18. Ueberschär, “Hitlers Entschluß,” 97; Förster, “Hitler Turns East,” 118; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 69, 78, 232; TBJG, 14 March 1941.
19. Gerlach, “German Economic Interests,” 213–14; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 118–34; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 898–99; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 69.
20. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 118–34; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 69; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 420.
21. Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 177; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 899–905; Halder, War Diary, 22 May, 25–26 June, 9, 11, 13, 22 July, 26 August, 5 December 1940 (quote), 161, 217–18, 224–25, 232, 251, 294; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 411–19; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 134–35; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 23–25. For the Soviet perspective on tensions in the Balkans, see Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 23–66.
22. Ueberschär, “Hitlers Entschluß,” 98; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 22, 25; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 68–69, and Hitler: Nemesis, 307.
23. Halder, War Diary, 31 July 1940, 241–46; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 25–30; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 68–72; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 307–8.
24. Halder, War Diary, 31 July 1940, 244–45; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 25–30; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 69–70; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 307–8.
25. TBJG, 9 August 1940; Ueberschär, “Hitlers Entschluß,” 100; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 27–28; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 69–70; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 307–8, and Fateful Choices, 69–70.
26. Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 70; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 38; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 904–7; Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, 87–92, and War of Annihilation, 20–21; Halder, War Diary, 27 August 1940, 252; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80–82.
27. Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 40–41.
28. Ibid.; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 911–12; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 325–26, and Fateful Choices, chaps. 3, 5.
29. Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 40–41; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 76–79, and Hitler: Nemesis, 326–27. For a detailed discussion of the Mediterranean strategy, see Schreiber, “Political and Military Developments,” esp. pt. 2.
30. Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 80–82; Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 76–80.
31. Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 82–83; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 72–75; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 910; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 327–28, and Fateful Choices, 81–82.
32. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 329–30, and Fateful Choices, 82–83; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 83; Halder, War Diary, 1 November 1940, 272; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 193–96.
33. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 330–31, and Fateful Choices, 82–83; Hillgruber, Staatsmänner, 1:142–49; Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter, 198–99; Halder, War Diary, 1 November 1940, 272; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 206.
34. Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 249–50; Halder, War Diary, 1 November 1940, 272; Bock, War Diary, 11 November 1940, 193; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 84–85, 87; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 912; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 331–32, and Fateful Choices, 83–84; Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 4 November 1940, 89–90; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 120. On Gibraltar, see also Goda, “The Riddle of the Rock.”
35. Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 42–43; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 912; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 177; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 332–33; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 67–75.
36. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 332, and Fateful Choices, 84; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 85.
37. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 333–34, and Fateful Choices, 84; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 43–44; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 915–19; Read and Fisher, The Deadly Embrace, 510–12; Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 525–27; Weinberg, A World at Arms, 201. See also Hillgruber, Staatsmänner, 1:166–93; Noakes and Pridham, Nazism: A History, 2:801–8; Bezymenskij, “Der Berlin-Besuch von V. M. Molotov”; and Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 67–75.
38. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 334, and Fateful Choices, 84; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 43–44; Koch, “Hitler’s ‘Programme,’ ” 919; Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 15 November 1940, 91; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 86; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 77–78, 82; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 70, 75–86; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 15 November 1940, 1, pt. 1:177.
39. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 334–35, and Fateful Choices, 84–90; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 46–48; Halder, War Diary, 5 December 1940, 292–98; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 5, 10 December 1940, 208–9, 1, pt. 1:222; Bock, War Diary, 3 December 1940, 2 January 1941, 193–94, 197–98.
40. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 334–35, and Fateful Choices, 84–90; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 28, 46–48; Schreiber, “Mittelmeerraum,” 91; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 9 January 1941, 1, pt. 1:258; Murray, “Betrachtungen,” 322–25; Deist, “The Road to Ideological War,” 385–92; “Weisung Nr. 21 Fall Barbarossa vom 18. 12. 1940,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 244–46.
41. Geyer, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,” 574–93; Murray, “Betrachtungen,” 322–25; Deist, “The Road to Ideological War,” 385–92; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 342–43; Klink, “Military Concept,” 284–85, 320.
42. Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 18 December 1940, 92; Halder, War Diary, 17 February 1941, 320; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 87–123; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–85; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 24–32.
43. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 101–3.
44. Ibid., 87–100; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 178–79.
45. Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 178–79; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 87–100; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 432–40, 452–56; Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 48, “Der historische Ort,” 632, and “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 200–202; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 26–28.
46. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, 98–99, 320–49.
47. Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 9 January 1941, 1, pt. 1:257–58; Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 179–80.
48. Weinberg, A World at Arms, 187–89; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 100–118; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–92; Halder, War Diary, 5 December 1940, 297–98; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 631.
49. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 124–32; Klink, “Military Concept,” 257–85; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 344–45; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 24–32; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–53; Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 633; Kroener, “Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs,” 846–48, 998.
50. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 133–39; Klink, “Military Concept,” 292–97; van Creveld, Fighting Power, 43–61; Hartmann, “Verbrecherischer Krieg—verbrecherische Wehrmacht?” 8–9; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–55.
51. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, 29–33; Cooper, The German Army, 163; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–55; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’ ” 146; van Creveld, Supplying War, 142–201; DiNardo, Mechanized Juggernaut? 35–54.
52. Klink, “Military Concept,” 294–97; Halder, War Diary, 28 January 1941, 314–15; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 3 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:299; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’ ” 142–44.
53. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 142–70; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 432–40; Kroener, “The ‘Frozen Blitzkrieg,’ ” 142–44; Megargee, War of Annihilation, 29.
54. Mül
ler, “Economic Alliance,” 150–51; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 140–41; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 344–45; Halder, War Diary, 23 December 1940, 28 January 1941, 308–9, 314; Bock, War Diary, 1 February 1941, 198.
55. Klink, “Military Concept,” 260; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 138–39, 149–50, 172; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 458–60; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 146–47.
56. Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 3, 11 February 1941, 1, pt. 1:297–301, 316–19; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 143–45; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–54; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 345–46; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 459–60. For an assessment of Thomas’s memorandum, see Lübbers, “ ‘Ausnutzung oder Ausschlachtung?’ ”
57. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 213–15; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 459–60, 476–80; Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 150–52, 171, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 181–82; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 234–42.
Klaus Jochen Arnold and Gert C. Lübbers argue that Backe had received a “special mission” from Hitler in February 1941. See Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616.
58. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 171–77; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 476–80; Klink, “Military Concept,” 294; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 616–18; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 236–42.
59. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 479–80; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 234–40; Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 619–25; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 238–39; TBJG, 1, 6 May 1941. See also Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, 46–59, and Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, 10–84; Aly and Heim, Vordenker der Vernichtung, 365–93; Aly, “Final Solution,” 172; and Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 298.
For an argument that the meeting of 2 May 1941 rivaled that at the Wannsee on 20 January 1942 in which plans for the Final Solution were discussed, see Kay, “Germany’s Staatssekretäre,” and “Revisiting the Meeting of the Staatssekretäre.”
Johannes Hürter argues for the term hunger calculation rather than hunger policy, a point supported by Alex J. Kay, since there was no clear idea among the economic planners as to how this hunger policy was to be implemented. See Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, 491; Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, 206–7.
60. Müller, “Economic Alliance,” 174–82, and “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 128–83; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 481–90; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 479–80; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 234–40; Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, 242.
Klaus Jochen Arnold emphasizes that, despite the considerable ideological points of agreement between Hitler and the Wehrmacht top brass, responsibility for the implementation of the hunger policy was purposely given to Goering, as head of the Four-Year Plan and Economic Command Staff East, and State Secretary Backe, of the Reich Ministry of Food. See Arnold, Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik, 74–101, 242–67; and Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 613–26. On a number of occasions, Hitler had stressed that the army was not to be “burdened” with administration (Halder, War Diary, 5 March 1941, 327), that generals “[were], for the most part, not able to deal with and solve political questions” (TBJG, 19 August 1941), and that, with regard to the murder of Jews, “the soldier should not be burdened with these political questions” (3 July 1941, quoted in Arnold and Lübbers, “The Meeting of the Staatssekretäre,” 620 n. 42).
61. Goebbels, “Wofür?,” quoted in Müller, “Das ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’ als wirtschaftlicher Raubkrieg,” 174 (see also 184–85); Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 135–61 (quote 141). For a more extreme, and controversial, version of this argument, see Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat (translated as Hitler’s Beneficiaries). For an earlier, less extreme assessment, see also Aly and Heim, Architects of Annihilation, passim.
62. Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 2:1663–64; TBJG, 1 February 1941. A full-text English translation of Hitler’s speech of 30 January as recorded by the Monitoring Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, courtesy of the Research Project for Totalitarian Communication, New School for Social Research, is available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410130a.html (accessed 29 August 2008).
63. For a comprehensive assessment of Der ewige Jude, see Hornshøj-Møller, “Der ewige Jude,” 3–39, 179–81, 309–15, “Der ewige Jude,” and “The Role of ‘Produced Reality.’ ” See also TBJG, 17, 24 October, 1, 8, 28 November, 18 December 1939, 9, 12 January, 6, 27 February, 4, 17 April, 9 May, 9 June, 3, 12, 25 September, 11 October 1940; Aly, “Final Solution,” 171–72; Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, 146–47; Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 2 February 1941, 94–95; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 349–51.
64. Aly, “Final Solution,” 160–61, 171–74; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 287–91; Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, 146–47, 151–56; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 349–53; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 111–68. Revealingly, Himmler had mentioned to a select group of SS leaders in January 1941 that the Slavic population would have to be reduced by 30 million, roughly the same figure thrown about by army and agricultural planners.
65. Streit, Keine Kameraden, 28; Schramm, ed., Kriegstagebuch, 3 March 1941, 1, pt. 1:341; Noakes and Pridham, eds., Nazism: A History, 2:1087; “Richtlinien auf Sondergebieten zur Weisung Nr. 21 (Fall Barbarossa) vom 13. 3. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 246–48; Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, 148–49; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 215–16; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 353–54.
66. Halder, War Diary, 17 March 1941, 339; Aly, “Final Solution,” 171–74; Noakes and Pridham, Nazism: A History, 2:1088–89; “Befehl des ObdH, Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, über die Zusammenarbeit mit der Sicherheitspolizei und dem SD für den vorgesehenen Ostkrieg vom 28. 4. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 249–50; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 485; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 217–18, 224–34; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 354–55.
67. Halder, War Diary, 30 March 1941, 345–46; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 497–98; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 218; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 355–56; Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 162.
68. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 219–20; “Erlaß über die Ausübung der Kriegsgerichtsbarkeit im Gebiet ‘Barbarossa’ und über besondere Maßnahmen der Truppe vom 13. 5. 1941, mit Ergänzungen des ObdH vom 24. 5. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 251–54.
69. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism: A History, 2:1090; “Richtlinien für die Behandlung politischer Kommissare vom 6. 6. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 259–60; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 220–21; Förster, “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 506–20; Streit, Keine Kamaraden, 44, 59.
70. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 358–59; Streit, Keine Kameraden, 50–51; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 221–23. On Poland, see Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland; Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions; and Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg.
71. Förster, “Hitler’s Decision,” 37, and “Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest,” 519–20; “Befehl des Befehlshabers der Panzergruppe 4, Generaloberst Hoepner, zur bevorstehenden Kampfführung im Osten vom 2. 5. 1941,” in Ueberschär and Wette, eds., “Unternehmen Barbarossa,” 251; Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 222–24; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 358–60.
72. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 224–29; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 381–82. On the Einsatzgruppen,
see Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges; Ogorreck, Die Einsatzgruppen und die “Genesis der Endlösung”; Herbert, Best; Wildt, Generation des Unbedingten; and Browder, Hitler’s Enforcers.
73. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution, 229–34; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 382. On the Order Police and the Reserve Police battalions, see Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions, “ ‘Friend and Helper,’ ” “ ‘Ordinary Men’ or ‘Ideological Soldiers?’ ” and “Himmler’s Uniformed Police on the Eastern Front”; Kwiet, “From the Diary of a Killing Unit”; Mallmann, “Der Einstieg in der Genozid,” and “Vom Fussvolk der ‘Endlösung’ ”; Klemp, “Kölner Polizeibataillone in Osteuropa”; Nachtwei, “ ‘Ganz Normale Männer’ ”; and Browning, Ordinary Men.
74. TBJG, 1–2, 5–6, 11–12, 24, 26 October, 2, 14 November, 8–9, 11, 13, 19, 20, 22, 24 December 1940, 14, 16–17, 19–20 June 1941; Kershaw, The “Hitler Myth,” 158–60.
75. Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 382–84; Halder, War Diary, 14 June 1941, 405–6; Below, Als Hitlers Adjutant, 277–78; Hitler to Goering quoted in Reese, A Stranger to Myself, vii.
76. TBJG, 16 June 1941; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 387.
77. TBJG, 16, 20 June 1941; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 387.
78. TBJG, 22 June 1941; Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, 223; Halder, War Diary, 21 June 1941, 408; Domarus and Romane, eds., The Essential Hitler, 756–65; Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, 59, 94; Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 156; Kershaw, Hitler: Nemesis, 386–87.
79. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 192; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 461–62.
80. Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 633–35, and “Hitler’s Decision,” 35; Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 18 February 1939, 45.
81. Förster, “Der historische Ort,” 634–35; Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 2:1664.
3. Onslaught
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