Bonar Law knew far more than was made public. Several key Members of Parliament supportive of and supported by the Secret Elite were in the Conservative Party and sat on the opposition front bench. Balfour was paramount as the conduit between the party leaders, trusted on both sides and absolutely at the heart of the Secret Elite. On 30 July, Asquith attended a secret meeting at Bonar Law’s Kensington villa together with the Ulster Unionist Leader Sir Edward Carson, ostensibly to discuss Ireland. The real purpose was to coordinate plans in the immediate run-up to war. The prime minister shared the latest intelligence from Berlin, which showed that the German government was counting on the Ulster crisis to affect British foreign policy. They were given sight of documents from the Belgian ambassador who had reported that ‘Britain was paralysed by internal dissentions and her Irish quarrels’.54 The most important was from the German chancellor, whose telegram was portrayed as attempting to buy Britain’s neutrality.55 Asquith believed that this was clear proof that Germany expected Britain to remain neutral in the coming war because of the debilitating effect of a possible civil war in Ireland.
It would be easy to forget that Asquith was sharing these secrets with his lover56 and leaders of the opposing party, while men who should have been informed, members of his own Cabinet, were not. The secretary of state for Ireland knew nothing about this. For reasons that will be made clear in the following chapter, the Ulster representatives were given very special treatment and exclusively made party to the fact that war was imminent. Behind the backs of the mass of government supporters, and a large majority of the Cabinet, a cross-party cabal of Secret Elite placemen was briefed in advance. The apparent runaway train that was Irish Home Rule would have to be switched to a safer track, but that would be arranged in good time. With trusted men on board, the Secret Elite could confidently start the countdown to the events that would bounce the British people into their long-planned war. In the meantime, Ulster was an impressive smokescreen behind which more than a 100,000 Irishmen could be turned into a fighting force right in front of the kaiser’s eyes.
Towards the end of July, Chancellor Bethmann was the only European leader who sought to prevent war and find an equitable solution. On the morning of 30 July, both he and the kaiser sent telegrams pleading with Austria to accept mediation. Berchtold paid no heed to the advice. A very angry Bethmann sent him yet another urgent message reiterating that Austria’s intransigence was placing Germany in an ‘untenable situation’ and insisting that Austria accept mediation. Bethmann restated that he accepted Austria’s right to seek retribution but refused to be drawn into a world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting his advice.57
It was, quite literally, a command. Desist. Berchtold was ‘most emphatically’ being told to accept mediation.58 He had to give way or the so-called blank cheque would bounce and explode in his face. Berchtold finally realised that his plans for retribution against Serbia had to be revised within the parameters set by Germany. He had spent beyond his limit.
With Berchtold at last prepared to negotiate, Bethmann clung to a glimmer of hope that all was not yet beyond repair. Austria gave assurance that she would not annex any part of Serbian territory or violate Serbian sovereignty, and the kaiser promised Russia that he would compel Austria to cease military operations and remain satisfied with the temporary occupation of Belgrade.59 Since the Austrian army would not be in a position to occupy Belgrade for another two weeks, there was still ample time for negotiations. If the Austrians agreed to ‘halt in Belgrade’, if Britain’s friendly overtures were genuine, if Grey put pressure on Sazonov to stop the Russian mobilisation, peace was still within the bounds of possibility. If the kaiser sent another heartfelt plea to the czar, would he agree to listen to his own cousin? Poor deluded, hapless men. They had been deceived, all of them. Grey had no intention of restraining Sazonov or accepting any German proposals or preventing war. He never had.
On 30 July, at 1.20 a.m., the kaiser sent a despairing telegram to Czar Nicholas unequivocally placing responsibility for war on his cousin’s shoulders.
My ambassador is instructed to draw the attention of your government to the dangers and serious consequences of a mobilisation … If, as appears from your communication and that of your Government, Russia is mobilising against Austria-Hungary … The whole burden of decision now rests upon your shoulders, the responsibility for peace or war.60
His cousin’s appeal to reason struck a chord. Deep in those early morning hours, his mind uncluttered by the baying of warmongers, Nicholas made a bold decision to stop the madness. He telegraphed the kaiser that he would send his personal emissary, General Tatishchev, to Berlin with explanations and instructions that would broker a peace. Tatishchev was the czar’s own representative at the emperor’s court and as such was outside the control or influence of politicians or the military. Czar Nicholas’s message held great promise, but Tatishchev never made it to Berlin.61 Unbeknown to the czar, Sazonov had him arrested and detained that night just as he was about to enter his compartment on the St Petersburg–Berlin train.62 It was an act of treason. Sazonov secretly defied the czar’s express command and thwarted the highest level of personal diplomacy between the two heads of state. By hauling Tatishchev off the train, he removed what would have become an awkward complication: one that could have stopped the war. It was a high-risk strategy in a high-risk game.
Sazonov, urged on by senior members of the Russian military in St Petersburg, begged the czar to ignore the German pleas. The telegrams from Kaiser Wilhelm had clearly influenced him, but Sazonov insisted that they were a ruse, that the Germans were lying and trying to buy time to split the Russian and French alliance and so leave Russia vulnerable to a devastating attack. Czar Nicholas relented under the sustained pressure and on the afternoon of 30 July again ordered general mobilisation. This time, nothing would be permitted to stop it.63
Sazonov instructed General Janushkevich to issue the order then ‘smash his telephone’ and keep out of sight for the rest of the day in order to frustrate any further attempt by the czar to countermand the mobilisation.64 It was a conspiracy inside the conspiracy. Every action that could possibly be taken to continue Russian mobilisation and bring peace talks to an end was approved by Sazonov and the military. A new era in world history had been sanctioned. In Dobrorolsky’s own words, war was ‘irrevocably begun’:65 deliberately, wilfully begun by Sazonov, Poincaré and Sir Edward Grey, all at the behest of the Secret Elite in London.
The Germans neither mobilised first nor rushed to mobilisation when the news of the Russian decision reached Berlin on Friday, 31 July. Bethmann had been desperately seeking confirmation from Vienna that they would listen to him and ‘Halt in Belgrade’, so giving the kaiser the opportunity to stop the needless war. The time for diplomacy had passed. Moltke was naturally anxious. Restraint gave advantage to Germany’s enemies, and these lay both to the east and west of the country. It was too late to avoid war. The official announcement of Russia’s mobilisation closed all doors to peace.
The czar’s order had been decreed while the kaiser was putting severe pressure upon Austria-Hungary to negotiate66 and the British were secretly making their own preparations. The fleet was at war stations, and on 31 July it was reported that:
Thousands of feet tramped Channel-wards; regiment after regiment with full kit wound through London Streets as the bells from tower and steeple called the folk to prayer. In Whitehall crowds parted to let a regiment march through. They marched on past the War Office and the Admiralty, but no one knew their ultimate destination.67
Thus the British navy was mobilised and the army began mobilisation before Parliament or the Cabinet had even had the opportunity to discuss the possibility of Britain going to war.
The timing was choreographed to perfection. Within hours of Austria relenting to sustained German pressure, and with the real possibility that successful talks could be held, the door to peace was deliberately, firmly and finally slammed shut by
the official Russian mobilisation. Kaiser Wilhelm sent another telegram to the czar on 31 July. He was hurt and disillusioned. His friendship and family ties apparently counted for nothing. While he had been mediating for peace at the behest of the czar, the Russians had taken full advantage and mobilised. The pfennig dropped. His good intentions had been skilfully abused by deceitful men. Wilhelm had received ‘trustworthy news of serious preparations for war, even on my eastern frontier’.68 Despite the fact that he had been deliberately misled and knew that his first responsibility was to his own people, the kaiser tried once more to convince the czar that disaster could be averted. He warned his cousin that:
It will not be I who am responsible for the calamity which threatens the whole civilised world. Even at this moment it lies in your power to avert it. Nobody threatens the honour and power of Russia, which could well have waited for the result of my mediation.69
Every word was true. Russia was under no threat. Nicholas could have chosen to wait for a solution to the problem between Serbia and Austria.
At the same time, Kaiser Wilhelm, the man who still stands accused of starting the catastrophic war, had made every possible effort to avoid it. One important measure of his inner feelings is how he responded to the news that war was inevitable. Was he elated, filled with unbridled joy? No. Was this the moment for which he had yearned? No. Wilhelm’s anguish was clearly reflected in a note he wrote that day:
I have no doubt about it: England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves … to take the Austro-Serbian conflict for an excuse for waging a war of extermination against us … the stupidity and ineptitude of our ally is turned into a snare for us … The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her persistently prosecuted purely anti-German world policy against which we have proved ourselves helpless … From the dilemma raised by our fidelity to the venerable old Emperor of Austria, we are brought into a situation which offers England the desired pretext for annihilating us under the hypocritical cloak of justice.70
And he was right on every count. He could hardly have expressed the Secret Elite strategy more succinctly. Like a wounded animal caught in a trap, he realised too late that it had all been a set-up. Around noon on Friday, 31 July, the kaiser went to Berlin for a final conference with Bethmann and Moltke. At 1 p.m., he proclaimed the ‘Threatening Danger of War’, not a mobilisation but a formal announcement that mobilisation would take place within 48 hours.71 It was to be war. German military authorities needed to move fast. Their mobilisation was based on the understanding that Germany, under attack from two sides, would have to advance firstly on France and then turn on Russia.
SUMMARY: CHAPTER 24 – JULY 1914 – BUYING TIME – THE CHARADE OF MEDIATION
From 25 July onwards, Sir Edward Grey’s diplomatic efforts were geared to buy precious time for the secret Russian mobilisation. Every suggestion he made over the next five days favoured that.
Grey abused his friendship with Lichnowsky by implying that Britain was unlikely to play any part in a ‘ruinous’ war.
The Secret Elite placemen made strenuous attempts to maintain an appearance of normality while secretly effecting every possible preparation for war.
King George V was instrumental in deluding the kaiser and his brother that ‘England’ would remain neutral.
The Foreign Office put about the lie that Germany was secretly mobilising and better prepared for war than Russia and France.
Several of the telegrams that Sir Edward Grey allegedly circulated to diplomatic contacts were in fact never sent. It was yet another part of the great deception that he appeared to make every effort to avoid war.
Based on an expectation of British neutrality, Germany remained optimistic that a war between Austria and Serbia would remain localised, despite evidence of Russian movements on her border.
Bethmann and the kaiser became vexed with Berchtold and the Austrians, who did not respond to their insistence that they should hold talks with the Russians.
The czar wavered between a general and full mobilisation in response to the pleas from the kaiser to avoid war, but Sazonov and the military convinced him that delay was out of the question.
While Bethmann in Germany was desperately trying to find ways of maintaining peace, and with Berchtold constrained and ready to take a step back from the precipice, the door was finally slammed shut on that option when Russia announced full mobilisation on 30 July.
CHAPTER 25
Ireland – Plan B
IN THAT LAST WEEK OF July when Russia was mobilising her armies on the German border, war became certain. The Secret Elite had known for at least a decade that when Germany reacted to the Russian mobilisation, she would have little option but to simultaneously advance on France through Belgium. They were confident that this German breach of Belgian ‘neutrality’ would provide their casus belli, but what if Parliament overwhelmingly rejected entering the war on the pretext of defending Belgium? Or what if Germany did the unexpected and poured her armies directly over the French border further south through Alsace and Lorraine? The Secret Elite had a fall-back position, a Plan B. They always had.
Astonishing as it sounds, that fallback position was to be civil war in Ireland. You will find no evidence of this in history books. It isn’t there. But look hard at the extraordinary evidence presented in the following pages and decide for yourself. We will demonstrate how the Secret Elite wilfully promoted strife between the mainly Protestant Unionist north and the largely Catholic Nationalist south, and had their agents arm both opposing camps with weapons purchased in Germany. If, for whatever reason, their justification for taking Britain to war could not be found in a German violation of Belgium, civil war in Ireland would immediately have been ignited. Banner headlines in the pro-war British press would have immediately blamed Germany. The kaiser would have stood accused of arming both sides in a devious attempt to neutralise Britain through internal conflict. Outrage on the streets would most certainly have followed, with public insistence that the country immediately join France and Russia against the evil ‘Hun’.
A similar plan had been considered with Alfred Milner in the run-up to the Boer War. His Balliol College friend and member of the inner core of the Secret Elite, Philip Lyttelton Gell,1 whom Milner made a director of the British South Africa Company, wrote to him in July 1899, insisting that more direct action be taken to stir war. Gell described the British public as the ‘uninstructed mass of limp opinion’ and added that ‘Something more has got to happen before the government could prudently take the initiative in bloodshed … a fresh murder would start the people … people would like that if the murder was really brutal.’2 Though he was talking about the Transvaal in 1899, the same remarks applied to Sarajevo in 1914. Of even greater interest was a fall-back position to which Gell made direct reference: the importation of guns and ammunition to South Africa. His view was that if the British public realised that the Boers had imported arms from Germany to be used against British subjects, the cause for war ‘would be popular and obvious’.3 And Kruger had taken such a step. In the aftermath of the Jameson Raid, the Boers imported 37,000 Mausers from Krupp’s factory in Germany.4 The ploy was identical. Both in 1899 and 1914, the Secret Elite had a considered fall-back plan involving guns and ammunition provided by Germany that would have turned public opinion in favour of war.
Civil war in Ireland was never the intention, but the appearance of one had to be real, and the Secret Elite wielded the power to take matters as far as they deemed necessary. Churchill was later to admit that ‘German agents reported and German statesmen believed that England was paralysed by faction and drifting into civil war’.5 The carefully engineered ‘crisis’ in Ireland presented coincidental bonuses. A large paramilitary force in the north, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), marched, drilled and trained with rifles for months before the outbreak of war under the instruction of former senior British Army officers. After the outbreak o
f war, a considerable number of these men enlisted with the 36th (Ulster) Division of the British Army. Perhaps of greater importance was that with public attention focused on Ireland, the Secret Elite created a very convenient smokescreen behind which they prepared for action on the continent. When the 5th Battalion, the Black Watch, was ordered to muster on 31 July, the soldiers assumed they were headed for Ireland, only to be thoroughly disappointed that their allotted task was to protect the Tay Bridge from an imaginary invasion force. ‘We thought we were going to Ulster when we got orders last night … there would have been some excitement there.’6 Plenty of ‘excitement’ lay ahead, but not in Dundee or Belfast. While historians and commentators wrongly use the concept of inevitability in conjunction with the First World War in July 1914, the only war that seemed inevitable then to the people of Britain was war in Ireland.
The Secret Elite was not responsible for centuries-old religious animosities in Ireland, but they manipulated them to their own ends. Ireland was riven by religious antagonisms between the historic Protestant ascendancy in the industrial north, and an agricultural Catholic majority in the south. The country was divided between those who wished Ireland greater degrees of self-government, and the pro-Empire Loyalist Protestants who held themselves to be British first, foremost and for ever.
Hidden History: The Secret Origins of the First World War. Page 40