by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War
With the departure of the carriers and the destruction of TF 44, the way to Port Moresby was open, and Mikawa sailed back through the Jomard on May 9, only two days behind schedule. American bombers from Townsville attempted to hinder his progress, but achieved meager results for the loss of two B-17s to fighters from Zuikaku. Similarly, the few remaining Allied fighters and dive-bombers at Port Moresby were overwhelmed by the Japanese after desperate fighting in the Papuan skies. With local air superiority, the veterans of the South Seas Detachment and the 3rd Kure SNLF landed at Port Moresby on May 12 and quickly broke the defenses of the demoralized and poorly trained Australian 30th Brigade. Though some Australians managed to escape into the forbidding jungles, more than 3,000 went into captivity, and by mid-May the first Japanese aircraft were operating from Port Moresby. The stage was set for Operation AU.
Australia's Darkest Hour
The twin defeats at the Coral Sea and Port Moresby were devastating to Allied morale, compounded when it became clear that neither Japanese fleet carrier had suffered major damage. Shoho was a poor exchange for the loss of Lexington and the injuries inflicted upon Yorktown. As Australian prime minister John Curtin grimly told his countrymen, “This is our darkest hour.”15
USS Hornet and Enterprise succeeded in diverting the two Japanese carriers from the Australian coast by feinting a raid toward Ocean and Nauru east of the Solomons in mid-May, but preparing a major operation in the Central Pacific, and both U.S. carriers were hastily recalled to Hawaiian waters. As Hornet and Enterprise steamed north, U.S. Pacific Fleet intelligence prepared an assessment that foresaw simultaneous Japanese thrusts toward the Aleutians, Australia, and the Hawaii/Midway area.16 MacArthur's analysis was similar: “The availability of large forces makes possible a strong enemy offensive effort of the most dangerous possibilities ... if Japan is not attacked elsewhere we can certainly look for an attack on Australia.”17With insufficient resources to respond to all three offensives, the Pacific Fleet had no choice but to concentrate on the Central Pacific threat, leaving MacArthur and the Australians to see to their own defense for the time being.
Map 9. Australia: Ground Force Disposition, May 1942
The Allied situation was not especially encouraging. Although Australia was in the process of forming a substantial army, in May 1942 less than half of the thirty-one brigades available in the country could be considered fit for combat operations and only four of these had any combat experience (five other brigades were still overseas, and three, including the 30th, had been destroyed thus far). An Australian home guard of 50,000 men, the Volunteer Defense Corps, was providing invaluable assistance, but its members were generally too old for extended active service, and there was hardly enough equipment for the regulars and militia, let alone these second-line troops. On the credit side of the ledger, the American 41st Infantry Division had reached Australia, the 32nd Division was en route, and American tanks were arriving to outfit the four Australian armored brigades. American army and marine units had also secured the island chains that guarded the line of communications back to the United States. With the exception of some elements of the 1st Marine Division, however, all of these units were newly formed and untested in battle.
The air picture was similarly worrisome, and the naval situation absolutely gloomy. The fighting in the Dutch East Indies and over Port Moresby had depleted Allied air strength badly, and many squadrons were now operating with only half their intended number of aircraft. Pilots were also a problem. Many of the Australians were inexperienced, while the Americans were an odd mixture of utterly green fliers newly arrived from the United States, and tired, dispirited veterans of the repeated defeats in the Dutch East Indies. These problems were greatly exacerbated by the general inferiority of the Allied fighter aircraft (P-39s, P-400s, P-40s, and Australian Wirraways) when compared with the Japanese A6M Zeros and Ki-43 Oscars. In the wake of the catastrophes in the Java Sea and Coral Sea engagements, the U.S. and Australian naval forces had neither carriers, battleships, nor heavy cruisers to oppose a Japanese invasion. Until further American help arrived, the handful of remaining light cruisers and destroyers would be restricted to limited support missions well within the range of land-based aircraft. The best Allied naval leaders could hope for was some success on the part of their old S-model USN submarines.
The Fall of Townsville
While Admiral Yamamoto and the Combined Fleet were slicing through the waters of the Central Pacific toward their rendezvous with the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Midway, Mikawa's armada steamed out of Rabaul and into the Coral Sea carrying Yamashita's invasion force to the Australian coastline.
Excellent intelligence work had alerted the Allies to the coming invasion, but the intended landing areas were still unknown as the Japanese transports approached the coast. Several problems contributed to this key intelligence gap. First, although U.S. and Australian cryptanalysts had divined the general outlines of Operation AU, unlike the Midway invasion, the Allied intelligence officers did not have a near complete operations order. Second, the Allies had only a limited ability to interpret Japanese army codes. They thus had little success unearthing critical operational details of major Imperial Army activities. Finally, the limited number of U.S. analysts had been focused on Yamamoto as the more immediate danger and were unable to devote as much time and energy to Operation AU. Though Australian intelligence also labored to penetrate the Japanese plans, there were neither enough specialists nor enough time to unravel the mystery before the Japanese struck.
Owing to these crucial holes in the intelligence picture, Allied strategists had to provide for the security of the entire east coast of Australia (see Map 9). Under plans prepared by Australian general T. A. Blamey, Commander of Allied Land Forces, most ground troops were already concentrated in the strategically vital southeast from Brisbane to Melbourne, and these were bolstered by the arrival of the 2nd Division from Western Australia in late May. North of Brisbane, however, Allied leaders believed they could only attempt to hold Townsville and Rockhampton against a serious invasion; much of the intervening ground might have to be abandoned to the enemy in the short term. These two cities were therefore garrisoned with the
5th Australian and 41st U.S. Divisions respectively, the former also commanding the 14th Brigade recently sent to Cairns. The greater part of the operational aircraft were also concentrated around Townsville. Smaller garrisons were retained at other strategically important points: Northern Territory Force (soon to be 12th Division) at Darwin, 4th Division around Perth, and 12th Brigade on Tasmania.18 The Australian government also improved its defensive posture by evacuating civilians, livestock, and potential war materiel from the area north of Townsville. Though resented at the time by many evacuees, this prudent and controversial move would deprive the Japanese invaders of the equipment and supplies (especially fuel and motor transport) that they were relying on to sustain their offensive.
Tasked to defend Townsville, Maj. Gen. E. J. Milford's 5th Division was the first to encounter the Japanese invaders. Yamashita's plan called for his own 5th Division to come ashore just north of Townsville while his 6th Division landed south of town to prevent reinforcements from pushing up along the coastal highway. Having served under Yamashita during the Malaya campaign, the men of the 5th Division would have the honor of capturing the town itself while simultaneously pushing inland toward the cluster of Allied airfields at Charters Towers eighty miles to the southwest by road. At the same time, the 17th Division would assault the port of Cairns, evict the Australian garrison (mistakenly estimated to be a battalion), and begin to construct an airfield. As a final security measure, the 3rd Kure SNLF would capture two Allied airfields at the far northern tip of inhospitable Cape York Peninsula. In typical Japanese fashion, the plan was complex and daring to the point of recklessness, relying on the proven skill and ferocity of the Imperial armed forces to stun and overwhelm the defenders.
Timed to coincide with the assault on Midway, Yamashita's
storm broke on the Australian coast on June 4, 1942. All three of his divisions quickly established footholds, but losses were heavier than expected and the Australian militiamen, as some Japanese staff officers had predicted were demonstrating unanticipated tenacity defending their homeland even when badly outnumbered. Many of the first day's objectives were not achieved much to Yamashita's annoyance, and there were problems unloading supplies under periodic Allied air strikes. The Imperial Navy was also experiencing difficulties. A destroyer and a transport were sunk, a cruiser damaged and air superiority continued to elude the combination of land-based and carrier aircraft. Furthermore, disaster struck in the north when the ancient American submarine S-38 put two torpedoes into one of the transports carrying the 3rd Kure SNLF. The resulting losses in men and equipment crippled the landing force and caused the temporary abandonment of the attacks on the Cape York airfields. Yamashita was also frustrated by supply and transportation problems. He had counted on seizing fuel, stores, vehicles, and coastal shipping to expedite the invasion, but Australian preplanning and the exertions of the Volunteer Defense Corps had removed or destroyed most of these assets, leaving the Japanese largely reliant on what little they had brought with them. Despite these setbacks, the two Japanese carriers were safe and the 17th Army well established ashore as night fell and commanders on both sides heard the first news of the Battle of Midway.
The catastrophe in the Central Pacific had almost immediate repercussions for Operation AU as Shokaku and Zuikaku were withdrawn to Rabaul, out of effective range of Allied land-based bombers. Having made a commitment to the Australia operation, however, Imperial General Headquarters felt it had no option but to proceed. For the next several weeks, therefore, combat raged at both Cairns and Townsville, leaving the rusted wrack of battle that dots today's tourist beaches. The fighting in Townsville was especially vicious, as the 5th Japanese Division had to pry the men of the 11th Australian Brigade and Volunteer Defense Corps diehards out of almost every building. By the end of the month the town was secure, but the leading Japanese infantry units were still more than fifty miles from Charters Towers, and Allied aircraft hindered port unloading and airfield operations. At Cairns, the 17th Division had pushed back the Australian 14th Brigade with relative ease and two airfields were nearly complete, despite routine visits from American bombers. Luckily, Lt. Gen. Yasushi Sakai, the 17th's commander, contented himself with fulfilling his specific mission of seizing the port of Cairns and allowed the 14th Brigade to escape destruction. Progress was slow and hobbled by logistic difficulties, which deprived him of mobility and supplies, particularly artillery ammunition. Nonetheless, Yamashita could take satisfaction in the occupation of the two Allied air bases on the Cape York Peninsula by the 5th Sasebo SNLF on June 19. Moreover, he was promised reinforcements. In addition to the 20th Division and the 2nd Tank Division, additional elements of the 6th Air Division were to deploy to Port Moresby and the new airfields in Australia. With these resources, he was confident that the Charters Towers runways would soon be in his hands.
The Allies responded to the invasion as quickly as scanty forces and Australia's limited transportation system would permit. As the enormous scale of the Japanese commitment became clear, MacArthur reasoned that another major amphibious landing was likely beyond the Imperial Navy's capabilities, especially after Midway. He and Blamey thus stripped the southeast coast of Australian units and redirected the U.S. 32nd Division from Adelaide to Brisbane. The veteran Australian 7th Division was the first to arrive, and almost immediately played a crucial role in smashing a Japanese offensive toward Charters Towers. Unfazed by headlong Japanese tank charges that had unnerved the weary 5th Division men, the 7th calmly shot up the enemy armored columns and ruthlessly cleaned up stray tanks that managed to slip behind their defenses. By halting the Japanese drive on Charters Towers, the 7th Division allowed Milford to strengthen his weak right flank where Yamashita had conducted small amphibious landings in an effort to break through along the coastal highway.
An operational pause followed the initial Japanese landings and attempted exploitation. However, while the two air forces battled for control of the skies and Yamashita waited for ammunition and reinforcements, Allied power steadily increased. By mid-July the bulk of the 2nd Australian and 41st U.S. Divisions were in the battle zone, and the first trains carrying the 1st Australian Armored Division were chugging north from Sydney. Supplying this growing force proved a major challenge, as the Japanese occupation of Townsville left the Allies dependent on a circuitous inland railroad link to Charters Towers. This arrangement was minimally satisfactory for the forces in the Townsville area, but the units near Cairns had to rely on a painfully lengthy road connection that was vulnerable to air interdiction.
Logistical obstacles notwithstanding, the new Allied units arrived just in time to blunt a renewed Japanese offensive. Yamashita, impatient with the lack of progress at Townsville, had decided to switch his reinforcements to Cairns to crush the 14th Brigade and swinging wide inland to sweep down on Charters Towers from the north, unhinging the Allied line in front of Townsville in the process. The assault opened at dawn on July 16, the newly disembarked 51st Division and 2nd Tank Division driving on Mount Garnet while the 17th Division attacked down the coastal road to establish a clean link to the forces at Townsville. At first the Japanese made rapid advances against the hopelessly outnumbered 14th Australian Brigade and its Volunteer Defense Corps auxiliaries, but resistance stiffened as elements of the 2nd Australian Division reached the front. Further slowed by concentrated air strikes, a scarcity of fuel for his tanks, and the unanticipated appearance of the American 41st Division, Yamashita's offensive came to a halt just short of Mount Garnet in the first days of August. On the coast, however, the 17th Division's push, coordinated with an amphibious landing by the South Seas Detachment, cleared the road to Townsville against minimal opposition, but left the Japanese troops strung out over nearly 300 kilometers in a narrow corridor between the ocean and the inland mountains.
“I Feel Absolutely Confident”
In retrospect it seems clear that early August 1942 was the high-water mark of the Japanese advance into the Southwest Pacific. At the time, however, there was no assurance of ultimate Allied success, and Deputy Prime Minister F. M. Forde was by no means unjustified when he told MacArthur that his country was facing “the greatest catastrophe that could have happened.” MacArthur's reply, on the other hand has come to symbolize the resilience of the Allied troops and of the alliance overall: “Although the war clouds are black I feel absolutely confident.”19 His sentiment was echoed by the men moving to the battlefront in Queensland. One Australian tanker of the 1st Armored Division recalled the pride and responsibility he and his squadron felt when people cheered them and their Grant tanks as they rolled through small stations on their way north. Others laughed and cheered themselves when a middle-aged woman on her way to a combat training session proclaimed, “I hope I never see one [a Japanese soldier], but if I do he will come off second best.”20 The men would need all that determination and more in the months to come.
If the defensive victory against Yamashita's second offensive in Australia was the first Allied success of August 1942 in the Southwest Pacific, the invasion of Guadalcanal was the second. Frustrated by his inability to divert more forces to the Pacific even after the attack on Australia, and convinced that the Allies could and should take the offensive as soon as possible, Admiral King successfully promoted a plan to seize Guadalcanal and the Japanese seaplane base on nearby Tulagi. Though nine months of incredibly hard fighting lay ahead, the landing of the 1st Marine Division on August 7 was the first step on a path that would isolate the Japanese invaders in Australia and ultimately set the stage for the explosion of Allied power through New Guinea to the Philippines and beyond.
While the U.S. Marines and the Japanese 18th Army were locked in the bitter struggle for Guadalcanal, the Australian and American armies were being reorganized to take the offe
nsive in Australia. This process led to considerable friction between the two Allies. MacArthur had wanted to keep American troops under U.S. commanders, but the exigencies of the dire situation precluded a tidy arrangement along national lines. To the egocentric MacArthur's intense irritation, there was no alternative to an intermingling of units that would lessen his direct operational role. U.S. I Corps under Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, an American, was thus duly constituted with one American and two Australian divisions at Mount Garnet, while Lt. Gen. S. F. Rowell, an Australian, moved the headquarters of Australian I Corps to Charters Towers to assume command of the troops facing Townsville. Both corps ostensibly came under Blamey as Commander of Allied Land Forces, but MacArthur often intervened directly, causing no end of frustration to the already harried commanders and staffs. Despite the frequent collisions between the senior Australian and U.S. generals, all were agreed upon the common goal. As Blamey noted later: “From the outset it was decided between General MacArthur and myself that as soon as possible we would move to the offensive against Japan as far north as we could proceed.”21