A History of the Muslim World to 1405: The Making of a Civilization

by Vernon O Egger

  Conclusion

  The Umayyads carved out a vast empire that extended from South Asia to western Europe. This enormous area became the matrix within which the distinctive features of Islam would emerge over the next several centuries. The Arabs who created this empire were a proud and martial people. It may well be that Islam’s survival in a new and hostile environment was due in large part to the Arabs’ utter self-confidence and to their assumption that Islam was exclusively an Arab religion. As the religion of the Arabs, Islam became a feature of their cultural identity that they jealously protected and did not allow to become submerged in the face of challenges from the long-established religions in the vast new empire. The Arabic language, as well, became a vehicle for Arab cultural hegemony. It was the language of the Qur’an; it soon became the language of administration and the lingua franca of commerce; over the next several centuries it displaced most of the spoken languages between the Iranian plateau and the Atlantic Ocean; and its mesmerizing poetry, with its cadences and rich evocations of the independence and romance of the bedouin lifestyle, inspired subsequent literature, especially that of the Iranian peoples.

  In this regard, the Umayyad achievement was monumental, but it was undermined by grave weaknesses that demanded radical solutions. The dynasty never developed a plan for administration other than constant conquest and the exploitation of non-Arabs for the benefit of Arabs. As a result, it failed to address the grievances that its subjects, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, were beginning to express. Tribal favoritism, the conscription of sedentary Arabs for campaigns of conquest, and the failure to develop policies that could accommodate non-Arab Muslims in the Umma became issues that eventually brought the dynasty to an end. Islamic principles of equality and justice became rallying cries against the Umayyad regime and demonstrated that the new religion was a powerful new force on the scene.

  NOTES

  1.

  For an indication of the ambiguity of the evidence, compare the differences in interpretation of the status of women in pre-Islamic Arabia found in the following works: Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven and London:

  Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 41–45.

  Esposito, John L. Women in Muslim Family Law. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982, pp. 14–15, 28–30.

  Hoyland, Robert G. Arabia and the Arabs from the Bronze Age to the Coming of Islam. New York and London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 128–34.

  Levy, Reuben. The Social Structure of Islam. Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1971, pp. 91–97.

  2.

  The date is usually given as 732, but see the discussion in Roger Collins, The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 89–91.

  3.

  Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. The End of the Jihād State: The Reign of Hishām ‘Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 82.

  FURTHER READING

  General

  Hawting, G.R. The First Dynasty of Islam: The Umayyad Caliphate, A.D. 661–750, 2d edition. London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

  Kennedy, Hugh. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century. London and New York: Longman, 1986.

  Arab Conquests

  Abun-Nasr, Jamil M. A History of the Maghrib, 2d ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

  Collins, Roger. The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710–797. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

  Donner, Fred. The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981.

  Gibb, H.A.R. The Arab Conquests in Central Asia. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1923.

  Ikram, S.M. Muslim Civilization in India. Ainslie T. Embree, ed. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964.

  Kaegi, Walter E. Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

  Administration

  Crone, Patricia and Martin Hinds. God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

  Morony, Michael G. Iraq After the Muslim Conquest. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.

  Dissolution of the Arab Empire

  Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. The End of the Jihād State: The Reign of Hishām ‘Abd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1994.

  CHAPTER 3

  The Development of Sectarianism

  The issue of legitimate leadership has been a central concern for Muslims since the death of Muhammad. The figure of the Prophet has cast a long shadow throughout history. Muslims have yearned to have a leader who embodied his qualities, but have usually had to settle for men whose ambition and weaknesses only accentuated the contrast with the ideal. The issue of the caliphate was not just a political question, but also one of maintaining the religious integrity of the community. Only fringe groups thought the caliph should have prophetic qualities, but most Muslims were convinced that in some sense he was responsible for continuing to provide religious guidance to the community in the absence of the Prophet.

  Because no consensus existed regarding the nature of the caliphate, controversies swirled about the method of selecting the caliphs as well as about the adequacy of the men who were chosen. The quarrels ensured that the first century of Muslim history would be politically unstable. Three of the first four caliphs were murdered, a growing number of Muslims became convinced that the Prophet had chosen ‘Ali as his successor and were angry that he was passed over in the selection process the first three times, and revolts began to break out more frequently against the Umayyads as their regime became increasingly identified with injustice and corruption.

  The debate over the nature of the caliphate had many repercussions. This chapter will revisit the Umayyad period to explore two of them. One was the emergence of divisions within the Umma that eventually crystallized into three major branches of Islam: Shi‘ism, Kharijism, and Sunnism. The other was the Abbasid revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the Umayyads and began a new chapter in Muslim history.

  ‘Ali and the Politics of Division

  One of the most recognizable figures in Muslim history is ‘Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. His martial skills, dedication to the Prophet’s cause, and concern for justice were widely admired. His attempt to resolve some of the problems arising out of the rapid expansion of the Muslim state raised the expectations and hopes of many Muslims, but it also aroused the enmity of others. His short and tragic career as caliph left a lasting mark on the Umma.

  Political Dissension

  The Arabs conquered Syria, Iraq, and Egypt during the caliphate of ‘Umar. During the decade of his administration (634–644), the task of administering the Umma became vastly more complex than it had been when Abu Bakr was caliph. Many issues became controversial, such as the distribution of plunder, the allocation of revenues from seized land, the awarding of contracts and administrative offices to family members and friends of the ruling elite, and the adherence to local customs in the numerous new lands in which Muslims found themselves. The pace of the conquests was so rapid, and the number of issues that everyone from the caliph on down had to deal with was so great, that none of the issues boiled to the surface during ‘Umar’s tenure. He was assassinated in 644, just as the more difficult and less remunerative phase of conquests was beginning. It was the ill fortune of his successor to confront the issues directly.

  ‘Uthman, one of the Prophet’s earliest converts, had been highly respected and was a popular choice for the caliphate at the time of ‘Umar’s murder. He was not unchallenged, however. Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, ‘Ali, let it be known that he wanted to be caliph and that he planned to change policies that many considered unfair. The council chose ‘Uthman, who served as caliph during the period 644–656. Overall, he has been held in respect by m
ost Muslims throughout history, particularly for his role in determining a standard version of the Qur’an. According to Islamic tradition, the Qur’an was not collected into its current form until after the Prophet’s death, and when it was, several versions existed. ‘Uthman reflected the concern of many Muslims that, since the Qur’an is in fact the word of God, its various written expressions should not differ. He is credited with having named a commission that agreed on a standard text.

  In general, ‘Uthman’s administration was similar to that of ‘Umar. Like his predecessor, he awarded lands abandoned by the Sasanian elite to individuals and tribes despite the official policy that such properties should be held in trust for the Umma; he maintained the garrison cities as permanent settlements despite their growing irrelevance as forward outposts and purely Arab enclaves; and he attempted to bring local affairs within the far-flung administrative units increasingly under the supervision of Medina.

  Where ‘Uthman’s administration diverged from previous practice was in its transparent favoritism of Meccan elites. Most of the soldiers in the Muslim armies that conquered Iraq and Egypt were from tribes of lesser status than the Quraysh, but they had been Muslims longer than the Quraysh elite, who had converted after the fall of Mecca. ‘Umar had consistently given precedence to warriors who had entered the Muslim armies from the earliest period, and they benefitted particularly in Iraq, where they were placed in charge of the revenues of many of the Sasanian royal lands and were named administrators of the province and of the cities. ‘Uthman, by contrast, followed the time-honored tribal practice of naming his close relatives to be leaders of all the major provinces as well as the important garrison towns of Kufa and Basra. These leaders, in turn, enacted measures and made appointments that favored the Umayyad clan and the merchants in Mecca who were linked financially with them. As a result, those tribesmen whose status and wealth had risen due to their having been charter members of the Umma now saw their position threatened by the politics of “business as usual.” The Umayyad clan and their allies, whose members on the whole had resisted the Prophet as long as possible, were now displacing those who had been the earliest supporters of the Islamic movement.

  ‘Uthman was not intentionally hurting the “older” Muslims. He probably viewed his nepotism as not merely customary—and even obligatory in light of traditional tribal values—but also as necessary in his quest to bring some coherence to the administration of the growing empire. Only by naming people whom he knew and trusted could he hope to bring about uniformity to policy in the same manner that he had brought about uniformity to the text of the Qur’an. Likewise, he felt compelled to make changes in the process of revenue collection, now that the flow of plunder from the conquests had slowed. The traditional one-fifth of the captured treasure that had come to the caliphal coffers for administrative expenses, pensions for widows and early Muslims, and the like, had been shrinking. ‘Uthman ended ‘Umar’s practice of allowing the provinces a wide latitude in determining their tax policies and began channeling a larger fraction of the tax proceeds to Medina to make up for the lost revenue from plunder.

  Despite ‘Uthman’s good intentions, by the early 650s important Arab families in Iraq and Egypt had become hostile to his policies, and Kufa, Basra, and Fustat had become centers of discontent. In 656, several hundred Arabs from Iraq and Egypt marched to Medina to protest the new policies before ‘Uthman personally. The caliph made no secret of his impatience with the complaints, and some of the protesters interpreted his comments as an insult. With passions aroused, a few hotheads climbed the wall surrounding ‘Uthman’s home, broke through the door, and killed him while he was engaged in religious devotions.

  ‘Ali’s Caliphate: Shi‘ites and Kharijites

  Upon ‘Uthman’s death, the mutineers and others in Medina acclaimed ‘Ali as their new caliph. Long critical of the policies that had benefitted the Quraysh at the expense of the common Muslim, ‘Ali was popular among the insurgents as well as among many who had known and admired him all his life in the Hijaz. His lifelong loyalty to his cousin the Prophet, his courage and skill as a warrior, and his piety had caused many to hold him in high esteem. Over thirty years earlier, he had married Fatima, a daughter of the Prophet, and the couple’s two sons were Muhammad’s only surviving grandchildren. His selection as caliph at this time, however, was controversial and bitterly resented by some. ‘A’isha, Muhammad’s youngest and favorite wife, held an old grudge against ‘Ali, and others among Muhammad’s closest friends resented ‘Ali’s popularity and his threat to the interests of the Quraysh. They seized upon the fact that the mutineers had been responsible for ‘Ali’s elevation to the caliphate, and they pointed out that ‘Ali had not only failed to make any effort to bring ‘Uthman’s murderers to justice—he had not even condemned ‘Uthman’s murder.

  Passions on both sides were high. ‘Ali’s supporters were euphoric that he had finally become caliph and would now bring justice to the Islamic community, whereas his opponents were possessed by a deadly rage stemming from their suspicion that his ambition had pushed him into becoming an accomplice in ‘Uthman’s murder. It was clear that a major clash was imminent, and both ‘Ali’s supporters and his opponents immediately set out for the garrison cities of Iraq in order to recruit troops for the struggle. ‘Ali marched to Kufa, where ‘Uthman’s policies were especially resented, while his opponents tried to rally the garrison in Basra in their favor. ‘Ali’s opponents included ‘A’isha and several of the Prophet’s oldest and most loyal followers, but they were unable to recruit as many soldiers in Basra as ‘Ali was able to raise in Kufa. The ensuing Battle of the Camel (so named because ‘A’isha sat upon one of the animals while she watched the conflict) resulted in a victory by ‘Ali’s forces.

  Almost immediately, however, the legitimacy of his caliphate was challenged by a relative of ‘Uthman named Mu‘awiya, the governor of Syria. For the next five years, the attention of the Umma was focused on the grand struggle between these two men. The supporters of one side or the other were known as the partisans, or shi‘a, of one or the other. Just as there had earlier been shi‘a ‘Uthman and shi‘a ‘Ali during the debate over ‘Uthman’s policies, so now the shi‘a Mu‘awiya were opposing the shi‘a ‘Ali. The term shi‘a in this context had no specifically religious meaning; it simply connoted support for the legitimacy of the claim of one or the other man in the quarrel.

  In 657, the two armies met at Siffin on the Euphrates River. After skirmishing for several months, it seemed that they were set for the decisive engagement. At that point, Mu‘awiya’s army asked for arbitration of the issues that divided the two men. ‘Ali felt compelled to agree to the arbitration because of a widespread sentiment on both sides not to shed the blood of fellow Muslims, but one group of his followers regarded his concession as an act of irresoluteness uncharacteristic of a true caliph. They defected and became known as Kharijites (khawarij, from kharaja, meaning “to depart or leave”).

  The term Kharijism appears frequently in Muslim history in the centuries after the Battle of Siffin. In the early years, it usually referred to the belief that a leader who violated a Qur’anic prescription was a grave sinner and should be excluded from the community of believers. The sinner had, by virtue of his error, become an unbeliever and should be killed. In practice, the groups who were called Kharijites were rarely in a position to exclude anyone from the Umma; rather, they themselves were a minority that withdrew from the larger community on the grounds that the majority had fallen into error. Kharijism was a feared and hated movement, because most of its early adherents believed that they had the right—and even duty—to kill non-Kharijites. In the late seventh century, however, a group of Kharijite scholars in Iraq rejected violence and rebellion and began to wrestle with the issue of how to live among a majority whom one regarded to be impious. By the late ninth century, it was this group’s nonviolent policy of withdrawing from society that was more characteristic of Kharijism than the earlier tac
tic of violent attack. Unfortunately, non-Kharijite chroniclers over the next few centuries often labeled any group that rebelled against the government as Kharijite, lumping togther a wide variety of movements and making it difficult to identify the actual beliefs of the groups.

  Kharijite tendencies were particularly strong among nomads and peasants, who were suspicious of the motives and policies of urban leaders. The Great Berber Revolt of 740, discussed in the previous chapter, was raised under the banner of Kharijism, and the doctrine subsequently became highly popular among Berbers. Several Kharijite Berber states established themselves in the wake of the revolt, setting themselves apart from the Umayyad dynasty and its successor, the Abbasid dynasty. They set out to follow what they considered to be authentic Islam. Kharijism gave religious sanction to the inclination of these marginal groups to live separately from the rest of society, and it enabled them to feel spiritually superior to the majority, even if they were economically inferior.

  ‘Ali remained unaccountably inactive in Kufa even after Mu‘awiya’s followers began proclaiming that their leader was the genuine caliph. In 661, a Kharijite assassinated ‘Ali as an act of judgment on his failure to do God’s bidding. Mu‘awiya then claimed the caliphate but stayed in Damascus, where his political and military support lay. ‘Ali’s ineffective caliphate and his violent death were a profound shock to his followers. For the previous quarter of a century, a growing number of Muslims had come to regard him as an advocate for the principle of equality and for a government dedicated to justice. Many of his followers believed that he had spiritual gifts not accessible to other mortals. The triumph of the Umayyad clan exacerbated the sense of loss, particularly in Kufa.