by Peter Lance
No earlier than March 1994, two months after Favo reported me to North, Gaspipe gave up the Mafia Cops to his debriefers at the Valachi Suite in El Paso. When Jerry Capeci broke the Mafia Cops story, did any of my accusers stop to consider that in view of the close relationship between the Lucchese Family and the Colombo Family, Scarpa’s law enforcement information, if he truly got any, could have come down the pipeline from Gaspipe? Gaspipe was getting extremely singular information from the Mafia Cops.31
Later in his book, DeVecchio recounts that fall 1993 meeting in Valerie Caproni’s office where Greg Scarpa reportedly claimed he’d received his tips from Gaspipe.
“Jim Brennan told me,” writes Lin, that “during Gaspipe’s debriefing in the Valachi Suite in El Paso, Gaspipe denied that he gave information to Scarpa, but that doesn’t change what Scarpa said.”32
Thus Lin DeVecchio’s principal explanation for the massive leaks of FBI intelligence to Scarpa seems to be that “34” received the intel from Casso via the two NYPD detectives. The question is, how likely is it that the depth and breadth of intelligence—particularly the intel supplied during the third Colombo war from 1991 to 1993—could have come from Eppolito, who retired in 1990, and Caracappa, who went out on disability in 1992?
Prior to Lin’s indictment in 2006, Fred Dannen wrote the most definitive magazine piece on Scarpa and DeVecchio for the New Yorker.33 It was based on multiple interviews Dannen conducted with the key Feds involved, including DeVecchio himself. After he read We’re Going to Win This Thing, I asked Fred for his reaction to DeVecchio’s theory about the source of the leaks. He focused first on the implication that Scarpa had obtained the 1987 DEA arrest lists and the name of Cosmo Catanzano from Casso.
DeVecchio denies tipping off Scarpa Sr. (and consequently Junior) about the DEA case. And he denies endangering the life of Cosmo Catanzano. He instead blames Gaspipe Casso for supplying that information, which Gaspipe supposedly had learned from the Mafia Cops. This borders on the ridiculous. It does not account for the piece of paper that Junior showed his associates, listing ten people targeted for arrest in the DEA case—a list, Junior said, supplied by “a friend” of his father’s, whom Junior described as “an agent.”34
Defense attorney Flora Edwards goes further. “Virtually all of the information that was leaked to Scarpa Sr. over the years had to do with federal law enforcement activities,” she says. “Not only was this pair of NYPD detectives not privy to much of that, but Scarpa and Casso were in the most jeopardy from the Feds, not the NYPD. So if they were going to protect themselves and stay out of jail, and they were able to corrupt anyone in law enforcement, their first choice would have been the kind of ‘crooked Feds’ that Gaspipe describes in his book.”35
Considering all the evidence uncovered in this investigation, it’s now clear that whatever “crystal ball” of intelligence Eppolito and Caracappa may have provided to Anthony Casso, it was a secondary source compared to what he could have gotten from Gregory Scarpa Sr., who was a trusted Top Echelon FBI informant.
Exposing the Agent Provocateur
By November 1994, the work done by defense attorneys Alan Futerfas and Ellen Resnick in peeling back the layers on the Scarpa-DeVecchio relationship was taking a serious toll on the war prosecutions. Selwyn Raab reported in the New York Times that Lin DeVecchio was being investigated by the Bureau “to determine if he leaked information to Mr. Scarpa about mob rivals and pending arrests.”36
Raab quoted DeVecchio’s lawyer Douglas Grover as calling the allegations “ridiculous and pure nonsense” but also took note—for the first time in the media—of the “assertions by defense lawyers that the F.B.I. used Mr. Scarpa as an agent provocateur to provoke a war among factions in the Colombo family and thereby provide evidence for indictments.” Raab quoted Grover as saying that DeVecchio was “angry and annoyed . . . because he knows he is going to be completely cleared.” But he also reported that, on November 10, defense attorney Alan Futerfas had asked Judge Charles P. Sifton for a hearing to determine if “34’s” informant files should be released.
In his pleadings, Futerfas asserted what was now the emerging defense theory about the third Colombo war: that the government had “turned a blind eye to Scarpa’s activities” in a plan “to create and further a divisive conflict which would enable the FBI to make, it hoped, dozens of arrests and convictions.”
By the following spring, the stage was set for Futerfas to make that argument in front of a jury in the trial of Vic Orena Jr., his brother John, and five other defendants indicted on murder conspiracy and related racketeering charges.37 But before the trial even began, Valerie Caproni, who was supervising the war prosecutions, and Ellen Corcella, the lead prosecutor in the Orena brothers’ case, were forced to make stunning admissions about the nature of the intelligence that may have gone to Scarpa Sr. from celebrated Supervisory Special Agent Lin DeVecchio.
Chapter 37
INSANE MAD-DOG KILLER
By April 12, 1995, a month before the Orena brothers’ trial, Valerie Caproni, the EDNY criminal division chief who had been so outspoken about the FBI’s handling of the DEA indictment leak in 1987, issued a sworn affirmation in which she made some surprising admissions. As far back as January 27, 1994—ten days after Favo and the other agents first approached ASAC Donald North—Caproni had successfully lobbied Supervisory Special Agents Thomas Fuentes and Jack Barrett, who were first assigned to the DeVecchio OPR, to delay their interviews of CWs. The agreement was that they would hold off for at least six weeks, pending the war prosecutions.1 Given the impact that the disclosures in the OPR might have had on juries, Caproni not only asked Barrett and Fuentes to delay their investigation but insisted that AUSAs be present when any cooperating witnesses, like Larry Mazza, were interviewed.2
“There’s little doubt,” says defense attorney Ellen Resnick, “that tactic was designed to contain the potential damage to the government that the CW’s statements might inflict at trial.”3
Now, in her sworn affirmation—in a move that might be interpreted as an effort to deflect criticism that she had acted to slow the OPR investigation—Caproni stated that as early as March 1994 Fuentes and Barrett were no longer working on the investigation.4 Since SSA Robert O’Brien from DC then took over the OPR,5 Caproni said, “From that point on, the pace of the investigation was essentially dictated by the schedule of . . . O’Brien and not by trial schedules of CWs or AUSAs.”
Having issued those disclaimers, Caproni nonetheless went on to state, under penalty of perjury, that “there is some reason to believe” the following leaks occurred:
A. In 1987, DeVecchio told Scarpa that the DEA planned to arrest Gregory Scarpa, Jr. and his crew. This information was conveyed in advance of the arrests and led to Scarpa, Jr., becoming a fugitive. Further, Scarpa correctly knew that law enforcement believed that Cosmo Catanzano was a “weak link,” who might cooperate with authorities if arrested;
B. On or about February 27, 1992, DeVecchio told Scarpa that Carmine Imbriale was cooperating with law enforcement;
C. During the Colombo Family war, DeVecchio provided Scarpa with information on at least one member of the Orena faction who had a hit team that was looking for members of the Persico faction;
D. Following the arrest of Joseph Ambrosino, DeVecchio informed Scarpa that although there were arrest warrants outstanding for Lawrence Mazza and James Del Masto (two of Scarpa’s closest associates), if they stayed away from their normal “hangouts,” they could avoid being arrested (as supervisor of C-10, DeVecchio could control who was assigned to find the fugitives Mazza and Del Masto and how extensive that agent’s efforts would be);
E. In or around January 1992, DeVecchio told Scarpa that it was believed that Orena was staying at his girlfriend’s house, the location of which (as then known by law enforcement) was also conveyed;
F. In or around January 1992, DeVecchio told Scarpa the address of the house in which Salvatore Miciotta, an Orena faction captain
, was residing; and
G. In early 1992, DeVecchio provided Scarpa subscriber information for telephone numbers of two of Scarpa’s loan shark customers.
Additionally, in the mid to late 1980’s Scarpa had information that his social club was subject to court ordered electronic surveillance and that he would soon be arrested on charges involving dealing with fraudulent credit cards. It is believed that the source of that information was also DeVecchio.6
Later in that sworn affirmation, Caproni made the extraordinary admission that “DeVecchio may have personally wished for the Persico side of the war to be victorious.”7 Here was the chief criminal prosecutor in the Eastern District effectively embracing Chris Favo’s view of DeVecchio’s “We’re going to win this thing!” cry: “Mr. Organized Crime” was a cheerleader for one of the Mafia factions in the bloody conflict that left at least a dozen dead.
Finally, in her affirmation Caproni wrote, “Because OPR conducted a criminal investigation, Agent DeVecchio was not compelled to submit to an interview. Last fall, however, he was asked to appear voluntarily [but] ultimately DeVecchio declined.”8
Although the OPR investigators couldn’t prevent DeVecchio from taking the Fifth, his reputation as the preeminent organized crime agent in the New York Office was at stake. Also, as Judge Jack B. Weinstein later noted, DeVecchio faced “serious criminal charges and certainly civil and administrative charges” as a result of the allegations surrounding his relationship with Scarpa.9 “So, concluding that Lin might have to testify in future war trials,” says Flora Edwards, “the Justice Department made the extraordinary decision to grant him immunity.”10
To make that happen, according to section 13-6.2 of the FBI’s Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures, the OPR Inspection Division had to determine whether the “the allegations, if true, would have potential” for DeVecchio’s criminal prosecution. Once that determination was made, Lin was allowed to sign a Form FD-645, captioned “Warning and Assurance to Employee Required to Provide Information.”11 After he had signed it, any potentially incriminating statement he made would be inadmissible in any future criminal prosecution, state or federal. That effective grant of immunity ended up having enormous consequences down the line. As we’ll see, the FD-645, which DeVecchio acknowledged signing,12 effectively prevented the DOJ from prosecuting him based on anything he said relating to the OPR charges—and it almost derailed the Brooklyn DA’s murder case against him even before the start of the trial in 2007.
DeVecchio’s Version of Events
On May 5, 1995, DeVecchio made his “compelled statement” to Supervisory Special Agent O’Brien. Throughout the twenty-eight-page statement, DeVecchio professed his innocence of the OPR allegations. It’s notable, however, that he made several admissions that bore on his credibility.
First, he stated that before reopening Scarpa in 1980, he conducted a “review” that determined that Scarpa “had been opened as an informant early in the 1960s.” He even identified Scarpa’s previous FBI contacting agents, giving their names (though they were redacted).
If Lin had read “34’s” file dating back to the 1960s it’s difficult to understand why he would continue to deny that Scarpa was a captain. As noted previously, as early as June 18, 1962, an airtel sent to J. Edgar Hoover on a debriefing of Scarpa identified him as “a Caporegima [sic] in the JOSEPH PROFACI family”13 (see Appendix D). But in his memoir, Lin states emphatically that “34” was “never a capo.”
He later confided in me that he would never agree to be a capo because it would draw too much attention to himself. He remained a soldier.14
How could DeVecchio have reached that conclusion when even the OPR documents identify “34” as “COLOMBO LCN CAPO GREGORY SCARPA SR.”15 But Scarpa’s status in the family was only one of the assertions in DeVecchio’s compelled statement that raised questions. After describing his unique one-on-one relationship with the Top Echelon informant, DeVecchio went on to discuss how he met Scarpa at least once a month, and on some occasions “a few times per week.”
They met in various locations in New York City and on “one or two occasions” in New Jersey. He admitted to multiple phone contacts with Greg via the “Hello” phone, but he stated to SSA O’Brien that Scarpa “never made any emergency calls to” him.16
That assertion conflicts with the statement that AUSA George Stamboulidis made to O’Brien and SSA Kevin Donovan on September 9, 1994, when he described the 1992 incident in which NYPD detectives saw Scarpa tossing a gun from his car and said Scarpa was so worried about a possible arrest that he contacted DeVecchio “in a panic.”17
Continuing in his compelled statement and asserting that the code name he and Scarpa used for each other was “Dello,” Lin then wrote, “Scarpa Sr. never told me that he referred to me as the ‘Girlfriend.’”18
DeVecchio then stated emphatically that Linda Schiro “was never in a position close enough to have overheard anything we discussed.” But that allegation was contradicted by multiple cooperating witnesses, including Carmine Sessa, Larry Mazza, and Billy Meli, who told OPR investigators how Scarpa “would talk about all kinds of criminal efforts including murders, right in Schiro’s presence”—most notably the Joe Brewster murder the night it happened.19
Later in the statement, DeVecchio admitted that he “did make an official contact with Judge I. Leo Glasser” on Scarpa’s behalf in the 1986 credit card case and that “the contact was endorsed by the FBI and AUSA Norman Bloch, who approached Judge Glasser on behalf of Scarpa Sr.” That intervention resulted in Scarpa’s getting a sentence of probation.20
But in that instance DeVecchio’s sworn statement conflicted with his testimony under oath during Michael Sessa’s war trial of November 1992, when he told defense attorney Gavin Scotti that he had never intervened to help an informant get “back on the street” in return for helping the FBI.21
On the next page of his compelled statement, Lin seemed either disingenuous or downright clueless about Scarpa’s drug-dealing activities. “I had no idea that Scarpa Sr. or Scarpa Jr. were involved in drug distribution,” he said. “It was my understanding that the Colombo Family had a disdain for drugs.”22
“You have to ask,” says Flora Edwards, “how DeVecchio’s own CI, Scarpa Sr., is grossing seventy thousand dollars a week selling marijuana and cocaine in a Staten Island drug ring and Lin somehow misses that. It’s just not believable that DeVecchio was that incompetent, especially when you consider that he was running two FBI organized crime squads.”23
Indeed, former AUSA John Kroger, who prosecuted Greg Scarpa Jr., among others, theorizes in his own book that DeVecchio may have fallen prey to what he calls “moral capture.” Kroger writes that agents like DeVecchio who run informants like Scarpa “spend so much time living in the underworld with crooks and crooked informants, they come to adopt [their] perspective.” He concludes, “It is possible that happened to DeVecchio as well. But only he knows for sure.”24
In the next several pages of his statement, DeVecchio proceeded to deny, point by point, each of the disclosures made by Valerie Caproni three weeks earlier in her sworn affidavit regarding his possible leaks to Scarpa. He then blamed the revelations of intelligence on “sources in law enforcement, in police departments and prosecutor’s offices.”
Then, in a stunning suggestion that the leaks to Scarpa had come from Detective Joe Simone, he wrote, “The Colombo Family war investigations resulted in charging a New York police officer with providing information.”25 At that point—early May 1995—DeVecchio surely knew that Simone had been entirely vindicated by a federal jury more than six months earlier. But even though he feigned sympathy for Simone in his 2011 book, in this 1995 compelled statement he was clearly hinting that Simone was the source of the leaks.
On the next page, DeVecchio made an interesting admission that pointed to the inaccuracies in many of his Scarpa 209s. He wrote, “I knew Larry Lampesi [sic] was a Colombo Family member but he was not very active. I d
o not believe that Lampesi [sic] was a prime player in our investigations.”
Interestingly, just two years into his tenure as Scarpa’s contacting agent, DeVecchio filed the following 209 with Washington on a debriefing he’d had with Scarpa on October 18, 1982:
Source advised that “Nick Black” Grancio has become more active in the Colombo family illegal activities, particularly with Dominick Montemarano, and was in on the hit of John Aratico who was shot in front of his house on 21st Avenue Brooklyn New York in April, 1982. The source noted that Aratico was the stepson of the late Colombo member Larry Lampasi.*26
Apart from the fact that Scarpa was blaming Nicholas Grancio for a murder he claimed was committed with “Donnie Shacks” Montemarano, DeVecchio’s reference to “the late” Larry Lampasi came ten years before he was shot to death in front of his house by Scarpa, Mazza, and Del Masto. “When you read that,” said Andrew Orena, “you come back to that same old question. Did Lin know that Scarpa Sr. was lying to him through his teeth? If he did, did he care?”27
“An Unusual Twist”
Three days after DeVecchio submitted his sworn OPR statement, the trial of seven Colombo members, including Vic Orena Jr. and his brother John, began in EDNY federal court before Judge Edward R. Korman. In advance of the trial, Korman, who later served as chief judge of the Eastern District,28 ordered the Feds to provide the defense with details of the possible leaks from DeVecchio to “34,” since they clearly amounted to “Brady material.” The result was a two-page letter from lead prosecutor Ellen Corcella to Gerald Shargel, Alan Futerfas, and the five other attorneys representing the battery of defendants.