May 2nd was a gunners’ day even more than May 1st; their heavy fire disorganized any plans the Germans had of renewing the attack when the storm abated. All through the 2nd, very little stood between the Germans in the Salient and the guns that harassed them so persistently, and the enemy’s forward troops even crept right to Bianca itself, where the 51st Regiment’s observation post was established on a low knoll. The Germans were held up by the only force available there – two Vickers guns of the Northumberland Fusiliers, an Australian anti-tank gun and small arms fire from the artillery observation party. That was all.
From this exposed position on Bianca, Captain Braddock of the 51st directed fire all through May 2nd – and May 3rd also. His guns kept firing in spite of enemy dive-bombing, and of machine-gunning from ground and air. The duststorm on May 2nd hampered the movements of both forces, but in the morning Braddock observed small parties of enemy infantry working their way forward on the Tobruk side of the minefield. They were evidently trying to cover delousing parties, but accurate shelling disturbed them. Nevertheless, they cleared some gaps; but again the gunners blocked the tanks from coming through.
That afternoon in an attempt to silence the artillery, the Germans pushed machine-gunners forward to shoot up the most advanced troop of British guns. But even this did not deter the Tommies. While some kept the guns going, others engaged enemy snipers with rifles and Brens. All day the artillery maintained its fire on enemy working parties, transport and tanks, which could be picked out whenever the storm momentarily cleared. But in the early evening more Germans moved up and the sniping became so severe that during the night the forward guns were withdrawn to alternative positions.
Late on the afternoon of the 2nd there was a heavy air raid on the field artillery and during the night it was spasmodically shelled. At dawn on May 3rd, with the 2/10th manning the northern flank of the Salient between the perimeter and Bianca and the 2/1st Pioneers covering the southern sector, the garrison stood-to, expecting Rommel to attack again in force when the storm cleared, as it did during the morning. Then a large number of enemy tanks and vehicles could be seen east of 209 near the minefield. At once the gunners put down a bombardment so intense that the vehicles promptly cleared out and the tanks gradually withdrew behind 209. During the rest of the day the enemy made no aggressive move. He had suffered so heavily that he could not afford to go on.
The garrison’s losses had been comparatively light: out of 12 ‘I’ tanks, 2 destroyed, 2 damaged; out of 19 cruisers, 3 destroyed, 1 damaged. The severest losses had been suffered by the infantry – especially the 2/24th. On May 2nd it was below half-strength, for 314 men (including 10 officers) who had been in the forward posts were missing, most of them prisoners. One officer and 13 men were known to have been killed and 25 men wounded. That was a sad day for the battalion, but it had the compensation of knowing that but for the stubborn resistance by the forward posts, German tanks might have done much greater damage.
The enemy’s tank losses had been particularly severe, as we know from a captured document, which showed that the 5th Tank Regiment went in with 81 on May 1st, but twenty-four hours later had in action only 35. The table of losses it gave explains much:
Type
Into Action – May 1st
Still in Action – May 2nd
Lights – Mk I
9
3
– Mk II
26
12
Mediums – Mk III
36
12
Heavies – Mk IV
8
6
Commander’s tanks
2
2
81
35
Only 12 of the 46 disabled tanks were completely destroyed, but before the rest were again fit for action the time for further attack had passed. Moreover the severe losses suffered by the 5th Tank Regiment apparently made Rommel reluctant to risk any tanks of his 8th Regiment. Once again the German armour had been defeated, and this time the effectiveness of minefields plus artillery fire in stopping tanks had been clearly demonstrated. Thirty-nine of the German tanks had been destroyed or disabled by mines or shells, only seven by the British tanks. This was the first time that any major attack had been broken by these tactics. The success was local but the lesson was universal. In Poland, Belgium and France, Rommel and the German tank battalions had never struck any resistance so effective as that of Tobruk. Their failure shook the morale of the tank crews in particular. As one German officer wrote in his diary, ‘What we experienced in Poland and the Western Front was only a promenade compared to this.’
When he learned what the 5th Tank Regiment lost on May 1st, Rommel must have realized that he could not afford to continue incurring such severe casualties, especially as he had to keep at least one battalion of tanks watching the Egyptian frontier. In two actions within a fortnight one of his crack tank regiments had been so badly knocked about that it needed substantial reinforcement and re-equipment. If he tried to batter his way through Tobruk’s minefields and past Tobruk’s guns, he would probably lose twice as many tanks as he had lost on May 1st. Inside its perimeter there were 220 square miles; of these he had captured only six, and he was little nearer to capturing Tobruk. The garrison had stopped him on May 1st without the use of Morshead’s final reserves. The Germans had not penetrated even as far as the Blue Line except at Bianca, and Morshead still held in reserve a dozen tanks and the 18th Infantry Brigade. With the enemy attack stopped and his tanks forced to withdraw outside the perimeter, the time had come for another counter-stroke by the garrison. On the night of May 3rd Morshead sent in Brigadier G. F. Wootten’s 18th Brigade in a determined attempt to regain the lost ground.
Brigadier George Frederick Wootten, one of the first graduates of Duntroon, was generally regarded by the men of his year as one of the ablest of them. He went straight from Duntroon to the 1st A.I.F. and on Gallipoli was Adjutant of the 1st Battalion. By the end of the war he was a staff officer on Haig’s G.H.Q., had won the D.S.O. and been mentioned in dispatches five times. After that war, he did a brilliant course at the Camberley Staff College, but in 1923 he left the Army and studied Law. He practised as a solicitor until he went away with the 2nd A.I.F. as C.O. 2/2nd Battalion. Early in 1941 he succeeded Morshead as Commander 18th Infantry Brigade, and commanded it at Giarabub, in Tobruk and later at Milne Bay and Buna. In April 1943 he succeeded Morshead as G.O.C., 9th Division, and led it to new triumphs at Lae and Finschafen. In these campaigns, he proved himself one of the most shrewd and long-headed commanders in the A.I.F. His Falstaffian appearance is misleading; in spite of his bulk, he is extremely nimble in mind. The task he now undertook called for all his ability.
PHASE IV. THE SECOND COUNTER-ATTACK
At a conference on May 2nd Murray, Wootten and Lloyd had urged Morshead to counter-attack with the 18th Brigade either that night or at dawn next day; but because of the duststorm and the general uncertainty as to the enemy’s position and intention, Morshead decided to wait. Before employing his reserve brigade to regain any ground, he wanted to be reasonably sure that he would not need it to stop another enemy thrust. Consequently it was not until the morning of the 3rd, when Rommel still showed no signs of pressing on, that Morshead decided to make this counter-attack.
The plan was for two battalions to attack the shoulders of the Salient on the general line of the old perimeter, retake the lost posts and cut off the enemy spearhead. The 2/12th were to attack from the north against S6 and S7, and the 2/9th from the south-east against R8 and R7. After the capture of these, both battalions were to push on to Hill 209. Meantime the 2/10th, which was holding the northern flank of the Salient, was to make deep raids into enemy territory. The attack was intended to start at dark, but as the 2/12th and 2/9th moved across the dusty desert to their start-lines in the late afternoon, the garrison learned for the first time what a decided advantage the enemy had in holding 209. From there he saw them coming, and shelled and
mortared them as they assembled for the attack. Because of this, the battalions were delayed and zero hour had to be put forward until 8.45 p.m., by which time darkness had set in.
Then, under cover of a concentration put down by twenty-four guns, the 2/12th advanced against S6 and S7 and right into the fire from machine-guns that were waiting for them. Flares went up from the forward German positions to mark the sector being attacked and down came severe mortar and artillery fire. This hindered the advance, and the infantry could not keep up with our barrage; when that had lifted from the S6–S7 area, machine-guns firing from there brought the attack to a stand-still. The troops did not know the country, and even though they made several attempts to move forward, they could not locate the enemy positions. The leading companies lost their way, and the attack petered out.
Meantime, on the southern flank the 2/9th had been more successful. They had been heavily shelled before zero, but had attacked strongly when the British barrage began. On the right, ‘A’ Company (under Captain E. W. Fleming) went for R8, with Lieutenant W. H. Noyes’s platoon in the lead. In the darkness Noyes missed R8, but farther on found the enemy strongly established behind a stone wall. As Noyes said afterwards:
They had more than a dozen anti-tank and machine-guns firing straight down the road that runs along the perimeter through R8 and R6, but we kept clear of their tracers and went in with the bayonet and grenades. Eventually we drove them out, but by this time I’d lost about a third of the platoon. Then down the road from R6 came three light tanks – Italian. My sergeant,6 three men and myself sneaked up and dealt with them by lifting the turret lids and dropping hand grenades inside. The tanks burst into flame and everything opened up on them. We moved on. Near R6 we found some more Germans and Italians in shallow diggings. We cleaned up several of these positions, but we then ran into a strong party in a half-dug anti-tank ditch. We had only half a dozen men left so I decided to go back and find the rest of the company. On the way we stumbled into R8. There was no one there.
The Germans had never occupied the post and there Noyes’s men were soon joined by the bulk of Captain B. M. Lovett’s company, which then made another attempt to get to R6, but lost its way and finished up at R7. This post had already been strongly attacked by the 2/9th’s ‘D’ Company, led by Captain F. E. C. Loxton. Some of his men had got as far as the anti-tank ditch surrounding the post, but had eventually been driven back by flame-throwers. Lovett’s company now succeeded in driving the Germans out of R7, but almost immediately were forced to withdraw by a counter-attack supported with tanks and flame-throwers.
The enemy fire grew fiercer and in the darkness and the confusion of battle it was impossible to organize fresh attacks before daylight. Soon after 3 a.m. Morshead gave the order to withdraw, rather than risk having his troops caught in the open at dawn by dive-bombers, artillery and machine-guns. They did so without further difficulty, for the enemy was already too shaken by his heavy losses to interfere. All next day his stretcher-bearers and ambulances were carrying dead and wounded away from the battlefield. Many of his casualties were caused by the raids launched by the 2/10th against the northern flank of the Salient during the main attacks. A platoon led by Lieutenant F. W. Cook charged one machine-gun post with the bayonet and accounted for eighteen Germans. In another post Private A. T. Taylor with a tommy gun killed six Germans single-handed.
By dawn on May 4th the 2/9th and the 2/12th were back in reserve behind the Blue Line. They had suffered 134 casualties, but had inflicted much heavier losses on the enemy, even though they had not regained any ground except R8.
The 18th Brigade’s casualties in the action were:
Killed
Missing
Wounded
2/9th
3
3
51
2/10th
–
6
15
2/12th
5
15
57
During the night the Australians took twenty-three prisoners.
The Germans had received a particularly severe pasting from the British gunners. Although these men had been in action continuously for three days and three nights, they excelled themselves on this occasion. It was a considerable achievement to amass the ammunition and work out the fire programme in the short time at their disposal. The thirty-nine guns of the 51st Field Regiment, and of the 104th and 1st R.H.A. which supported the attack, fired more than 10 000 rounds in two and a half hours. One of Braddock’s guns fired 375 rounds. ‘By the finish,’ he said, ‘you could have fried eggs on it.’
It must have been equally hot at the receiving end, for the barrage, and the 2/9th’s attack in particular, made the Germans realize that they could hold the Salient only by building strong defences and packing them with their best troops. This they proceeded to do. They were so much on the defensive that during May 4th, when the 2/9th took over a sector of the Salient front south of Bianca, it soon pushed the German outposts back more than half a mile in a series of impromptu local skirmishes. Schorm’s diary for May 3rd reveals something of the effect the counter-attack had on the Germans. He wrote:
At 1.15 a. m. a message to the commander: ‘Australians have penetrated the defences between R1 and R7. Immediately counter-attack and cover with tanks.’ Wireless message: ‘Ready for action.’ Oh Hell! Where to? No idea. Italians argue and gesticulate wildly. I start by going as far as the gap, then turn right. No officer knows the position. Near R7 an Italian tank is burning. The Australians have gone back leaving 26 dead behind them. The Italians are absolutely in confusion. They have been under heavy artillery fire. Of 150 men occupying R7 there are more than 100 dead or wounded.
Three days later he wrote:
Our opponents are Englishmen and Australians. Not trained attacking troops, but men with nerves and toughness, tireless, taking punishment with obstinacy, wonderful in defence. Ah well, the Greeks also spent ten years before Troy.
Schorm’s reaction was apparently typical and after this the Germans were forced on to the defensive for the first time in this war. Troops who had been used to trampling all opponents underfoot regarded it as humiliating to have to dig in. The Battle of the Salient was another major defeat for Rommel, even though he did gain a small amount of territory. He had set out to capture Tobruk; actually he had captured little more than Hill 209. He had complete command of the air; over-whelming tank superiority; strong artillery support and far more infantry than the garrison. He employed the Blitzkrieg tactics of combined dive-bomber and tank assault which had succeeded so well in the Nazis’ European campaigns. Probably not one German who went into the May 1st attack doubted that the Fortress would fall within a few hours, as it had done when the Australians and British had attacked it only three months earlier. For the first time in this war a determined German offensive had been broken.
This battle, like the rest, was often fought again in Tobruk messes in later months, and several times I heard it argued that Rommel might have been completely defeated and driven from Hill 209 if one or other of certain courses of action had been followed – if, according to some, the 26th Brigade had organized a strong infantry counter-attack during the night of April 30th–May 1st, or at least at dawn on the 1st; or again, if all the British tanks had been employed together for one major attack on the German tanks during May 1st; or yet again, if the counter-attack by the reserve brigade had been delivered on the night of the 2nd instead of the night of the 3rd. It is easy to fight the battle again after the dust and smoke have died away. Maybe when the full facts are known it will be discovered that if one or other, or all three, of these courses had been adopted, and if there had been more boldness in the direction of the defence, the Germans might have been driven right back beyond Hill 209. Alternatively it may be shown that the risks entailed in trying to save a little might have lost the lot. Whether these criticisms are right or wrong, the fact remains that in spite of everything Rommel could do, Morshead and h
is men not only held the Fortress but inflicted such heavy casualties that Rommel did not seriously attack Tobruk again in 1941.
What the checking of Rommel meant to the defence of Egypt and the general conduct of the war was well summed up in two signals Morshead received from Wavell and Churchill after this battle. They read:
‘Personal Gen. MORSHEAD from C.-in-C. Your magnificent defence is upsetting enemy’s plans for attack on EGYPT and giving us time to build up force for counter offensive. You could not repeat not be doing better service. Well done.’
‘To General MORSHEAD from PRIME MINISTER ENGLAND. The whole empire is watching your steadfast and spirited defence of this important outpost of EGYPT with gratitude and admiration.’
_____________
1 The captured diary of an officer of the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Tank Regiment contained a full account of the German plans and moves during this day, and I have drawn on it for this and other statements.
2 This company, commanded by Captain C. H. B. Norman, was specially commended by Morshead for its good work on this day. At Tobruk its casualties amounted to more than 50 per cent of the unit.
3 There had been no tactical minefield behind 209 when the Italian tanks had charged right across this reserve position on April 17th, and so the Germans expected to have a clear run once they got through the perimeter.
Tobruk 1941 Page 20