Peter G. Tsouras

by Rising Sun Victorious: An Alternate History of the Pacific War

  On Guadalcanal, Vandegrift was dealing with the loss of the 7th Marines. He pulled the last of the 2nd Marines out of Tulagi and sent them to join their sister battalions on the Matanikau defensive line. He reiterated to his superiors his determination to hold the island as long as he had marines to fight and aircraft to fly.

  On the night of September 24 the Japanese battleships— missed once again by U.S. scouts—opened fire on Henderson Field from over 29,000 yards. Guided by observation aircraft launched for that purpose, the battleships pounded the area with nearly 1,000 heavy shells over the next ninety minutes. The effect was devastating. Henderson Field was rendered unusable, over eighty percent of the SBDs damaged or destroyed and all aviation gas wiped out. The lone bright spot for the Americans was the survival of Fighter One and over half of its fighter aircraft. Although they were able to get fighters in the air to meet the afternoon bombing attack, the first group of transport destroyers made their run without interference. The move had been spotted but there was nothing the Americans could do about it that day. The lack of resistance led the Japanese to start the high-speed convoy toward the island.

  U.S. air operations began sporadically the following day, with emergency supplies and planes flown in. Refueling was still the critical item but was aided by the discovery of small “emergency” stashes. But resistance to the approaching convoy was minimal. At midnight, September 26, the six transports, along with a large Tokyo Express run of destroyers, made their anchorage at Tassafaronga and began landing their troops. There was no reaction until daylight. The Japanese, confident in Henderson Field's suppression, found themselves under attack early the next day. Three of the transports were destroyed during the daylong battle, but almost all of the troops and most of the supplies survived the onslaught. That night the Japanese retaliated, with another bombardment by the heavy cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa. A more ominous development for the Americans was the initial artillery fire from newly arrived 150mm guns, with enough range to reach Henderson Field from west of the Matanikau. Fortunately for the marines, ammunition for these guns was still in short supply.

  Vandegrift sent a warning to his superiors that an estimated 10,000 enemy troops had landed. The news arrived at the same time as word that a fuel convoy of four ships had been attacked by Japanese carrier aircraft and stopped with the loss of USS Meridith. The stranglehold on the island seemed to be tightening.

  As Vandegrift dug his troops in, waiting for the Japanese attack he knew was coming, the fate of the island was being discussed at the highest levels in Washington. Ghormley's assessment that he could not support the marines logistically was fed by his natural pessimism. It overshadowed Vandegrift's insistence that he could hold the island. The loss of TF 64 left the South Pacific with one carrier, two battleships, three heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers, against the Combined Fleet under Yamamoto, which contained four heavy carriers, two light carriers, four battleships, and eight heavy cruisers in the immediate area. Holding out the necessary escort for the surviving carrier Hornet, the ratio of forces was clearly against the Americans. Twice, Ghormley had tried to reinforce the beachhead, and had failed both times. Supply was becoming more difficult to deliver. He saw little hope in the situation.

  Ghormley's gloomy assessment sparked a renewed debate in Washington between Army Chief of Staff General Marshall and his naval counterpart Admiral King. With MacArthur in Australia pushing his Southwest Pacific plans, the Marshall-King debate finally went all the way to the White House. On October 3, President Roosevelt made it clear that most of the nation's efforts had to be focused on Europe, and that the Pacific's time would come. More important, he told King point-blank to supply the marines as best he could, but if he couldn't, to withdraw the troops. U.S. public opinion, the president told his commanders, would not accept the loss of the 1st Marine Division. King left the meeting and sent the president's orders to Ghormley.

  On Guadalcanal, the Japanese were ready to move. With his troops landed, the Sendai Division's commander, Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama, prepared a detailed plan of attack. He would lead most of his troops southward to attack the American perimeter from its inland side. He split this force into three columns. The left column, commanded by Maj. Gen. Nasu, consisted of the three battalions of the 29th Infantry Regiment. The right column, under Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi, contained two battalions of the 230th Infantry, plus the 3rd Battalion, 124th Infantry. The center column was the divisional reserve under Maruyama's direct control and consisted of the 16th Infantry's three battalions. Artillery and mortar units broke down their weapons and were to join the march. Coordinated with this landward assault, Maruyama ordered a supporting attack at the Matanikau. The Sendai's artillery commander, Maj. Gen. Tadashi Sumiyoshi, would command on this front with two groups. The first, under Colonel Oka, would be the two battalions from the 124th Infantry, plus a battalion from the 4th Infantry. This force would march inland and attack the marine line from the south up the east bank of the river. The second group consisted of the 1st Independent Tank Company plus the remaining two battalions from the 4th Infantry, which would attack straight across the river. Maruyama's plan thus set over 15,000 troops into motion against the marines.

  On October 1, Nasu's column stepped off into the jungle. Maruyama planned to attack five days after starting his march and set the attack date for October 6. Heavy air raids would commence to prepare the way on October 5, with the navy adding another bombardment that night. But what looked like a simple march proved anything but that in reality. Steep terrain, deep gorges, and dense jungle hampered the marching troops. Navigating solely by compass, obstacles had to be overcome rather than avoided, and the pace was very slow and exhausting, especially for the artillerymen carrying their guns. Four days after starting, Maruyama's headquarters reached a small valley he estimated was only four miles from the U.S. lines. But the scouts he sent out either got completely lost or returned to report nothing but jungle. He radioed Sumiyoshi that the attack date would have to be postponed until October 7.

  His Matanikau diversion commander got the order but failed to send it on in time to stop the preattack air raid. The Zeros and Bettys appeared as they always did over Henderson Field, but this time most of the bombs hit the west bank of the Matanikau and a ridge south of the airfields. Vandegrift rightly assumed the Japanese would attack those positions. The ridge in question was 1,000 yards long, with two knolls rising eighty and 120 feet above sea level. It commanded the southern approach to Henderson Field, located less than a mile behind it. The marines began beefing up the defenses in those areas. Edson's raiders had that particular responsibility, flanked by battalions of the 1st and 5th Marines. The troops began digging in and stringing barbed wire. The batteries of the 11th Marines registered around the ridge. Dense jungle precluded any semblance of a continuous line: Edson's men set up mutually supportive platoon-sized strongpoints 100 yards apart.

  Map 12. Japanese Offensive at Guadalcanal: Disposition of Forces, October 7-8, 1942

  Maruyama's plan continued to unravel. Pushing forward during the daylight hours of October 7, he expected to be in position to attack soon after nightfall. But by nightfall he had barely begun to reach the outskirts of the marine lines. Brief firefights erupted along the marine line as Japanese scouts probed. But the left and center columns had less than a battalion near contact; the rest of the column stretched back into the jungle. In addition, Kawaguchi's column on the right, having strayed off on a course parallel with the marine lines, reported jungle in all directions. Once again Maruyama sent word to postpone the attack a full day.

  While his 17th Army superiors in Rabaul received word of the postponement, Sumiyoshi's diversionary force on the Matanikau did not. Pursuant to orders he did not know were changed, Sumiyoshi attacked at 2330 on October 7 (see Map 12). But even his own attack had coordination problems. Colonel Oka, with the main force approaching from the south, was delayed by the same jungle conditions that had hampered Maruyama, and at the appointe
d hour he wasn't in position to attack. Consequently, the 1st Independent Tank Company, with a battalion of the 4th Infantry in support, attacked alone. The Japanese artillery, seventeen 75mm and 100mm guns, struck the positions of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, near the mouth of the river. The first wave of five tanks made it through the barbed wire and over the first machine-gun positions before being destroyed by massed antitank fire and the heroic actions of individual marines.4 The second wave was destroyed quicker. Massed artillery fire from the 11th Marines' forty guns stopped the infantry cold. One side of Sumiyoshi's attack was stymied.

  Three hours later Oka's three battalions stormed out of the jungle, striking, by sheer good luck, the seam between the two 2nd Marine battalions. Oka's troops forced their way onto the ridge, but the massed marine guns began to take their toll on the exhausted attackers. Counterattacks caught the Japanese in a vise and pushed them back off the hill. Sumiyoshi again sent his two remaining battalions against the river lines, trying to support Oka's attack, but they achieved little. By morning the Japanese had withdrawn, leaving almost 700 dead on the field, including over half the tank crews that had attacked.

  The marines spent the daylight hours working on their defenses on what was now being called Edson's Ridge. The raider commander pulled his troops back some 200 yards from the positions that had been probed earlier. The 11th Marine guns registered their weapons carefully in front of the new lines. On the Matanikau front, the 2nd Marines hunted down the small detachments of Japanese that had infiltrated during Oka's attack.

  Shortly after dark on October 8, Maruyama attacked, using his very limited artillery and mortar support. One battalion from the left and center columns each charged the lines and were disrupted by accurate and massed artillery fire. Maruyama reinforced the assault with two more battalions an hour later and put severe pressure on the raiders. Japanese soldiers began pushing through the gaps between strongpoints, threatening to flank and breach the thin line. Edson ordered his troops to pull back to his last line built near the large knoll on the ridge. With the aid of 37mm cannons firing canister, the raiders repulsed two more assaults. Vandegrift stripped companies from the 1st and 5th Marines to bolster the thinning line, but the 5th Marines ran into Japanese from a battalion of the 16th Infantry that had broken through and was heading for the airfields. A savage fight broke out, and ended with the arrival of marine tanks. The Japanese remnants withdrew to positions near the Fighter One airstrip, where engineers and other rear area troops destroyed them.

  Exhaustion and artillery fire finally stopped Maruyama's attack, and he pulled back into the jungle leaving over 2,000 of his troops dead on the field. He was unaware of the 16th Infantry's breakthrough or their position inside the marine perimeter. It had been a very close battle—the fact that the three battalions of Kawaguchi's column failed to engage was decisive.5 Devoid of supply, the Sendai Division began a tortuous trek back to their Matanikau lines.

  The Final Phase

  Vandegrift's marines had fought ably and well, but even he knew how close it had been. As his troops tended their dead and wounded, they also dug in deeper and hunted down Japanese infiltrators. He sent his report to Ghormley: “We held and are holding, but we need more troops.”

  Ghormley's nerve failed on receiving word of the big Japanese attack. Fearing another such attack would wipe out the marines, he told Vandegrift that troops were available but unable to get safely to the island, and ordered him to prepare for evacuation. Ten transports would arrive to get the troops out, and all equipment was to be destroyed prior to leaving. Vandegrift was livid, arguing that if empty ships could make it to the island, full ones could as well. But Ghormley would not relent.

  The evacuation convoy got under way that same day. The cruisers Portland, Atlanta, and San Juan, along with fifteen destroyers, under Rear Adm. Mahlon Tizdale, escorted the transports. Also providing cover was the newly re-created Task Force 64, now consisting of the battleships Washington and South Dakota and the destroyers Walker, Gwin, Preston, and Benham, under Rear Adm. Willis Lee. The carrier Hornet, with its escort of four cruisers and six destroyers, provided very careful air cover, as well as the stepping-stone for those Guadalcanal aircraft capable of using her flight deck.

  The U.S. convoy was spotted soon after its departure from Espiritu Santo, and the Japanese took its significance the wrong way. They assumed that the convoy meant significant reinforcements. Much discussion was taking place in Rabaul after Maruyama's defeat. His report of severe losses and continued close attack by marine aircraft pointed again to the importance of closing Henderson Field down. Coordination problems had stymied the effects. The Japanese navy again prepared to roll out its big guns while the army sent orders for the 38th Division to prepare for transport to the island. Word of the big U.S. convoy added incentive for the Japanese.

  On October 12, Lee and his ships arrived off Lunga Point. As they waited, TF 64's destroyers began evacuating Tulagi of the troops left there, while the battleships, guided by aircraft, bombarded Japanese positions west of the Matanikau. The pounding by the 16-inch shells demoralized the Japanese, although Lee intended solely to disrupt further Japanese land assaults. A B-17, however, reported a large group of Japanese ships heading south—including what looked like battleships.

  Turner and the transports arrived the following day and began the laborious process of loading. Vandegrift's staff had prepared a pull-back plan that kept the front lines covered as much as possible. Engineers grouped equipment for demolition. As the work continued air scouts reported Japanese ship movements. Turner realized the Japanese would arrive that night, well before the evacuation was completed. They would have to be stopped.

  Turner gave the immediate interception mission to Tizdale and his cruiser-destroyer force, leaving his battleships as the last line of defense. Tizdale established his line west of Lunga Point with the destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterret, and O 'Ban-non leading his flagship, the heavy cruiser Portland. The light cruisers Atlanta and San Juan followed with the destroyers Aaron Ward, Barton, Monssen, and Fletcher. Behind them, if needed was Lee's task force, with its four destroyers leading the battleships.

  The Japanese, under Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo, flagged in the heavy cruiser Atago, advanced in three divisions. The light cruiser Sendai and three destroyers (Ayanami, Shikinami, and Uranami) would sweep through the Slot, scouting for the bigger ships. The light cruiser Nagara and four destroyers would escort the main column, consisting of the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, with two more destroyers. Kondo's plan was simply to destroy any U.S. ships he found and bombard Henderson Field in a repeat of his September 24 success.

  At 2305, October 13, Portland's radar picked up three ships east of Savo, and Tizdale moved his line to intercept. Sendai's keen lookouts spotted the U.S. column and reported the finding to Kondo. Sendai, Shikinami, and Uranami opened fire on the approaching U.S. ships and maneuvered for a torpedo attack.

  Map 13. Naval Battle of Guadalcanal 2305, October 13, 1942

  The U.S. line replied, but got the worst of the shooting. A Japanese shell punctured destroyer Sterret's forward magazine and a massive explosion left the ship sinking. Cushing led other lead destroyers off against a lone Japanese destroyer spotted in front of them (see Map 13).

  Portland opened fire with her radar-controlled 8-inch guns and scored heavily on the Japanese light cruiser, but too late to stop the torpedo attack. The U.S. line found itself in a swarm of Long Lance torpedoes, and the cruiser San Juan was hit. Even as the light cruiser lurched out of the line, another torpedo tore the destroyer Aaron Ward in half. The Cushing and her two companions caught the Ayanami trying to maneuver for a lone torpedo attack and sank her, while Sendai succumbed to massed fire from Atlanta and Portland.

  As the U.S. ships were finishing off the Sendai, the two other Japanese columns came into contact from west of Savo Island. Nagara and her four destroyers sent more torpedoes toward the U.S. line, sinki
ng the Fletcher; but Tizdale's attention was drawn to the capital ships that opened up at his column from 8,000 yards. Portland and Atlanta opened fire on the battleships while the destroyers engaged the Nagara and her escorts. Hiei and Kirishima's shells hammered the cruisers, but the U.S. return fire seemed to do little.

  Then Fate changed sides. Up to that point the Japanese were winning the battle. Three U.S. destroyers had been sunk and a cruiser damaged, with two more U.S. cruisers under fire by a superior force. Each battleship's 14-inch broadsides could deliver almost 12,000 pounds of destruction, while the Portland could answer with only 2,400 pounds per broadside. But one of the Portland's 8-inch shells hit Hiei's bridge, destroying her main fire control and killing everyone there. The battleship careened out of control, disrupting the entire Japanese line. In addition, while the Japanese were concentrating their fire on the US. cruisers, the destroyers Cushing, Laffey, and O'Bannon closed unnoticed and opened fire with guns and torpedoes on the Japanese flagship. The attack set fires all along the cruiser's length, while one torpedo destroyed a boiler room. The sudden and unexpected barrage also killed Kondo on Atago's bridge.

  The loss of their commander coupled with the out of control Hiei created chaos within the Japanese ranks. Takao and Atago's destroyers turned their full fury on the daring U.S. destroyers, sinking Laffey and O 'Bannon and leaving Cushing a twisted wreck. The Kirishima circled and continued to battle with the U.S. cruisers trying to protect her wounded consort. Her accurate fire pounded Atlanta into a sinking hull.

  Farther to the east, Nagara and her destroyers spotted and tangled with Lee's approaching column, but Washington's 16-inch shells convinced the Japanese to turn back. As they passed just south of Savo, the Japanese fired another round of torpedoes. They missed the intended targets—Portland and her two remaining destroyers—but the long-range weapons continued firing and one of them hit Takao, nearly disemboweling the heavy cruiser.6