The international community has to accept that success is likely to fall short of complete victory in conventional terms or the creation of a fully-fledged Western-style liberal democracy. Ultimately those who currently resist the central authority from Kabul may even have to become part of a negotiated political solution that is acceptable to the Afghan people and the international community. The majority of the population desperately want peace and security, but many remain on the fence. To win their hearts and minds the current reconstruction and development effort needs to be more vigorous and more visible.
Success also has to be measured in the number of roads and schools that are built, the regeneration of the economy to improve the everyday lives of the Afghans and the creation of viable alternatives to a dependency on opium production. While the conventional military lines of operation are often secondary and subordinate in this area, development agencies like DIFD must be more muscular and risk-orientated if they are to deliver tangible benefits. The UK has invested 600 million in Afghanistan since 2002, but at the time of writing the only school building project in Sangin still remains incomplete two years after 3 PARA fought so hard to keep the Taliban at bay. If the risks are considered too great, then the military must be allowed to take the lead in delivering civil projects and given sufficient finances to do it.
There is no doubt that the overall strategy in Afghanistan is in need of a major overhaul and it remains to be seen whether America’s new President can repeat the success of the US Army’s surge in Iraq. Gearing up will need to consider all lines of development, take a regional view of working with Afghanistan’s neighbours and bind all forty-one participating nations into an agreed stratagem with a unified purpose. It will need to be supported by this country; there will be setbacks and more British servicemen are likely to lose their lives. Consequently, the government will need to do more to convince the public that the blood and treasure that have been, and must continue to be, invested, have not been and will not be in vain. The public information campaign will need to improve and the government must recognize the central role that the media has to play and that keeping them at arm’s length is a counter-productive exercise. Operations in the villages, deserts and hills of Afghanistan will require an enduring military presence as, regardless of the increasing technological sophistication of weapons technology, it will remain a boots-on-the-ground intensive activity. The human element, whether in combat or delivering civic assistance, will remain the central dimension. Our service personnel therefore need to be properly equipped, manned, trained and remunerated for the risks, sacrifices and challenges that they will have to continue to face on our behalf.
For many soldiers who have already completed two operations in Afghanistan, their third six-month tour of duty is already on the horizon. The Army has to be properly resourced to ensure that these troops are adequately rested between tours and that their families are looked after. In July 2008 a government Command paper entitled The Nation’s Commitment: Cross-Government Support to our Armed Forces, their Families and Veterans announced that servicemen and their families would receive priority treatment from the NHS and improved access to public services, such as education and houses. Significantly, it stated that compensation payments to injured personnel would be doubled and men like Bombardier Ben Parkinson finally got a better deal. It chimed with a growing public recognition of what the military does and the unique set of conditions they and their families face at a time when the Military Covenant appears to be increasingly out of kilter with the demands that are being placed upon them. But it has come late in the day and its implementation across all the relevant government departments remains to be seen. Those responsible for ensuring that pledges of obligation are met need to remember that they are not the ones being shot at. They are not the ones who have to zip a fallen comrade into a body bag or answer the questions at a coroner’s inquest in front of a dead soldier’s family.
Morale on operations was sky-high in 2006 and I believe that remains the case today. Soldiers want to be tested and accept that risk and loss are part of their profession. They don’t want the nation’s pity, but they do want its support. Yet soldiers still have to share mixed wards with civilians when all the evidence indicates that they recover faster when treated by, and among, their own kind. The MOD is still struggling to grasp the implications of the psychological impact of war on its soldiers. Many of those suffering from PTSD have been medically discharged into a society and health system that are not geared up to look after them. Given that the average incubation period for PTSD is fourteen years, the situation can only get worse, as the demons of thousands of veterans, who have served in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, begin to surface in the future. Although there have been recent pay rises soldiers still need to be paid better when on active service. Even when operational allowances and bonuses are taken into account, a private has to live on less than £20,000 a year. For that they are shot at, bombed, work 24/7 for extended periods and often have to live in a trench. They know what real fear is and live with the physical and psychological consequences of the application of lethal force. They are on call twenty-four hours a day, whether at home or on operations. They do not go on strike, but stand in when others, who earn considerably more than they, do.
Improving the conditions of service and providing the equipment and numbers to ensure operational success at minimum cost will require resources. Current defence spending is unlikely to increase, especially in the prevailing financial climate. But if the military is to provision itself properly from its allocated budget, it must recognize that the strategic landscape has changed. It must restructure to fight the type of wars that it is currently engaged in. This will require a reprioritization and rebalancing of defence spending to end large and expensive Cold War legacy projects. New Typhoon high-altitude fighters currently have no potential adversary. Consequently, their raison d’être has become increasingly questionable at a time when there is a severe lack of battlefield helicopters in Helmand.
The lessons of Britain’s most recent engagement in Afghanistan have brought about the need for a fundamental reappraisal of the structure and approach of our armed forces. But as this recognition has slowly percolated through to the uppermost echelons of the military establishment, I detect that there are some of them who wish to rewrite the history of events surrounding the Army’s effort in Helmand in 2006. Recent comments made to the media regarding mistakes made by soldiers on operations having caused more casualties than the enemy, or that British forces were smug and complacent, suggest a degree of blame is attached to those who risked, and continue to risk, their lives on the ground. This generates a perception of an attempt to shift some of the responsibility from the MOD decision makers. But it ignores the fact that field commanders at the time raised concerns about strategy, the poor reconstruction effort, and made repeated requests for more troops and equipment. They knew what was required and were certainly not smug or complacent. Such criticism also ignores the fact that some notable senior Army officers risked their careers to make these appeals, both before and during the initial deployment to Afghanistan. In truth, those soldiers and officers who fought, and those who continue to fight, are blameless. Instead they do an exceptional job with the limited resources made available to them by the mandarins in Whitehall.
This country owes its soldiers an immense debt of gratitude. Given the risk-averse and self-obsessed nature of modern-day society they are a remarkable fraternity that has demonstrated the strength of character to make something of themselves. Today’s young soldiers have witnessed a level of combat experience not seen for two generations and they are every bit as good as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers who fought in the Second World War. The eighteenth-century writer Samuel Johnson once said that ‘every man thinks meanly of himself for not having been a soldier’. However, few people step voluntarily into the arena of battle. There is no glamour in it and only those who have done it can comprehend the
full nature of the horrors of war. But it is a noble undertaking founded on a culture of normative values of shared endeavour, ethos, mutual trust, regard for the group and self-sacrifice. For me, leaving 3 PARA was the natural order of things, but it meant that membership of an extraordinary band of brothers was over. I was extremely fortunate to have been part of it and to be able to say that I fought and marched with 3 PARA. Sometimes I had to make hard decisions, and people often speak about the loneliness of command, but I can’t say that I ever felt lonely as their CO. In the words of Paddy Caldwell, I regret nothing; if I was twenty years younger, I would do it all again.
Honours and Gallantry Awards
Honours and Gallantry Awards made to members of 3 PARA Battle Group and those that worked directly with them during Operation Herrick 4 (April — October 2006):
Victoria Cross
Corporal Bryan James Budd, The Parachute Regiment (killed in action)
George Cross
Corporal Mark William Wright, The Parachute Regiment (killed in action)
Commander of the Order of the British Empire
Brigadier Edward Adam Butler DSO MBE, late The Royal Green Jackets
Officer of the Order of the British Empire
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Friedrich Patrick Felton MBE, Army Air Corps
Colonel Martin Nicholas Nadin, late Royal Army Medical Corps
Member of the Order of the British Empire
Major David James Eastman, Corps of Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
Major Huw Spencer Williams, The Parachute Regiment
Distinguished Service Order
Major Paul Alan Blair, The Parachute Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel Stuart John Craig Tootal OBE, The Parachute Regiment
Conspicuous Gallantry Cross
Lieutenant Hugo James Edward Farmer, The Parachute Regiment Lance Corporal of Horse Andrew Geoffrey Radford, The Life Guards
Military Cross
Flight Lieutenant Matthew Kenneth Carter, Royal Air Force
Second Lieutenant Oliver Dale, The Parachute Regiment
Corporal of Horse Michael John Flynn CGC, The Blues and Royals
Staff Corporal Shaun Keith Fry, The Life Guards
Corporal Stuart James Giles, The Parachute Regiment
Lance Corporal Karl Wayne Jackson, The Parachute Regiment
Private Peter McKinley, The Parachute Regiment
Major Giles Matthew Timms, The Parachute Regiment
Private Mark James Wilson, The Parachute Regiment
Distinguished Flying Cross
Major Mark Christopher Hammond, Royal Marines
Flying Officer Christopher Michael Haslar, Royal Air Force Flight Lieutenant Craig Thomas Wilson, Royal Air Force
George Medal
Lance Corporal Paul Hartley, Royal Army Medical Corps
Queen’s Gallantry Medal
Corporal Stuart Henry Pearson, The Parachute Regiment
Mention in Despatches
Captain Matthew Anthony William. Armstrong, Royal Regiment of
Artillery (7 PARA)
Lieutenant Nichol James Emslie Benzie, Royal Navy
Private Jonnie Chad Bevans, The Parachute Regiment
Warrant Officer Class 2 Michael John Bolton, The Parachute Regiment
Warrant Officer Class 2 Karl Terence Brennan, Royal Regiment of Artillery
(7 PARA)
Captain Alexander John Eida, Royal Regiment of Artillery (killed in action)
(7 PARA)
Captain Mark Richard Eisler, The Parachute Regiment
Lieutenant Thomas David Fehley, The Parachute Regiment
Rifleman Ganesh Gurung, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
Warrant Officer Class 2 Trilochan Gurung, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
Corporal Benjamin Stephen Hall, Royal Army Medical Corps
Private Stephen James Halton, The Parachute Regiment
Lieutenant Martin Joseph Hewitt, The Parachute Regiment
Lieutenant Paul Ronald Hollingshead, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
Sergeant Daniel Jarvie, The Parachute Regiment
Warrant Officer Class 2 Thomas Heron Johnstone, Army Air Corps
Corporal Kailash Khebang, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
Sergeant Carl Frederick Lane, The Parachute Regiment
Warrant Officer Class 2 Zachary Adam Leong, The Parachute Regiment
Captain Alexander James Mackenzie, The Parachute Regiment
Lance Corporal Luke Edward Patrick McCulloch, The Royal Irish Regiment (killed in action)
Warrant Officer Class i Christopher Paul Mulhall, Army Air Corps
Rifleman Nabin Rai, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
Warrant Officer Class 2 Andrew Kenneth Schofield, The Parachute
Regiment
Major Toby Patrick Oughtred Till, Coldstream Guards
Sergeant Daniel Cameron Baxter, Royal Air Force
Sergeant Graham Martin Jones, Royal Air Force
Squadron Leader Michael John Woods, Royal Air Force
Queen’s Commendation for Bravery in the Air
Senior Airman Jason Broline, United States Air Force Staff
Sergeant Cameron Hystad, United States Air Force
Queen’s Commendation for Valuable Service
Colour Sergeant Stuart Bell, The Parachute Regiment Captain Nigel John Bishop, The Parachute Regiment
Colonel Charles Peter Huntley Knaggs OBE, late Irish Guards
Acronyms
7 RHA: 7th Regiment Royal Horse Artillery
AAR: After Action Review
ANA: Afghan National Army
ANP: Afghan National Policemen
ASP: Afghan Standby Police
BC: Battery Commander
CGS: Chief of the General Staff
CO: Commanding Officer
DFID: Department for International Development
DZ: Drop Zone
FOB: Forward Operating Base
FSG: Fire Support Group
FST: Fire Support Team
GPMG: General Purpose Machine Gun
HRF: Helmand Reaction Force
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
JDAM: Joint Direct Attack Munition
JOC: Joint Operations Centre
JTAC: Joint Terminal Attack Controller
KAF: Kandahar Airfield
LAVs: Light Armoured Vehicles (Canadian variant)
LZ: Landing Zone
MERT: Medical Emergency Resuscitation Team
MFC: Mortar Fire Controller
MIA: Missing in Action
MOG: Manoeuvre Outreach Group
NCO: Non-Commissioned Officer
NDS: National Department for Security
PJHQ: Permanent Joint Headquarters
PJI: Parachute Jump Instructor
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
PTSD: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
QRF: Quick Reaction Force
RAMC: Royal Army Medical Corps
RAP: Regimental Aid Post
RC-S: Regional Command South
RHA: Royal Horse Artillery
RMP: Royal Military Police
ROE: Rules of Engagement
RSM: Regimental Sergeant Major
SNCO: Senior Non-Commissioned Officer
Tac: Battle Group Tactical Headquarters
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UKTF: United Kingdom Task Force
WMIKs: Weapon Mount Installation Kits
Acknowledgements
Although the events described in this book are as they appeared to me, they also reflect the views and recollections of over one hundred individuals who played a part in this story. The vast majority are soldiers or airmen who fought with, or in support of 3 PARA in 2006. I am indebted to all of them and to the families whom I spoke to; without them and their assistance this book would not have been possible. I would also like to thank Major Jamie Loden for his detailed comments that helped me w
ith some of the accuracy and sequence. The general support and faith of one senior Army officer was particularly important, although he needs no mention here and he knows who he is. My thanks extends to Annabel Merullo, my agent at PFD, who picked up and drove the project late in the day; also to Roland Philipps and the rest of his incredibly enthusiastic, professional and helpful team at John Murray. Patrick Bishop also deserves a mention, as his book 3 PARA first brought the achievements of my soldiers to the attention of the public and played a part in influencing my own decision to write. My final thanks to Karin for her unstinting love and support during both the writing of this book and the events surrounding it.
Danger Close Page 34