Embedded

  I found out what had transpired once we arrived at the camp. According to the Iraqis there was a huge fight between Sermen and Captain Natham, the Iraqi convoy commander. Captain Natham had requested that Sermen refrain from driving like a maniac and slow his Humvee. Sermen had refused the order, told Natham to go to hell, jumped out of the Humvee, and gone to the rear of the convoy because he could not stand Natham any longer.

  After hearing the story I did not know whose side to take. On the one hand Captain Natham was the convoy commander and had the authority to tell his subordinates what they could and could not do. On the other hand Sermen realized that if he drove as Natham desired, the convoy would become an easy target for insurgents. I decided I was with Sermen. Speed and unpredictability keep you alive in Iraq. Even so, because Sermen was in the military, he needed to respect his officer’s commands.

  This incident highlights the relationship between officers and enlisted men in the Iraqi army. In the U.S. Marines, if an enlisted Marine defies an officer or senior enlisted, he isn’t allowed to carry on as if nothing happened. He is punished through the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Without respect for the chain of command, a military organization will have no ability to maintain order and discipline.

  Sadly, the Iraqi army is set up so that soldiers have no service obligation and face no legal punishments. If a jundi decides the Iraqi army sucks and wants to quit, he can. Likewise, if he wants to tell a superior officer to rot in hell, he can. In the Iraqi army it is nearly impossible for officers to maintain military rule that is necessary to execute combat operations. A formal legal system simply does not exist. The only way for officers to punish the jundi is to take away pay or leave, but when they implement this punishment, the jundi just quit.

  The Monarchy

  There is another side to the Iraqi officer and enlisted relationship, of course. The Iraqi officers treat the soldiers like servants. It is very difficult for enlisted soldiers to take orders from their officers if they believe the officers do not care about them. Here is a perfect example. One day we were rolling through the Haditha market and spotted a vehicle that looked like one of the vehicles on our BOLO (be on the lookout) list. Our Humvee immediately flagged the vehicle to pull over, then we called up the rear Iraqi Humvee to go search the car.

  After five minutes the Iraqi Humvee finally pulled up. We waited for another five minutes and began to wonder why nobody was searching the car. We asked our terp Mark to call them on the Iraqi radio net to find out what the situation was. Mark explained, “Gents, the Humvee alongside us is full of Iraqi officers and they are refusing to do “soldier” tasks. They see their role as commanders and thus do not have a role in actually conducting any of the work.” Major Gaines and I each looked at each other, dumbfounded. Gaines replied, “Mark, are you kidding me or are you serious?” Mark replied, “I’m not joking, Gaines. The Iraqi officers just called on some enlisted soldiers from one of the front Humvees to come back and search the vehicle.” Confused, I said, “Mark, the officers are twenty feet from the car. The soldiers they called on are two football fields away. I don’t get it.” Mark smirked and said, “I know. It’s stupid. Welcome to Iraq.”

  I guess none of this was surprising. The concept of king and servant seems to be pervasive in Iraqi culture. The sad part is that we are supposed to change these people somehow. In the words of one of our Camp Taji instructors, “Teach the Iraqis the concept of the leader being the servant of his men. Teach the Iraqi officers that they must respect their enlisted soldiers.” Are you kidding me? That’s equivalent to asking us to convince the American people that they need to stop watching NFL football and start watching professional soccer. Changing a culture is not a mission, it’s a pipe dream.

  The Status Quo Cannot Go

  Major Pyle and I spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Ali about promoting Sergeant Major Kasem to the highest position of enlisted leadership in the battalion. We suggested that he replace Sergeant Major Nayim, who maintained the current position and had failed miserably in his role. Major Pyle stated the facts. “Seyidi [Sir], Kasem is a stellar leader, has impressive initiative, and gets things done on camp. We believe Kasem should be in the highest enlisted position. He can have a positive influence on the entire battalion, show off his work ethic, and reinforce the concept that meritocracy wins over nepotism.”

  Lieutenant Colonel Ali was visibly confused. He gave Pyle an odd look. “Why would I promote Kasem? If we promote Kasem we have to get someone else to fill his current job and he is doing a great job where he is. If I move him to Nayim’s position, he has to learn another job. It makes absolutely no sense. And if I give him a promotion, all of the jundi will want promotions. Finally, if Nayim gets kicked out of the top enlisted position, he will lose all respect in the battalion. I will not do this. Nayim is my friend.” Major Pyle’s jaw dropped to the ground—and for good reason. How can a Marine respond sensibly to something like this?

  Sometimes the Iraqis just don’t get it. Their deep-seated tribal influences reinforce some of their least productive traits: maintaining the status quo, nepotism, playing favorites, and fixating on pride and honor. The concept that the hardest-working, most-qualified individuals should be rewarded for their efforts is completely foreign to them.

  Chapter 13

  Iraqis Speak on the Nation, Region, and Military

  September–October 2006

  Mark,” I said to our Kurdish terp, “I’d like to hear what your opinion is of the American invasion. When the plan was written up, we would free the country’s people from Saddam’s oppressive grip and these people would then rebuild the society and become the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. What went wrong?” Mark smiled and playfully punched me in the shoulder. “Jamal, I never thought an American could admit that something may have gone wrong in the Iraq invasion. Are you sure you are not an Iranian spy?” I said, “Mark, shut up. Get on with your story.” He said, “Jamal, I think America screwed up in four categories when they came in during the original invasion.”

  The Nation

  Mark lectured me on the situation in Iraq before the U.S. invasion. “The majority of people in Iraq were excited the Americans were coming, particularly the Kurdish, Shia, and highly educated,” he said. “Despite the misinformed Western vision of a Saddam-controlled media feeding Iraqi people propaganda that vilified the United States, many Iraqis had their eyes wide open to the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian media outlets through illegal satellite dishes. This opened our eyes to the good things Americans could bring to Iraq. Basically, the stage was set for a successful American campaign.”

  Mark paused before going on. “Listen, Jamal, it was no secret Saddam was in a desperate fight for the population’s support. His groveling for support actually made the Iraqis feel more and more that what America had to offer was better, even if we weren’t sure what this offering would be. It got so pathetic that Saddam ordered banks to give everyone a hundred dollars if they would support him in the war against America. They would never admit it in public, but my guess is the majority of Iraqis wanted the Americans to invade.”

  “Mark,” I asked, “if people were excited about us invading, why am I here three years later dodging IEDs?” He replied, “Well, everything went down the crapper because of four key mistakes: opening the borders, disbanding the army and police, leaving the military bases open and unguarded, and leaving the banks unsecured.” In his professional manner Mark elaborated:

  When the Americans opened the borders, or at least left them unsecured, it let Al Qaeda fighters, Syrians, and Iranians come into the region to create chaos. This was the first sign to the Iraqi people that there was a weakness in the American’s ability to secure the situation. Then you guys had the brain-dead idea of disbanding the Iraqi army and Iraqi police. The Iraqis would have accepted this if the Americans had maintained the security these services provided, but instead you guys fired the security forces and at the same time let the thieves and bandits run rampant
. This was strike two against America. Next you left the Iraqi army camps unguarded after the invasion. This allowed everyone in the country to arm and prepare for guerrilla warfare. Hell, with my own eyes I saw grandmothers carrying RPGs out of the camps so they could sell them for money. It was a free-for-all. If the United States put in a simple effort to secure these facilities the number of weapons and ammunition available to the subsequent insurgency movement would have been erased. Finally, strike four for America was leaving the banks unsecured. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back, Jamal. Iraq went from a semimodern banking system to the stone age after the invasion. Thieves were robbing banks without consequence and the American soldiers simply watched it happen. All the money that was once held in the hands of decent Iraqis transferred into the paws of the nefarious Iraqis. You guys fucked us, plain and simple.

  Mark’s comments tore at my heart. If we had brought in a much larger invasion force and planned more appropriately for the fall of Saddam, Iraq may have actually ended up as a success story. Tragically, any good will Iraqis had toward America all but vanished.

  The Region

  In the two weeks after 2/3 took over the area from 3/3, they suffered twenty-two wounded and two Marines killed. Before 2/3 arrived, 3/3 had experienced numerous combat casualties. The Triad was nothing short of a bloodbath for the Marines. I decided to get the Iraqi perspective on why 3/3 and now 2/3 were getting waxed by the insurgents.

  I grabbed Moody, the most experienced terp we had. Moody had been with our battalion in Haditha since it had been formed almost two years earlier, and he had seen four different Marine units rotate in and out of the Triad. “Moody,” I asked, “why have the past two Marine battalions been crushed by the insurgents?” Moody responded, “Jamal, the problem with Marines is that you do not understand Iraqi people.” He hesitated. “Well, actually, the only Marine I have seen that really understood Iraqi people was Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani, the 3/1 commander. Do you know what happened to him? The Marines fired him for the ‘Haditha Massacre.’”

  Moody continued his praise for Chessani. “Jamal, the guy was a genius. You know the entire time his battalion was here there were only two Marines killed? He was the only Marine commander who would come to the Iraqi camp and ask for advice on a regular basis from the jundi and the terps.” I retorted, “Are you kidding me? He’s the only Marine commander that sought out Iraqi advice on how to deal with Iraqi problems?” Moody replied, “Jamal, I am dead serious.” I said, “Well, what exactly did he do that was so different than what we are doing now? We don’t want to create another Haditha Massacre. That isn’t an option at this point.”

  Moody said, “Jamal, the so-called Haditha Massacre was the best thing that ever happened to the Marines.” He sat back and smiled. “Until the Marines realize that violence is how politics and policy are solved in Iraq, they will never be successful. I guarantee when the Americans leave us alone, the solutions to our country’s problems will be solved by violence. That is just how it is and how it always will be. We are different.”

  Moody continued with his insightful lecture. “What Chessani finally realized after speaking with Iraqis, myself included, was that the people in this region need to feel pain in order to respond, because the insurgents put pain on them everyday. Unless we reciprocate we are not going to convince anybody to do anything.” I fired back, “So you suggest we just go grab civilians and start torturing them or something?”

  “No, the key is to implement policies that put the pressure on the tribal sheiks to act,” Moody responded. “The sheiks control the populations and do what is in their best interest. The trick is to shape the decisions they must face. For example, we suggested to Chessani that he button down the cities and eliminate vehicle traffic, implement curfews, and shut down the power. The sheikhs were forced to come out of their holes and negotiate with the Marines. The Marines have the power to put the pain on the people without resorting to the violence the insurgents use. Chessani knew this and was highly successful in protecting his Marines.”

  Playing the devil’s advocate I responded, “Well, if we implement those policies then we will continue to anger the people and they will just want to side with the insurgents.” Moody burst out with laughter. “Jamal, you and I both know the Americans will never, never, never win the hearts and minds of Sunni Arabs in Al Anbar Province; however, you can win their respect for your authority, power, and money. This is how you will get them to do what you want. They are never going to like you, but they may be willing to work with you if it is in their interest.”

  What Moody said made so much sense. From an Iraqi perspective the facts are very clear: to beat the insurgents one needs to fight fire with fire or one will lose the fight. If the sheikhs can collect thousands of dollars from insurgent groups by promoting violence against Marines, without incurring any cost, the decision is simple: continue supporting the insurgents. Likewise, if the Marines put a little pressure on the sheikh—take his electricity, his ability to drive, his food, his water, and so forth—he now has a cost associated with accepting money from insurgent groups. You have now shaped his decision-making process in your favor.

  Toto, we aren’t in Kansas anymore.

  The Military

  I got my last dose of Iraqi perspective this evening speaking with Colonel Abass. I addressed Abass with the standard litany of greetings, pleasantries, and small talk Iraqis need before getting down to business. But then I asked, “Sir, what are your thoughts on implementing some sort of awards system to recognize the work of jundi who are doing excellent work?” Abass sunk into his leather chair and twisted his handlebar mustache. “Jamal, what exactly are you thinking?” I replied, “Sir, to be quite honest, I’m not sure. I know what works in the Marines, but I’m not sure how our system would translate into the Iraqi Army. One idea I had would be to give the jundi formal letters of appreciation signed by you. What do you think of something like that?”

  Colonel Abass chuckled in a low grumble and propped himself upright. “Jamal, Jamal, Jamal, I love your enthusiasm. You are a happy fellow and I think it is wonderful. God has obviously blessed you.” I quickly replied, “Sir, I know you think I’m full of shit on this one and I actually realize that I probably am. I’m really just fishing for some ideas from you. Why won’t a system like this work? Didn’t you have an awards system in the old Iraqi army?”

  Abass proceeded to lecture me. “Jamal, in the past the Iraqi army was a job of pride and honor,” he said. “Today, it is purely a way for people to make ends meet. Iraqis no longer have any pride in the country or their military anymore. God willing, we can fix this over time, but I doubt it. The only thing that will motivate my jundi is more money, more leave, or less work. These men are not soldiers, they are civilians.”

  Colonel Abass summarized his thoughts. “Jamal, did you know the brigade tried to write me a formal letter of appreciation a few weeks ago? It was a wonderful gesture, but even I have become disillusioned in this new Iraqi army. I don’t command anything, the Americans do. I can’t kill insurgents, because the Americans won’t let me. Civilians don’t even respect the power of the Iraqi army anymore. How can I have pride in it? You know what I did with the letter I received?” I replied out of courtesy, “What?” Abass said, “I wiped my ass with it and used it for toilet paper. That’s how much that paper was worth to me. The same holds for a majority of the jundi in my battalion.”

  At the conclusion of the initial Iraqi invasion, we should have never dissolved Iraqi’s only functional organization. It now may be irreparable.

  Part 3

  COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH THE IRAQI ARMY

  Chapter 14

  Operation Nimer

  September 2006

  Five years ago, on September 11, 2001, terrorists blew things up in New York City and Washington, D.C. At Camp Ali terrorists decided to celebrate the five-year anniversary by sending a 107-mm rocket screaming over the MiTT camp. It landed thirty-five meters north of
us. Luckily it was a dud or it could have killed our entire team in one shot. Death was a reality we faced in combat. We had been lucky thus far to have experienced relatively few casualties in the Iraqi battalion. But in September we headed into our biggest operation yet, and I was certain that at the end of the operation someone would be dead or missing a body part. Surviving the operation would be a serious relief.

  We began the operations briefs. Even by Iraqi standards the preliminary Iraqi order had failed. Don’t get me wrong, the content was solid. The briefer communicated his ideas and everyone understood how we would accomplish the mission. Even so, the Iraqis made a rookie mistake in formulating the plan. They assumed they could fit 222 individuals into the Haditha FOB, a space designated for a maximum of 100. The Iraqis may enjoy the idea of being stacked on top of one another, but I didn’t want an Iraqi sleeping on top of me.

  Captain McShane did not endorse their plan either. “What about the idea of using peoples’ homes as patrol bases?” he asked. “We can switch every day or so.” Although such an idea would certainly infuriate the locals, we thought it was better than stacking 222 bodies in a shoebox. But McShane’s ideas did not persuade the Iraqis. Captain Hasen said, “We are Iraqis; we do not want to invade another Iraqi’s home. The Americans may be willing to do this, but we refuse to do this!” Hasen’s critique was correct, but he did not offer any alternative solutions. McShane, visibly frustrated, fired at the Iraqis, “We must do this. You have presented no solutions—we are doing it our way now!”