4. Criticisms of Race and IQ Data
The criticisms of these data take three forms: (1) to question the national IQs per se; (2) to assert that IQ tests are biased against blacks; and (3) to assert that the tests are reasonable, but the reasons for the differences are not genetic.
1. The National IQs are all Problematic
Critics have dismissed Lynn’s (2006) IQ scores, variously, as being ‘virtually meaningless’ (Barnett & Williams, 2004) or ‘technically inadequate … and meaningless’ (Hunt & Sternberg, 2006, 133–136). The IQ data drawn upon have been described as ‘highly deficient’ (Volken, 2003, p. 411). Ervik (2003, p. 406) asserts, of Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), that ‘the authors fail to present convincing evidence and appear to jump to conclusions’ while Nechyba (2004, p. 1178) has stated that there is ‘relatively weak statistical evidence and dubious presumptions’.
Lynn and Vanhanen (2012, p. 7) rejoin that their national IQ scores are highly correlated with national scores in tests of mathematics and science as well as with many other social and economic variables which are predicted to varying degrees, at an individual level, by intelligence.10 The validity of an IQ test is the degree to which it measures intelligence, and this can be shown by the extent to which its results correlate with other established measures of cognitive ability. Intelligence positively correlates with educational attainment, claim Lynn and Vanhanen (2012, Ch. 1), at between 0.5 and 0.8. Lynn and Vanhanen have shown that their national IQ scores correlate with national mathematics scores at 0.88, and with national science scores at 0.86. They correlate with PISA science scores (obtained by fifteen year olds) at 0.83, and subsequent studies using larger data sets have found a correlation of 0.9, with the results independently confirmed (Rindermann, 2007). In one study of 108 nations, Lynn found a correlation of 1 between national IQ scores and scores aggregated from PISA and other national tests (Lynn & Vanhanen, 2012, pp. 33–34). The national IQ scores also correlate in the right direction with other factors which correlate with intelligence such as health, wealth, and (negatively) crime. Accordingly, the critics are deliberately exaggerating the deficiencies. This is a straw man argument.
The next, and perhaps the most useful method, as it is the least overtly fallacious, is, as Allik (2008, p. 707) summarizes, ‘to interpret the results as measurement error. A useful strategy is to discover a few small mistakes, declaring that all the results are equally suspicious’. MackIntosh (2007) is an example of such a critic. MackIntosh writes, albeit regarding Lynn’s (2011) analysis of dysgenics, that, ‘The errors may not be particularly important, and I do not know how typical they are. But they do not increase my confidence in Lynn’s scholarship’. This criticism risks the fallacy of composition. That there is a particular error or relevant omission in one place does not mean that it will be the case throughout the work. Only a detailed analysis of the work can allow a person to argue that there are so many important errors in it that the argument is essentially undermined. Critics of these data have not done this and, as such, they engage in the fallacy of composition.
2. Tests Are Biased against Black People
We have already looked at this issue as part of our broader discussion of IQ tests and noted that this argument cannot be sustained.
3. Tests Are Accurate Measures but Black White Differences Are Not Genetic
Firstly, blacks score worse on IQ tests than groups which can be understood to be more impoverished and more distant from white norms than them, such as Eskimos (Levin, 2005). This implies that their low IQ cannot be attributed to environmental or cultural reasons.
Secondly, the one SD difference between white and black intelligence in the USA is evident by the age of three. The earlier a difference becomes apparent, it is argued in genetics, the more likely it is to be genetic (Broman et al., 1987).11 Levin (2005) calculates that it is extremely improbable on this basis, around a 10% probability, that such differences would not be at least partly genetic. Thirdly, race differences in IQ scores correlate in the expected direction with race differences in undoubtedly objective measures, such as reaction times.
Fourthly, compelling evidence comes in the form of interracial adoption studies, because these help to control for environment. Weinberg et al. (1992) show that the average IQ of black children adopted, usually by educated white families, is 96.8. This is significantly below the average white IQ of 100 and even further below the IQ of the adoptive parents, which is in the region of 110. The fact that it is higher than the average black IQ may reflect a much more stimulating environment from a very young age, but it is clearly closer to the average black IQ in the USA than that of the adopted parents. This would seem to indicate, argues Lynn (2006), that the racial difference in IQ is genetic.
Studies of Northeast Asian children adopted by white families demonstrate something similar. The IQs of Northeast Asian children adopted by whites are closer to the Northeast Asian average than to the white average. There have been six such studies. Winick et al. (1975) investigated Koreans aged between six and fourteen adopted by white families in the USA. Those who were severely undernourished as infants had an IQ of 102, those who were poorly nourished had an IQ of 106, while those who were well nourished had an IQ of 112, higher even than the average IQ of the adoptive parents. Another USA study (Clark & Hanisee, 1982) gave Koreans adopted by whites an IQ of 105, a study in Belgium (Frydman & Lynn, 1989) was 110, while a Dutch study (Stams et al., 2000) was 108. We have noted that intelligence is substantially heritable, so it makes sense that these children’s IQs are higher than the average white IQ and, if well nourished prior to adoption, even higher than the average IQ of the white adoptive parents.
Fifthly, Italian anthropologist Davide Piffer (2016) has shown that the correlation between a country’s average IQ and the percentage of the population who carry forms of particular genes which essentially predict high intelligence is 0.9, which is an exceptionally high correlation. It means that 81% of the variance in population differences in IQ is down to genetic differences. In effect, Piffer proves that race differences in intelligence are overwhelmingly a reflection of genetic differences. As such, the arguments against racial differences in intelligence being genetic can be refuted, and critics are merely left with moralistic arguments and other fallacies.
5. Conclusion
We have to conclude that the lexical definition of intelligence is justifiable and IQ tests can be legitimately administered to different cultures and races. Further, there are consistent racial differences in average intelligence and these are overwhelmingly genetic in origin.
Chapter Four
What Are ‘Ethnocentrism’ and ‘Ethnicity’?
1. Introduction
We saw in Chapter Two that we must distinguish between the concepts of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ or we may as well reject one of the two categories. In this chapter, we will clarify what we mean by the terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnocentrism’. We will argue that the most useful definition of an ‘ethny’ is, in effect, what might be termed a sub-race; a group that is a substantially separate breeding population, such that its members are an extended kinship group who have more genetically in common with each other than with a random member of the neighbouring ethnic group. Thus, an ethny can be seen as on its way to becoming a separate ‘race’, just as a ‘race’ can be regarded as on its way to becoming a separate ‘species’.
2. What Is Ethnocentrism?
The word ‘ethnocentrism’ combines the Greek words ‘ethnos’ (ethnic group, nation or people) with the word ‘centre’ — placing one’s ‘ethnic group’ at the centre. According to historical research by Bizumic (2014), the word ‘ethnocentrism’ was coined by Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909), a Polish sociologist, in 1879 (Gumplowicz, 1879) and employed in Gumplowicz’s research, which was written in German and Polish. American economist William Sumner (1840–1910) introduced the word into the English language and popularized the concept (Sumner, 1906). However, Sumner did not referenc
e Gumplowicz’s work, meaning that later ethnocentrism researchers have credited Sumner with coining the term (e.g. Adorno et al., 1950).
For Gumplowicz, ethnocentrism was similar to geocentriism or anthrocentrism, only the reference point was one’s own ethnicity. He argued that it was the belief that one’s own ethnic group was superior to and preferable to other ethnic groups. For Sumner (1906, p. 13) ethnocentrism involved ‘the view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it’. Sumner included, under the umbrella of ethnocentrism, feelings of in-group devotion and cohesion, the rejection of out-groups, a sense of in-group superiority, and the exploitation of out-groups. He also assumed that in-group positivity would generally be positively correlated with out-group negativity. Subsequent researchers drew upon this concept of ethnocentrism, often defining it more narrowly. For example, Adorno et al. (1950) effectively used ‘ethnocentrism’ only to refer to out-group prejudice. However, more recent research has suggested that Sumner’s assumption — that in-group love and out-group hate should positively correlate — is incorrect (Brewer, 1999). The fundamental dimensions to ethnocentrism can be found cross-culturally. These are:
1. A strong sense of group cohesion and group-devotion;
2. Preference for the ethnic in-group, a belief in one’s own ethnic group’s superiority, a desire to maintain ethnic purity, and approval of the exploitation of ethnic out-groups (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012).
Accordingly, ‘ethnocentrism’ is more than simply out-group prejudice and in-group favouritism. It is conceptually distinct, though it crosses over with both of these. There is considerable debate regarding what causes ethnocentric behaviour. But before we look at this, it would be useful to understand the nature of the ‘ethnic group’.
3. Lexical Definitions of Ethnicity
In defining ‘ethnicity’, it is useful to begin with ‘dictionary’ or ‘lexical’ definitions, as these reflect how the concept is commonly employed and understood. However, with regard to ‘ethnicity’ there is some implicit debate over the definition. According to the current Oxford English Dictionary, an ‘ethnicity’ is ‘a social group that has a common cultural tradition’, while for the Collins English Dictionary an ethnicity is a ‘human group having racial, religious, linguistic and other traits in common’. For the Merriam Webster Dictionary, an ‘ethnicity’ is ‘a race or large group of people who have the same customs, religion, origin etc.’ There is a subtle disagreement between these three dictionaries regarding how the word ‘ethnicity’ is best defined and this disagreement reflects a broader division, over this subject, between scholars of ethnicity. The essential divide is between the older school of thought, known as the ‘Primordialists’, and school of thought that has become popular since the 1960s; the ‘Constructivists’ or ‘Subjectivists’.
For the Primordialists, ethnic groups are extremely ancient because they are ultimately based around common ancestry; in other words, bonds of blood. As such, they have a key point of commonality with ‘race’. The ethnic group can thus be understood as a kind of extended family; a large-scale kinship group; something reflected in the way that members of ethnic groups do tend to have a folk sense of common ancestors and of being a kind of family. Indeed, this is consistent with genetic data, which has shown that ethnic groups really are distinct genetic clusters (see Salter, 2007). The Collins Dictionary definition is the most Primordialist, because it refers to ‘race’, which, as we have discussed, is generally a matter of genetics. Indeed, in common parlance, ‘ethnic minority’ is a term used to refer to a racial, rather than purely cultural, minority.12 For the Constructivists, ethnic identities are merely a matter of ‘culture’. They are relatively arbitrary and they are subject to change, meaning a person might change their ethnic identification during their lifetime. For this reason, ethnic groups are relatively unstable, because they are merely products of environmental factors. As such, ‘Constructivists’ construct their theories around cultural or environmental determinism, the view that a phenomenon can be entirely explained by environmental or cultural factors. Culture and environment are assumed to explain the development of ‘ethnic identity’ and there is no space for a significantly genetic explanation.
We will look at both of these conceptions of ethnicity in some depth, and we will begin by examining the Constructivist school and the most important examples of it. Doing this is relatively complicated, because this school has itself divided into many sub-schools (perhaps we should call them ‘classes’, to extend the metaphor). But they are worth exploring, if only to understand just how much debate the concept of ‘ethnicity’ has engendered in social science. To make this easier to follow, I have italicised the names of the different schools and classes.
4. Constructivism
The Constructivist School can be divided into a variety of competing theoretical camps.
Instrumentalists
Firstly, there are the so-called ‘Instrumentalists’, epitomized by the Norwegian anthropologist Frederik Barth (1928–2016). In some respects, they have points of commonality with Primordialists. For Barth (1969), an ethnic group is a social organization based around a shared culture, with ‘culture’ employed to mean ‘way of life’. It has symbolic social boundaries and the extent to which it maintains these boundaries is a function of environmental variables. The factors which distinguish one ethnic group from another are essentially arbitrary and the groups are mobilized by their leaders in times of crisis.
This model has a number of shortcomings from the viewpoint of other Subjectivists. Most obviously, it may explain identification in tribal groups, where members follow a fission-fusion model of frequently splitting and forming new groups, but may not work in nations, where a sense of ethnic identity is longer established. Olzak and Nagel (1989) have presented a variation on Barth’s model called ‘Competition Theory’ wherein a sense of ethnic identity is cultural and fluid but is periodically reawakened by competition between ethnic groups. Accordingly, ethnic identity is espoused in order to better access resources. However, this raises the question of why certain ethnic identities only begin to be espoused at certain points in history.
Then there are the Rational Choice Theorists, such as British sociologist Michael Banton (1983). They argue that people will behave rationally in order to maximize their benefits and they will adopt an ethnic identity, which is purely cultural and fluid, accordingly. This theory is highly problematic as there is strong evidence that people can act against their rational self-interest, following evolved tendencies which were useful in our evolutionary past. These include:
1. Obedience to Authority: Under laboratory conditions, it was demonstrated in American psychologist Stanley Milgram’s (1933–1984; Milgram, 1974) experiment that the majority of people (more than 50%) would be prepared to knowingly administer a lethal electric shock to an innocent person in another room simply in order to comply with the instructions of an authority, in the form of a white-coated scientist. Subjects were told that they were taking part in an experiment to see whether electric shocks increased learning ability. They watched as their ‘student’ (really an actor) was strapped into the electric device. Then, in another room, they had to ask the student questions over a speaker system, watched over by a scientist, with teachers increasing the electric shock level each time the student gave a wrong answer. Eventually, students were audibly screaming in pain and teachers questioning whether they should continue. Told that ‘the experiment must go on’, over half continued past the point where the machine said ‘Danger: Severe Shock’ and even after the students had fallen silent, presumably fainted or worse, simply because they were instructed to do so by an authority. This adaptation could explain why people can be induced, by an authority, to act against their interests.
2. Consensus Effect: We have evolved a strong capacity to conform to the group and this extends to the tendency to alter one’s beliefs, even if one knows one is
correct, in order to conform to the group. Indeed, the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance shows that people will alter their memories in order to ensure that their worldview is congruous with that of the group. This demonstrates that peer-pressure can be strong enough to cause us to behave in an irrational manner.
3. Evolved Altruism: We have evolved such a strong desire to be altruistic that it causes us to behave in a seemingly irrational manner. In Game Theory there is a game called ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. In experiments, two players will play on this game on networked computers and the two players will neither meet each other nor know anything about each other. Each player can decide to ‘cooperate’ with the other player or ‘defect’ on the other player. ‘Cooperation’ benefits the other player while ‘defection’ hurts the other player but benefits the defector. In a ‘two shot’ game, it may be rational to ‘cooperate’ because if you don’t then the other player can ‘defect’ on you in the future, so damaging you. However, in a ‘one-shot’ game it is always rational to defect, as you will always get a higher pay-off by doing so. Despite this, numerous experiments have shown that around 50% of people cooperate in a one shot game (Kanazawa, 2012, p. 32). This would mean that our evolved capacity to be altruistic is so strong that it can make us behave in an irrational way, in a way that actually damages our interests.
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