The arrival of the British and Dutch light cavalry decided the issue and the French withdrew. The opening phase of the battle was over by about 3 pm. D’Erlon’s massive and innovative attack had come very close to success. The French had opened up a clear hole in the centre of Wellington’s army, but the charge of the British heavy cavalry had thrown them back.
Bruising encounter
The casualties on both sides had been heavy. Of d’Erlon’s infantry about 2,000 were dead and 3,000 taken prisoner, with hundreds more wounded. Some units had taken particularly heavy casualties, and even those that had escaped relatively lightly were disorganized and scattered. It would take some time before d’Erlon had any infantry regiments able to fight with any real cohesion.
The British cavalry had started their charge with some 2,500 men and horses. More than half of these had been killed or wounded. The Scots Greys suffered especially badly. They had started with 416 men and horses: now 228 horses were dead along with 104 men, while another 97 were so badly wounded that they had to leave the field for hospital treatment. Among the British cavalry regiments there now followed a reorganization, as wounded men gave up their horses to unwounded, but horseless comrades. Like d’Erlon’s infantry it would be some time before they were fit to fight again.
Napoleon was aware that time was running out. He did not know exactly where Bülow was, but he knew the Prussian was on his way. He had little time to defeat Wellington, but if Wellington could be defeated then Napoleon could turn to face Bülow with all his force. With Grouchy hopefully cutting across country toward Waterloo it was likely that Bülow would be caught between the two French forces and crushed.
The entire campaign depended on Napoleon being able to defeat Wellington before Bülow arrived.
Chapter 9
‘Give me night or give me Blücher’
Wellington, on the field of Waterloo
While d’Erlon’s attack was unfolding, Reille’s corps had become increasingly drawn into the fighting around Hougoumont. This had been prompted by Prince Jérôme’s decision to lead a second brigade of infantry into the assault on the chateau.
The high point of this assault came when French infantry, working round the western side of the buildings, managed to reach the north gate at a time when it had been opened to allow ammunition to be brought in from the ridge. There was a rush on both sides, the British trying to close the gate, the French trying to get through before it closed.
Heroism at Hougoumont
The British got the gate closed in time, but Sous-Lieutenant Legros had an axe and used it to smash his way inside. This huge officer charged in, followed by about 50 of his comrades. Lieutenant Colonel James Macdonnell of the Coldstream Guards together with Corporal James Graham and a handful of others ran back to the gates and managed to shut them again by pushing with brute force against the press of Frenchmen outside. All the Frenchmen inside the farm were killed, except for the drummer boy, who was trussed up and thrown into the farm chapel. In the fighting Corporal Graham saved the life of his captain by killing a Frenchman who was about to shoot the officer.
Wellington later remarked that the battle had hinged on closing the gates at Hougoumont. Corporal Graham was promoted to sergeant by his colonel for his bravery, and subsequently on the recommendation of Wellington was given an annuity that he received until his death in 1845.
Soon after the closing of the gates, Macdonnell realized that his men were low on ammunition. He gave the agreed signal that he needed to be resupplied and a driver of the wagon train set off down the hill with a cartload of ammunition. To reach Hougoumont he had to cross several hundred yards of open ground, swept by French artillery fire and within musket range of the French infantry. He got through, but every horse was injured and the cart was a wreck.
This sort of growing battle was not what Napoleon had intended. He fully appreciated the tactical importance of the chateau and that capturing it would allow him to outflank Wellington’s right wing. However, he had not intended to launch such an attack, but to batter his way through Wellington’s centre. The intention had been to worry Wellington and trick him into moving troops away from the centre to protect his right. Wellington had not done so, but nor had he moved any of the men on his right to reinforce his centre.
Napoleon ordered that a battery of howitzers should be brought up to fire incendiary shells into the farm with the purpose of setting fire to the buildings. He was hoping to achieve his purpose without the need to feed more men into the growing struggle. The shells soon had the buildings on fire – indeed, only the chapel would not eventually go up in flames.
As the flames got a hold, Wellington sent Macdonnell a message: ‘I see that the fire has communicated itself from the haystack to the roof. You must, however, keep your men in those parts to which the fire does not reach. Take care that no men are lost by the falling in of the roof or floors. After they have fallen in, occupy the ruined walls inside the Garden, particularly if it should be possible for the enemy to pass through the embers in the inside of the House.’ Wellington was determined to hold Hougoumont.
Artillery onslaught
With his plan for the battle in disarray, Napoleon now had to think quickly to achieve a breakthrough. He ordered his grand battery of over 80 guns to open fire again, swamping the central area of Wellington’s ridge with cannonballs and explosive shells. One British officer was wounded by a ball and fell to the ground. Six of his men rushed forward with a blanket to carry him to the rear for medical treatment when a shell came down and killed them all. In the ranks of the 40th Regiment an exploding shell hurled a man 2 m into the air, over the heads of his alarmed colleagues to land in a tangled heap behind them. Amazingly, he was unwounded. Elsewhere, men were falling in numbers; again regiments were told to lie down to avoid casualties and the cavalry were pulled back.
On the French side of the valley, Napoleon was engaged in a not dissimilar operation. Many of d’Erlon’s units had taken relatively few casualties, but had become scattered and disorganized. Men needed to be recalled to their colours and got into formation. Those units that had taken heavy casualties also needed sorting out and the fitter men reformed in new formations.
A message arrived from Grouchy. It had been written at 11 am from the village of Walhain. The first thing this told Napoleon was that Grouchy was moving forward to Wavre, not cutting across country toward Waterloo; it also showed that Grouchy was moving slowly. The contents of the letter claimed that Blücher had halted near Wavre, but that Grouchy thought they were about to retreat back to Brussels to which place Grouchy would chase them. Clearly at 11 am Grouchy had not yet got Napoleon’s new orders. Whether he yet had them and what he was doing about them Napoleon had no way of knowing. He could only hope that Grouchy was doing what he had been told and was cutting across country.
Napoleon decided that before a fresh attack on Wellington could be launched the farm of La Haye Sainte had to be captured. Ney sent in a brigade of infantry, which as it advanced suffered badly from the sniping of the 95th Rifles who had reoccupied the sandpit. Again the French took the orchard, but could get no further and failed to capture the farmhouse.
Exactly who took the decision about what to do next is unclear. Some accounts say it was Ney who took the decision as Napoleon was temporarily ill with stomach cramps at the time. Others maintain that Ney could not have taken such a drastic decision without Napoleon’s approval. Whoever gave the orders, what followed was one of the most dramatic episodes in Napoleonic warfare.
French cavalry charge
Napoleon had few infantry reserves except for the Imperial Guard, which he had always used only for a decisive, victorious blow. In front of him was Wellington with a greatly diminished and badly battered army. Somewhere to his right – he did not know where – were Blücher and Grouchy, both marching cross-country to join the battle. Napoleon needed to destroy Wellington quickly so
that he could turn his forces east to join with Grouchy and destroy Blücher in turn. The militarily sensible option of withdrawing to link up with Grouchy and try again was not open to Napoleon because he needed a quick victory to break apart the coalition ranged against him.
French heavy cavalry charge the squares of British infantry after a few exchanges of fire, both sides fell back on cold steel as sabre faced bayonet. The artillery shown here forming part of a square were, in fact, stationed between the squares.
The only large force of men available to him were his cavalry. Using cavalry to assault an army not yet broken by infantry attacks was a risky move. Other commanders had used the move before, generally with unfortunate results, but Napoleon had triumphantly used cavalry in this way at the Battle of Eylau in 1807. In that battle, Napoleon had also found himself without infantry reserves, though this time facing a Russian army; somewhere nearby there had been a Prussian army, with a French force under Ney also in the area.
Napoleon had ordered Murat to assault the Russian centre with a vast force of cavalry: Murat had smashed his way through the Russian centre, inflicting heavy casualties and throwing the Russian formations into disarray. Although the Russians had brought up reserves to plug the gap, the delay had been sufficient to allow Ney to arrive on the Russian flank. Napoleon had won the battle, and soon after forced Russia to make peace.
Now, at Waterloo, Napoleon knew that Wellington had no reserves left on the field. A similar massed cavalry charge might very well deliver him victory. But Napoleon had two handicaps that he had not faced at Eylau. First he was attacking the well-trained, professional British infantry, not the conscripted Russians. Second he did not have Murat with him to lead the charge. Handling large numbers of heavy cavalry in action was a difficult thing to do. Murat could manage it, not least because the French cavalry loved and respected him, but few others could do so. The British heavy cavalry had just achieved great things, but had ended up taking huge casualties because their officers had been unable to rally them.
Now Ney was about to lead one of the greatest cavalry assaults in history. Whether he would be able to control his men remained to be seen. He brought up the IV Cavalry Corps of 3,000 cuirassiers and the Guard light cavalrymen, as many men again, to a position between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont.
Wellington watched Ney’s horsemen gathering to attack with puzzlement. When fighting the French in Spain, Wellington had rarely faced large numbers of French cavalry, and those he had met had been less than useful due to the often mountainous terrain. He had studied reports of Napoleon’s battles, but had little first-hand experience of what French cavalry could do. He ordered his infantry to form squares on the reverse of the ridge. The artillerymen were to fire into advancing horsemen for as long as possible, then run to take shelter in the squares. Wellington’s cavalry were to pull back to well behind the infantry squares and watch for an opportunity to launch a counterattack.
Ney led his vast cavalry force up the slope at a trot, breaking into a canter as they approached the British guns so as to cover the deadly ground quickly while still keeping formation. When the British guns fired their shot and grapeshot they inflicted casualties on the horsemen, but the vast majority of the French got through. Among those to go down was Ney himself. He was not injured, but his horse was killed. Streaked with mud, Ney grabbed a horse off a passing man and leapt back into the saddle, spurring up the hill to catch up with the lead units.
As the French cavalry surged over the crest of the ridge they saw spread out ahead of then a patchwork of British and Dutch infantry in squares. The squares relied on the bristling hedge of bayonets to keep the horses at bay. Once the men had fired their muskets, therefore, they could not reload without withdrawing their bayonets from the hedge and giving the French an opening. After one volley the squares fell silent.
The horsemen had a pair of heavy pistols each. These fired a ball nearly as large as that of a musket, but had a shorter range. Once the cavalry had fired their pistols, they too were reluctant to take the time to reload so their firearms fell silent. The sabres of the cuirassiers were shorter than the infantry bayonets, so in the clash of cold steel that followed the infantry had the longer reach, while the cavalry moved with greater speed and nimbleness. When the lancers came up, they found that they could outreach the bayonets and inflicted greater casualties.
Pounding of cannon
Having failed to break the squares, Ney and his horsemen fell back down the slope. Napoleon then opened fire again with his grand battery of cannon. This time the damage the artillery did was even greater. Infantry in squares were densely packed so any cannon ball hitting them would kill or disable half a dozen men, while an exploding shell might kill a dozen or more.
After allowing the guns to pound Wellington’s infantry for some time, Ney returned to the charge. Again his men took casualties from British artillery and muskets, while inflicting death on their own account with their pistols and lances. But once more the squares held firm. A countercharge by British light cavalry sent Ney back down the hill again, but opened the way for the French artillery to open fire with renewed fury.
During the lull in the cavalry attacks, the commanders of the British 30th and 73rd Regiments combined their men into one square after both having lost so many men that their individual squares were too small to be firm. Wellington realized his men were taking heavy punishment and could not hold out for much longer. He was heard to mutter ‘Give me night, or give me Blücher’.
At around 5 pm Napoleon sent Ney reinforcements in the shape of Kellerman’s III Cavalry Corps with 4,000 more cuirassiers and 2,000 men of the Imperial Guard’s heavy cavalry. There was a pause while the new troops were deployed, during which the French artillery continued to pound Wellington’s troops, then Ney once again led a charge.
This charge followed the same pattern as those before. The cavalry thundered up the slope to crest the ridge while taking casualties from artillery, then rode around the squares exchanging pistol shot for musket fire until both sides fell back on cold steel.
This time, with greater numbers and the men of the Imperial Guard, Ney achieved more. The British 15th Hussars were caught in open order by the Guard Dragoons and lost heavily, as did several units of Brunswick infantry. When the Guard horse artillery joined the fray they poured fire into the densely packed men of the squares. An infantry division from d’Erlon’s corps marched up the slope close to Hougoumont and deployed to open musket fire on the squares facing them. Both moves threatened to inflict massive casualties, but due to the restricted space they had in which to deploy neither could get fully into action. A charge by the 900 men of the Brunswick cavalry caused them to fall back.
At 6 pm Ney accepted that he could not batter his way through Wellington’s army with cavalry and led his men back across the valley. He had been too busy with his cavalry charges and too deafened by the thundering roars of the grand battery to notice what had been going on elsewhere on the battlefield. When he got back to Napoleon’s command post he must have been aghast at what he learned.
A new threat
It had been nearly six hours since Lobau’s small corps had been sent to hold the right flank of Napoleon’s army. Lobau had known that he was as likely to face a Prussian attack as to welcome Grouchy’s forces, but for hours nothing had happened. He could hear the cannon and musketry coming from behind him as the attack on Wellington’s ridge continued, but he received no word from his emperor. Once or twice Lobau had seen columns of men moving across open ground miles to the east, but they had been too far away to see if they were French or Prussian.
Lobau occupied his time deploying his men to block the roads coming from the east. He also sent units to secure the ground around the Smohain stream. The sun shone, the birds sang, time passed. Suddenly there was movement on the edge of a wood a mile to his south-east. Men were hauling two dozen cannon out of the trees and manhand
ling them into position. Suddenly the cannon belched flames and smoke. Cannonballs began falling among Lobau’s men to kill and wound dozens of his men.
The Prussians had arrived.
Chapter 10
‘As if blown by a whirlwind’
Marshal Grouchy describing the Prussian army in a letter to Napoleon, 17 June 1815
The Prussians, meanwhile, had been having problems of their own. Before dawn a confidential message arrived from Müffling giving Blücher his private view on Wellington’s intentions and abilities. He confirmed that Wellington had drawn up his army to defend the ridge at Mont-Saint-Jean and that he intended to fight. However, Müffling gave his opinion that Wellington would not be able to hold out all day without Prussian help.
Blücher and Gneisenau discussed the situation. Gneisenau in particular was still wary of Wellington’s intentions, and both men were painfully aware of the mauling their forces had received at Ligny. For both reasons it was decided that the Prussian advance to Waterloo would be led by the only corps that had not been involved at Ligny and which was therefore both fresh and at full strength: that of Bülow. The army’s entire baggage and supply train would go in the opposite direction, to Louvain, in case a retreat to Germany proved necessary.
Slow progress
Bülow set out at dawn, at 7 am reaching Wavre – where the bottleneck of the bridge over the river Dyle was expected to cause delays. Entirely unexpected was the fact that a large house in the high street caught fire just as Bülow’s ammunition wagons were trundling past. The potential for an explosion on an epic scale was obvious. The march was abandoned and thousands of men were thrown into the town to drag the wagons clear and put out the fire. The affair delayed Bülow by more than two hours. It was 10 am before he marched out of Wavre.
The Battle of Waterloo: Europe in the Balance Page 11