*14 Julio Zeñon Acosta was one of the first peasants to join the uprising, and the first whom Che taught to read and write. When he died, Che wrote in his diary: “The man was tireless. He knew the area well, and was always ready to help a companion in trouble or a companion from the city who wasn’t yet strong enough to fend for himself. He was the one who brought water from the faraway spring, who could build a fire quickly, and find the kindling needed to make a fire on a rainy day.” Ernesto Che Guevara, quoted in Che Guevara and Raul Castro, La conquista, p. 310.
*15 “Dear folks: I am perfectly well. I have spent only two and still have five. I am still working on the same thing. News is sporadic and will continue to be but have faith that God is an Argentine. A big hug for all, Teté.” Quoted in Revista de la Casa de las Américas, no. 168, May-June 1988, p. 6.
†10 As Raúl Castro noted, “All the books had been requested … by the many-faceted Che.” Raúl Castro, “Diario,” p. 157.
‡3 In his recent biography of Guevara, Paco Ignacio Taibo II claims that Che carried out the sentence himself, quoting an unpublished interview of Universo Sanchez by Luis Adrian Betancourt. Paco Ignacio Taibo II, Ernesto Guevara también conocido como el Che (Mexico City: Planeta, 1996), pp. 163 and 780. In his biography, Jon Lee Anderson quotes Che’s Sierra Maestra diary to the same effect. See Anderson, Che Guevara (New York: Grove Press, 1997), p. 237.
*16 Following the interview, and in a classic example of historical blindness, the U.S. ambassador in Havana, Arthur Gardner, commented confidentially: “The controversy over whether Fidel Castro is alive or dead has no real importance.” Arthur Gardner to Roy Rubottom, February 28, 1957, Department of State, National Archives, box 2, College Park, Maryland.
†11 Che’s honesty contrasts with that of his epigones. In a recent biography, Jean Cormier attributes to Guevara the Cubans’ hugely effective tactic of returning prisoners to the enemy. But Che himself states in his diary: “Against the opinion of the more drastic ones, including myself, the prisoners were questioned and held overnight and then released.” Che Guevara and Raúl Castro, La conquista, p. 254. Cormier’s assertion appears in Jean Cormier, Che Guevara (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1995), p. 131.
*17 A former combatant of the Sierra recalls that Che’s hygienic practices were far from perfect: “He didn’t even wash his hands.” Francisco Rodríguez, quoted in Martin Resnick, The Black Beret: The Life and Meaning of Che Guevara (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 88.
*18 Fidel Castro, letter to Ernesto Guevara, quoted in Carlos Franqui, Diario, p. 385. Che replies, “I am sorry to have disregarded your advice, but our people’s morale was very low … and I considered my presence necessary in the line of fire.” Ernesto Guevara, letter to Fidel Castro, December 1957, quoted in Granma (Havana), October 16, 1967, p. 15.
†12 “Chicho’s fate had been sealed a long time before, like that of any company leader who fell into our hands, and the punishment was summary death by shooting, the only way to deal with these turncoats.” Raul Castro, “Diario,” p. 201.
*19 “My historical name cannot be linked to that crime [i.e., the Miami Pact]. … I am doing this to have one day a record testifying to my integrity.” Ernesto Guevara, letter to René Ramos Latour, December 14, 1957, quoted in Franqui, Diario, p. 362.
*20 This is the opinion of Carlos Franqui, who lived these events intensely: “There was no consultation with the leadership in the plains or with Fidel. There was a basis for a pact, so that if Pazos had a deal without these controversial points, matters would have been different. But Fidel never signed.” Carlos Franqui, interview.
†13 According to Franqui, those who opposed the Miami Pact from the beginning were Raul Castro and Che, Evelio Martinez, Julio Martínez, and Franqui himself, as well as “Daniel,” who was in hiding. See Franqui, Diario, p. 371.
‡4 Tad Szulc emphasizes that, “for softie strange reason, Che Guevara initially thought that Castro had authorized the Miami Pact.” Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: Avon, 1987; first edition, 1986), p. 469.
** This is Franqui’s tentative point of view. Franqui, Diario, p. 371.
*21 “My only mistake of some gravity was not to have trusted you more from the first moments in the Sierra Maestra, and not to have understood soon enough your qualities as a leader and revolutionary.” Ernesto Che Guevara, letter to Fidel Castro, January 6, 1958, quoted in Ernesto Ghe Guevara, Escritos y discursos, vol. 9 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1977), p. 394.
†14 “Daniel” ’s letter, dated December 18, 1957, was published in Franqui, Diario, pp. 365–369. Though the exchange does not appear in any of the editions of Che’s correspondence, nor in the various biographies and histories of the Cuban Revolution already cited, there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. One may consult the original notes for Franqui’s book in the Franqui Archives at Princeton University. They all agree with the published text. The Cubans have never responded to Franqui’s assertions, either to support or deny them. Che’s own reference to his “rather idiotic” letter to “Daniel” confirms the existence of the letter, if not its content.
*22 Jorge Ricardo Masetti, “Los que lloran y los que sufren,” quoted in Ernesto Guevara Lynch, Mi hijo el Che (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1981), p. 42. Cantinflas was a famous Mexican comic actor, somewhat similar to Charlie Chaplin in his character and demeanor.
*23 Fidel Castro, letter to Celia Sánchez, June 18, 1957. Huber Matos, who fought under Che’s command in the Sierra for several months, has a similar recollection: “Fidel always tried to impose his authority, raising his voice or saying insolent things or trying always to be right. However, I never saw him clash with Che. Fidel sometimes behaved in an insulting or despotic way with his subordinates. There were exceptions. Che was one of them. I never saw him talk to Che in a rude or ugly way.” Huber Matos, transcript of interview with English journalists, London, October 1995, mimeo made available to the author.
*24 In the undated intelligence report previously cited, the Americans concluded: “It seems clear, then, that even though he is not a member of the Communist Party, Guevara is a Marxist in his thinking, and does maintain some contacts with Communist circles.” At this stage, the Americans seriously underestimated both Che’s Communist leanings (not so much in terms of the Party as its ideas) and his growing links to the PSP. Quoted in “Possibility of Communist Connections,” Department of State, National Archives, lot 60 D 513, MER 1137, box 7–8.
†15 Dispatch from the U.S. consulate at Santiago de Cuba to the Department of State, “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960,” vol. 6, p. 35. According to Tad Szulc, the vice-consul at Santiago (possibly the author of this cable) was a certain Robert Wiecha, a CIA agent who delivered large sums of money to the 26th of July—either as part of the Eisenhower administration’s policy or on the initiative of the CIA itself. See Szulc, Fidel, pp. 469–471. In an interview with Georgie Anne Geyer in 1987, Wiecha denied having given money to Fidel or his group, though he acknowledged his sympathy, as well as the CIA’s in general, for Castro and the rebels. There is still some mystery as to somebody else from the CIA, or Wiecha himself, giving funds to rebels that did not strictly belong to Fidel’s group. See Georgie Anne Geyer, Guerrilla Prince (Boston: Little, Brown, 1991), p. 189.
Chapter 5
Our Man in Havana
By August 18, 1958, Fidel Castro knew he had won the war against Batista. The failure of the army’s offensive and the rebels’ earlier breakout from the Sierra Maestra to another mountain range, the Sierra de Cristal, had tipped the balance. The regime was cornered and crumbling fast. The key was to ensure the victory of those rebels hiding in the cities and mountains, rather than a military junta or any compromise solution imposed by Washington. To achieve this, Castro devised the most astute and decisive military move of the war. He called for an “invasion” of the island, by two columns setting off from the Sierra Maestra. Their mission was to travel westward, to initiate c
ombat in the center of Cuba, to cut the island in two, and to start the march toward Havana.
With his brother leading the Second Front, Castro had few commanders left for the two spearheads in the guerrillas’ counterattack. Camilo Cienfuegos had distinguished himself since the Granma landing by his bravery, ingenuity, and easy relations with combatants and civil population alike. He was a natural candidate, though he had never held an autonomous command. The other logical choice was Che Guevara, who for almost a year had led his own column (recently renamed the Ciro Redondo after a Granma expeditionary fallen in combat). His leadership skills and military boldness were well known. And Fidel Castro trusted him enough to give him a task whose political implications were even more complex than its military ones.
Che’s mission was to cross endless miles of enemy territory with only 150 new recruits, far from the shelter of the mountain range. But he also had to “coordinate operations, plans, administrative decisions, and military organization with other revolutionary forces operating in the province [of Las Villas], who will be invited to merge into a sole Army Corps, so as to structure and unify the Revolution’s military efforts.”1 In other words, Che would have to convince or oblige the other opposition forces operating in Las Villas and the Sierra del Escambray to accept his preeminence. These included battalions from the 26th of July Movement, as well as isolated groups from the Revolutionary Student Directorate, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), and the Second National Front of the Escambray, which had split off from the student organization and was led by Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo. Che was thus assigned three goals. From a military point of view, he was to attack and defeat the enemy in the center of the country. He was to maintain unity and discipline under singularly adverse conditions, without the sheltering mantle of Fidel Castro. Finally, he had a political mandate requiring both negotiating skills and the exercise of authority.
True, Castro had few choices in assigning these tasks. But this does not detract from Guevara’s achievement during his three years with the Cuban leader. He started out a mediocre physician, a wandering foreigner lacking any political and military experience, and became the third most important figure in an undertaking of epic proportions. Perhaps the Cubans on board the Granma resented his arrogance, his ironic and haughty reserve, his isolation and foreignness. Maybe the least radical elements of the 26th of July, in the mountains and plains, mistrusted his pro-Soviet stance and growing affinity with the long-discredited Cuban Communists. And those closest to Fidel Castro, including his brother Raúl, may have had their moments of envy when they saw the camaraderie and loyalty that bonded the two men. However, none of these feelings could overshadow Guevara’s enormous contribution to the struggle, his bravery, discipline, organization, and level headedness. The very traits that at first the Cubans tended to dislike eventually made him indispensable. His Argentine and European sense of order, his punctuality and formality, his respect for the rules, his insistence on honoring promises and commitments, were not Caribbean virtues by any means. Indeed, it was their rarity which made them so precious during the final phase of the war.
At the end of August 1958, Che was forced to separate himself from some of the people he held dearest: Camilo Cienfuegos, his most trusted friend in the Sierra Maestra, and Zoila, his girlfriend of several months. He also demanded of his troops an explicit decision regarding the “invasion.” He warned them that they were risking their lives: up to half of them might die. Almost 80 percent of them were young men lacking combat experience, mere boys newly recruited from Minas de Frío.
Che embarked on his mission on August 31 with 148 men. During forty-six days they would endure all the hardships of isolation in a tropical climate: hunger, thirst, mosquitoes, cyclones and floodwaters, unsafe roads, an indifferent population, and continual harassment by Batista’s army. They marched over 300 kilometers, suffering through swamps, torrents, and constant privation. They were forced to abandon their transport trucks after the army cut them off from gasoline supplies, and had to perform the entire trek by foot or on horseback. Though only six men died (or three, according to some accounts), their tribulations soon became the stuff of legend. This was partly thanks to General Francisco Tabernilla Dolz, Batista’s joint chief of staff, who on September 20 announced the annihilation of the “invading” force and the death of Che Guevara. The ordeal finally ended on October 16:
When the situation was at its most tense, when only insults, pleas and tantrums could make the exhausted people keep marching, a single faraway vision animated their faces and infused the guerrillas with new spirit. That vision was the blue line of the mountain range of Las Villas.2
Thus ended the first phase of Che’s independent mission. Victory was less than three months away. Strangely enough, there is no mention of asthma attacks during this entire period—the “invasion,” the battle of Santa Clara, the entry into Havana—either in Che’s notes or his companions’ recollections. Of course, the episodes may have taken place with their usual intensity during those weeks without Che’s recording them in his diary. But there are other possible explanations for a lull in the illness. A first, physiological, one involves the level of adrenaline generated by continual combat-readiness. If adrenaline is the best-known bronchodilator, and the human body is its best supplier, it is not absurd to speculate that the tension arising from constant danger should have provided Che with the best possible antidote, his own adrenaline.
Another possible reason is the absence of situations that were likely to bring on attacks. Once Che left the Sierra and was no longer busy running the camps with their constant problems, contradiction disappeared. Even when he had to settle disputes among the different factions opposing Batista, Guevara chose the ideal political-military tactic, which was also the optimal antidote to his ailment: combat. The link between asthma and ambivalence would thus seem to have worked both ways.
This was the real beginning of Che Guevara’s autonomous command. During this stage he acquired loyalties and habits, and the fame that would accompany him even in death. He set up an escort consisting of José Argudín, Alberto Castellanos, Harry Villegas (“Pombo”), and Hermes Peña. The first three formed part of his international team in Argentina, Bolivia, and the Congo. Eliseo Reyes Rodríguez (“San Luis”), Carlos Coello (“Tuma,” whose remains were found in Bolivia in 1996), and Alberto Fernández (“Pachungo”), other companions during this phase, would all die in Bolivia.
These six weeks also saw the emergence of a lasting and characteristic trait in Che Guevara: intransigence toward the weakness of others. However essential to the brand of leadership he exercised, this trait would prove a liability under more normal conditions. He could not tolerate errors in his subordinates; he scolded, insulted, and punished them. Joel Iglesias recalled one such incident at the height of the “invasion”:
Several comrades got off the truck, which was stuck … while others refused to get off and push it. Che got into a very ugly mood, addressing them with very harsh and violent words, in my opinion, and with an angry expression. He strongly criticized their behavior in those moments. He was something to hear and see when he was indignant.3
Che’s decency (and nobility) always led him to apologize after a few hours or days. And he never demanded of his subordinates anything that he would not impose upon himself. But these abstract qualities irritated people in the real world: others did not share his sense of destiny, intellect, or willpower. His explosions of anger toward his followers, whose devotion knew no limits, became part of his unwritten story. During the “invasion,” his expeditions to the Congo, and especially in Bolivia, his outbursts were legendary. Though rarely unfair or based upon an authoritarian position, they were always extreme and devastating. His rages, or “outpourings,” as they were eventually termed by his companions, were followed by moments of contrition—but they were still continual. In this regard, one cannot neglect the possible influence of his frequent epinephrine or adrenaline injections. These bronchodilato
rs have no long-term effects, but can generate sudden increases in blood pressure, anxiety, and “rushes” lasting up to thirty minutes. Though appropriate from a medical standpoint, the medication may have contributed to his drastic mood swings.*1
The column’s arrival in Las Villas forced Che to focus on the task of unifying the opposition forces. He had also to institute administrative procedures to fulfill the great promises of the coming revolution—especially land reform. During those months Guevara, Cienfuegos, and other rebel leaders undertook an extensive process of land distribution, beginning with a suspension of rental payments on small plots and tax exemptions for small farmers (for instance, coffee producers). The spread of these practices soon required a legal framework, which became the Sierra Maestra’s Law no. 3 on agrarian reform, dated October 10, 1958.
For Che, the incorporation of peasants into the guerrilla war acquired a purifying dimension, over and beyond its military or political significance. The guerrilla fighter “joins” the people as they, in turn, join the rebel army. As the “people,” in rural areas, consist of peasants, their affiliation with the revolution became a defining moment. In his own words,
Simultaneously with the incorporation of peasants into the armed struggle due to their demands for freedom and social justice, a magical word arose which mobilized the oppressed masses of Cuba in their struggle for land ownership: Land Reform.4
In areas like the Sierra Maestra—which is where Che had his first encounter with the problems of land and rural poverty—the farmers’ principal demand was land ownership and the cancellation of rents. This was not necessarily the main concern of day laborers toiling on the sugar and tobacco plantations in other areas. But in the zones where Che Guevara came to know the peasants’ way of life, land was essential. As a result, agrarian reform was crucial to the process of merging the peasants with the guerrilla camp. That is why Che called the Rebel Army a “peasant army,” and the 26th of July a “peasant movement.”5
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