2 August 1942. 68 Sqn, Coltishall. Beaufighter R2248.
Pilot: Plt Off D P Paton. Nav/RO: Plt Off G E Bennett.
Airborne 15.05. Landed 17.50.
Scrambled, very cloudy. After lunch an E/A approached off sector in 10/10 cloud conditions. P/O Paton had four visuals during a chase of over 300 miles in and out of the cloud but the enemy bomber managed to escape.
Eleven HE bombs caused four deaths in yet another raid on Boston during the night of August 22/23, but these raids finally petered out in the Fenland region after brave little Skegness was hit yet again on the nights of September 15/16 and October 24/25. Three people were killed in the first of these attacks and fourteen in the second.
With little enemy air activity over the UK during the previous ten days, night fighter Mosquito NFIIs of 151 Squadron, Wittering, at last found some trade during the late evening of September 17, in what appears to have been a final fling by the Luftwaffe – at least for a while. KG2, for example, had taken quite a beating during the past six months and needed time to draw breath and rebuild. On some occasions the teamwork of RAF night fighters and GCI stations could be almost clinical in its effectiveness as a killing machine and is well illustrated by an incident on this date.
With just scattered light clouds, a half-moon promised good visibility as Flt Lt Henry Bodien and Sgt George Brooker (RO) eased off Wittering’s runway at 21.43 hours. Flt Lt Bodien’s name will be remembered from 151’s early Defiant days. He had come a long way since then, rising through the ranks and earning an enviable reputation on the way and certainly with a more potent weapon in his hands now.
Flying Mosquito NFII, DD610, they were taken over by Sqn Ldr Grace, CO and senior controller at the nearby Langtoft GCI station, who guided them to the vicinity of nine raiders coming in over The Wash, heading for King’s Lynn. Brooker, head down under the visor of the latest AI Mk V set, got a momentary contact to port then lost it, but despite there being a lot of interference on the set, picked out another target slightly to starboard. It was 1,000 yards ahead, level with them at 7,000 feet altitude and going in the same direction. In a classic interception, Henry Bodien obtained a visual when the enemy’s outline took shape as it turned to port in front of him. It was a Dornier Do217, one of the enemy aircraft attacking King’s Lynn and it had just released part of its bomb load. Bodien eased closer from astern and slightly below. From the way the Dornier began to make diving turns to right and left, losing height to 4,000 feet, the German crew may have spotted the Mosquito but there was no defensive fire during the engagement. Bodien came in from slightly below and let fly with several short bursts of cannon from 200 to 300 yards range as the target jinked in and out of his gunsight, first hitting the port wing then the engine, which caught fire. His cannon fire now raked the Dornier’s fuselage as it darted from side to side trying to escape the hail of shells that sprayed into the starboard engine. The port engine blew up and now going down with both motors on fire, pilot Fw Franz Elias jettisoned the remaining bombs and ordered his crew, Gefrs G Buchner and W Berg and Uffz F Leibrecht, to bale out. The stricken bomber, U5+UR, wk nr 4265 of III/KG2, plunged to earth between the villages of Fring and Shernborne about ten miles east of King’s Lynn and the crew were all taken prisoner. Local inhabitants’ memory of this incident has faded now and few realise why the final resting place of this Dornier was known locally as ‘the aeroplane field’.
By September 1942 KG2 had lost so many crews that it was reduced to twenty-three out of its original complement of ninety and the remainder of the year was spent in mounting occasional nuisance raids. Once again RAF night fighters had given the Luftwaffe enough of a bloody nose to make it necessary for it to withdraw and regroup its resources. But it was not through yet.
CHAPTER 8
Steinbock, Gisela and Buzz-bombs
Having rebuilt its strength by February 1943, KG2 was back in the front line again and in addition to the build up of fresh crews it was also re-equipped with the latest Dornier Do217K- and M- sub-types. With reorganisation and re-equipment being prevalent in the second half of 1942, the RAF had not stood still either and thus the stage was set for another clash in the night sky around The Wash. By the end of that spring of 1943, though, KG2’s casualties began to mount once again, peaking in March with the loss of twenty-six crews.
In May of 1942, 25 Squadron relocated from Ballyhalbert to RAF Church Fenton and later that year began re-equipment with the Mosquito. The quantity of defensive night fighter units was decreasing by this time and from its base in Yorkshire, the squadron would be called upon to provide cover to a wide area, involving them in sorties as far south as The Wash and north Norfolk coast and well out into the North Sea. By the start of 1943 the Turbinlite Havocs of 532 Squadron (formerly 1453 Flight) and the other similarly equipped squadrons, were disbanded and their crews were dispersed among other night fighter and intruder units. For example, Fg Off Jack Cheney and his RO, Plt Off Mike Mycock, already mentioned earlier, were posted to 25 Squadron in January 1943.
151 Squadron, having finally seen its Defiants and Hurricanes replaced by the Mosquito NFII, had a fairly thin time during the summer of 1942. Many nights went by without a sniff of the Luftwaffe and when it did venture over it was often just an odd aircraft or two with no discernable purpose other than of a nuisance value.
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, from the beginning of 1942 cooperation between night fighters and searchlights was reorganised into a tactical ‘box’ system with boxes, forty-four miles wide by fourteen miles long, within which a night fighter circled a stationary vertical beam [the ‘beacon’] to maintain station. When an enemy aircraft entered the box, other searchlights converged to indicate the location of the raider as it approached the central ‘killer’ zone. Evidence of this box structure lying across the route to the Midlands can be gleaned from some 151 Squadron interceptions during that summer, each one occurring during the periods of no moon, when searchlights would be at their most effective.
On the night of August 11/12, for example, Plt Off E Rayner and Flt Sgt V Brown (RO) intercepted and damaged a Ju88 at 01.30 hours near Grantham while patrolling searchlight box 14 under Digby sector control. Rayner was probably deprived of a kill because his firing buttons had accidentally been wired in reverse and for his crucial first burst the machine guns fired when he thought he was firing the cannon. Just before 23.00 hours on September 8/9 two 151 Mosquitoes were sent off to patrol boxes 15 and 20 and showed just how effective the current tactics could be – AI Mk V not withstanding. Flt Lt Henry Bodien with Sgt George Brooker as RO, were first up:
… with orders to man S/L box 15 under Wittering sector control. After orbiting beacon they were given ‘smack’. This proved fruitless but as they returned to the orbit a contact at 15,000 feet altitude, maximum range was obtained, followed by a visual of exhausts at 650 yards range slightly above and to starboard, heading SE at about 230mph. Pilot was told to investigate with extreme caution as it was probably friendly but owing to the darkness of the night, definite identification was difficult. The aircraft was chased from NW Bedford to Clacton and down to 10,000 feet and it was just on midnight when searchlights illuminated both aircraft. From sixty yards range it became possible to identify it as a Do217 with black crosses and a number visible on the green camouflaged underside of wings. Bandit made a diving turn across the nose of Mosquito and received a burst of cannon fire outside its port engine. It then straightened up and a second burst from 150 yards astern hit port wing behind the engine. Visual was then lost through searchlight dazzle at 6,000 feet altitude and the AI became unserviceable as a result of vibration from the cannon fire. Landed back at Wittering at 00.57 and this Do217 is claimed as damaged.
There was a rather intriguing comment on Bodien’s combat report to the effect that his Mosquito was: “camouflaged in a special manner as devised by 151 Squadron”, but this was not explained further. The term ‘smack’ is the order for the fighter to leave the beacon and head in the d
irection given towards a possible target, usually indicated by searchlight activity.
Three minutes later Fg Off Alex McRitchie and Flt Sgt E James (RO) followed Bodien down Wittering’s runway to man S/L box 20 under Duxford sector control. This is their account of the sortie.
Pilot orbited beacon at 12,000 feet. Given ‘smack’ and saw S/L beams fifteen miles away, which doused as Mosquito approached. Then proceeded in direction of more beams to the south and saw a flare dropped. Duxford control ordered pilot to return to beacon but he obtained permission to continue as he felt sure hostile aircraft were near. He was then warned of presence of a bogey. A blip was obtained at 10,000 feet altitude at maximum range. The blip spread and pilot assumed this indicated bombs dropping. Several other blips followed which came down to 650 yards range and spread as in the first case but contact was lost again. Bombs were seen exploding and RO was warned by control of possibilities of a contact. A few seconds later an AI blip was obtained at maximum range and a visual of exhausts was obtained when it was at 500 yards range. Mosquito was at 7,000 feet altitude with the E/A, confirmed through binoculars by the RO as a Dornier Do217, jinking violently at 200mph, 500 feet above and in front, heading north. Opened fire from astern at 300 yards with a four-second burst that hit the fuselage and a fire broke out. E/A began diving turns and fired back ineffectually but failed to avoid a three-second burst that set the port engine on fire. Another three-second burst from 300 yards hit the wings and the bomber dived into the ground, exploding in a vivid white flash.
The Dornier F8+AP from II/KG40 crashed at 23.35 hours at Rectory Farm, Orwell near Cambridge and its crew of Fw A Witting, Ofw F Heusser, Ogefr A Hoppe and Uffz A Eysoldt all died in the engagement. This was McRitchie’s last combat victory and promoted to Flt Lt, he was posted away on non-operational duties in April 1943. His name returned to prominence with a bang though in February 1944 when he took part in the Mosquito raid on Amiens prison, during which he was shot down and made POW.
In April 1943, 151 Squadron would leave Wittering for Colerne in the West Country from where it began intruder operations. From the beginning of that year, 151 Squadron’s preparations for its transition from a defensive to an offensive role became evident from the increase in cross-country training flights and regular classroom sessions on navigation for the observers (RO), who would themselves become part of the navigator fraternity with the option of wearing the N brevet.
Other subtle improvements were filtering through 151 Squadron in January 1943, such as one or two Mosquitoes having their four Browning machine guns removed to make way for a new mark of AI equipment in the nose that it was believed would give better results.
This is a reference to the Mk VII version of AI, which had a small, moving dish scanner, mounted behind the nose cone of the aircraft, instead of the external arrowhead, fixed dipole antennae associated with the Mk IV and Mk V. Maximum range was now about seven miles and this apparatus represented a considerable improvement over previous versions, including allowing radar-guided interceptions to be made at altitudes below about two thousand feet, something earlier AI sets could not cope with. Sqn Ldr Lewis Brandon explains:
The performance of AI Mk IV depended largely on the altitude at which the fighter flew. The range in feet was roughly equivalent to the altitude at which the aircraft was being flown. The return echo from the ground was of course much stronger than from an aircraft. The lower the fighter flew, the further down the azimuth and elevation display tubes the ground return came… so that eventually at about 1,000 feet [altitude] it would blot out any other echoes.
AI Mk VII worked on the same principle as the Mk IV but the main difference was a more powerful, beamed transmission, which gave a greater maximum range and to a large extent eliminated or reduced the ground returns, thus improving interception of low-flying enemy aircraft such as mine-layers. So far as the RO was concerned the Mk VII was also easier to operate, as there was only one display tube for him to look at.
There was also a version in between these two: the Mark V, which has been mentioned in several of the preceding incidents. It had the same external antenna system as the Mk IV but with a different display tube arrangement – including one mounted on the top of the instrument panel for the pilot to view. Some were of the opinion that it only served to ruin his night vision, even if he had time to use it! The Mk V seems to have become generally disliked but was factory-installed in the first batches of Mosquitoes to be issued to squadrons, so 151 Squadron was among the first to experience this version. Lewis Brandon was involved with the testing of AI Mk VII at RAF Ford and then went on to serve with 157 Squadron, the first unit to receive the Mosquito NFII, and his opinion of the interim Mk V was quite scathing.
Fighter Command perpetrated a blunder almost as bad as the Turbinlite fiasco. They decided to install in our beautiful Mossies a wretched new Mark V AI that had all the faults of the Mk IV plus many of its own. It was a retrograde step even when compared to the Mk IV but compared to the Mk VII it was like going back to a divining-rod. There were times when I thought that if I took a hazel twig, persuaded a dachshund to lift a leg against it and then took it into the Mossie with me, it would lead me to a German more readily than would AI Mk V.
GCI radar was undergoing its own changes, too, with the rolling out of the permanent ‘Final AMES’ version to, among others, Langtoft and Neatishead. These installations became irreverently known to their staff as ‘Happidrome’, being named after the popular 1941 radio programme about an imaginary variety theatre where everything went wrong and nobody seemed to know what was going on. It was not long before those in the know about radar realised the similarities between the radio programme and the new Final GCI installations and thus the new brick and concrete operations buildings were dubbed accordingly. The development of the radar also allowed each GCI station to handle several interceptions simultaneously and four 151 Squadron Mosquitoes were sent off on the 23rd to test the system with Neatishead.
While it had become patently obvious, in view of the demise of the Turbinlite Havoc squadrons, that the Turbinlite concept was a dead duck, someone had conjured up the bright (!) idea of grafting a Turbinlite onto a Mosquito and wanted to try it out. 151 Squadron became involved with this venture when Flt Lt Henry Bodien and Fg Off Yeats flew down to Heston aerodrome on January 8 1943 to collect the prototype Turbinlite Mosquito W4087. That turned out to be a wasted journey because the aeroplane wasn’t even ready when they arrived. Next day Bodien and Fg Off Rayner went down again and this time Bodien was able to fly the Turbinlite back to Wittering. Rayner should have brought back their NFII but had to wait for it to be repaired after a Polish airman very prettily taxied a Tiger Moth into it.
Temporarily, Sqn Ldr Stewart, OC 532 (Turbinlite) Squadron – mentioned in Chapter 5 and still clearing up at Hibaldstow – was sent down to Wittering where he and one of the remaining 532 Squadron ROs, Fg Off Andy Cunningham, were to put the Turbinlite Mosquito through its paces. This took them all of a day and then they were ferried back to Hibaldstow. The result of the test is unclear but W4087, which was officially on charge to 1422 Flight at Heston, was ordered to remain at Wittering. It does seem a terrible waste of the Mosquito’s true potential to encumber it with all that gear but as there were no more Mosquito conversions, fortunately a veil seems to have been drawn quickly over the experiment.
There was little enemy activity in the sector until in the clear moonlight of January 15/16 the Luftwaffe attacked Lincoln with about twelve bombers. Four Mosquitoes were launched from Wittering but the only confirmed kill fell to Canadian new boy, Sgt Earl ‘Tex’ Knight and his RO Sgt Bill Roberts, who were on their first operational sortie.
Airborne at 20.25, twenty minutes later they came under Patrington GCI controller Sqn Ldr Donaldson who put them onto a bandit coming in over the Lincolnshire coast at 10,000 feet. Roberts lost his first contact on the AI Mk V set but the controller helped him to pick out another one at maximum range, and he brought Knight
into visual range of a Dornier Do217 at 1,000 yards. Closing to 150 yards Sgt Knight fired a two-second cannon burst into the port engine just as the Dornier dived hard down to 4,000 feet, jinking right and left and even making complete circles in the process. As machine-gun fire from the Dornier’s dorsal turret zipped over the Mosquito’s wing tip, Knight’s second burst hit the starboard engine and a third burst from a hundred yards range riddled the bomber’s fuselage. Shedding debris and with both engines on fire it dived into the ground, exploding near Boothby Graffoe, ten miles north of Sleaford. The Dornier Do217E was wk nr 4308, U5+KR of II/KG2 and its crew, Lt Wolff, Ogefr Krusewitz and Uffzs Knorr and Semlitschka, all died.
This was the last combat of any significance by 151 Squadron before it moved out of Wittering to Colerne in April 1943. In its place, 141 Squadron was due to move into Wittering with Beaufighters but, although it would be available for defensive night fighting if called upon, its role was principally that of offensive intruder and bomber support duties.
No Place for Chivalry Page 23