by Greg Clancy
In fact it is likely the CIB would have welcomed the meeting and the opportunity of setting up a line of questioning for Annette. This would be primarily aimed at obtaining information on the next level of her spying activities, i.e. her contacts and means of transmitting the products of her espionage. Because Annette was exceedingly careful in this regard, prior to the interview, the CIB could only provide educated guesses about her extended connections and exchanges.
The CIB Interview Tactic
The questioning appears to have been structured as follows:
Routine personal data: answers were unlikely to provide anything new. Annette’s background, employment and personal friendships were well rehearsed and firmly in place – and there was little evidence to dispute this. Nonetheless, these questions remained essential.
Her husband: Robert Wagner was a mystery man with a background worth exploring. Like everyone else, the French had their own Nazis and the German-born civil servant had a head start in acquiring such political leanings. Prior to the meeting, little was known of him, and afterwards, little more was added to this. However, intriguing as Robert may have been, he was not central to the CIB’s immediate needs.
The questions exploring Annette’s German affiliations were crucial. Should she be spying for Germany, and without sophisticated transmission equipment, how could she avoid all contacts with Germans? Her exchanges with several Germans were known, but were these the people with whom she shared her undercover work, and if not, who were her vital contacts? Annette may have held information that could add to the bigger picture of German espionage in Australia and possibly the Pacific region.
Details of Annette’s consulate dealings were needed to explore her political inclination. She was a French citizen married to a French civil servant, yet the Swiss Consul emerged as the preferred contact.
Annette’s mother tongue needed to be investigated. It was generally believed that her French language skills did not conform to expectations.
Other questions that arose out of answers provided.
The Spy Interview 3 Cs – Be Cool, Confident and Convincing
The distinctive impression gauged from Annette’s responses is that she was cool, and she was confident – but convincing, no. She may have been believable with answers of lesser importance, but when she lied to the critical questions, her credibility was shattered. In the spy game, there aren’t any part measures – there is no such thing as half a spy.
Annette’s Performance Assessment
The credibility problem Annette faced when she requested the interview was insurmountable – but she didn’t know it. Her great failing was not to recognise she had been under considerable, and at times intense, surveillance for the previous twelve months. She was never going to ‘win’ the interview and achieve her objective of returning to radio broadcasting. A winning performance by Annette could only have succeeded through the absence of the most essential of questions. This was a security interrogation for a fundamental purpose and the questions were never going to avoid exploring the very basics of her employment activities and her personal associations. Equipped with the long-term surveillance results, the CIB was effectively handed a security slam dunk.
From the transcript of the interview, it is clear that Annette did not score any points, she only lost them. Most of her answers were precise, and conveyed the outward appearance of a professional, sincere, and independent young woman seeking the restoration of her former employment – nothing more and nothing less. Without the prior knowledge available to the CIB, she may well have succeeded in exiting the meeting with a satisfactory security clearance. The door would then be open for her return to direct radio broadcasting, and in time refining a format for the dispersal of coded information.
The most damning answer by Annette was her response to the question of her associations with Arnold Kaemper and Dinah Marshall. She denied knowing Kaemper, and the question was repeated. Dinah Marshall received the same treatment. Surveillance also rendered her claim that she did ‘not know a single German in Australia’ to be false.
The consulate questions are interesting. Logically, Annette would have had all her affairs handled at the French consulate. She was married to a French civil servant, all the more reason to expect her consular attendances to be accorded an additional measure of assistance, if not an unqualified preference. Attending the Swiss consulate to arrange her processing on the basis that the Swiss consul, Hans Hedinger, was ‘better as a man’ strongly suggests another motive. Describing Hedinger as the ‘Swiss German Consul’ was strange. Further, for Annette not to know that the Swiss Consulate was acting for German interests is remarkable. Australia was now at war with Germany and with Annette’s broad international knowledge and experience it would be unlikely she would not have been aware of this arrangement. However, in keeping with Annette’s policy of avoiding any mention of contact with Germans, she was forced to sound surprised to learn what she would probably already have known.
Annette’s French language articulation and accent were always suspect. Jack Clancy informed me that he had known of fluent French speakers (possibly members of Alliance Francaise) who had difficulty understanding her. This undoubtedly was the prompt for the ‘mother tongue’ question. The answer removed any doubt as to her claimed first language.
The final thrust by Annette was understandable – a common tactic in any similar situation – to finish off with basic arguments and appealing for a fair recommendation to reverse the decision in her case. But did she ‘overdo’ the final pitch? A strong finish by Annette was irrelevant as whatever she said, or should have said, would not affect the interview’s outcome.
The core issue here is the removal of Annette from the airwaves by an all-embracing decree. Her removal was not personal, it was a normal security order probably used in many countries. So introducing the supposed suggestion of some jealous fellow employee was completely immaterial – but she threw it in as an attempt to isolate her case for special, and favourable, consideration. ‘I have told you the truth’ was unnecessary, but it could not be argued that this implied the opposite. Hoping that the investigation will ‘prove satisfactory’ would have been better left unsaid. If she were as innocent as claimed, there wouldn’t be any doubt, in her mind at least, as to the determination of her security status.
From the standpoint of giving Annette the benefit of the doubt, it may be reasoned that her limited English language skills could account for statements and answers that attracted reservations as to her honesty. Two facts counter this. Firstly, she was educated in England from the age of seven – a learning period that would ensure her English language skills would have been effectively developed. Secondly, she had attained a level of verbal communication sufficiently adequate to find employment as a broadcaster during an era, unlike today, when the standards of speech in public radio were high.
Unknown to Annette, her request for a security interview was an employment and residential status suicide mission. The interview confirmed that the lengthy surveillance operation carried out on her movements, and on others associated with her, had succeeded in revealing an espionage cell, even if the finer details of the cell remained unknown. It also verified that she was a high security risk, meaning that allowing her to return to radio was not a consideration.
Annette’s usefulness to the security services – allowing her to work unhindered in the hope that she may lead to higher levels in the Nazi spy chain – also diminished. Most of the eminent Nazi spies were removed from Australia prior to the war commencing, and others had been, or would be, interned. Some, like Annette, remained at large. Annette’s spying role following the commencement of the war may have been programmed on shipping and military establishment targets, but whatever the prepared role was for her, it would never commence.
The troublesome question of exposing Annette’s controllers during the war would remain unanswered – for the present. Who were her ‘next level’ contacts, and how di
d they convey information? The ultimate destination of Annette’s reporting was significant. Being transmitted to an intelligence branch in Berlin would be expected – but what if part of her information gathering was directed to the Japanese? Australia was at war with Germany, not Japan, but the rumblings of greater expansion through military force were increasing in Tokyo, and observed with mounting apprehension in Australia. What could not be ignored were Annette’s supposed past associations with the Japanese embassy in London and the Japanese legation at the League of Nations.
Another issue for consideration by Military Intelligence was Annette’s on-going security operation. The agents attached to observing Annette were probably tiring of the surveillance. They had their woman, and while the necessary evidence had been collected, they were not with her for every minute of the day. Leaving her around to possibly conduct successful covert operations that may elude them was not worth the risk. There were legal complications in arresting her and enforcing restrictions on her movements and contacts. The most suitable course of action, in the absence of concrete evidence obtained since the war commenced, was to encourage her to leave the country. When Inspector Mitchell offered to return her passport, he most likely knew she would soon be using it.
The Interview Outcome
Inspector Mitchell wasted little time in actioning his conclusions. The following day, Saturday 21 October, a Military Intelligence memo confirmed a communication with Naval Intelligence, which included:
Requested Comdr. Nixon to ask Comdr. Long –
if he would let us know where the papers referred to as taken from Durkop are held, and by whom.
if this information apparently received on 4th September regarding Wagner was made available to M.I. (Military Intelligence) at the time, or since.
The writer of the letter to Comdr. Long referred to Wagner ‘who Combes will know about’.
Where were the Durkop papers that included a reference to Annette Wagner? Naval Intelligence had secured these when Durkop was interned immediately following the declaration of war. Military Intelligence, responsible for tracking Annette, had not seen the papers and now needed them. The request to Naval Intelligence was forwarded the day after Annette’s interview, and the timing was not accidental. Inspector Mitchell had effectively closed the case on Annette, and he had advised Military Intelligence accordingly. All outstanding matters on the case were to be immediately brought up to date, including the Durkop papers.
The memo advises that the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, General Combes, was aware of Annette and presumably, her activities. Had there existed an ‘A’ list of suspected enemy agents, Annette would have been included.
Annette’s attempt to return to her incomparable secret code distribution system – the radio – never left the ground. It served only to work against her objective and provided the green light to set in motion another plan – to remove her from Australia.
Did Annette have an alternative to requesting the interview? She did, and that was to lie low, remain in the radio station back office scripting wartime censored programs and wait for developments to determine her next move. But this alternative would not appeal to Annette’s nature. The determined lady with a proactive temperament would have difficulty in biding her time.
Also, what did she have to lose in requesting the interview? From what she knew, there was nothing to lose. It’s what she didn’t know that brought her down and booked her passage back to Madagascar.
FOOTNOTES
* * *
14 The correct spelling is Hedinger.
10
The Lady Departs
The sole official record of Annette Wagner for the period following her CIB interview until her departure from Sydney in late January 1940 is an Alien Application for Registration form issued on 16 January 1940. The application lists a new address for Annette, Barncleuth Square, in the harbour-side inner Sydney suburb of Elizabeth Bay, a short distance from the ABC studios from which she had broadcast her travelogues the previous year.
Annette had attended the nearby Darlinghurst police station and completed the application, listing her occupation as ‘advertiser’. In the ‘remarks’ section on the form is the statement ‘she was under the impression that she did not have to register’. As the war had commenced over four months earlier, it is remarkable that she had not been aware of her requirement to register as an alien.
Annette departed Sydney in late January 1940 on the MV Gorgon15 and sailed from Fremantle on 9 February. Her route was to Colombo via Batavia (Jakarta) before transhipping to Madagascar. Nine first-class passengers were listed on the manifest and three second-class, of whom one was Annette. Her occupation was described as ‘radio announcer’ and her nationality as ‘French’.
While the other passengers disembarked in Singapore, Annette terminated in Batavia. This stopover was curious as the shipping schedules from Batavia offered her a sailing disadvantage, and strengthens the claim that she wished to travel to Madagascar via Japan. Added to Annette’s Personal Statement and Declaration, completed on her arrival in Australia two years earlier, was the handwritten comment Return ticket order to Colombo. Annette’s Personal Statement had moved from Customs to Military Intelligence and clearly she had been denied any opportunity for an alternative route home. Had Australian officials forbidden this for security reasons – as suggested – the next preferred option for Annette would be the Netherlands East Indies where highly organised Japanese spying was rampant.
Evidence indicating Annette may have undergone a forced removal from Australia does not appear to exist. The absence of notes in her file for the interval from the CIB interview until her departure implies little of consequence was learned from her conduct. But there were some clear motives supporting her decision to leave.
The CIB interview confirmed that Annette had lied in answering key questions. She certainly would not be granted the broadcasting exemption for which she had applied. The interview results would have in fact led to a tightening of her surveillance, rather than a reduction. Annette may not have been officially ‘hounded’ out of the country, but the freedom to conduct her successfully developed routine had vanished.
From Annette’s perspective, the failure to gain permission allowing her return to radio would have been a substantial factor in her decision to leave Australia. Her capacity to operate as a spy diminished when she was deprived of her amazing communication channel. Added to this is the possibility she discovered, or suspected, that she was under surveillance. That being so, she would have shut down her entire undercover network. Her use as a spy in Australia would be worthless, but her talents could be applied elsewhere.
Then there is the security operational factor. If Annette had been just a little too clever to be caught in the act, and had the ability to talk her way through almost any difficult situation, she may have presented to authorities the dilemma of what to do with her. The expense required for a surveillance operation cannot be open-ended. The country was now at war and there was an abundance of suspicious individuals who warranted the same treatment. It could have been an opportune time to apply some form of pressure for her removal – and one way would be to deliberately allow the exposure of the surveillance operation.
For a lady with a strong sense of control, to learn that she had lost that capacity could be very unnerving. Knowing that she was constantly stalked could understandably mean her cover had evaporated and her preference, or rather that of her controllers, would be to exit the scene entirely. It would now be time to return to Madagascar, sort out the issue with her husband, and to then avail herself for further espionage work in another direction.
In a May 1942 report to the Director of Military Intelligence, an officer within the General Staff stated:
During the period from September 1939 until departure from Sydney in February 1940 Wagner was the subject of close enquiry but no evidence of her alleged pro-Nazi sympathies or association with members of the Ge
rman community was obtained.
The precise meaning of close enquiry is not clear. It may be interpreted as ‘more of the same’, or an intensification of her monitoring, or it could be taken to mean a deliberate surveillance overkill – more than enough to send an unsubtle message to Annette that her game was up. Clearly, Annette had gone to ground and was avoiding all contact with suspect connections. However, this may not have been difficult. The important Nazis had been removed from Australia prior to the outbreak of the war, others had gone underground, while the remaining suspects, such as Kaemper, Cordes and von Skerst, had been interned. Annette’s broader network had largely disappeared, but this was to be expected, as her projected wartime espionage role would not have needed support from others.
Following her arrival in Madagascar, Annette wrote a letter to her relative living near Newcastle. The letter, dated 4 March 1940, was intercepted in Newcastle by postal authorities and the contents were described in the above May 1942 report.
The letter indicated that, since her arrival in Madagascar, she had been subjected to interrogation by the authorities there in regard to her German antecedents but that, with the assistance of the Swiss Consul, she had been able to establish her bona fides, and ‘no harm was done’. She considers that interrogation had been made as the result of advice forwarded by persons in Australia to the French authorities.
Her file implies that this letter was the final communication received from Annette.