, the RAF had lost twenty-nine aircraft and twelve pilots had been killed. In contrast, the Luftwaffe had lost fifty-six aircraft and 136 men were either dead or POWs. There was a sense of jubilation in the air. The British pilots knew full well that despite the odds being against them they had countered everything that the Germans had thrown at them.
Across the Channel, the mood was despondent. For three months now, the German crews had been deluded by promises that Fighter Command was on its last legs, that the British were even down to their last fifty Spitfires. Yet again and again the defenders had pressed home their attack, in increasing numbers, and with a greater determination than before.
Time was now running out for Goering. It was already mid-September, and the glorious sunshine that had prevailed for most of the summer months could not last. With the weather turning, there would be fewer opportunities for the Luftwaffe to exploit. Hitler’s patience was also wearing thin. His thoughts were now drawn eastward towards Russia. Goering’s failure to achieve air superiority in time for an amphibious assault simply confirmed the inevitable. The launch date had already been moved several times; now, in the light of these substantial German losses, Sealion was postponed indefinitely on 17 September 1940.
The official end date for the Battle of Britain was 31 October 1940, as stipulated in the Air Ministry pamphlet on the subject published in 1941. In reality, war is not so clearcut and there was significant overlap. The German planes continued to wreak havoc, as night-time raids over London continued until May 1941, in the hope of forcing Churchill to surrender. Yet the British people did not abandon their homes, flee from their factories, or beg their government to negotiate a peace deal. They stayed strong and saw off the German attacks once again. The Blitz was to be a victory for the British spirit.
For Dowding, the battle had been won and now his war was over, officially retiring on 25 November 1940. Keith Park, his loyal and brilliant deputy, was also moved aside to make way for a new order at Fighter Command, with his rival, Trafford Leigh-Mallory, replacing him as commander of No. 11 Group.
That Germany failed to successfully invade Britain was one of the costliest strategic errors of the war. The maintenance of British sovereignty ensured that the island would later become a giant floating base for the Allied armies before the invasion of Europe four years later. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful whether the United States would have been able to wage a successful campaign in western Europe when separated by 3,000 miles of ocean.
Despite the many doubters, Dowding, and his brilliant defensive system, had emphatically proven them wrong. But the war was still not won. A series of key battles would be vital in banishing the scourge of the Nazis. One of which was to be known as the ‘Greatest Raid of All Time’, and it was another elite British unit that would again face impossible odds . . .
20
THE COMMANDOS
AD 1941
Following the failure to rule the skies in the Battle of Britain, Germany changed tack. Knowing that Britain, as an island, was somewhat reliant on importing food and materials in order both to feed its people and continue to prosecute the war, it now tried to dominate the seas. While German U-boats became the scourge of British ships, their battleships and heavy cruisers represented a real problem. These great leviathans could only be countered by other capital ships, or aircraft, and the availability of these weapons in the vast wastes of the North Atlantic was limited.
A particular threat to the British was the Bismarck. Along with the Prinz Eugen, it roamed the North Atlantic like a bully. On facing the pride of the British fleet, HMS Hood and HMS Prince of Wales, it took just ten minutes of action before the Hood was destroyed, sinking to the bottom of the ocean along with its crew. However, with the Prince of Wales subsequently outnumbered by the two German ships, she managed to get off a few shots of her own. One of these was to prove crucial. Hitting the Bismarck, it allowed the Prince of Wales to escape while the German ship had to urgently seek repairs. Fortunately for the Bismarck, the French port of St Nazaire, the only dry dock on the Atlantic coast capable of handling and repairing the great German warship, was not far away. But the Bismarck was not to get that far. En route it was destroyed by British ships, seemingly marking a monumental victory, but it was to be fleeting.
In Germany, an even more powerful ship, the Tirpitz, was now nearing completion. At 251 metres in length, and able to reach a speed of 30 knots, she was bigger and more powerful than any vessel the Royal Navy could muster. The threat that the battleship posed, and the realisation of what it could do to Britain’s vital supply lines, became almost an obsession for the prime minister, Winston Churchill. The mere existence of the Tirpitz meant that four British capital ships had to be held in readiness at all times, waiting for her should she exit into the deep waters of the Atlantic upon her completion. Churchill told his chiefs of staff that no other target was comparable to the destruction of the great German capital ship. He even went so far as to say that the whole strategy of the war turned on her mere existence. At this, both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force immediately went to the drawing board.
Some looked at whether they could bomb the ship at port, or hit its weak spots should it ever enter the Atlantic. Others in the Admiralty, however, looked for a craftier solution, one that would not just stop the Tirpitz in her tracks, but also any other battle cruiser the Germans should build. They had noted how the ailing Bismarck had turned towards the port of St Nazaire after being hit. This was, after all, the only port in the North Atlantic that could handle a ship of that size. If the port was to be taken out of action, it was unlikely the German navy would risk the Tirpitz in the Atlantic, knowing it was the only dry dock where it could seek repairs. This was a masterstroke. Now all means had to be found to render the dry dock unusable.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Dudley Clarke, a staff officer at the War Office, had already come up with a solution, even if he did not know it yet. In June 1940, Clarke had drawn up the outline of a guerrilla raiding force that he called ‘commandos’. His idea was passed to the prime minister, who very much liked what he read, subsequently ordering:
Enterprises must be prepared with specially trained troops of the hunter class who can develop a reign of terror down the enemy coast . . . I look to the Chiefs of Staff to propose measures for a ceaseless offensive against the whole German-occupied coastline, leaving a trail of German corpses behind.
Indeed, it is no surprise that Churchill was enthusiastic about Clarke’s idea, or his name for the new unit. During the Boer War, Churchill had been a newspaper correspondent and had observed how Boer ‘Kommandos’ had conducted a series of hit-and-run raids that tied down large numbers of British troops. By the time the Boers were finally persuaded to make peace, the British had been taught invaluable lessons in irregular warfare that they would never forget. Moreover, Churchill had also seen just how effective guerrilla raiding tactics were during the First World War thanks to the exploits of T. E. Lawrence in Arabia against the might of the German and Ottoman armies.
However, not everyone shared Churchill’s enthusiasm for this new unit. To many high-ranking service officers, commandos were anathema. They considered the new force to be a misuse of good officers and men who would have done better to remain with their units. In the view of these officers, the war would be won by conventional means, not by sideshows.
Nonetheless, just forty-three days after Clarke had suggested a raiding force, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes was made head of Combined Operations, and became responsible for the direction of all raiding operations and their co-ordination with naval and air forces.
The troops who were to form the commandos initially came from two sources: volunteers from the units of Home Commands
as well as those from Territorial Divisions. Many flocked to the cause, excited by the prospect of ‘hazardous service’, and also the pay, which was 13s.4d. (68p) for officers and 6s.8d. (33p) for other ranks. By the standards of the day, this was generous. Moreover, the commandos would live in billets, rather than barracks, for which they received a daily allowance to pay for their food and lodging. Best of all, life in billets meant that there were no barrack guards, cookhouse fatigues, or many of the petty and irksome chores of life in a barrack room.
With their training initially haphazard, and differing from unit to unit, a uniform set of standards was eventually laid down by the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Newman, which read as follows:
1. The object of Special Service is to have available a fully trained body of first-class soldiers ready for active offensive operations against an enemy in any part of the world.
2. Irregular warfare demands the highest standards of initiative, mental alertness and physical fitness, together with the maximum skill at arms. No Commando can feel confident of success unless all ranks are capable of thinking for themselves; of thinking quickly and of acting independently, and with sound tactical senses when faced by circumstances which may be entirely different to those which were anticipated.
3. Mentally. The offensive spirit must be the outlook of all ranks of a Commando at all times.
4. Physically. The highest state of physical fitness must at all times be maintained. All ranks are trained to cover at great speed any type of ground for distances of 5–7 miles in fighting order.
5. Cliff and mountain climbing and really difficult slopes climbed quickly form a part of Commando training.
6. A high degree of skill in all branches of unarmed combat will be attained.
7. Seamanship and Boatwork. All ranks must be skilled in all forms of boatwork and landing craft whether by day or by night, as a result of which training the sea comes to be regarded as a natural working ground for a Commando.
8. Night sense and night confidence are essential. All ranks will be highly trained in the use of the compass.
9. Map reading and route memorising form an important part of Commando training.
10. All ranks of a Commando will be trained in semaphore, Morse and the use of W/T (radio).
11. All ranks will have elementary knowledge of demolitions and sabotage. All ranks will be confident in the handling of all types of high explosive, Bangalore torpedoes, and be able to set up all types of booby traps.
12. A high standard of training will be maintained in all forms of street fighting, occupation of towns, putting towns into a state of defence and the overcoming of all types of obstacles – wire, rivers, high walls, etc.
13. All ranks in a Commando should be able to drive motorcycles, cars, lorries, tracked vehicles, trains and motorboats.
14. A high degree of efficiency in all forms of fieldcraft will be attained. Any man in a Commando must be able to forage for himself, cook and live under a bivouac for a considerable period.
15. All ranks are trained in first aid and will be capable of dealing with the dressing of gunshot wounds and the carrying of the wounded.
16. These are few among the standards that must be attained during service in a Commando. At all times, a high standard of discipline is essential, and the constant desire by all ranks to be fitter and better than anyone else.
17. The normal mode of living is that the Special Service soldier will live in a billet found by himself and fed by the billet for which he will receive 6s.8d. per day to pay all his expenses.
18. Any falling short of the standards of training and behaviour on the part of the Special Service Soldier will render him liable to be returned to his unit.
As the threat of a German invasion receded, the tempo of training increased, with the emphasis on raiding. Much of this was carried out at the Irregular Warfare School in Scotland, which ran courses for ‘special forces’ in the mountains and lochs of the wild Highland country. Endurance marches, cliff climbing, swimming with full kit, killing with and without weapons, seamanship and boat work, night operations, map reading, fieldcraft, stalking and much else was taught, at a pace that only the very fittest survived.
However, the first commando operations in 1941 achieved only varying success, although a raid of the Norwegian Lofoten Islands in March did see a number of wheels for a German Enigma encoding machine seized, which enabled the British to decode much German radio traffic over the course of the war. Despite this, the raids were often small, and unsuccessful, other than keeping the German forces on their toes.
As such, in October 1941, Captain Lord Louis Mountbatten was installed as the new chief of combined operations, in the hope that he could inspire the commandos to greater feats. But raids in Europe and the Middle East continued to be viewed largely as failures.
Nonetheless, it was the commandos to whom everyone soon looked to target the dock of St Nazaire, as all initial options were deemed unsuitable. The RAF had already attempted to bomb St Nazaire without much success, due to precision bombing not being an exact science. Moreover, there was also a reluctance to engage in a large-scale bombing campaign since it might cause large casualties to the nearby French civilian population.
In January 1942, with all other options ruled out, Churchill turned to his misfiring commandos. While Lord Mountbatten was tasked with planning the operation, he realised it would be extremely difficult. St Nazaire was located 5 miles up the treacherous estuary of the River Loire and was only approachable from the sea by a single narrow channel, which, in 1942, was covered by several batteries of coastal defence guns. Going up the River Loire would therefore result in certain detection well before any landing could be made. However, Mountbatten soon had a moment of inspiration.
He found that, in late March, there would be exceptionally high spring tides that would allow a vessel of shallow draught to pass over the sandbanks and bars that dotted the estuary of the Loire, rather than approaching the docks along the well-protected shipping channel. It was an opportunity too good to miss. But how could a small unit carry enough explosives to totally destroy the dock? This was when Mountbatten now had a true masterstroke.
He realised that, if they could pack a ship with enough explosives and ram the dock gates, this would certainly destroy the dock. As such, HMS Campbeltown was loaded with 4 tons of explosives, encased in steel and hidden within her bows. But this was not a suicide mission: the charges were designed to explode hours after the collision, so as not to kill all the commandos on board.
To avoid detection, the ship would be disguised as a German destroyer. However, if it should come under attack it was reinforced with extra metal plating and armed with cannons. There was also concern that it might be too heavy for the shallow waters, so it was stripped of all non-essential items, to make it as light as possible.
Following the ramming of the gates, supporting ships would deposit teams of commandos onto land. From there, they would destroy key targets, and then board the waiting ships to return home. It was a high-risk plan, with little chance of success, but it was all Churchill had. As such, he gave it the go-ahead.
Lieutenant Colonel Newman was subsequently chosen to lead the raid. A building contractor by profession, Newman was a prewar territorial officer from the Essex Regiment, whose thirty-eight years made him seem very old to his younger subordinates, most of whom were in their early twenties. However, his skills in leadership, and his ability to relate to his men, made him a popular and well-respected commanding officer. After being given command of 2 Commando, Newman spent the next year preparing it for the raid of a lifetime: Operation Chariot.
A crucial part of the raid would be played by the demolition teams, who would lay explosives at key parts of the dock. These teams were sent to Burntisland, on the shores of the Firth of Forth, to undertake a specialised course in the destruction of dockyards. Trained in the handling of modern explosives, the men were familiarised with the weight and sh
ape of the charges they would have to place and taught how to identify the precise spots where the explosives would have to be positioned to gain maximum effect. At Southampton and Cardiff docks, they practised over and over, against the clock, in the dark, and often without key members of their group, who were suddenly deemed to be casualties.
Their targets at St Nazaire were:
1. The destruction of the two caissons of the Normandie Dock;
2. The demolition of the dockyard facilities supporting the dry dock, such as the winding sheds and the pump house;
3. The wrecking of all lock gates; and
4. The destruction of any shipping that was present, especially U-boats.
It was vital that these demolition teams were protected as they went about their job. Over 100 of Newman’s best men were selected for intensive training in securing and holding crucial demolition positions, while keeping the enemy at bay.
The Royal Navy were also involved in the operation, having to actually place the commandos at St Nazaire and then get them back home safely. The man chosen to command the operation was 34-year-old Robert Ryder. Ryder was, however, a surprising choice. At the time, he was languishing in a desk job in a stately home in southern England, suffering the Admiralty’s ‘displeasure’ at having lost his last ship. This therefore offered the rare opportunity for redemption.
On the afternoon of 26 March 1942, the explosive-packed HMS Campbeltown, disguised as a German destroyer, and its fleet of small boats left Falmouth and made their way into the Channel bound for France. It was a mission that could determine the fate of the war.
The Elite Page 24