According to Fabio Grobart’s account to Tad Szulc in 1985, beginning in January 1959 the top leaders of the Sierra and the PSP held a series of clandestine meetings either at Che’s dwelling in Tarará or Fidel’s house in Cojímar. Castro was accompanied by Che, Camilo Cienfuegos, Osmany Cienfuegos (the guerrilla leader’s brother, a sometime member of the PSP, who had remained in Mexico during the war), Ramiro Valdés, and, occasionally, Raúl Castro. The PSP was represented by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, its secretary-general, Bias Roca, and Anibal Escalante, a member of the Politburo. According to Grobart,
We began to hold meetings as soon as Fidel, Che, and Camilo arrived here. We were not informing the militants, only a small group in the leadership. The success [of the negotiations] was linked to the need of preventing the Americans from having a banner for an intervention, as they had done in Guatemala, and we had to go on maintaining the secret that had prevailed until then and had contributed to the success.67
Problems arose very quickly when labor union elections were held at the end of January. As the former pro-government leadership of Cuba’s Confederation of Workers (CTC) disintegrated, both the PSP and the 26th of July began jockeying for control of the old labor organization. The 26th of July mounted a fierce attack on the PSP, obliging it to escalate its salary demands in order to regain its traditional leadership of the labor movement. The controversy was highly publicized. It took up entire pages of Hoy and Revolución throughout the summer, and lasted most of the year. Finally, in November 1959, the PSP was soundly defeated in elections for the CTC congress. Only Fidel Castro’s intervention kept the Party from being evicted entirely from the labor movement. But the rivalry and friction between the union activists of the PSP and the 26th of July did not obscure the fundamental unity that was gradually being forged by the leadership on both sides. Che played a major role in this process.
The reason he helped build the alliance with the Communists was not personal sympathy with them—though, aside from Raúl Castro, Che was the leader who had the most PSP aides. Rather, it was based on strong political affinities; Che was, in a sense, the Communist within the 26th of July, as much as Raúl Castro; moreover, as Carlos Franqui recalls “Raúl was in fact more discreet than Che.”68 The strength and presence of PSP cadres was due to their convergence with Che, not the other way around. Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, a former secretary-general of the Mexican Communist Party who spent several months in Havana in early 1959, remembers how as early as then Che protected the PSP. One day at a Party office an official from the Commission of Recovered Properties knocked on the door, bearing an order from Che to take over the buildings. The Party member in charge warned him immediately, “Sit down. You don’t seem to know where you are; we are a revolutionary party that fully participated in the January 1st victory.” He picked up the phone, Che himself answered, and the PSP kept its branch.69 Over and beyond agrarian reform and the new army training program, Che was moving ever closer to the classic positions of Latin American Marxism. The fact that he would later break with these positions, and with the Cuban Communists and their Soviet backers, does not invalidate the fact that he shared their views completely for almost four years.
In several public appearances during those months, Che gradually drew away from the traditional stances of the 26th of July, distinctly drifting toward the movement’s left wing. In the first days of January, there was still a certain amount of confusion in Cuba and in U.S. government circles as to Che Guevara’s ideological position.*19 By April, and especially after Che granted a long television interview to the program Telemundo Pregunta, his views began to attract greater attention in Havana and U.S. Embassy circles. The Embassy had it basically right:
Ernesto “Che” Guevara, Chief of La Cabaña Fortress, if not an out and out Communist, is so closely oriented toward Communistic doctrine as to be indistinguishable from one. … Che Guevara and Raúl Castro because of their political orientation, coupled with their popularity and the effective control which they exercise over the armed forces, represent the single most important danger of Communist infiltration within the present government. The extent of their influence over Fidel Castro is not known, but is probably considerable. It may be an important factor in Fidel Castro’s reluctance to align himself clearly with the free nations in the East-West struggle.70
In his television interview, Che displayed vast rhetorical and diplomatic skills when asked about his ideological leanings, his opinion of the Soviet Union, the PSP, the land reform, Cuba’s participation in an uprising in Panama, and so on. Despite his verbal maneuvers, however, it was obvious to anyone watching the program that Che was not only close to Communist positions but supported both the idea and the reality of an alliance with the PSP. He probably expressed the same views in private conversations: Guevara was not given to concealment.
This is confirmed in a report delivered to the U.S. Embassy by a Cuban tobacco grower in May 1959.*20 Dr. Napoleón Padilla was a member of the Tobacco Forum, a group established by the revolutionary government to improve the industry’s production and working conditions. The government’s representative was Che himself, so Padilla was able to observe him closely for several weeks. According to his report, Guevara even offered to make him manager of the state cigarette company he was planning to create. Padilla stated that Che was violently anti-American, opposing the sale of any U.S. products in Cuba—including those actually made in the country, like Coca-Cola, Keds sneakers, and American cigarettes; he did not want any U.S. capital in Cuba, or good relations with Washington. He described the Rebel Army as the “defender of the proletariat” and “the main political wing of the people’s revolution.” Padilla also asserted that the new army was to be a major source of “indoctrination” for the Cuban people. Though it would also engage in useful public activities, its main task was to defend the Revolution—which would inevitably come under attack by the United States, as it was essentially contrary to American interests.71
Padilla’s report includes exaggerations—Che “often talked of the way he controls Fidel Castro”—and personal interpretations—“Guevara and Raúl Castro want to create a Soviet system in Cuba”—but its main thrust seems plausible. Che did, indeed, hold the views ascribed to him and expressed them quite openly. At the same time, however, Fidel Castro was making his way along the East Coast of the United States, trying to convince the American establishment and the general public of his “good” intentions in a number of areas: land reform, communism, and the Soviet Union, among others.*21
This glaring inconsistency has various possible origins. Castro, with his extraordinary talent for showmanship, may have tried to placate his American hosts by telling them exactly what they wanted to hear, in order to gain more time before the inevitable confrontation with Washington. For almost forty years, Castro has proven repeatedly that he is fully and easily capable of sustaining two or more contradictory positions simultaneously. In this interpretation, Fidel said one thing up north while his brother and Che said another on the island, totally aware of what they were doing.
Or perhaps Fidel had not yet defined the course of the Revolution, and was seeking a middle ground—unstable and temporary, but effective for a time. Finally, the possibility exists that Castro was saying whatever people wanted to hear, with the conviction of a master politician who fully trusts his own powers of persuasion. When Fidel spoke with his companions in the United States—Regino Boti and Felipe Pazos, among others—and accepted their words of caution and restraint, he did so just as sincerely as when he agreed with Raúl and Che that the Revolution must proceed rapidly in a more radical direction. Some eventually felt betrayed by him; others saw their suggestions and aspirations made reality. But when talking with Fidel, they all swore he was telling them the truth. That was simply the way he functioned.
The relationship between Fidel and Che grew closer during those months, though it went through several minor difficulties. Their styles were too dissimilar for there not to
be occasional friction. Fidel talked unceasingly, while Che was extremely reserved. Fidel was a politician who carefully calculated his myriad, oratorically torrential public declarations; Che expressed openly and publicly his sporadic utterances. Fidel lived in a continual, luxuriant chaos, while Che was highly organized, disciplined, and austere. Che believed in well-defined political goals; Fidel was always pondering his course and was able to adjust, qualify, or reverse it at a moment’s notice. When he left the Sierra, Fidel returned to a familiar world; indeed, he was in his element. Che, in the meantime, was confronted with a completely new environment; his friends and family, his youth, were all far away.
Comments attributed to Fidel during those months, especially during his trip to the United States and immediately after his return to Cuba, must have hurt Guevara. Since January, there had been rumors of critical or sarcastic statements by Fidel. Lázaro Ascencio, a veteran of the Escambray who had dinner with Castro in Cienfuegos during his triumphal march from Oriente to Havana, recalls a strange comment by the líder máximo. Speaking of Comandante William Morgan (a companion of Gutiérrez Menoyo who would later be executed), Fidel declared that he should leave Cuba. When Ascencio disagreed, Castro attacked Che Guevara: “All these foreigners are mercenaries. Do you know what I’m going to do with Che Guevara? I’m going to send him to Santo Domingo and see if Trujillo kills him. As for my brother Raúl, I’m going to send him to Europe as a minister or diplomat or ambassador.”72 The rumor became so widespread that a journalist asked Che on January 6 whether “it is true that you are going to lead an expedition to liberate Santo Domingo, and that you’re going to finish off Trujillo.”73
Later, and perhaps more realistically, Jules Dubois, an American journalist who had interviewed Fidel Castro in the Sierra and was in contact (to say the least) with U.S. intelligence, delivered a report to the State Department. He had been assured by people close to Castro that the latter was convinced of “Communist” infiltration and propaganda within La Cabaña, and that he was going to deal with it immediately. The first step would be to expel Che Guevara from the country. He planned to use as a pretext an official invitation from President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, to commemorate the expropriation of the Suez Canal. Castro even predicted that Guevara, during his travels through the Middle East, might well suffer a severe and prolonged attack of asthma.74
Though the exact wording may be fictitious, Castro must have expressed himself along these lines. Yet his comments may have been a test or a disinformation ploy, in one of the grand maneuvers that Fidel Castro has systematically used to mislead and confuse his interlocutors for nearly four decades. Che was doubtless familiar with his friend’s subterfuges—but he also knew that Fidel could be ruthless in his alliances and loyalties. Throughout all his years in power—and even as a university student—Castro had always been a staunch supporter of his friends while they remained out of politics, and a man fully capable of turning on them, no matter how close to him, if they entered the political fray and expediency required it.
During those innocent and memorable days of victory, Che may well have believed more in a well-intentioned maneuver by Fidel than in his duplicity or sudden indifference. But he must also have suspected that there was some truth to the rumors. Behind them lurked a typical Fidelista logic. A vicious struggle was underway between what Carlos Franqui has called the nationalist wing of the 26th of July Movement and the pro-Communist one led by Che and Raúl. As Franqui notes, “Fidel Castro, being a much more skillful politician than his brother or his favorite deputy, thought that if he confronted the United States prematurely, it would have been fatal for the Revolution. That’s why he wanted everybody to keep believing in his classical anti-communist stance.”75 Several conflicts erupted between them all—for instance, regarding agrarian reform: when Raúl and Che encouraged land takeovers, Fidel delivered a violent speech against such acts. On one occasion at the Havana Comptrollers Court, the conflict between the Castro brothers became so bitter that Raúl “ended up in tears.”76 Things became even more disconcerting in the context of Castro’s trip to the United States, which Che had opposed.*22 During the voyage, Fidel’s moderate advisers held full sway. Castro’s statements in Washington and New York added to the uncertainty that Che probably felt despite himself. But he stayed at his post and fought his battles. The First Law for Agrarian Reform enacted in May was a partial victory; he achieved other triumphs: the departure of Sorí Marín from the government, followed weeks later by the resignation of Manuel Urrutía from the presidency and the Revolution’s radicalization in July 1959.
On June 2, Che Guevara celebrated his second wedding. Having finally broken his relationship with Hilda and obtained his divorce, Ernesto was free to marry Aleida. Till her death, the Peruvian activist believed she lost her husband to Aleida: “When a man falls in love with another woman, there is nothing a wife can do.”77 Herein perhaps lies the cause, logically enough, of the strain and antipathy that prevailed between her daughter, Hilda Guevara, and Aleida, till the former’s death in 1995.78 The marriage took place at the home of one of his bodyguards, Alberto Castellanos, and once again Raúl Castro was one of the witnesses. The couple left immediately for Tarará: not very far, not very different, and not for very long.*23 Nonetheless, the honeymoon had a strong impact on Che Guevara. Later, during a trip to India, José Pardo Llada shared a room with him and committed the indiscretion of reading a letter from Che to his wife. He found it extremely explicit sexually, “absolutely pornographic.”79 After his relationship with Hilda, followed by the hardly romantic conditions prevailing in the Sierra, the experience of spending days alone with an attractive and worldly Cuban woman must have made a strong impression on the stern guerrilla fighter.
On June 5, Castro confirmed his decision to send Che on a lengthy trip to the Middle East, India, and Japan. Guevara left a week later, to discover a completely alien world, accompanied by a dear and familiar companion: his love of otherness. He spent three months away from Cuba, in an exotic voyage replete with contradictions and uncertainties. It was the first in a long series of missions around the globe that were useful for the Revolution and captivating for him. But always they were darkened by a sense of exile—no matter how necessary, important, or temporary. All of these voyages would contain a mystery. His last one, to Bolivia, would bring about his death.
*1 I owe this hypothesis to an enlightening conversation with Dr. Roberto Krechmer, one of Mexico’s most eminent authorities on childhood asthma. Mexico City, July 6, 1996.
*2 Ernesto Che Guevara, letter to Fidel Castro, “Sobre la invasión,” quoted in Ernesto Che Guevara, “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria,” in Escritos y Discoursos, vol. 2 (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1977), p. 277. In the ongoing efforts of many biographers to rewrite the story of Che’s life, some have tried to detect an early hatred of the Communists in Che, creating the image of a “good” Che who was always anti-Communist, as opposed to the “bad” Fidel, who was one from the beginning. Horacio Rodríguez, for example, takes this same passage to prove the exact opposite of the interpretation offered above. The “Movement’s organizations” are identified with the PSP leadership, and the text is thus transformed into a complaint against the PSP. The interpretation presented here was corroborated by Che himself, in an exchange with Enrique Oltuski: “So far we have received little help from the Movement. The ones who have done a lot for us are the PSP.” Enrique Oltuski, “Gente del llano,” Revista Casa de las Américas (Havana), vol. 7, no. 40, January–February 1967, p. 52. See Horacio Daniel Rodríguez, Che Guevara: ¿ Aventura o revolución? (Barcelona: Tribuna de Plaza y Janés, 1968), p. 122.
*3 According to Carlos Franqui, Acosta joined Che’s column from the Sierra and “in violation of Communist Party discipline.” Carlos Franqui, Diario de la revolución cubana (Barcelona: R. Torres, 1976), p. 604.
*4 Che “was not yet a Communist, either according to his own account or that of other witnesses.” Robert E. Quirk
, Fidel Castro (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 197. Hugh Thomas, the most distinguished historian of the Cuban Revolution, makes a similar statement: “However, in 1959 Guevara expressed himself with a certain ambiguity. He was not a Communist and had never been a member of the Party.” It is worth recalling that Thomas’s masterful text was first published in 1971. He could not have known, or made reference to, the wealth of material, letters, interviews, and documents on Che’s political and ideological leanings as we have presented them in these pages. See Hugh Thomas, Cuba: la lucha por la libertad, 1958–1970, vol. 3 (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1974), pp. 1347–1348.
*5 Theodore Draper makes the same distinction between Castro and the Communists: “The dividing line between Castro and the Communists had been reduced to a single topic: the armed struggle. To achieve an alliance, the Communists had to bridge that difference.” Theodore Draper, Castroism: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 34.
*6 In a text published in February 1961 in Verde Olivo, Che described his contact with Gutiérrez Menoyo the following way: “On January 1, the revolutionary leadership ordered all troops to be placed under my command in Santa Clara. The Second National Front of the Escambray, through its leader, Gutiérrez Menoyo, immediately accepted. There was no problem.” Ernesto Che Guevara, “A Son of the Revolution,” Verde Olivo (Havana), February 12, 1960. A few lines below, he denounced the behavior of Gutiérrez Menoyo’s troops on entering the capital, but that is another matter.
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