by Don Berry
The Aricaras, it seemed, were interested in peace, too. They told Leavenworth that Gray Eyes, who had been the cause of all the trouble, had been killed. They were most abject, and begged for pity. Leavenworth magnanimously informed the Ree delegate that he had not come to fight (which was probably obvious by then) but to bring peace. He would, however, have to speak with persons of authority. The Aricara returned to his village, Leavenworth and Pilcher returned to the boat to await the delegation of chiefs. Pilcher was thoroughly disgusted by now, realizing that any treaty entered into at this time would simply be letting the Aricaras off. He was not convinced of the extent of damage claimed, nor of the abjectness of the Rees.
Soon ten or twelve Aricaras emerged from the villages and made their way toward the boats, among them Little Soldier. Leavenworth greeted them warmly, embracing Little Soldier affectionately; which act further infuriated Pilcher. He later wrote that the gesture "done credit to the goodness of your heart; but did not in my humble opinion, comport with the dignity of the Legion's chief."
Ceremonial buffalo robes were spread, the Indians and some of Leavenworth’s officers sat to parley. Leavenworth required, as conditions of peace, that Ashley’s stolen property be returned, that the Indians behave well in the future, and that they give him Eve, hostages to take to Fort Atkinson as surety for this last condition.
The Aricaras said they would be happy to return what they still possessed, but that the Sioux had made off with a good part of it and killed many of the horses as well. Leavenworth then expounded at some length on the majesty and power of the United States Army, to which dissertation the Indians apparently listened without smiling. They would return what they could, the Aricaras said again, and made other expressions of their good intent.
"Considering my small force," writes Leavenworth, "the strange and unaccountable conduct of the Sioux, and even the great probability of their joining the Aricaras against us—and also the expense and trouble of a long Indian war, and the importance of securing the Indian trade, I thought it proper to accept the terms."
The peace pipe was duly produced. Pilcher refused to smoke, being in goodly rage by this time, nor would he shake hands. He "got up and walked back and forth in great agitation, telling the Indians that they could look out for him on the morrow" (Chittenden). Since the Aricaras had been informed that Pilcher was the most important white in the expedition, "his manner produced a bad effect upon [them]." As well it might. Leavenworth finally persuaded him to smoke, but Pilcher flatly refused to condone any other part of the inadequate agreement.
While Leavenworth was picking out his hostages from among the nervous Indians, something occurred to upset them. It is not known precisely what this was, but it ended in the Indians refusing to go. Several shots were fired in the excitement, but no one was hurt. The Aricaras scampered back to the villages and the first negotiations for peace ended.
***
Monday, August 11, 1823
In the morning the Sioux allies were gone. So were seven of Ashley’s horses, six government mules, and an unrecorded percentage of the Aricara cornflelds.
Shortly after sunup the minor Aricara chief Little Soldier appeared again. He explained to Leavenworth that his people were very much disturbed by Pilcher’s attitude. They wanted to know what the fiery Missouri Fur leader was going to do.
Leavenworth guaranteed that Pilcher would be bound by any treaty made; that he would have no choice in the matter if he, Leavenworth, made peace. Thus reassured, Little Soldier proposed that he bring some chiefs out to negotiate a treaty and that Leavenworth in turn send a few whites into the village, probably as a guarantee of the chiefs’ safety. Agreed, but who of Leavenworth’s command had that much nerve?
Edward Rose the interpreter, qualifying as a white by the accident of employment, volunteered to go in alone and look things over. Without any doubt, Rose was the best man for the job. He had lived with the Aricaras for three years and they were "very much attached to him." Rose also had a ferocious reputation among Indians; he was known as Five Scalps by the Crows, commemorative of a famous solo battle.
Rose went into the village and returned with the report that the fortifications were not nearly so strong as had been thought and that the Indians were quite humbled. Other officers among the whites then went in and confirmed Rose’s report.
The Aricara "chiefs,” however, turned out to be men of no particular responsibility. They were sent back (probably by Pilcher) and eleven others came out. Pilcher was still not satisfied, and claimed none of the Indians present had any authority. Nevertheless, the second group were the signers of the treaty.
When it came to the drawing up of the treaty itself, Leavenworth ran into another snag. He requested Pilcher to draft it. (Not in order to shift responsibility, as some scholars have claimed, but because such a treaty was clearly the job of the ranking Indian agent present; and this was Pilcher.)
Pilcher, of course, flatly refused. Leavenworth was finally reduced to drafting the treaty himself, which he did very simply. It consisted of four articles. The first, and most important, provided for the return of "the arms taken from Ashley’s party and such other articles of property as might remain in their hands which were obtained from Genl. Ashley in exchange for horses." The second article consisted of promises that the navigation of the Missouri be kept unobstructed and that authorized traders would be treated civilly. The third and fourth articles were pledges of enduring mutual friendship between the Indians and the United States.
The treaty was signed by the eleven Indians, Leavenworth, five of his officers, and Ashley, at whose request the expedition had been formed.
The Aricaras then returned to the villages to gather together what goods of Ashley’s they could find.
All they could seem to locate was three rifles, sixteen robes, and one horse. This was not sufficient, and they were sent back for more.
***
Tuesday, August 12, 1823
By the afternoon of the 12th Little Soldier finally came back with the report that no more of Ashley’s goods could be found. He pointed out again that Gray Eyes was dead, though what this had to do with Ash1ey’s property is somewhat vague. The upper village refused to contribute anything at all, claiming that they had not been involved in the original attack on Ashley and could not be expected to donate valuable goods.
Leavenworth told Little Soldier he would have to attack the village if the first article of the treaty, the most important one, were not complied with. He was apparently more confident since their inspection had shown the weakness of the village defenses. (Lieutenant Morris had somewhere found more round shot, which doubtless added to Leavenworth’s confidence.)
The threat of another attack agitated Little Soldier considerably, and he inquired if he might change sides. He could be of considerable value to the whites, which point he illustrated by giving a bit of logistic advice. He pointed out where the village might best be attacked, and suggested that the cannon be aimed lower, because everybody in the village would be lying on the ground when they fired.
This was all very interesting, and possibly even useful, but it still didn’t settle the problem of Ashley’s goods. Once having made the threat of attack, many men might have felt compelled to carry it through if the treaty were not honored. Leavenworth did call his officers, and it was agreed to everyone's satisfaction that a general assault should begin the next day if the goods were not forthcoming.
Edward Rose went back into the village and managed to squeeze a few more robes out of the Rees, but that, they declared, was the absolute limit. He brought the robes back, and also information to the effect that the Indians were intending to desert the towns.
This was what Leavenworth was afraid of. He could deal with the Aricaras all right as long as they stayed in their villages but would be completely helpless if they scattered over the prairie. The desertion of the Sioux cut his force from 1,100 to about 350. His previous statement—to the effect that he wou
ld follow to the Mandan villages if necessary and attack them there—was not repeated at this time. Instead, he called his officers back and announced that the proposed attack was called off.
Little Soldier, said Leavenworth in effect had done the very best he could. "I have therefore determined to abandon the charge and dispense with that article of the treaty." It being noteworthy that this article was the only one not wholly vague and theoretical.
Leavenworth, like Little Soldier, was doing the best he could. He was apparently convinced he had done his job: "For my own part I felt confident that the Indians had been sufficiently humbled, fully to convince them of our ability to punish any injury which they might do us, and that they would behave well in future if we left them undisturbed in their villages." He also thought his word to the Aricaras would be sufficient, and took no special precautions to prevent their desertion of the villages.
***
Wednesday, August 13, 1823
On the morning of the 13th the human population of the
Aricara towns had dwindled to one; that one being the
ancient mother of the dead malefactor Gray Eyes. There were
still some dogs, however, and a rooster, by one account. But
no Aricaras. Leavenworth hopefully sent out a patrol to look
for them.
***
Thursday, August 14, 1823
The patrol came back. Still no Aricaras. Leavenworth then wrote the following plaintive little note, which I give in its entirety:
Ricaras Towns August 14,1823
Colonel Leavenworth, commanding the 6th regiment,
to the chiefs and warriors of the Ricaras nation of
Indians,
Greeting:
Ricaras:
You see the pipe of peace which you gave to me, in the hands of Mr. Charlonnan, and the flag of the United States.
These will convince you my heart is not bad. Your villages are in my possession; come back and take them at peace, and you will End everything as you left them. You shall not be hurt if you do not obstruct the road or molest the traders. If you do not come back, there are some bad men and bad Indians who will bum your villages. Come back, and come quickly. Be assured that what I say is the truth.
H. Leavenworth
Col. U.S. Army
They then left Gray Eyes' mother in complete possession of the Ree towns, supplied her with provisions and water, and departed at 10 A.M. on the 15th of August.
Behind them, as if to prove Leavenworth’s absolute veracity, the towns burst into flame. The colonel was convinced some of Pilcher’s men had done the dirty work—quite correctly, as it turned out—and addressed Pilcher: "The Colonel commanding, is extremely mortified to say, that he has too much reason to believe, that the Ricaras towns, have been set on fire by [men of your company . . . ; with such men he will have no further intercourse."
His offical report, two weeks later, when he had returned to Fort Atkinson:
If the nation has been deprived of the advantages which might have resulted from the magnanimity of her troops toward a fallen and an humbled enemy, it is chargeable to that company, or to those individuals, who set those towns on nre. Had not this been done, there is no doubt that the Ricara Indians would in the future have behaved as well toward our countrymen as any other Indians on the river. It is now my deliberate opinion that those Indians will be excited to further hostilities if in the power of the Missouri Fur Company to effect it. It is understood that the company have withdrawn their trade from above the Sioux country . . . ·
He goes on to imply that Pilcher’s intent is to hamper the activities of Ashley and Henry; and to laud the latter organization for their cooperation.
Our officers and men [Leavenworth concludes] have returned in Ene health and spirits and it is well; for those left here are nearly all sick . . . Our spring wheat has done well, and all our crops are very good.
The only white battle casualties of the entire campaign
were two men slightly wounded. Far and away the greatest »
loss_was occasioned by the wreck of the keelboat on the way
up, which had drowned seven men. No wonder they returned
in line spirits.
Chittenden estimates that the Aricara campaign cost $2,000, and most historians have followed him. However, there is another cost that can be charged to the campaign: that of moving the supporting troops which were never used. By September 5 there were six full companies encamped a short distance above St. Louis. For the movement of these troops, Major General Gaines issued a request to the quartermaster for an additional $12,000, which makes the campaign seem a good deal less a bargain.
The most amazing part of the campaign was that Leavenworth was convinced he had done his job. In the set of "Orders" issued to his men immediately on return to Fort Atkinson, he says:
The Colonel commanding is happy to announce to his command that the objectives of the late expedition against the Ricaras Indians have been eifected. The blood of our countrymen has been honorably avenged, the Ricaras humbled, and in such a manner as will teach them, and other Indian tribes, to respect the American name and character.
This was so far from the truth as to be a classic example of the monstrous fictions possible to the military mind. The Aricaras now became more murderous than ever, massacring several trappers near the Mandan villages immediately after. Even the long-time friends of the whites, the Mandans themselves, were involved in several attacks that fall and winter. For several years it was not safe for a white man to show his face on the upper Missouri. The Sioux had been completely alienated by the ineffectual show and henceforth had an extremely low opinion of the Great White Father and all his aides.
So unpopular was Leavenworth that the two men he excepted in his indictment of the Missouri Fur Company—Vanderburgh and Carson—wrote to their boss Pilcher that they were "extremely mortified at having been selected as the object of his approbation and praise."
The truth was much closer to Pilcher’s hotheaded accusation: I am well aware that humanity and philanthropy are mighty shields for you against those who are entirely ignorant of the disposition and character of Indians, but with those who have experienced the fatal and ruinous consequences of their treachery and barbarity these considerations will avail nothing. You came to restore peace and tranquillity to the country, and to leave an impression which would insure its continuance. Your operations have been such as to produce the contrary effect, and to impress the different Indian tribes with the greatest possible contempt for the American character. You came (to use your own language) to "open and make good this road"; instead of which you have, by the imbecility of your conduct and operations, created and left impassable barriers.
The greatest burden under which Leavenworth labored was undoubtedly his appalling ignorance of Indians. He was consistently dealing with some strange figment of his own imagination rather than real people. He treated the Indians not only as children but as retarded children. It is quite amazing that a man in charge of a military force on the American frontier could refer to "advantages [resulting] from the magnanimity of her troops toward a fallen and an humbled enemy." This is a rather romantic view of warfare, and certainly one the Indians did not comprehend at all. For "magnanimity" any Indian would read either "cowardice" or 'weakness." They were not conversant with the European concept of gallantry.
Leavenworth naturally had to consider how his action would appear to his superiors. In the civilized East, having slaughtered their own Indians, people were developing a strong conscience about what the West did with theirs. It is possible this was a factor; he had, after all, taken a large body of men on a punitive expedition without authorization and did not know that this would be approved. If it ended in the obliteration of the Aricaras, he might well have a great deal to answer for. There is very little justification, however, for his failing to insist on the observance of the treaty, once signed.
The conduct of the camp
aign became a sort of cause célébre of the day and was widely debated. On the Missouri there was more or less unanimous agreement that the expedition had been a complete failure.
In spite of this, Leavenworth and the military continued to regard the campaign as an unqualified success (if it hadn’t been for the rascally Missouri Fur Company). Leavenworth wrote glowing recommendations for all his officers, including those who didn’t do anything but showed by their general attitude their bravery, loyalty, and other desirable military qualities.
Gaines himself wrote to Secretary of War Calhoun: ". . . if the President of the United States should be pleased to confer any token of his approbation on either of the officers engaged in the late expedition. Colonel Leavenworth himself has a well founded claim to the first notice."
An aide-de-camp, however, informed Gaines that "the President . . . deems it inexpedient to confer any brevets for services on that occasion."
CHAPTER 4
"A Verry unfavourable account"
THE Missouri Legion was disbanded at the mouth of the Grand River, just a few miles below the Aricara villages. Rancor and bitterness within the party were the rule; Leavenworth gave Pilcher and his Missouri Fur men dishonorable discharges—nominal, presumably, as were their ranks—and Ashley’s men received honorable ones.
For Ashley the consolation was a small one. The campaign, far from restoring his losses, had cost him seven more horses. His men were half a thousand miles from where they should be, sitting on the wrong river with no supplies. It was past the middle of August—the trappers should have been preparing for the fall hunt——and unless 1823 was to be a complete loss some men had to be gotten into the field immediately. If they folded now, it was for good; even a "person of credit" can push his financial luck only so far. The losses already sustained by accident and Indian were enough to disillusion the most optimistic of backers.