My dear Shebbeare, Read the accompanying in case of attack. Kindly take the remainder of your men (twenty Gh?) to the Sammy House and take command of that post. More men will be required behind the breast work on the right of Sammy House. At present there are only fifty of my men there. We have a working party out on the left of the Sammy House. Look out for them please. Let the Rifle Officers know of the expected attack. Yours sincerely, C. Reid
My dear Shebbeare,
Look out, they are turning out again.
The whole force is out.
Sincerely,
C. Reid
My dear Shebbeare, I have been at the breastwork all night ready to support you — Kissengunge is full of rascals, and they have during the night erected a battery for three heavy guns in the very place where I destroyed their batteries on the 17th June. One gun is already in position and has fired three shots. The other two will open immediately.
We must attack them or we shall soon be broken out of this.
Yes, by all means give your men a talk of pay. I’ll write to Flowers.
Have you a flag at Hindoo Rao’s?
Yes, of course you have.
Sincerely,
C. Reid
Camp before Delhi. August 10th, 1857
My dear Harry,
Here we are, still before Delhi, and we are getting very tired of the affair. For want of troops we have been obliged to remain inactive, contenting ourselves with repelling the attacks of the mutineers, and getting quietly shot at in our own trenches. I’ll give you a sketch of our position on the opposite side, which will enable you to understand somewhat about our movements. I suppose you will get full accounts of the various fights in the overland papers, so I will give news only of myself. I got a bullet through my hat yesterday while passing along the breastwork near the ‘Sammy House’ where I was on picket. It gave me a bad headache and slightly cut the skin, but no more. I have such a bad memory that I don’t know what I told you in my last letter.
Sketch of the British positions before Delhi
Did I tell you that I am acting as commandant of the Corps of Guides? I am so and shall probably be so if I live another month or two. We expect reinforcements daily, very strong ones, and then we shall quickly make an end of this wretched city. I shall be very glad when the siege is over as it is very tiresome and very hard work, and Delhi very unhealthy at the end of the rains. I have only been able to snatch half an hour to scribble this note and am off again to the picket.
With best love to father and mother and all at home. yours affectionately
Robert H. Shebbeare
The road to the camp from Hindoo Rao’s House is marked ‘Valley of the Shadow of Death’ as there were many casualties there from shells fired by the Indian heavy batteries.
Camp Delhi 26th August, 1857 9.30 am
My dearest mother,
I have only just heard (being on picket) that the mail goes out today at 10 am and have just time to tell you that I am all safe. General Nicholson got twelve guns from the enemy this morning.8 I cannot write another line or I shall lose the mail.
Ever your most affectionate son, Robert H. Shebbeare
Camp before Delhi Sept 11th, 1857
My dearest mother,
I have just come down to camp from the picket and hear that there are doubts about letters posted tomorrow being in time, so I have borrowed writing materials from Innes, who lives in camp, to scribble a few lines and that I am alive, hearty and happy. Our siege train having arrived, we are hard at work battering the walls down and I suppose the breach will be practicable by the day after tomorrow when I hope we shall get in and make an end of the business. Innes is quite well and will write to his mother tomorrow.
I have had a disagreeable attack of fever but believe I have got over it. A move away from Delhi will do us all an immense deal of good as we all require a change of air. I wish the mail could be kept for three or four days that I might tell you the end of the business, but you must remain in suspense until the next mail I fear. I hope my letter will find you all well and happy at home and that you will believe me to be ever your most affectionate son.
Robert H. Shebbeare
Delhi September 30th, 1857
My dearest mother,
I am again obliged to send you a shabby chit as I have been out of the district on an expedition, but as you will again see my name amongst the list of wounded I cannot leave you without the assurance that my wound was very slight and that it did not prevent my bringing the regiment out of action — we had very severe fighting. Poor young Murray, as fine a young soldier as I ever met, close by my side. A great number were killed and wounded and our loss especially was very heavy but thank God the day was won and we are now living inside the city. The mutineers have entirely disappeared from before Delhi and we have just heard of a victory gained against them by Colonel Greathed at Boolandsluckur. We shall have plenty of troops shortly and I doubt not everything will be settled. My own prospects are heightening considerably but my loss of friends has been very great. I have had no letters from home for two months and am longing for news of you all. With sincere love to all, believe me dearest mother, your most affectionate son
Robert H. Shebbeare
Many of the events at the time of the storming of Delhi on 14 September have been exhaustively covered by others and there are a great many accounts of heroic exploits, particularly at the Cashmere Gate; but a brief account of the general picture might be helpful at this point.
During the early part of the campaign, the British, through want of sufficient forces, were mostly engaged in repelling attacks by large numbers of rebels on their positions along the ridge.
In the first part of September, when a siege train and other reinforcements arrived from the Punjab, it was decided to mount a full-scale siege, and the artillery batteries began to throw a daily barrage at the walls, a softening-up process that was concentrated on the north side of the city, where the main assault was to take place.
The assault force was divided into four columns, with one in reserve, each with specific objectives: the first column, under Brigadier Nicholson, was to storm the breach near the Cashmere Bastion; the second, under Brigadier Jones, was to storm the breach in the water bastion; the third, under Colonel Sir Edward Campbell, was to blow open the Cashmere Gate and storm the breach; the fourth column, under Major Reid, was to attack the suburb of Kissengunge and enter the Lahore Gate on the eastern wall of the city.9
The actions of the fourth column, in which Robert Shebbeare commanded the Guide infantry, have received much less attention than those of the other three, perhaps with good reason, as it did not achieve military success, although it did serve to divert large numbers of rebel troops from the walls of the city. The suburb of Kissengunge had been a persistent source of irritation to the British flank throughout the early campaign, and because of the nature of the terrain, and the shelter that the walls and gardens offered to small groups of rebels, guerrilla warfare by the infantry was the order of the day, as the cavalry could not function in these conditions. This indeed proved to be the case on the day itself, when the cavalry in support of the column, under Brigadier Hope Grant, had to remain still under heavy fire for some two hours, as they were unable to deploy.
Rotton (op. cit.) gives much detail as to how the columns were organized and how Major Reid’s plan was intended to work, but it was thwarted by the usual mishaps that occur in military engagements:
The column was divided into two divisions; one part formed the main body of the column, consisting of H.M.’s 60th Rifles, 50 men; 86 men of H.M.’s 61st, 160 of the 1st European Bengal Fusiliers, 200 of the Sirmoor Battalion, 200 of the Guides’ corps, 70 of the Punjaub Infantry, and 65 of the Kumaon Battalion, making a total of 831; the other part, called the support, consisted of the Jummoo troops, numbering 1,200 infantry and 200 cavalry, besides four guns.
They all paraded at half past four on the morning of the day of the storm, o
n the Grand Trunk Road, opposite the Subzi-Mundi picquet. Every arrangement requiring Major Reid’s supervision, and dependent on his foresight, was ready before the clock struck five. The only thing wanting was the artillery guns. They never made their appearance ... and when they did appear the officer in charge reported that he had only the proper complement for one gun.
The day had more than dawned: it had advanced a little; and therefore none of our operations, so far as the light was concerned, could possibly be hidden from the enemy’s watchful eye. The signal for Major Reid to commence proceedings was the loud crash which was expected to ensue on the explosion at the Cashmere Gate. The Major, in breathless silence, was awaiting this sound. The Horse Artillery had not, in spite of the various delays, been equipped with the wanting gunners. Instead of the noise looked for in the neighbourhood of the Cashmere Gate, the reports of musketry shot struck on the ears of Major Reid. They seemed to come from the direction of his right. It was the Jummoo contingent, which had engaged the enemy; their act was premature, but there was now no help for it. Accordingly, Major Reid hurried, with sufficient force to the rescue, selecting the pucka road towards Kissengunge, as his way of advance.
Immediately, a skirmishing party, consisting of the 60th Rifles, was thrown out, under Captain D.D. Muter, on the right of the road; a ‘feeling party’ having preceded the entire column. The enemy had manned a breastwork which they had across the road, and another running parallel with the road. Both of these had been strengthened during the night. The enemy watched our advance, neither saying or doing anything until we were within fifty yards; they then saluted us most warmly with a well-directed volley. Being charged by the Rifles and Goorkhas, they evacuated their strong breastwork, and stood awhile in apparent perplexity, as to whether they should retire on the second breastwork or attack the Jummoo contingent.
Up to this time not a gun could be brought to bear on them, for want of gunners; otherwise, at this juncture, the enemy might have been mown down, like wheat beneath the reaper’s sickle. Not only were we losing opportunity after opportunity, but the enemy were reinforcing their position at Kissen Gunge. And still more disastrous than all, just as Reid was about to make a feint on the rebel front and a real attack on their rear and flank, he was severely wounded in the head, and obliged to resign his command in favour of Captain Richard Lawrence; who had been previously in the secret of Major Reid’s plan of attack.
This plan, I think richly deserves record. The position of the enemy at Kissen Gunge was formidable indeed, and the strength of the breastworks at the end of the road, already alluded to, was very great. No one was more alive to this fact than Major Reid himself. With anxious eye, during many a long and weary day just before the attack, he had watched the rebels, and seen them, sparing neither cost nor pains to give additional strength to that which before was very strong. He thought it was probable also that they might bring to their assistance, as soon as we advanced, light field pieces; which might play along and down the road by which our advance was to be made.
After having taken the breastwork across the road and close to the canal, it was the intention of the Major to have made a rush with half the column, to the angle of a serai in the immediate neighbourhood, and with the other half (whose first great duty would have been to get rid of some of the enemy who had lined certain garden walls which were in the vicinity) to march parallel to the first division of the column.
By this movement the breastworks at the end of the road would have been taken in front and in rear. The second or right division of the column would than necessarily have their right shoulders forward; and then the two divisions of the one column would have entered Kissen Gunge, simultaneously, at the breach made in the rear of the heavy batteries of the enemy.
After securing Kissen Gunge, Major Reid proposed turning the heavy guns, four in number (which, by the occupation of Kissen Gunge, he must have captured), besides two eight and a half inch mortars, which were also placed there, against the enemy in a place called Trevelyan Gunge. And if in addition to these six pieces of ordnance wrested from the foe, he could have combined with them the fire of those light pieces originally intended for him (and the want of them sadly hampered his operations from the very first) as well as the fire of the four guns in the Jummoo Contingent which were at the Eeeghur, the concentration of so much artillery upon Trevelyan Gunge would probably have led to its evacuation. And in the event of such a desirable contingency, leaving only some of the Jummoo troops within the serai, Major Reid would have proceeded with the remainder of his force along the dry bed of the canal, and so have entered the city by the Cabul Gate, which General Nicholson had promised to open for him.
Such was Major Reid’s plan, which naturally enough depended much on circumstances for success ... But as providence would have it, another had succeeded to the command at the eleventh hour, and Kissen Gunge remained in the hands of the mutineers. The Rifles and Goorkhas in possession of the breastwork (which was taken gallantly at the charge, in which Captain McBarnett and Lieutenant Murray fell) continuing unsupported, were unable to maintain their position.
Nevertheless, Kissen Gunge was the scene of many an individual act of daring. The valour of Lieutenant Shebbeare, of the 60th Native Infantry, was very conspicuous throughout the operations of the day; and not less so was the conduct of Sergeant Dunleary, of the 1st Fusiliers, whose gallantry unfortunately cost him his life. Yet all was to no purpose. Our troops, particularly the Contingent, became completely disorganised. There was no rallying them. The Cashmere levies lost their four guns; themselves flying in utter dismay. And eventually the column fell back on its original position; not, perhaps, — despite its want of success — without having done some substantial service, in diverting the attention of the enemy from the main point of attack. But the losses incurred were something very severe.
From Captain D.D. Muter’s letter of July 1858 to Robert Shebbeare, it would seem that Lawrence had responsibility for the much-maligned Cashmere contingent, while he, Muter, took charge of the withdrawal of the left column. His letter casts some interesting light on the matter of the behaviour of the Cashmere (Jummoo) contingent.
Norman did write to me about the Cashmere contingent, putting questions to be answered. I wrote to Dick [Lawrence] on receipt of the letter and asked him if he really meant to call in question the behaviour of such regiments as the 60th Rifles, the 1st Fusiliers, the Guides and the Goorkhas. This he disclaimed, at the same time that he maintained that the Cashmere contingent continued to hold a prominent position long after the European troops had been repulsed and driven from the ground. He also said that the contingent had not been defeated with the loss of their guns before we could come up, but that only a detachment of the force had been engaged (400), and that they continued to fight long after Reid was carried from the field, and that this occurred a mile from where we attacked. If this is true the Cashmere contingent as a body did not attack at all, for they most certainly did not support us.
Alluding to their occupying a position before this fortified serai, I observed in my answer to Norman that I considered it an erroneous charge against Captain Lawrence that he could have committed so gross a military blunder as to employ his men firing musketry at the walls of a position 10 feet thick. In attempting to carry such a position as that at Kissengunge I could only understand the attacking column going at the breach with fixed bayonets, failing to reform and go at it again, and finding it too strong and the loss too great to enable the place to be carried, to withdraw the column under fire and report the result to the authorities. I begged him not to get up a public controversy on the subject. If he does, I feel that he, Captain Lawrence, will not benefit by it. I see the beginning of such a controversy in the Lahore Chronicle where it is stated that the troops of the Maharajah had not justice done them in the despatches and a threat they would bring the whole thing up. I hate these controversies — they give rise to such a bitter spirit and leave the questions in more obscurity
than ever. However, I am determined not to let the shadow of a slur to be thrown on any detachment of the Delhi Field Force that formed our column on that day, and I hope that the officers engaged will come forward and show that such an attempt will not be tolerated.
Major H.W. Norman, Deputy Adjutant of the Bengal Army, whose A Narrative of the Campaign of the Delhi Army10 was the approved semi-official version of events, gives the following brief account of the actions that took place:
No. 4 column, under Major Reid, advanced from the Subzee Mundee towards Kissengunge, the Cashmere contingent co-operating on its right. The latter, however, was so sharply attacked by the insurgents, who were in great force, that, after losing a great number of men and four guns, they were completely defeated and fell back to camp.
Major Reid’s column met with the most strenuous opposition, greatly increased, no doubt, by the failure of the Cashmere contingent; and the enemy were so numerous and so strongly posted, that after the loss of many men and officers, the Commander, Major Reid, having been carried away severely wounded, Captain Muter, 60th Rifles, the next senior officer, judiciously withdrew the troops to their former posts at Hindoo Rao’s and in the Subzee Mundee. Their retirement was much aided by a fire of shrapnel shells, opened by Lieutenant J.A. Evans from the light guns at the battery called the Crow’s Nest. One party of Guides Infantry, however, were surrounded in an enclosure, and could not get away. Their rescue was eventually effected in a spirited manner by the wing of the Belooch battalion, which, as before stated, had been detached to this quarter.
Brigadier Hope Grant’s report of 17 September, adds some more detail:
A party consisting of an officer and eighty of the Infantry Guides came down to our support, and, though so small a number, went gallantly into the gardens and took up a position close to the battery. I regret, however, to say the officer in command, a most gallant young fellow, Lieutenant Bond, was wounded in the head and had to be carried away; but the Guides held out most bravely till they were surrounded in the house and were in great danger; a detachment of the Beloch Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Farquhar, however, came to their assistance and brought them away in safety.11
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