In the decades leading up to the beginning of the First Punic War both regional powers had agreed to stay out of each other’s spheres of influence. Treaties in 348 and again in 279 clearly gave Rome control over the Italian Peninsula and Carthage dominion over the western seas and islands. But as the third century wore on, both sides knew that competing economic interests would create friction and eventually war.
The First Punic War’s casus belli would be control of the Straits of Messina between Sicily and Italy. In 265, a powerful Greek army from the city of Syracuse launched an attack on Messana, a rival city to the north located on the northeast corner of Sicily. Years earlier a band of mercenaries and pirates called Mamertines (from the war god Mamers or Mars whom they worshipped) had seized Messana and used it as a base of operations against Syracuse.68 Rival factions within the besieged city sent embassies to both Rome and Carthage offering the city in return for military assistance. Rome dispatched an army under the command of consul Appius Claudius Caudex, but he arrived too late. Carthaginian forces had already invested the city and taken control of the strategic strait. Unwilling to tolerate a Carthaginian presence in what was perceived as Rome’s sphere of influence, the Senate accused Carthage of violating the long-standing treaty and declared war in 264. The first of three Punic wars was on.
Rome immediately found itself presented with a strategic problem – how to prosecute a war against Carthage’s thalassocracy without a navy of its own. A North African fleet patrolled the Straits of Messina and the Carthaginian commander, Hanno, felt confident his navy would keep the Romans at bay. He would be proved wrong. Claudius’ army of perhaps two legions and support troops (perhaps 20,000 men) garrisoned the Italian city of Rhegium, an important port facing Messana across the straits.69 Under cover of darkness and using commandeered fishing boats and merchant ships, Claudius boldly ferried his troops across the waterway and surrounded Messana. Outmanned and outwitted, Hanno was forced to retreat, leaving Messana to the Romans.
Sicily and North Africa During the First Punic War
Sicily remained the main theatre of operations for the entire First Punic War.
After seizing Messana, the Romans threatened Syracuse itself in 263. Despite the lack of sophisticated siege techniques, Rome was able to compel the Syracusans into an alliance, but not even the presence of a powerful ally in Sicily could keep the war going well for Rome and most of the warfare which took place on the island consisted of siege warfare. Roman siege techniques were still rather simplistic at the beginning of the Punic wars. Rome had learned how to organize and sustain long sieges in its wars of Italian expansion, while also developing such skills as the escalade (when soldiers attack enemy walls with scaling ladders), battering, and sapping (tunnelling under walls). In fact, it was during this period that the Romans perfected the deployment of the testudo (a formation where legionaries create a protective, interlocking canopy with their shields to protect them from missile fire). The Romans also became proficient at protecting their siege lines with elaborate field fortifications. Despite these developments, Roman warfare remained seriously deficient in the use of artillery, specifically catapults, when the First Punic War began. Roman siegecraft did mature during the conflict with Carthage, with Romans eventually mastering the use of artillery. Our knowledge of Roman siege warfare also increases due to the detailed accounts of Polybius, who was an expert on siege warfare and who gave very detailed accounts of the Roman sieges of this period.70
The Carthaginians used their superior navy to raid the Italian coast and blockade Sicilian ports, denying Roman troops the supplies needed to secure the island completely. Unable to lure their adversary into a decisive engagement on land, the Romans made a fateful decision to seek battle on the open water. In 260 Roman engineers and carpenters constructed over 120 large naval vessels (reportedly one hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes) in only two months, using a Carthaginian galley that ran aground as a template.71 Fortunately for the Romans, the Italian Peninsula was blessed with great forests of fir, the preferred wood for warship construction.72 The commanding admiral, consul Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, then assembled crews and drilled them on benches on the beach before putting them to sea. Polybius tells us that the ships were launched as soon as they were finished.73 By creating a navy literally from scratch the Romans exhibited the resourcefulness and adaptability that were hallmarks of their civilization.
But even the Romans recognized that ships built and manned in haste would have problems matching the Carthaginian fleet in open water. To compensate for inexperience, an unnamed Roman shipwright fitted an unknown number of quinqueremes with a boarding device known as a corvus (Latin for crow or raven).74 Four feet wide and thirty-six feet in length and fitted with an iron spike on the end, the corvus was pivoted from a mast by a topping lift, then dropped onto the adjacent ship’s prow or deck, securing it in place as Roman marines crossed the plank and engaged in hand-to-hand combat with enemy sailors. The application of the corvus in naval warfare allowed Rome to fight as a land power at sea, evening the odds against an accomplished naval power.
Though the quality of the ships and crews no doubt differed, both Carthaginian and Roman quinqueremes and triremes were narrow war galleys whose chief offensive tactic was to ram an opposing ship with its bronze ‘beak’. In combat, a fully-equipped Carthaginian or Roman quinquereme had a complement of 300 sailors, of which 250 to 270 were rowers and the remainder manned the rigging, masts, and rudders.75 These vessels also carried a detachment of between 80 and 120 fighting troops, including archers and catapult operators for offensive missile fire and swordsmen and spearmen to defend the deck from boarding. There was one notable difference between Punic and Roman warships. The corvus made Roman ships very top-heavy, much less manoeuvrable, and extremely vulnerable to bad weather.
Armed with a novice navy, the Romans sought battle with the Carthaginians in the summer of 460 in the waters off Mylae, on Sicily’s northeastern coast. The Roman flotilla, led by the consul Gaius Duilius, watched as the Carthaginian fleet of 131 galleys sailed right toward them, probably in a single line abeam, the standard formation a superior fleet took when meeting an inferior one.76 Polybius maintains that the Carthaginians were not concerned by the strange superstructures fitted to the Roman ships.77 When they tried to ram the Roman ships, the Romans dropped their corvi onto the unsuspecting Punic ships, catching thirty vessels immediately off guard. Unable to escape the falling gangplanks, the North African sailors watched as the Roman marines swept onto their decks. Altogether, the Romans sank or captured as many as fifty enemy ships, stunning the Carthaginian sea power.78
The Battle of Mylae, 260 BCE, Phase I. Off the northwest coast of Sicily, a 131-ship Carthaginian fleet (1) closes with a 145-ship Roman fleet (2). The Carthaginians sail in line abreast, counting on their superior seamanship to offset the slight numerical superiority enjoyed by the less-skilful Romans. The Carthaginians pay no heed to the odd structures mounted on the bows of the Roman vessels.
The Battle of Mylae, 260 BCE, Phase II. As the fleets close and the ships clash together, the purpose of the odd structures on the Roman vessels becomes clear. The corvus provides a ready-made gangplank for Roman infantry to board enemy vessels. Upon closing with the Carthaginian vessels, the corvi are released, their steel beaks slamming into the enemy decks and locking the ships fast. Roman marines swiftly cross the bridges and overwhelm the startled Carthaginian sailors (1). The Carthaginians attempt to envelop the Roman flanks (2) but the corvi rotate to face the oncoming ships.
The Battle of Mylae, 260 BCE, Phase III. More Carthaginian ships are impaled by the corvi. The Romans capture or sink around fifty ships, causing the rest of the enemy to flee. The defeat sends a shock wave through Carthaginian naval circles.
The victory at Mylae gave the Romans local command of the sea around Sicily and allowed the Italians to broaden the theatre of operations to include Sardinia, Corsica and Malta. Confident in their newfound abilities as sailo
rs, the Romans continued to build ships and engage the Carthaginians in large-scale naval battles. The most significant of these victories took place in 256 near Cape Ecnomus in south-central Sicily. Here, a Roman flotilla of 330 ships and 140,000 men met and defeated a Carthaginian fleet of some 350 ships and 150,000 men in one of the greatest naval battles of the classical period.79 The Roman objective was simple – the destruction of the enemy navy in order to establish command of the sea and strike directly at Carthage itself. With the Carthaginian fleet in flight, the Romans refitted and sailed for North Africa.
The Romans landed at the city of Aspis just south of Cape Hermaia (modern Cape Bon), some seventy-five miles east of Carthage. After beaching their ships and surrounding them with a trench and palisade, the Romans ventured out and captured Aspis. But with winter approaching, Rome sent word recalling one consul and the fleet to friendly waters, leaving Regulus with forty ships and two under strength legions and auxiliaries (15,000 foot and 500 horse) to ravage the countryside.80
The Battle of Ecnomus, 256 BCE, Phase I. A 330-ship Roman fleet under consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius Vulso and a 350-ship Carthaginian fleet under Hamilcar and Hanno approach each other off the southern coast of Sicily. One Roman squadron tows transports containing an expeditionary force, shielded by a fourth squadron to their rear. Three Carthaginian squadrons are in line, while the landward squadron positions itself to outflank the Romans as the forces close.
The Battle of Ecnomus, 256 BCE, Phase II. Hamilcar signals the fleet, ordering his centre squadrons to thin their rank by sending ships to the flanks (1), hoping to entice the aggressive Romans into concentrating on this weak point while ignoring their flanks. The Carthaginian flank squadrons begin to manoeuvre for a flank attack against the Roman formation (2).
The Battle of Ecnomus, 256 BCE, Phase III. The Carthaginian centre comes about and feigns flight from the Roman wedge (1). Regulus and Vulso take the bait and pursue (2), but the ships towing the transports and their covering force cannot keep pace and fall behind (3).
The Battle of Ecnomus, 256 BCE, Phase IV. The Roman vanguard engages the main Carthaginian squadrons (1). the corvi prove highly effective, locking the opposing vessels together and allowing the Roman marines to rapidly assault the grappled Carthaginian ships. The remaining Punic ships flee, this time in earnest (2). The Roman’s third line cuts the towed troop transports free and joins the fourth line in engaging the Carthaginian squadrons approaching from the north and south (3).
The Battle of Ecnomus, 256 BCE, Phase V. Rather than pursue the fleeing Carthaginians, Regulus and Vulso order their squadrons to come about and sail to the aid of their comrades (1). Meanwhile, the Roman’s third and fourth squadrons succeed in driving off the Punic ships approaching from seaward (2) and trap the landward element against the coastline (3). At a cost of only twenty-four ships lost, the Romans capture sixty-four galleys and sink thirty. After refitting, the Roman fleet and expeditionary force sails for North Africa.
The Carthaginian authorities quickly put their wealth to use and hired an experienced Greek general named Xanthippus to lead their defence. Brought up in the Spartan military system, Xanthippus was a capable and charismatic leader who quickly hired an army of mercenaries to supplement the native garrison, raising a substantial force of 15,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 100 war elephants.81 In the spring of 255 (most probably May) Xanthippus took the initiative and led his force against the invading Romans. When the two hosts made contact somewhere in the flat country southwest of Tunis, near the town of Adys, the Romans encamped a little more than a mile away and waited. The following day the Carthaginians held a war council and decided to attack while their soldiers were in good spirits.82
Xanthippus ordered the war elephants forward and stationed them in a line to screen the forming army. The Carthaginian heavy infantry assembled behind the pachyderms, with the cavalry on the wings. He placed some additional mercenary forces on the right wing and light infantry in front of both cavalry detachments. The Romans moved eagerly to accept battle, screening their forming legionaries with velites, ever wary of an elephant charge. Polybius tells us that Regulus positioned his forces ‘shorter and deeper than usual’ as a defence against the elephants, but it also shortened the frontage of the entire army, making it more vulnerable to the Carthaginian cavalry, which already far outnumbered the Roman horse.83
The Battle of Tunis opened just as the Roman’s expected, with Xanthippus ordering the Punic war elephants and cavalry on both wings forward. The Romans immediately met this attack, ‘clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom, and shouting their battle-cry’.84 The Roman cavalry, outmatched and outnumbered, was immediately routed on both wings. The Roman legionaries on the left faired much better, avoiding the elephant charge and driving the Carthaginians and mercenaries back, pursuing their enemy as far as the Punic camp. In the Roman centre, the forward maniples tried in vain to meet the elephant charge, but were trampled underfoot. Still, the formation held, owing to its increased depth. Despite this modest success, the remainder of the Roman line found itself pressed between the charging elephants in front and encircling enemy horse behind. Even those legionaries which managed to fight their way through the elephants now faced a fresh Carthaginian phalanx bearing down on them. Surrounded on all sides, the Roman centre was annihilated. Retreating early, Regulus was captured along with about 500 of his troops. Only the 2,000 Roman legionaries who sacked the Carthaginian camp managed to escape back to Aspis. Polybius states Carthaginian casualties at 800 mercenaries.85
The victory at Tunis would serve the Carthaginian cause for generations. A composite Punic army made up of local North African militia and mercenaries could defeat Rome, a perennial land power, as long as the population remained safe behind the long walls of Carthage, safely resupplied by sea from its far-flung maritime empire. Xanthippus’ strategy at Tunis would also inspire Hannibal Barca at Zama half a century later. The loss at Tunis also left an indelible mark on the Roman psyche. It illustrated the difficulty of outfitting, deploying and maintaining a Roman army in North Africa. The defeat not only inflamed Roman enmity towards Carthage, its lessons would be remembered by older Romans in the Second Punic War, men like the influential Fabius Maximus, who understood all too well the value of a Punic victory on North African soil to the Carthaginians.
The Battle of Tunis, 255 BCE, Phase I. Somewhere on the plains southwest of Tunis, the Greek general Xanthippus deploys his army behind a protective line of 100 elephants to face a smaller Roman force led by consul Marcus Atilius Regulus. The Roman deployment is deeper than normal in an attempt to counter the danger posed by the enemy’s pachyderms.
The Battle of Tunis, 255 BCE, Phase II. Xanthippus opens the action as expected, ordering his cavalry wings (1) and elephants forward against the Romans. Outnumbered eight-to-one, the Roman horseman have no hope of success and are driven quickly from the field (3). The legionaries clash spears and shields together, shouting their battle cry as they watch the line of elephants lumbering towards them.
The Battle of Tunis, 255 BCE, Phase III. The Roman left drive off many of the attacking elephants and infantry, pursuing some of them back to their camp (1). The Roman right fares less well, as men are trampled underfoot and pressed hard by the enemy phalanx (3). Meanwhile, the Punic cavalry breaks off its pursuit of the inferior Roman horse and begins to reform in the Roman’s rear (4).
The Battle of Tunis, 255 BCE, Phase IV. Pressed on all sides by Carthaginian infantry and elephants (1) and the advance of the Punic cavalry to their rear, the Roman army is annihilated. Attempting to escape the fate of his men, Regulus flees the field with 500 men but is quickly captured (3). Only the 2,000 men that had sacked the Punic camp managed to avoid their comrades’ fate.
The Romans sent a fleet to rescue the remaining legionaries, who managed a spirited defence of Aspis. This Roman fleet secured a major victory against the Punic fleet in 255 off Cape Hermaia. But on the retu
rn home, the Roman flotilla was struck by a massive storm, destroying 184 of the 264 ships.86 The Carthaginian army did not fare much better. After defeating Rome’s ‘Army of Africa’, Carthage faced an even more dangerous enemy when the Numidians attacked and ravished its territory. After a ruthless campaign, the Carthaginians exacted a terrible tribute of 10,000 talents and 20,000 head of cattle from the rebelling tribes, even capturing and crucifying the chiefs.87
Over the next six years (255–249) the main theatre of operations returned to the island of Sicily centred around the Punic fortress at Lilybaeum and its harbour city of Drepana, though Romans did occasionally raid Carthaginian territory in North Africa. Storms continued to wreak havoc with Rome, destroying a fleet in 254 and again in 249. Also in 249 the Carthaginians enjoyed a major naval victory, defeating a fleet of 123 quinqueremes at the Battle of Drepana off the west coast of Sicily, near the harbour of the same name. Rome lost ninety-three ships, while Carthage did not lose a single vessel. Drepana would mark the last time the North African thalassocracy would win a major naval victory. Despite success, Carthage could not raise the land siege of Lilybaeum and the war in Sicily ground on for another eight years.
In 247 BCE Carthage sent one of their best and brightest generals, Hamilcar Barca, to Sicily to take over command, though there is evidence that he was never given the resources necessary to win the campaign.88 His famous son Hannibal was born around the time of his father’s departure for Sicily. Polybius has high praise for Hamilcar, calling him ‘the general who must be acknowledged as the greatest on either side, both in daring and in genius’.89 He was an aggressive commander, defending Sicily from bases at Heirkte (near Panormus) and Eryx while raiding southern Italy in Bruttium around the city of Locri on the toe of the peninsula. But Rome’s steady pressure, combined with lessening support from Carthage, spelled the beginning of the end for Hamilcar in Sicily. In 242 the Romans finally captured the harbour at Drepana, cutting off Lilybaeum from resupply by sea. Polybius makes it clear that the Roman strategy was to provoke a major naval engagement to land a ‘mortal blow’ against Carthage.90
Hannibal’s Last Battle Page 5