One day’s rations for one person on the Terra Nova expedition. The rations were divided into standard or summit rations, the latter reflecting the greater demands of the polar plateau. Photograph by Herbert Ponting, January 1912.
On 18 August 1911, while Scott’s team continued to make preparations at Cape Evans, Dr Edward Atkinson, its naval surgeon, gave a lecture to the men that summarised what Scott believed at the time: ‘Atkinson lectured on “Scurvy” last night. He spoke clearly and slowly, but the disease is anything but precise. He gave a little summary of its history afloat and the remedies long in use in the Navy. He described the symptoms with some detail. Mental depression, debility, syncope, petechial, livid patches, spongy gums, lesions, swellings, and so on to things that are worse. He passed to some of the theories held and remedies tried in accordance with them. Sir Almorth Wright has hit the truth, he thinks, in finding increased acidity of blood – acid intoxication – by methods only possible in recent years… so far for diagnosis, but it does not bring us much closer to the cause, preventives, or remedies. Practically we are much as we were before, but the lecturer proceeded to deal with the practical side. In brief, he holds the first cause to be tainted food, but secondary, or contributory causes may be even more potent in developing the disease, damp, cold, over-exertion, bad air, bad light, in fact any condition exceptional to normal healthy existence. Remedies are merely to change these conditions for the better. Dietetically, fresh vegetables are the best curatives – the lecturer was doubtful of fresh meat, but admitted its possibility in Polar climate; lime juice only useful if regularly taken. He discussed lightly the relative values of vegetable stuffs, doubtful of those containing abundance of phosphates such as lentils… His remarks were extremely sound and practical as usual. He provided the value of fresh meat in Polar regions. Scurvy seems very far away from us this time; yet after our Discovery experience, one feels that no trouble can be too great or no precaution too small to be adopted to keep it at bay. Therefore such an evening as last was well spent. It is certain we shall not have the disease here, but one cannot foresee equally certain avoidance in the southern journey to come. All one can do is to take every possible precaution.’ (L Huxley, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 2, 1913 edition)
A Huntley & Palmer’s biscuit from Shackleton’s 1907–1909 expedition. The stores included much tinned and bottled fruit and jams, dried milk, butter, cheese and preserved vegetables in the hope of their preventing scurvy.
On 24 October 1911, two motor sledges started ahead of Scott’s main group, hauling material, but they quickly broke down and had to be abandoned. Scott himself left on 1 November with eight ponies, each with a sledge. Dogs were used, following later, but were not to be taken to the Pole. Travel was difficult: the ponies sank in the snow, but, even more importantly, they suffered terribly as they stood at night when sweat turned to ice on their bodies. Though dogs did not suffer from the harsh conditions, Scott did not appreciate their advantage over ponies. While he knew dogs would eat dog, he does not seem to have liked it as a strategy – particularly the fact that men could also eat dogs. Before his final support party left, Scott made the decision to increase his group going to the Pole from four to five men, which required a reshuffling of rations from Teddy Evans’s sledge to Scott’s to reflect this additional person. At this point they were all man-hauling, which undoubtedly placed their bodies under greater stress and would have had an impact on vitamin levels. Perhaps Scott should have followed the 1890 recommendation of the US Arctic explorer Robert E Peary that ‘every increase in the party, beyond the number absolutely essential [adds to] an element of danger and failure’.
Enjoying a can of Heinz baked beans. Advertising the products taken on Antarctic expeditions was an important way of attracting sponsorship. Photograph by Herbert Ponting, January 1912.
Yet for a brief time all seemed well. Just three days later Christmas was celebrated with such a plentiful supper that Scott wrote they had eaten too much: ‘I must write a word of our supper last night. We had four courses. The first, pemmican, full whack, with slices of horse meat flavoured with onion and curry powder and thickened with biscuits; then an arrowroot, cocoa and biscuit hoosh [thick soup or stew] sweetened; then a plum-pudding; then cocoa with raisins, and finally a dessert of caramels and ginger. After the feast it was difficult to move. Wilson and I couldn’t finish our plates of plum-pudding. We have all slept splendidly and feel thoroughly warm – such is the effect of full feeding.’ (L Huxley, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 2)
However, the group arrived at the Pole physically exhausted, with their morale further undermined by discovering that Amundsen had been there before them. The fateful return journey started on 25 January. Soon they were frequently stalled by very bad weather, exhausted and barely making each depot before running out of food, even when on partial rations. By 14 February, Scott was writing: ‘There is no getting away from the fact that we are not pulling strongly. Probably none of us: Wilson’s leg still troubles him and he doesn’t like to trust himself on ski; but the worst case is Evans, who is giving us serious anxiety. This morning he suddenly disclosed a huge blister on his foot. It delayed us on the march, when he had to have his crampon readjusted. Sometimes I fear he is going from bad to worse, but I trust he will pick up again when we come to steady work on ski like this afternoon. He is hungry and so is Wilson. We can’t risk opening our food again, and as cook at present I am serving something under full allowance. We are inclined to get slack and slow with our camping arrangements, and small delays increase. I have talked of the matter tonight and hope for improvement. We cannot do distance without the hours. The next depot some thirty miles away and nearly 3 days’ food in hand.’ (L Huxley, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 2)
Then came two terrible fatalities. The first was the death of Petty Officer Evans, a large man, who complained that he received the same ration as the rest of them but that his body required more. In retrospect, one can say that his claim was well founded, although Scott formally noted his belief that concussion from one of several falls may have contributed to his physical and mental collapse. By 5 March they still had a long way to go, but with favourable wind still made 14.5km (9 miles) that day. Yet Scott knew things were bad: ‘Lunch – Regret to say going from bad to worse. We got a slant of wind yesterday afternoon, and going on five hours we converted our wretched morning run of three and a half miles to something over nine. We went to bed on a cup of cocoa and pemmican solid with the chill off. The result is telling on all, but mainly Oates, whose feet are in a wretched condition. One swelled up tremendously last night and he is very lame this morning. We started march on tea and pemmican as last night – we pretend to prefer the pemmican this way.’ (L Huxley, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 1)
Oates had indeed started failing rapidly, particularly with very bad feet, but by the time he walked out of the tent to his death on 17 March all three of the others were also suffering in various ways, particularly Dr Wilson. On Wednesday 21 March they were stopped by a sub-zero blizzard and never left their tent again.
The last entry in Scott’s journal has already been quoted (see here), but he also left a message to the public that included his explanation of the causes of his party’s death:
1)The loss of the pony transport in March 1911 obliged me to start later than I had intended and obliged the limits of the stuff transported to be narrowed.
2)The weather throughout the outward journey and especially the long gale in 83° south stopped us.
3)The soft snow and lower reaches of glacier again reduced the pace.’ (L Huxley, Scott’s Last Expedition, vol. 1)
He also added that he thought they had brought enough food and that the depots were properly placed.
There have been many analyses of the Scott expedition and the reasons his polar party did not survive their return. The weakest link in the end was the food and nutrition. This failure was not entirely Scott’s, because the state of knowledge at that time w
as insufficient to formulate the diet properly. Nonetheless it is clear that malnutrition occurred and, especially with Evans, scurvy is also suspected.
In his dramatic account of the Terra Nova expedition, The Worst Journey in the World, Apsley Cherry-Garrard stated: ‘I have always had a doubt whether the weather conditions were sufficient to cause the tragedy.’ He went on to indicate that even in 1922 when he wrote his book, it was clear that Scott’s party had insufficient calories: ‘Of course the whole business simply bristles with “ifs”: if Scott had taken dogs and succeeded in getting them up the Beardmore: if he had not lost those ponies on the depot journey: if the dogs had not been taken so far and the One Ton Depot had been laid: if a pony and an extra oil had been depoted on the barrier: if a four-man party had been taken to the Pole: if I had disobeyed my instructions and gone for One Ton, killing dogs as necessary: or even if I had just gone on a few miles and left some food and fuel under a flag upon a cairn: if they had been first at the Pole: if it had been any other season but that…’ (Cherry-Garrard, The Worst Journey in the World)
Cherry-Garrard was deeply affected by the failed rescue attempt that he and dog handler Dimitri Gerov made with dogs to the One Ton depot at the time Scott was still travelling. Scott had left orders that the dogs were not to be pushed hard and, in addition, dog food had not been left at One Ton because of transportation and weather problems. After waiting a few days, Cherry-Garrard and Gerov had returned to Hut Point. Many think Cherry-Garrard spent the rest of his life believing that he could have saved Scott if he had gone further than One Ton, killing dogs as needed, but this would have been against Scott’s original order.
The restored Antarctic huts, in this case from Scott’s 1910 expedition, still preserve recognisable brand names 100 years on. Their sense of familiarity continues to engage new audiences.
Not only did Scott’s South Pole group meet their end in tragic nutritional conditions but his last support party, during their return, likewise encountered scurvy and other serious problems. A look at Scott’s rations would not reveal anything to appeal to us today, nor does it tell us its nutritional value; however, an analysis of Scott’s diet in comparison with other expeditions is shown here. Although these figures are estimates because no contemporary analyses were or could have been made, they indicate deplorable nutrition. Much of this was unavoidable because of the ignorance about vitamins at that time, but the calorie deficiency need not have occurred. It is also likely that deteriorative chemical interactions could have greatly reduced the diet’s nutritional value. For example, data on the composition of Scott’s biscuits shows that they contained sodium bicarbonate. This is not surprising in itself, but it could have lowered some of the vitamin content on baking, possibly destroying all of the thiamine. Because the biscuits were an important source of thiamine, its loss could have been critical, leading to incipient beri-beri, which causes inflammation of the nervous system and paralysis, especially of outer limbs.
One of many carefully soldered tins of pemmican (dried meat with lard) taken by Amundsen. Unlike on previous expeditions, his pemmican also included oatmeal and vegetables, improving its flavour and, he claimed, making it easier to digest.
Amundsen’s Norwegian expedition was profoundly different in planning, execution and outcome. He had analysed Shackleton’s Nimrod expedition and concluded that larger depots were needed along the route. Amundsen’s idea that fresh, undercooked meat prevented scurvy was a critical point. However, for energy on the long stages he still needed pemmican. A perhaps fortunate set-back occurred when the food manufacturer Armour of Chicago, who believed that Amundsen planned to head for the North Pole and had already supported Peary’s successful expedition there in 1908–1909, cancelled their promise to give free pemmican. From Amundsen’s polar work he knew that richer, sugar-based foods might cause problems for some men, including stomach ailments, constipation and diarrhoea, all of which could create great difficulties on a polar trail. So he had pemmican specially prepared, first adding vegetables and later oatmeal for fibre.
After setting up Framheim, the Norwegian base camp, on 27 January 1911 at the Bay of Whales, 200 seals and the same number of penguins were killed and frozen for food. Served twice daily for lunch and supper, fresh or deep-frozen seal was the main dish at the base. The men also received cloudberry preserves, which were a rich source of vitamins. Amundsen directed that the seal meat must be undercooked, thereby saving much of the vitamin C. All through the subsequent winter Amundsen’s group stored up vitamin C, vitamin D and, probably most important of all, vitamin B complex in their bodies. They ate wholemeal bread fortified with wheatgerm and leavened with fresh yeast (both later known to be good sources of B vitamins). When the party laid their depots southwards, they also did so at good march intervals with plenty of food in each place, the last pre-laid main depot being 676km (420 miles) from the Pole at 82° south.
Amundsen also recognised the value of the traditional Norwegian diet, which formed the basis for sledging provisions: ‘I have never considered it necessary to take a whole grocery shop with me when sledging; the food should be simple and nourishing and that is enough – a rich and varied menu is for people who have no work to do. Besides pemmican we had biscuits, milk powder and chocolate… Milk powder is a comparatively new commodity with us but it deserves to be better known. It came from the district of Jaederen. Neither heat nor cold, dryness or wet could hurt it; we had large quantities of it lying out in small thin linen bags in every possible state of the weather … we are bringing all the purveyors of our sledging provisions samples of their goods that have made the journey to the South Pole and back, in gratitude for the kind assistance they afforded us.’ (Amundsen, The South Pole, vol. 1) Amundsen had provisioned so prudently that he actually had spare foodstuffs to bring back to the temperate zone as souvenirs.
Skinning a penguin. To supplement the diet of early explorers they hunted seal, walrus and penguin. If not overcooked, all were an important source of vitamin C. Photograph by Frank Hurley, January 1915.
One of the ration bags found with the bodies of Scott, Bowers and Wilson. This contained onion powder, which was used to add variety to the daily round of pemmican.
The Norwegians left Framheim for the Pole on 20 October with an even greater margin of safety in their depot supplies because of the very late reduction of the planned party from eight to five. When he reached his last depot at 82° south, Amundsen was carrying supplies for 100 days, until 6 February, but was hoping to return to Framheim by 31 January. This estimate did not include the depot already at 82°, plus others further north, so even if he missed all these on the return, his supplies were still adequate to make it back with a week to spare. Furthermore, the party also slaughtered surplus dogs en route to feed the others, as well as themselves, and placed some of the carcasses and small supplies at further small depots for their return. On the journey south the Norwegian men even savoured the idea of eating the dogs: ‘The thought of the fresh dog cutlets that awaited us when we got to the top [of the Axel Heiberg Glacier] made our mouths water. In the course of time we had so habituated ourselves to the idea of the approaching slaughter of dogs that this event did not appear to us as horrible as it would otherwise have done.’ (Amundsen, The South Pole, vol. 2)
On restocking their provisions they made up their supplies in such a form that they could count them instead of weighing them out: ‘Our pemmican was in rations of one-half kilogram (1 pound 1½ ounces). The chocolate was divided into small pieces, as chocolate always is, so that we knew what each piece weighed. Our milk powder was put up in bags of 10½ ounces – just enough for a meal. Our biscuits possessed the same property – they could be counted, but this was a tedious business, as they were rather small. On this occasion we had to count 6,000 biscuits. Our provisions consisted of only these four kinds, and the combinations turned out right enough. We did not suffer from a craving either for fat or sugar, though the want of these substances is very commonly felt on
such journeys as ours. In our biscuits we had an excellent product, consisting of oatmeal, sugar and dried milk, sweetmeats, jam, fruit, cheese, etc., we had left behind at Framheim.’ (Amundsen, The South Pole, vol. 2.)
At 82° south, on their return, they had pemmican and seal steaks, with chocolate pudding for dessert. Three dogs had died and they had had to kill one, reducing their number to thirteen. When the dead ones were fed to the living, they seemed to liven up. The dogs were put on double rations of pemmican, seal meat, biscuits and even chocolate later on. On reaching the big depot at 80° the party considered that they were ‘home’ and left it ‘still large, well-supplied, and well-marked, so it is not impossible that it may be found useful later’. On 25 January they returned to Framheim with a dozen dogs, as originally planned, and with men and dogs all in good shape.
Both noted and hidden in the many versions and stories of these two expeditions are the dietary reasons for their successes and failures. Racing from depot to depot and killing his dogs, Amundsen did not once appear to be short of nutritious food. It is well known that Scott, Wilson and Bowers were almost out of food when they died, with only a single bag of rice and one or two biscuits reclaimed from their tent. Explanations of the disaster that overcame Scott’s party have tended to dwell on the terrible weather they encountered and the vital time expended on scientific observation and specimen collection. This has rather overlooked the major difference between Scott and Amundsen in the matter of food – both in its quantity and quality – and especially so given Scott’s reliance on man-hauling rather than on dogs. Underlying this, as we know, is the critical fact that food is metabolised and energy generated by the catalytic fires of vitamins and some trace-metal ions, whose retention varies depending on levels of both prior and ongoing intake, as well as on energy consumption. The application of this knowledge, and that of other discoveries relating to calorie intake and nutrition during polar journeys, was used in ration planning and development for the two World Wars of the 20th century and have also contributed to the development of nutrition programmes for space and modern polar expeditions.
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