What they could do was to try to bring their opponent to the mat and if possible to pin him.
Professionals were permitted to use limited striking, including knees above the waist, headbutts to the body, and straight-kicks above the waist. They could also use headlocks [gravatas], twists [torcões], locks [chaves], bear-hugs [cinturas], leg-scissors [tesouras], throws [tombos], pressure holds [golpes de forçamento], and chokes [estrangulamento].
Amateur catch was apparently not much different from amateur sport free-style wrestling, while the professional version was not much different from what it had always been, except that some care was taken to remove the more ludicrous aspects that had earned the scorn of sports writers and fans. For one example, article 4 warned that a fighter would be disqualified if he attacked the opponent outside of the ring.
In all, it was a conscientious if self-serving attempt to put catch, or luta livre, on a serious footing as a amateur and professional sport. The directors of the Federation expressed their plans in altruistic terms, implying that they simply wanted to help spread amateur ring sports, and that the professional version would presumably help to pay for it. An equally plausible interpretation would be that they hoped to use amateur wrestling to support and legitimize professional wrestling. Like most people, their intentions and motivations were probably mixed.
From the point of view of jiu-jitsu, it didn’t matter. Or rather, it was unclear what it meant. Jiu-jitsu seemed to have little future as a professional sport as long as it aimed at doing what catch could do better. As an amateur sport, jiu-jitsu seemed to be on the losing side. Judo was already well on the way to monopolizing amateur sports jiu-jitsu (under the name of judo), or, more objectively, submission grappling with kimonos (how much standing versus ground grappling would be rewarded was still an open question, but had already come to strongly favor standing).
For jiu-jitsu to maintain a separate identify it would need to establish competition rules that were different from judo rules. With the Federation’s new strategy to revitalize professional catch wrestling, jiu-jitsu now faced a double challenge. Amateur jiu-jitsu competition rules would need to be different from amateur catch rules as well different from judo. Otherwise, jiu-jitsu was at risk of being classified as catch with a kimono, or judo without throws.
New Phase
1949 was the beginning of a new phase for jiu-jitsu in Brazil. Professional jiu-jitsu had run its course. As a form of theatrical entertainment, fans clearly preferred luta livre and catch wrestling to jiu-jitsu and voted with their admission tickets. There was no shortage of supply when it came to catch wrestlers. Candidates for stardom simply needed to be extremely large and capable of a certain degree of acting. A catch or luta livre wrestler could participate in a “jiu-jitsu” contest, and many did, but that generally required at least a modicum of authentic skills. The more responsible among sports writers quickly spotted and lambasted fakes. Being Japanese also helped, and if not that, at least a lineage to a Japanese master (whether real or invented). Or at bare minimum, a Japanese sounding name might suffice. The mystique of jiu-jitsu almost required the stylist to be small. Jiu-jitsu was the science by which a small person could defeat a big person. How else could the fans grasp that he had used “jiu-jitsu?” But jiu-jitsu was not easy to fake. Unfortunately, being Japanese and being huge were often incompatible.
The jiu-jitsu masters of the 1930’s were all dead or old, or had moved on. Geo Omori died in 1938. George Gracie was 38 years old. Helio Gracie had not fought since 1937. Oswaldo Gracie died in 1943. Yassuiti Ono was older and had aligned himself with the growing international judo movement. The same was true of Takeo Yano. At 40 years of age with almost 15 years of ring wear-and-tear behind him, most of the last ten with giants and goliaths with names like King Kong, Gorila, and “Human Mountain,” he was ready to move more into the promotional side of fighting. At the end of 1949, Yano relocated to Porto Alegre, where he founded the Academia Yano and produced a Campeonato Brasileira de Luta Livre on November 27.6
Yano was also involved in judo. He didn’t give up on pro wrestling. He was still at it as late as August 1958 when he participated in the Tornei Internacional de Luta Livre at Maracanazinho.7
Jiu-jitsu in Brazil had arisen in the context of show wrestling, first luta romana, then luta livre, or catch-as-catch-can as it was also called. Because luta livre/catch could be scripted, it was generally more entertaining than jiu-jitsu, especially when jiu-jitsu was presented as “real” fighting and the fighters tried not to lose.
Pro wrestling was easier and paid more (as Masahiko Kimura later said). That encouraged jiu-jitsu stylists who wanted to make money to emulate catch methods and to work in harmony with catch people. Any jiu-jitsu representative who couldn’t or didn’t want to do that left the business. Eventually, everyone got old. Fewer new jiu-jitsu men wanted to be pro wrestlers or professional fighters. At the same time, efforts were made by people like Oswaldo Fada, Yassuito Ono, Augusto Cordeiro, and the Gracie brothers, to promote jiu-jitsu as an amateur sport, along the lines of amateur luta livre (eventually called called luta livre olimpica) and especially, judo.
Some, like Yassuiti Ono and Augusto Cordeiro, took the next logical step and simply became judokas. That meant adopting the international rules of judo, which increasingly rewarded standing technique at the expense of ground fighting (which had already been comparatively neglected, but became even more so when judo was adopted as an Olympic sport). Takeo Yano merged with the judo community while keeping one foot in the pro wrestling ring.
The key to the development of jiu-jitsu over the succeeding decades lie in this. The Gracie brothers attempted to compete in judo tournaments, which is to say, they entered some of their students in judo competitions, and one even medalled, albeit as a white belt. Judo was well-regulated and as an international and finally Olympic sport, prestigious. Successful competitors became legitimate national heroes. Those who remained true to what they believed were jiu-jitsu’s roots in ground fighting, faced a dilemma. Judo had government support, without which any success as an amateur sport was going to be an uphill struggle, if possible at all. Brazil has always been a highly bureaucratic society. Government approval is necessary for almost anything, and government support, permission to use public facilities, monetary subsidies, and the like, requires persuading the right people that there is some public benefit. Any Olympic sport automatically qualified. Jiu-jitsu was not an Olympic sport and the benefits, notwithstanding marketing clichés about self-esteem and self-discipline (which applied equally to judo, if not more so), seemed to be directed at a certain large family and a few individuals associated with them.
At this point, the jiu-jitsu story becomes largely co-extensive with the Gracie family, with a few exceptions. The Gracies were not the only people who clung to the old ways, but they were in the forefront of the movement to win official recognition, popular support, and government subsidies for jiu-jitsu as an amateur sport. What the Gracies did was not new. They simply adopted judo’s organization, methods, customs, traditions, myths, even more so than they already had, inadvertently or not, owing to the fact that what they had learned was essentially an older form of Kodokan judo (as all of the Kodokan trained jiu-jitsu people pointed out to them). They obviously could not join forces with the judo people and they could not compete with them, under international, government approved judo rules. They needed to make jiu-jitsu an alternative form of judo, that is, one stressing ground fighting rather than throwing. That necessitated some minor changes in competition rules. For example, the notion of the “ippon” or one-point win, was retained, but not for a “clean” throw or pin, but rather for a “submission” to a choke or joint-lock technique. Procedures for determining a winner based on points were adopted from judo. Judo rules were not perfect but they were better than the alternative. Rather than invent a new set of rules, jiu-jitsu simply modified judo rules, and in a sense brought jiu-jitsu a bit closer to what Kodokan judo and some
of its off-shoots and variants had originally been.8
In a sense, jiu-jitsu returned to its source, which was Kodokan judo. It is true that judo derived from jiu-jitsu, as no one including Kano ever denied. But the jiu-jitsu that the Brazilians learned was the jiu-jitsu that had been transformed by Kano into his Kodokan system. If anyone in Brazil learned “jiu-jitsu” from anyone other than a Kodokan associated man, there is no record of it.
But there were differences. Given enough time, and differing environments, cultural practices, such as languages or sports, will diverge in some ways, unless strong pressures prevent that from happening. Accordingly, in time jiu-jitsu and judo diverged in certain relatively minor ways.
The first difference between jiu-jitsu and judo was that jiu-jitsu specialized in ground fighting while judo increasingly specialized in throwing.
The second difference was that jiu-jitsu called itself jiu-jitsu, rather than judo. This was necessary from a marketing stand point. Jiu-jitsu could not compete with judo on price because judo was cheap or free (with a few exceptions) and it could not compete in the prestigious international competitions, which were necessarily conducted according to judo rules, which meant little opportunity for the jiu-jitsu people to do what they did comparatively well.
The third difference was that while judo rapidly shed any pretense that it was designed for self-defense or “real” fighting, jiu-jitsu retained the traditional (since 1904 at least) marketing points and re-doubled its emphasis on these aspects.
The fourth difference was that judo warmly embraced its status as an “amateur” sport (ignoring the fact that judokas were well subsidized in many countries). Jiu-jitsu continued to preserver in the realm of professional theatrical fighting. But just as jiu-jitsu could not compete with judo at judo’s game, so it could not compete with pro wrestling at pro wrestling’s game. Jiu-jitsu attempted to carve out its own niche within the theatrical fighting world. Jiu-jitsu entrepreneurs adopted an older name for their fighting sub-genre, “vale tudo,” or “everything goes”.9 Vale tudo was basically grappling combined with striking, in a sense catch-as-catch can mixed with savate, capoeiragem, and boxing, but without the choreography. It wasn’t “real” fighting, but it was pretty close. The problem was, for some people it was too close.
It was a risky business in more ways than one. Judo and pro wrestling were either accepted or supported by society and government. Attitudes toward vale tudo were as mixed as the game itself was. Judo was clearly a “sport”, and pro wrestling was just as clearly “entertainment.” Brazilians were never really sure what vale tudo was, but at times it made certain people uncomfortable. In Brazil if the right person (or wrong person, as the case may be) doesn’t like what you are doing, you are well advised to stop. Very bad things can happen if you don’t.10
But vale tudo was only a small part of the story, and it wasn’t the first part. Jiu-jitsu’s recrudescence occurred in 1951 with a fateful encounter between an under-employed ex-fighter and a pro wrestler. The pro wrestler just happened to be the greatest judoka (or “jiu-jitsu fighter,” according to some versions) Japan had produced up to that time. His name was Masahiko Kimura. The under-employed ex-fighter was Helio Gracie.
.Chapter 26 Notes
Epilog
ue
The Past and Future of Jiu-Jitsu
Shortly before ju-jitsu reached Brazil there was jiu-jitsu―and judo―in North America and other places in frequent contact with the major port cities of Brazil.1 Brazilians were interested and well-informed about what was happening in the capitals and cultural centers of the advanced countries, primarily England, France, Germany, and the United States. They wanted to be part of it.
They were usually several steps off the pace, but as rule, what happened in London, Paris, Berlin, and New York eventually happened in Rio, São Paulo and a few other cities.
All of the major powers, including Russia, had been interested in Japan since Perry’s first visit in 1853. Around the turn of the 20th century, they became even more so, alarmed by Russia’s expansionist aims. Japan was seen as a potential counter-weight. Japan’s own imperial ambitions would draw Russia’s attention eastward. The Pacific region was becoming increasingly vital. One of those who was especially interested was American president Theodore Roosevelt.
The first noteworthy martial arts entrepreneur in North America was John J. O’Brien. He had, he claimed, a diploma of professor of jiu-jitsu awarded by the Japanese government.2
Theodore Roosevelt had an interest in the manly arts, and jiu-jitsu was seen as the “new manly art”. O’Brien was invited to teach the president in March of 1902. O’Brien proposed a course of eight weeks.
Roosevelt never finished his lessons. But in the field of marketing, a short and slim connection to the right person or group can be enough. Even a single word or picture can be worth millions. O’’Brien had offered to teach the president for free (or expenses).3
The publicity would be more valuable than his usual fee of $100 for eight weeks, and O’Brien wasted no time exploiting it.4
As it happened, everyone in the jiu-jitsu business profited, probably more than O’Brien himself. When Roosevelt’s daughter Alice showed an interest in the Japanese game, it wasn’t O’Brien who was invited to teach her, but a Japanese expert, ironically, a Kodokan judo man, Professor Yamashita.5
The real explosion in jiu-jitsu interest took place during the Russo-Japanese War (February 8, 1904 to September 5, 1905). It took almost no time for ambitious promoters to get into the act. Writers looking for sensational material were not far behind. Newspapers welcomed both. They provided content which attracted readers who attracted advertisers, which made the cost of copies of the paper lower which attracted more readers. Readers could buy tickets to professional matches. It was a highly symbiotic relationship.
Teachers could also offer their services. But there was one problem. To reveal the jealously guarded ancient secrets of the Japanese science of self-defense, one had to have access to them in the first place. But for two thousand years, jiu-jitsu masters had been prohibited by imperial edicts from teaching foreigners. Therefore, one almost had to be Japanese. Failing that, one needed a plausible connection to a lineage. John. J. O’Brien seemed to have a reasonably legitimate claim, with documentation of a sort. Other people made similar claims, sometimes of questionable validity. O’Brien had a formidable combination of assets. He had a diploma, friends in the media, and a personal link to a sympathetic American president. It was no wonder that jiu-jitsu became faddishly fashionable for a few years.6
Like all fads, it quickly lost steam. Jiu-jitsu’s profitability, or sustainability, had to be maintained in more old-fashioned ways. Enter marketing and professional wrestling.
***
Technology can change quickly. Basic human motivations don’t. What has happened before will happen again. What is happening now has happened before. Looking at the marketing and diffusion of jiu-jitsu in North America illuminates considerably what later took place in Brazil. The parallels are very close.
In many cases the phrasing used in marketing materials in 1904 in the United States is almost identical (allowing for translation) to that used in Brazil throughout the period reviewed in Choque Volume 1 1856-1949, and even in 2014. Secrets of an ancient scientific art, previously “closely (or jealously, or religiously) guarded”, suddenly are made available to the Western world, or to anyone anywhere with money to spend. The Imperial edicts prohibiting Japanese jiu-jitsu masters from teaching outsiders had been abruptly lifted. The reasons varied. It might be that newly formed friendly relations between America and Japan suddenly made it safe to teach Americans (while Japan was concentrating on learning how to build battleships, dive-bombers, and torpedoes). It might be an individual master’s feeling of gratitude for the courtesies extended to him by the natives of his host country, as Yae Kichi Yabe claimed.7 Usually, no reason was offered.
Similarly, when the Gracies, or to be legally precise,
The Gracie Jiu-Jitsu Academy, 1951 W. Carson Street, Torrance CA 90501, decided to reveal the “closely guarded secrets” of the family’s fighting system, using precisely the same phrase used 94 years before by Yae Kichi Yabe, or his copywriter,8 no reason why the closely guarded secrets were suddenly being revealed was provided.9
The author doesn’t point this out to make fun of anyone, but rather to remind that some things don’t change much. Young males want to be strong. People are easily panicked by media-created threats. Bored people want to be entertained. Entrepreneurs want to make money. People like novelty. People are basically lazy and want secret easy ways to accomplish things that actually are neither secret nor easy but require time and effort. People want to impress other people with their extraordinary abilities and membership in select groups. They seek artifacts (such as belts and diplomas) to help them accomplish that.10
Technology has changed. Instead of newspapers we now have computers and iPods. Human nature is the same. Readers who proceed to Choque Vol. 2 1950-1999 will have a head start if they keep that in mind.
.Epilogue Notes
Appendix 1
.
Fighters
Jiu-Jitsu Representatives
Members of Conde Koma Troupes in Brazil1
1914 São Paulo
Conde Koma (Maeda Mitsuyo)
Okura
Satake
Akiyama
Matsura
Choque: The Untold Story of Jiu-Jitsu in Brazil 1856-1949 (Volume 1) Page 45