Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series)

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Republic (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Page 9

by Plato


  b

  c

  d

  e

  344

  b

  c

  Thrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, o deluged our ears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him; they insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added my own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him, excellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away before you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the attempt to determine the way of man’s life so small a matter in your eyes—to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the greatest advantage?14

  d

  e

  And do 1 ditter from you, he said, as to the importance of the inquiry?

  You appear to differ, I replied, or else to have no care or thought about us, Thrasymachus—whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you say you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep your knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you confer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play.15 For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.

  345

  b

  And how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what I have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof bodily into your souls?

  Heaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you change, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark, Thrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you began by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a like exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as a shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere diner or banqueter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a trader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the shepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to provide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already insured whenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was saying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler, considered as a ruler, whether in a State or in private life, could only regard the good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in States, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.

  c

  d

  e

  Think! Nay, I am sure of it.

  Then why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without payment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of themselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts different, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear illustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.

  346

  Yes, that is the difference, he replied.

  And each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general one—medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea, and so on?

  Yes, he said.

  And the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not confuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be confused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be improved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you? that navigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use of language?

  b

  Certainly not.

  Or because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that the art of payment is medicine?

  I should not.

  Nor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes fees when he is engaged in healing?

  Certainly not.

  C

  And we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined to the art?

  Yes.

  Then, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be attributed to something of which they all have the common use?

  True, he replied.

  And when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an additional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?

  He gave a reluctant assent to this.

  Then the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts. But the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of the builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay. The various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which they preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he were paid as well?

  d

  I suppose not.

  But does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?

  e

  Certainly, he confers a benefit.

  Then now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor governments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying, they rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker and not the stronger—to their good they attend and not to the good of the superior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now saying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the reformation of evils which are not his concern, without remuneration.16 For, in the execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist does not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and therefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one of three modes of payment, money, or honor, or a penalty for refusing.

  347

  What do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are intelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a penalty can be a payment.

  You mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the best men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and avarice are held to be, as in deed they are, a disgrace?

  b

  Very true.

  And for this reason, I said, money and honor have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honor. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonorable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help—not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city were composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an object of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have plain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own interest, but that of his subjects; and everyone who knew this would choose rather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring one. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest
of the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present; but when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous than that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more serious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life, Glaucon, do you prefer?

  c

  d

  e

  I for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he answered.

  Did you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was rehearsing?

  348

  Yes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me. Then shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is saying what is not true?

  Most certainly, he replied.

  If, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the advantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a numbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in the end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our inquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons.

  b

  Very good, he said.

  And which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.

  That which you propose.

  Well, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer me. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?

  Yes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.

  c

  And what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the other vice?

  Certainly.

  I suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?

  What a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be profitable and justice not.

  What else then would you say?

  The opposite, he replied.

  And would you call justice vice?

  No, I would rather sav sublime simplicity.

  Then would you call injustice malignity?17

  d

  No; I would rather say discretion.

  And do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?

  Yes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust, and who have the power of subduing States and nations; but perhaps you imagine me to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession, if undetected, has advantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just now speaking.

  I do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but still I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and virtue, and justice with the opposite.

  e

  Certainly I do so class them.

  Now, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if the injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by you as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to you on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice honorable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities which were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate to rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.

  349

  You have guessed most infallibly, he replied.

  Then I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so long as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real mind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself at our expense.

  I may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?—to refute the argument is your business.

  Very true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer yet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the just?

  b

  Far otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he is.

  And would he try to go beyond just action?

  He would not.

  And how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would that be considered by him as just or unjust?

  He would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not be able.

  Whether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question is only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just man, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?

  c

  Yes, he would.

  And what of the unjust—does he claim to have more than the just man and to do more than is just?

  Of course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.

  And the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the just man or action, in order that he may have more than all?

  True.

  We may put the matter thus, I said—the just does not desire more than his like, but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his like and his unlike?

  d

  Nothing, he said, can be better than that statement.

  And the unjust is goodp and wise, and the just is neither?

  Good again, he said.

  And is not the unjust like the wise and good, and the just unlike them?

  Of course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a certain nature; he who is not, not.

  Each of them, I said, is such as his like is?

  Certainly, he replied.

  Very good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you would admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?

  e

  Yes.

  And which is wise and which is foolish?

  Clearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.

  And he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?

  Yes.

  And you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?

  Yes.

  And do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyreq would desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and loosening the strings?

  I do not think that he would.

  But he would claim to exceed the non-musician?

  Of course.

  And what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would he wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?

  350

  He would not.

  But he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?

  Yes.

  And about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any man who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing more than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same as his like in the same case?

  That, I suppose, can hardly be denied.

  And what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the knowing or the ignorant?

  b

  I dare say.

  And the knowing is wise?

  Yes.

  And the wise is good?

  True.

  Then the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more than his unlike and opposite?

  I suppose so.

  Whereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?

  Yes.

  But did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and unlike? Were not these your words?

  They were.

  And you also said that the just will not go beyond his like, but his unlike?

  c

  Yes.

  Then the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and ignorant?

  That is the inference.

  And each of them is such as his like is?

  That was admitted.

  Then the just has turned out to be wise and good, and the unjust evil and ignorant.

  Thrasymachus made
all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but with extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer’s day, and the perspiration poured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and wisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:

  d

  Well, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also saying that injustice had strength—do you remember?

  Yes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are saying or have no answer; if, however, I were to answer, you would be quite certain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say out, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer “Very good,” as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod “Yes” and “No.”

  e

  Certainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.

  Yes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else would you have?

  Nothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you shall answer.

  Proceed.

  Then I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our examination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on regularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful than justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue, is easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this can no longer be questioned by anyone. But I want to view the matter, Thrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a State may be unjust and may be unjustly attempting to enslave other States, or may have already enslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?

 

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