by Mark Zuehlke
tactical doctrine of, 269–70, 275
warned against looting, 350
withdraw from Ortona, 347–48
withdraw from The Gully, 238–41
26th Panzer Division, 16
26th Panzer Regiment, 89–91
65th German Division, 48, 160
76th Panzer Korps, 51, 201, 212, 338, 347
90th Panzer Grenadier Division, 67, 101, 133, 135, 172, 187, 205, 376
200th Regiment, 50, 84–85, 87, 89, 101, 114, 126, 130, 176
361st Regiment, 51, 101, 113–14, 126, 270
blamed by Kesselring, 211–12
and boobytraps, 158–59
casualties of, 101, 365–67, 269–70
counterattack at Sangro River, 16
counterattack Hasty P’s, 112
defects of tactics of, 160, 214, 275
defence of The Gully, 166, 177–79, 183–85, 190, 192–94, 215
described, 48–50
fails to re-establish San Leonardo flank, 126
and fortifications at Villa Rogatti, 77
little affected by barrage, 157
need for relief of, 197, 201
and Sterlin Castle engagement, 144–45
strength of, 114–15
surprised by Highlanders, 142–43
takes over Moro River line, 48
uses surrender as trap, 94, 173
withdraws from Moro, 155
305th Panzer Division, 199–200
Afrika Korps, 48
Sixth Army, 272
Tenth Army, 160, 312, 338
on 1st Para Division casualties, 366
approves withdrawal from Ortona, 347
and Bernhard/Gustav lines, 10
changes strategy at Ortona, 162
fear Ortona lost, 260
fights delaying action in Ortona, 262
opinion of Ortona’s importance, 326
orders 1st Para Division to Ortona, 200–201