The motion that passed was a strong statement saying that the organization was firmly against torture. Fine with me, I thought at the time. So am I. It also listed a set of harsh techniques that psychologists were prohibited from ever advising in a consultation with interrogators. I had no hesitation about supporting that statement. Those techniques were not used under my watch at Gitmo or Abu Ghraib and I would never recommend them as an ethical, moral way to obtain intel.
The debate did help answer some of the questions raised about the role of the psychologist in this war. Psychologists should not do interrogations. They should stay out of the interrogation booth. I always knew that if I were ever to be court-martialed while at Gitmo or Abu Ghraib, it would have been because I lost my objectivity and did something stupid while trying to be an interrogator. I knew that I had to stay out of that room and not be an active participant in the interrogation. My job was to help interrogators avoid behavioral drift. In other words, I helped them stay within the boundaries of the SOP and stay away from abusive behaviors.
Throughout all of this debate I had many conversations with well-respected military psychologists from around the country. I remember talking with Colonel Tim Watson from the Army’s Intel Command at Fort Meade, Maryland. Tom was a senior, highly regarded Army psychologist. I debated the issue of combatant versus doctor with him and Colonel Banks on many occasions. The question that I had struggled with for so long—How can I be a psychologist and a combatant at the same time?—kept coming up over and over as we talked.
“You can’t, Larry,” Colonel Watson told me during one of these talks. “You have to keep your role as a psychologist and as a doctor separate and never shall the two cross. It would be like being someone’s defense attorney while also serving as their prosecuting attorney at the same time. It ain’t gonna work.”
From these many conversations with Colonel Banks, Lieutenant Colonel Dobson—my deputy in the Department of Psychology when we were at Walter Reed who was involved with Major Leso’s assignment to Gitmo—and I began to shape the national DOD policy for the biscuit. Now, what has evolved is that the biscuit psychologist provides no actual medical care and serves as a military officer in intel units. Others provide mental health care, but the biscuit psychologist stays firmly in the role of soldier, not doctor.
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Conclusions
September 2007–January 2008
I spent much of my time after my stint in Abu Ghraib analyzing what I learned as Biscuit 1 and what can be done to prevent a repeat of the hell we faced there. The worst outcome of our experience in Abu Ghraib would be to learn nothing from what happened there, to blindly stumble into the next detainee operation without bringing with us the lessons we learned from fixing that hellhole. As I told those young captains at Tripler, the mess at Abu Ghraib happened because no one was in charge, no one knew what had to be done, and no one led the way.
So what can—and needs—to be done as we move into the future? Where are our shortfalls and our vulnerabilities in this war on terrorism? How can the United States fight a “new” enemy effectively, while remaining within the humane boundaries of the Geneva Conventions and presenting a good role model of democracy to the rest of the world? Are there very distinct things that need to be done immediately in order to achieve success, and prevent a future Abu Ghraib from occurring?
We have come a long way since the 9/11 attacks. At that time our nation was totally unprepared to deal with the rates of mental illness, behavioral problems, the number of juvenile terrorists, and the myriad cultural issues of our enemy, as well as the asymmetrical battlefield tactics, such as IEDs and urban warfare. We went to war without enough mental health staff in place to treat the soldiers at Abu Ghraib and the detainees—a moral tragedy of sorts. The shame of it all was that the leaders failed to plan for it or denied that it was a real need. Along the way, out of revenge, pathology, or just plain old stupidity, some few American soldiers chose to torture detainees at Abu Ghraib. Clearly, these acts were a combination of failed leadership, moral disengagement by the soldiers who committed the acts, and unchecked behavioral drift.
We now know that most of the abuses at Abu Ghraib had nothing to do with interrogations. Rather, the abuse was done by a few soldiers who had become combat ineffective under the cloak of darkness, abusing the detainees for their own pleasure and twisted needs. It is a fact that out of any large number of human beings, soldiers or otherwise, there will be some small percentage who will take advantage of others, particularly the weak and powerless, to indulge their own worst, most craven desires. Unfortunately, at Abu Ghraib their leaders were not there to ensure proper adherence to standards.
I was brought to Abu Ghraib to put procedures in place to prevent these atrocities from ever happening again. I’m proud to say I successfully completed that mission. I did it. I trained a biscuit staff and monitored the behavior, training, and job performance of interrogators. We did this not to teach abuse but rather to prevent it. By the time I left Abu Ghraib in October 2004, major milestones had been reached. We had videotaping capability for all interrogations and one-way mirrors in all interrogation rooms. We became important consultants to the intel commander as well as the military police who guarded the detainees. Slowly but surely, a hospital was built with inpatient psychiatric capabilities. Colonel Robert Thomas, Abu Ghraib’s post commander, spent $300 million improving the infrastructure there, building a hospital, upgrading the living facilities for the soldiers, and improving the quality of life for the detainees. Abu Ghraib had three colonels, Colonel Thomas, the new hospital commander, and the new intel center director, who were dedicated to humanity and always doing the right moral things at all times. This is a secret that America never knew. The mass media frenzy forced us all to be mentally stuck on those horrible pictures, the abuses, the torture. Mention “Abu Ghraib” and those images immediately come to my mind. Most people assume that little has been done to improve the situation in Abu Ghraib, that perhaps the outright abuse has been stopped but probably little else has changed. Those people are seriously mistaken. Somehow, the nation was never told that the United States spent over $300 million to do the right moral thing at Abu Ghraib after the abuses were uncovered.
What must we do to prevent abuses in the future? First and foremost, we need well-trained interrogators and military police who have responsibility for the humane care and custody of the detainees. When I arrived at Guantanamo in 2003 the interrogation regulations were so broad they allowed almost anything to happen, except the death of a detainee—that would have been considered bad. Now the regulations that govern interrogations and the rulebook for the military police have outlawed abusive tactics for interrogations and for the military police.
Second, unlike at the beginning of the war, we have a training course for psychologists who work in the detention arena. They are incredibly well trained. Unlike Major John Leso, these young officers have a detailed set of guidelines that lay out what a BSCT psychologist can and cannot do. Leso was flying blind, doing his best to figure out the rules on his own. We know now that well-trained psychologists should remain a major part of the detention and interrogation team. Why? Because they can provide oversight on when behaviors are starting to drift and identify the early signs of abuse. These are the critical things the Department of Defense can do to prevent the occurrence of abuses or torture in prisons, whether in a U.S. prison or a POW facility.
Lieutenant Colonel Frantz once told me, “Sir, I have no problem with torturing these guys to get information if it will save American lives. Heck, Colonel, I don’t see what the big deal is about using information out of a detainee’s medical record. If that’s going to help us save a soldier’s life, well, what’s the problem with it?” I suspect many civilians would take the same position, but my experience in working at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib reaffirmed the position I previously held on these issues. I now know, more surely than ever before, that I am against torture.
When L
ieutenant Colonel Frantz brought the issue up, I explained my position by saying, “Frantz, is America going to be a moral leader in the world? When you torture a prisoner, the information you get is not reliable. We cannot allow our anger and need for revenge to serve as a compass in the global war on terrorism. It’s really about morality, and Frantz, we must treat every human being with decency and respect. I was taught as a child to always take the high road, and as an officer, I was taught to never violate the Geneva Conventions. It will only fuel the enemy.”
As an American soldier who believes wholeheartedly that we must fight the Muslim extremists who want to see us all dead, and fight them aggressively, I support the American military’s effort to extract valuable intel from detainees. But I do not support torture, because it is simply wrong from a moral perspective, it violates my duties as a psychologist, and—this is an important point that can negate the need to debate the first two—it is not as effective as the other methods of interrogation that I put in place at Gitmo and Abu Ghraib.
Much has been written about Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, the commander at Abu Ghraib and earlier at Guantanamo Bay. He never ordered me to teach torture. It was the direct opposite: he told me to teach the interrogators how to work with detainees without any abuse whatsoever. His gruff appearance and style got in his way at times. In terms of how he was presented in the media, he sometimes did himself no favors with the way he interacted with people. But it was General Miller’s desire to do the right thing that led to the humane treatment of the juveniles at Guantanamo and the large field hospital being built at Abu Ghraib. Likewise, I have no data to show that Major Leso ever tortured anyone. Leso’s efforts to change the way prisoners were interrogated at Gitmo was like watching an aircraft carrier do a 360-degree turn in a harbor. It was going to change course and head in a new direction, but everybody watching knew that it was going to take some time. Major Leso got that carrier started in the turn, and eventually it did head in a new direction.
The BSCT and all medical services are now separate from one another and there is no sharing of medical information. Moreover, we now have the American Psychological Association’s guidelines for psychologists who work in the intel and detention arenas to serve as a guide.
From the day I arrived at Abu Ghraib in June 2004 there were no more incidents of abuse reported by an interrogator or a psychologist, and we handed the prison back to the Iraqis on September 6, 2006, in better condition than we found it. There also have been no incidents of abuse at Guantanamo Bay by either an interrogator or psychologist reported since my arrival in Cuba in January 2003. Clearly, the role of the psychologist on the battlefield in the global war on terrorism has made a difference.
The procedures that were put into place have served to prevent abuses and help ensure that all under our care and custody are treated with humanity and respect.
Epilogue
April 2008
It is very fitting that I have been deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, once again. The place where I first deployed in support of the global war on terrorism is the place where my twenty-two-year military career ends. Many things have changed since I left Gitmo in May 2003. It is now under the command leadership of the U.S. Navy rather than the Army. When I departed here in 2003, there were over 600 detainees. We now have fewer than 275, with plans for the numbers to decrease even more over time.
The harsh tactics are gone and the overall experience has improved for detainees. The minimal living conditions have been replaced with a meal menu that has six choices, state-of-the-art facilities, a cultural adviser, a detainee hospital, and rigid adherence to the Geneva Conventions guidelines. The International Committee of the Red Cross has open access to interview any detainee. Guantanamo Bay Naval Station no longer mirrors an overseas remote-duty station with few amenities. It has matured into a sophisticated military complex with a Starbucks, wireless LAN systems, cell phones, nightly movies at an outdoor theater, rock concerts, regular appearances by celebrities, and frequent visits by family members of those deployed here. The Gitmo detention facility is now state-of-the-art. It has a thirty-bed hospital, with five to ten physicians and fifteen nurses on duty. The inpatient psych unit has a psychologist, psychiatrist, nurses, and psych techs dedicated to treating the mental health needs of the detainees. Many of the detainees have attorneys and there have been over a thousand legal visits in 2007 alone.
Admiral Mark “Buz” Buzby is the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. He is a far cry from the early leaders at this facility. A Merchant Marine Academy graduate and polished gentleman, he is indeed a career military officer. He and his deputy commander, Brigadier General Cam Cameron, dispel the notion that you have to be a foulmouthed jerk to be a great military leader. They have set a tone of decency and respect for all of Gitmo. They simply would not tolerate abuse, hate, torture, or anything that resembles indecency. The chief of staff, Navy captain Pete Husta, was brought in to organize and carry out the admiral’s intent of “humane care and custody” for the detainees. Captain Husta is a brilliant organizer and motivator and has a way of getting the task force to move in the right direction at all times.
Navy captain Pat McCarthy is the senior attorney at Gitmo. He and his deputy commander, Dan Jones, are two of the finest legal minds I have come to know. They, together with their large legal team, keep us on the right side of the Geneva Conventions and common sense. They are hypervigilant at making sure Gitmo does its very best to always take the correct moral and legal road.
Paul Rester is the director of the Joint Intelligence Group at Gitmo. He brings to the job four decades of skill, experience, and most important, humanity. Paul would simply not tolerate any of his interrogators abusing any one—I admire and respect him. Also, the FBI has a large detachment there and works hand-in-hand with the DOD intel community. One complements the other and as a result, the level of skill, expertise, and professionalism is increased tenfold.
The biggest change is that the guard force is under the command of a career Army military police officer by the name of Colonel Bruce Vargo. He was command-selected for this position rather than being a reservist who was randomly assigned here with his reserve unit. Back in 2002 and 2003, many of the leaders here were reserve officers, and although they had good intentions, many of them simply didn’t know what they were doing. That has changed. The reserve and guard force today have come a long way. The soldiers, sailors, and marines who make up the task force here are well trained and represent the best America has to offer. Colonel Vargo is a graduate of the Army War College and brings to Gitmo and the Joint Task Force a level of competence that was lacking in 2002 and 2003 among the guard force leadership. His leadership has made a difference. Now the guard force is incredibly well trained and is far superior to the untrained guards of the early Abu Ghraib and Gitmo abuse era. Clearly, abuse and torture will not be tolerated, from the youngest private to the senior officer. We are one another’s keeper and are always hypervigilant against abuse and torture. I am fully confident about what would happen if I walked into the detainee camp late one night, found a young guard on duty, and suggested we take one of the prisoners out of his cell so we could rough him up and try to get some intel, maybe even have some fun along the way. That young sergeant would look at this colonel and say, “No sir. That is against my orders,” and then he’d be on the phone immediately, within minutes, reporting the incident to his superiors. And I’d be in a shitload of trouble. That’s exactly what should happen, and I sleep easy at night knowing that this culture is now the norm at Gitmo.
The biscuit at Gitmo is alive and well, established as a major and important part of the mission. All biscuit officers at Gitmo and around the world receive intense training prior to serving in a biscuit capacity. Unlike Major Leso, these young officers come to the fight well trained and incredibly prepared. They will have read all that has been written on their roles, duties, and functions in detention facilities. Moreover, there is now a
network of biscuits available for consultation 24/7. We did not have this when I arrived here in 2003.
Many have moved on to the next phase in their life. General Miller retired from the Army. Major Leso resigned his Army commission and no longer resides in this country. I think of John often and hope that he is well. Lieutenant Colonel Denise Dobson is now the chief of Walter Reed’s psychology department. On November 1, 2007, she was selected for full colonel. Denise has excelled at helping the Army and the Department of Defense develop policy that serves as the law for those health professionals working in the intel community. She, along with Colonel Banks, myself, and others, developed a course to train all new biscuit psychologists, who now undergo a three-week intensive course coupled with a six-month Web-based portion.
Colonel Banks remains as the command psychologist for the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. He has made a real difference in the fight against evil and terrorism. Colonel Banks is the finest operational psychologist I have ever known. Our nation owes him greatly. Lieutenant Colonel Frantz completed his deployment at Abu Ghraib and returned home to chewing tobacco, hunting, and the beauty of rural America. I often think of him and many of the other soldiers I served with in Abu Ghraib and at Gitmo. Almost daily, when I’m fatigued, in pain, and wanting to stop, I think back to the coffin of the young soldier we loaded on that C-130 in Kuwait. Those images have served to fuel me in ways I never could have imagined.
I will retire from the Army at the end of this deployment. I hope to be back in Janet’s arms and never leave her side. I cannot put into words how much I owe her. Her heart, touch, brilliant mind, and humanity have kept me balanced and have allowed me to fight evil in foreign lands around the world. As I write these words, my mind is flipping through a scrapbook in my head and I see clear images of the faces we have lost along the way—fine men and women who fought for their nation and what our nation stands for. Indeed, it has been an honor to walk among America’s best for a little while. I am them, they are me, we are one, in this global war on terrorism. I am a better person, human being, father, soldier, and psychologist for having served. Most importantly, I am a better American and citizen because of my experience with the U.S. military. With pride in my heart, I rest easy knowing that we have such great Americans in the fight, at the tip of the spear, keeping us safe, keeping us strong, fighting for freedom around the world. Indeed it was a privilege to stand between good and evil and be a part of the fight to help save humanity.
Fixing Hell Page 24