The relative failure of the efforts to shelter and rescue the bombed communities provoked a crisis at the centre of the war effort by the end of September 1940 not unlike the crisis facing the RAF with the switch to night-bombing. Churchill pressured Anderson to do something urgently about the shelter crisis and to restore confidence in the ARP structure, but for all his widely acknowledged competence, Anderson was not an inspiring home-front commander. Beaverbrook suggested to Churchill in early October that a change was needed at the top. Anderson became Lord President of the Council, responsible for home-front mobilization of resources, and on 3 October his place was taken by the former Labour Party chair of the London County Council, Herbert Morrison. Morrison was a popular political figure, a barrow boy from Lambeth and a conscientious objector in the First World War, who dedicated himself in the interwar years to promoting the welfare of poorer Londoners. He was a blunt, intelligent and politically astute politician, capable much more readily than Anderson of engaging with public concerns and demonstrating the government’s desire to act. He recruited the radical Labour MP for Jarrow, Ellen Wilkinson, as his under-secretary responsible for shelter. Nicknamed ‘Miss Perky’ by her parliamentary colleagues, her energy and forthrightness were deemed to be the right qualities for one of the hardest jobs to be faced in the winter of 1940.105
The first priority was to reform and expand the provision of shelter and welfare. Anderson had already set in motion programmes for improvement, though much still depended on the initiative and resourcefulness of local authorities. In mid-September Lord Horder, chairman of the British Medical Association, had been asked to report on shelters in London in view of the potential threat of epidemics and public disorder. He had recommended installing bunks and proper sanitary facilities, spraying the walls with antiseptic, delousing bedding (and sleepers), appointing shelter marshals, and regular inspections by the local medical officers of health.106 Morrison, together with the Minister of Health, Malcolm MacDonald, set about implementing many of the recommendations. In late September a set of standard by-laws for conduct in shelters was drawn up and finally published as an Order in Council on 4 December. The orders prohibited smoking, animals, cooking, noisy conduct and musical instruments, and denied access to anyone drunk or whose ‘person or clothing is offensively unclean or verminous’ or who spat or defecated in the shelter.107 Social discrimination was encouraged by the new regulations. Vagrants and alcoholics were barred from shelters and in London were accommodated during raids by a volunteer pacifist group in Westminster. Wardens were also told to police prostitution by ‘firmly and discreetly’ telling a woman to desist from soliciting, as long as they were reasonably certain that that was what she was doing. Popular hostility to East End Jews, who became the butt of some of the protest during the early raids for allegedly sitting all day in the shelters, was mitigated by the establishment of separate Jewish rest and feeding centres where kosher food was provided and Yiddish spoken.108
The shelter programme nevertheless required more than rules for exclusion and shelter discipline. A programme was begun to install thousands of bunk beds in two or three tiers in all public and many domestic shelters. Morrison introduced a ticketing system to control entry to London shelters. Heating and lighting, mainly absent from surface shelters, were slowly introduced, while programmes to drain and cover over the floors of flooded Anderson and brick shelters were begun. The shortage of labour and materials meant dividing the country into A, B and C zones, with priority for shelter improvement in the A zone of major urban areas. Each of the twelve civil defence regions was asked to appoint a Regional Shelter Officer to coordinate the activity.109 Morrison also introduced a new portable shelter which bore his name to supply the many thousands who chose to stay in their homes rather than use garden or public shelters. It was designed by an engineer in the ministry’s Research and Experiments Division late in 1940 and approved after a demonstration on New Year’s Day 1941 in front of Churchill. Shaped like a large table, it had a flat surface top, steel frame and wire mesh sides and could withstand a fall of debris. Production depended on the availability of steel and the first models were ready only in March 1941 when the Blitz was nearing its end. By August 298,000 had been delivered.110 By this stage 1,330,000 bunks had been installed in Underground stations, communal shelters, basements and Andersons with orders on hand for a further 3 million; half a million Anderson shelters (60 per cent of the whole) had been given concrete flooring. In May 1941 London could sleep 461,000 in bunks and had public and domestic shelter accommodation for 86 per cent of the population, though much of it still remained unused.111
The medical and welfare conditions for the homeless and for shelterers were also subjected to a thorough overhaul. It was decided in December 1940 that responsibility for this aspect of shelter and rescue should be given over fully to the Ministry of Health. One of the problems in organizing effective welfare since September was the absence of a clear demarcation of function. On 31 December the Ministry of Home Security took over responsibility for the number, siting and construction of shelters, while the Ministry of Health assumed control over everything that went on inside – health, welfare, public order, food and entertainment. This still produced some overlap, since Morrison remained responsible for the welfare provided by local civil defence authorities outside the shelters, but it eased the confusion that had existed when the bombing began.112
The first fruit of the new order was to institute shelter committees and a system of shelter wardens, distinct from the ARP organization, whose responsibility was to keep public order, note infractions and organize shelter activities. The Ministry of Health recommended people who could be firm and polite without bullying or domineering and encouraged the choice of one of the ‘House Mothers’, women who had already established a reputation in the larger shelters for sorting out the frictions and anxieties generated in their small, claustrophobic communities.113 In January 1941 the Ministry appointed a welfare director to organize programmes of welfare for the shelter population and in May each local authority was encouraged to appoint a welfare officer to supervise the new activities. These included educational programmes, entertainments, games and excursions. The shelter population was regarded as ‘almost terrifyingly receptive’ after weeks of boredom and darkness. Nevertheless, dull talks were arranged on practical subjects such as furniture covering and how to keep fit, and included a suggested lecture on ‘National Savings – the danger of carrying about or hiding large sums of money.’ For children aged 5–14 there were separate talks for girls and boys which reflected the prevailing gender values: for boys there were ‘careers’, ‘life in the armed forces’, ‘a farmer’s work’, ‘aeroplane construction’; for girls, ‘dressmaking’, ‘cookery and housekeeping’, ‘nursing as a career’, ‘elementary first aid’. A central film library was set up for shelter committees to choose a programme of information films; the list included The Manufacture of Gas (the first and most unfortunate title), The Life Cycle of the Tadpole and Kill that Rat, for which a better case could be made. Shelters established choirs, which competed with other shelters, while some shelter committees organized excursions during the day to concerts, theatres and to London Zoo.114 The class bias of much of the effort to improve shelter life was unavoidable, given the social background of senior officials dealing with a predominantly working-class constituency. Among the evening classes recommended in February 1941 for the cockney borough of Hackney was ‘elocution’; for the more cosmopolitan Soho, ‘English for Foreigners’.115
One of the principal concerns since September 1940 had been the threat of epidemic disease created by insanitary conditions and the close proximity of large numbers of people. Under the Ministry of Health the programme of establishing first-aid centres was accelerated. By January 1941 there were posts in most Underground stations and major shelters with more than 500 people. Face masks were distributed from February, though seem not to have been used. Education was seen as an important ele
ment of the programme and an information film titled Atishoo! was distributed to cinemas the same month to encourage the use of handkerchiefs. The close links between the medical personnel and shelter wardens created what one local authority called ‘a miniature social service’. The spread of satisfactory conditions was slow (there were complaints in Norwich in March that people still fouled the streets because there were no shelter toilets), but by the early summer issues of hygiene and health were under control. The equipment detailed for medical posts was extensive, turning them into small well-equipped clinics just at the point when large-scale bombing tailed off.116 At the same time the problem of Rest Centres and feeding was tackled. Most local authorities expanded the capacity of Rest Centres and provided improved meals. In Newcastle the number of places expanded from 2,400 in August 1940 to 12,200 a year later, with 3,300 volunteer workers to man the centres. There were 22 emergency feeding centres which provided a narrow but wholesome menu of traditional English food. The government undertook to supply extensive stocks of foodstuffs for emergency purposes and by autumn 1941 had allocated ‘ “blitz” food stocks’ capable of feeding 10 million people for three days and an Emergency Meals Service for feeding at least 10 per cent of the population of the most vulnerable 147 cities.117 The Rest Centres also became places where the WVS and other volunteers supplied information to the homeless or bomb victims on where to go to find official assistance. By the end of the Blitz there were 78 information centres functioning, while the Citizens Advice Bureaux, set up before the war, expanded the number of offices from around 200 to more than 1,000 by 1942.118
From late 1940 a concerted effort was made by the government to learn lessons from the early experience of the bombing and to make sure that those lessons were communicated widely to the authorities responsible for civil defence. After the Coventry raid in November 1940 a number of ‘Coventry Conferences’ were held for local ARP Controllers where problems were discussed and recommendations made. The key issues isolated were the need for mobile canteens prepared for an emergency, the establishment of temporary information centres and posters or loudspeaker vans to announce exactly where they could be found, and the effective use of outside aid for emergency fire-fighting and repair work.119 The success of the learning curve can be judged by the reaction to raids later in the Blitz. The major raids on Hull on 7–8 and 8–9 May 1941, which followed smaller raids during March and April, showed that lessons had been learned from the problems experienced in Coventry and Southampton, highlighted at the Coventry Conference. Although the city guildhall was hit and the surrounding area was set on fire, the Control Room in its basement continued to function, using messengers when phone lines were ruptured. Although 24 reception centres were damaged and the WVS worked even during the raids without the promised steel helmets, 41 centres remained open on the first night and 46 on the second, coping with a total of 13,000 people. Clothing, tea and biscuits were supplied and over 13,000 garments distributed. The centres had representatives from the key welfare departments who could answer queries immediately. Volunteers were under instructions not to send anyone away even in crowded halls. On the following day the local authority opened district offices in the damaged areas to deal with the homeless and claims for assistance. The officials dealt with the long queues as quickly as they could and diverted people to slacker offices when that was possible. Over 36,000 people were seen during the week after the raids. During the first few days mobile canteens and emergency feeding centres provided 367,000 meals, most of them a midday dinner. Out of the 39 mobile canteens, 30 were supplied from outside the city. Meals were free for the first four days. The government authorized the release of 4,000 cases of oranges for the bomb victims. The result was an outcome very different from the experience of Southampton.120
The state had learned much since the start of the Blitz, but there had been much to learn. Casualties still remained high in the spring of 1941 as the bombing spread out into areas less prepared to cope with it and starved of the resources now being provided for London. In late March 1941 Churchill wrote to Morrison and MacDonald urging them to speed up the programme of improvements to cope with the expected intensification of the Blitz later in the year. The moment of crisis evident in September 1940 had temporarily subsided. At least one of the explanations was the effective response of the government to the deficiencies in shelter and welfare provision exposed by the reality of heavy bombing. Another lay in efforts to limit the amount of material damage that bombing could do.
DAMAGE LIMITATION
No amount of effective blackout, camouflage or firepower could prevent damage on the ground to industry, commercial buildings and housing. People could be moved or sheltered, or choose to stay and be bombed, but physical assets were generally static, except for foodstuffs and machine tools. The government and the armed forces needed to guarantee the continued operation of the war economy by keeping factories working as many hours as possible. They needed to ensure a continuous supply of foodstuffs for the population by protecting stocks and maintaining the activity of the ports. Finally, the population needed to be housed in the bombed cities where they worked to keep production going. These were the elements of Britain’s war effort that German airmen were ordered to erode; damage limitation was critical to Britain’s survival.
British industry and commerce was an easy target. Concentrated in major industrial regions in the centre, north-west and north-east, and in the large port cities from London in the south to Glasgow in the north, industry and commerce lay open to attack once German air forces had secured bases in France and Belgium. Britain was also exceptionally urbanized, with the majority of the population crowded into cities and towns, most of which had swollen in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with low-rise, poorly built terraced housing or tenement blocks to house a large industrial and commercial workforce. No planning had ever anticipated heavy bombing attack; cities grew haphazardly, the working classes concentrated in the centres around the docks or industries they worked in, the better off moving to larger, sturdier and more spacious suburban houses. This pattern of growth made individual industrial or port targets difficult to find and hit, but it also maximized the prospect of widespread physical damage to the urban infrastructure and residential housing. The exception was the expansion of new technology manufacture – aircraft, radios, electrical goods, scientific instruments – which developed in southern Britain and London during the interwar years. These new factories were often sited on the outskirts of smaller towns and cities; they were easier to locate from the air than factories in crowded urban areas, but also more dispersed.
Protection for industry and the industrial workforce followed standard civil defence procedure. Shelters were constructed in many key industrial and commercial undertakings (though less effectively in dock areas); the blackout was closely observed, with exceptions for undertakings that could not black out all their operations entirely; many firms ran their own ARP branch, while key equipment and machinery were protected by sandbags and blast walls.121 These provisions gave limited protection during a raid but in the early attacks did little to protect workers from falling glass from roofs and windows, which accounted for up to 80 per cent of the casualties in the aircraft industry. Instead glass was replaced with solid material, which eliminated all daylight and left workers labouring in artificial light by day and by night.122 The necessity for keeping production going for as long as possible, even during red alerts, led to the introduction in the autumn of 1940 of roof-spotters whose role was to watch for local gunfire and approaching aircraft before alerting the rest of the workforce to take shelter. The initial loss of production time was substantial. The steel industry calculated that up to the end of August bomb damage to plant had caused a loss of only 1,000 tons of steel products, but alerts had cost 147,000 tons. This was more than was lost when heavy attacks were eventually made on the steel industry in December.123 The spotter scheme was approved by the War Cabinet in September. It was pro
voked initially during the months of the Battle of Britain by the need to keep aircraft production going at all costs, which was the responsibility of Lord Beaverbrook, the first Minister of Aircraft Production. Beaverbrook favoured conscripting all workers to stand to their duties ‘as soldiers and sailors are required to conform to the orders of the Commanding Officer’, but discussions between employers and unions led to the adoption of the look-out scheme.124
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