Secret representation in Lausanne to be established as contact points for the French headquarters England and USA…. A summary of financial needs is as follows. (1) Sufficient Swiss funds to cover local representation. This item we have already agreed to meet. (2) To develop the organization as above 25 million francs monthly. (3) An additional amount to cover specific maintenance for guerrillas, sabotage, etc. (4) a reserve capital to take care of releve [relief] personnel…. There is an immediate need of materials, arms, explosives and a reserve stock of rations for guerrilla organizations.10
Dulles urged planning from London to help organize French guerrilla warfare and resistance programs. “For reasons explain[ed] separately 511 proving cooperative and this greatly facilitates the maintenance of communications across the border with groups.”11 The number 511 was the code for the Swiss intelligence service, headed by Roger Masson, whom Dulles referred to as “Bones.”12 Dulles did not identify specific Swiss agents when using the number 511. What was significant was that “511” cooperated with OSS assistance to the French maquis. Moreover, General Henri Guisan, commander-in-chief of the Swiss armed forces, who had ultimate authority over Swiss intelligence, cooperated with Dulles.
Secrecy was critical, because the threat of invasion was real. Had Nazi spies gained information about Swiss cooperation with the Allies, Germany would have another reason to attack. During the 1943 “March Alarm,” discussed earlier in this book, Swiss intelligence was informed by its “Wiking Line,” which reached into Hitler’s headquarters, that an invasion of Switzerland was imminent.13 Dulles was privy to Swiss intelligence evidencing that “Germany is commencing a new war of nerves against this country. Detailed invasion plans are being planted, perhaps for the purpose of bolstering economic negotiations which may be pending. Despite the fact that immediate danger is discounted, all possibilities should be considered and plans laid accordingly.”14 This intelligence, even if it proved inaccurate, demanded the highest levels of military preparedness by the Swiss.
To this day, it remains unknown whether the reports about an imminent Nazi attack were real or planted, either to blackmail Switzerland into economic concessions or uncover sources of suspected leaks in the German high command. Both of these scenarios were typical of the insidious intelligence warfare waged by the Hitler regime. Switzerland nevertheless continued to allow herself to be a center of resistance planning.
The OSS was highly active in supporting resistance against the Fascist regime in Italy. Early on, Mussolini saw the writing on the wall and recognized that his days in power were numbered. In an April 1943 telegram to “Victor” (an OSS transmitting and receiving station in England), “Burns” (Dulles) wrote:
The Swiss authorities have been approached by Mussolini with a view to finding out whether they would grant him admission into their country in case of eventualities, as he has fears for his personal safety in the event internal revolution or invasion by the Allies should take place. It was also reported by this source that consideration of the matter at this time was refused by the Swiss. It may be recalled that a number of years ago when Mussolini was a youthful agitator, he was compelled to leave Switzerland under orders of expulsion, and that later when he came to Switzerland as Prime Minister, the decree of expulsion had to be speedily revoked.15
Germany being a far more formidable enemy than Italy, intelligence gathered in Switzerland about the former was more valuable. One of Dulles’ most important German sources was Hans Bernd Gisevius, an Abwehr (German military intelligence) agent stationed in Zurich under the cover of Vice Consul. A member of the anti-Hitler German underground and a conservative lawyer, Gisevius rejected Nazism.16 Although the Abwehr actively spied on Switzerland, its head, Admiral Canaris, discouraged a German invasion there, just as he had previously counter acted Hitler’s designs regarding Spain and other neutral countries. Hitler mistrusted Canaris, eventually dismissed him, and finally had him executed as a conspirator in the July 1944 assassination plot, from which Hitler had barely escaped. Gisevius, who had a good relationship with Swiss police authorities, tried to halt the replacement of Abwehr personnel with those of Himmler’s SD (Sicherheitsdienst) intelligence network. In view of Himmler’s increasing power, Dulles knew this was a losing battle.17
In a telegram in mid-March 1944, Dulles expressed concern about a meeting between Swiss intelligence chief Roger Masson and Walter Schellenberg of the Gestapo. Without naming any agent or information passed other than the mere fact of the meeting, Dulles described the contact as a “perilously close association” (even though Dulles himself also had contacts with Schellenberg18). Dulles believed that “the controlling Swiss authorities have a basic desire for an Allied victory,” but others hoped for a compromise peace. Dulles thus presented evidence of possible leaks “in strictest secrecy to the highest Swiss Quarters”—headed by General Henri Guisan, commander of the Swiss armed forces. Guisan, as it turned out, was aware of the meetings between Masson and Schellenberg, considering it the task of any spy agency to obtain intelligence from all sources. Dulles continued:
The disclosure could be made in such a manner as to implicate the Lomax shop [the British spy and smuggling ring in Switzer land],19 which the Swiss already know to be very leaky. General Guisan has just indicated his wish for a confidential conversation with me, and it is to him, and to him alone, that I would personally submit my evidence. I am convinced that his integrity and devotion to our ideals are unimpeachable, and that the discovery of what is occurring (presumably unbeknownst to him) might move him to act.20
Dulles used the code name “Castle” as a general indicator for messages dealing with the German threat to Switzerland. Under this category Dulles sent a telegram recording his March 1944 meeting with General Guisan as follows:
Recently I talked to General G. [Guisan] and made known to him that the situation in general was causing me some concern. He said that he would begin an investigation on his own. I think that his reason for requesting a talk with me was to try to gain some indication of whether or not it is probable that France will be invaded in the near future. It is evident that he fears the threat to Switzerland present in the fact that the Nazis may wish to use Swiss railroads to transport Nazi forces into safety in the event of a retreat of the Germans from the South in case the attack is carried on simultaneously in the North and South. We have assigned General G. Our 839.21
Thus, General Guisan became code number “839,” a standard OSS practice to protect the identities of contacts in case the message was intercepted. Had Germany intercepted this telegram, it would not have been hard to guess that “General G” was number “839.” It was hardly a secret that General Guisan was a bitter enemy of Nazi Germany.
During this same period, Dulles continued to question the demand for “unconditional surrender.” He knew that most Germans believed the Allies were set on annihilating German economic power once and for all. “The expression ‘unconditional surrender’ therefore signifies to most of them total catastrophe for the country and for the individual German, as we ourselves haven’t done a thing to offer them any hope of any more optimistic meaning for this expression.” The Allies had made no efforts to restrict the term to military and party leaders, and the horrific ongoing air raids seemed evidence enough of Allied intentions.22
Nazi propaganda chief Goebbels used the demand for “unconditional surrender” to harden German resistance. Dulles suggested that Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin should issue harmonizing proclamations that would allow the German people to accept the complete surrender of the Nazi government and war machine without the annihilation of Germany. Through radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda, some Germans had been encouraged (albeit remaining suspicious) by the Free German Committee set up by Moscow.23 Dulles feared that the West’s failure to drive a wedge between the Nazi leadership and the German people was prolonging the war and could turn Germans toward the Soviets.
All the intelligence trails in such matters seem
ed to lead to Switzerland. Dulles sent a telegram to the head of OSS, General William (“Wild Bill”) Donovan, that the group code-named “the Breakers,” a pro-Western, anti-Hitler faction within the German military, proposed military operations to help Allied forces enter Germany from the West and to isolate the Nazi leadership, on condition that German forces be allowed to hold the Eastern front. They knew the war was lost and sought to have as much of Europe as possible occupied by the Americans and British to prevent the spread of Communism. Although the West would not agree to the Ger mans continuing to fight the Soviets, Dulles sought to encourage the Breakers to strike the Nazi leadership. “This group can safely contact Switzerland,” as “their contacts here are more secure than anywhere else….”24 Much of the encouragement and coordination of the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler’s life took place in Switzerland.
D-Day intervened before this attempt, and emboldened the anti-Hitler conspirators. By a radiotelephone transmission on June 6, 1944, Dulles commented on German reactions to that morning’s Allied invasion of Normandy as reported in the evening edition of Switzerland’s leading newspaper, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). NZZ reported that surprised German authorities waited until afternoon to inform the German people, who were skeptical of Nazi propaganda, that the invasion was ordered by Moscow. Dulles noted that the OSS would now step up its intelligence efforts “from this vantage point behind German lines,” concluding: “Undoubtedly, every effort will be made by the Germans to tighten the control of access to Switzerland, but this will require troops, and these they can spare with difficulty. The general impression here is that with the main attack apparently coming from the North, Switzerland itself is not in any immediate danger from the Germans.”25
Just days into the D-Day invasion, Dulles telegraphed General Donovan a report on the use of Dulles’ German contacts for the postwar organization of Germany. Dulles was concerned that the identity of the German informants communicating with him in Switzerland be kept strictly confidential, noting: “Switzerland, with its literature and news papers printed for the most part in German and with the majority of its nationals speaking that language, is in a better position to maintain contact with Germany than other countries are, regardless of the fact that the German-speaking Swiss are fundamentally opposed to the Third Reich philosophy.” Dulles identified a number of German exiles in Switzerland who were anti-Nazi and could assist in the occupation and reeducation of Germany.26
Dulles had another confidential meeting with General Guisan on June 13 and reported in a telegram:
1. 839 [Guisan] stated in a private talk which I had with him yesterday that he felt a renewed sense of unrest regarding the local situation, in view of the developments in Italy and the presence of a substantial number of Nazi reserve troops on his northern border. He said that their SI [Swiss Secret Intelligence] services had located 35 Nazi divisions in the general vicinity of Alsace, Vorarlberg, Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Black Forest and Baden; they estimated that the total Nazi strategic reserve amounted to 60 divisions.
2. He was aware that the greater part of the 35 divisions were in all probability either recuperating or training and that a majority of them were only two regiments strong. He stated, nevertheless, that they had identified among this group two air divisions and several veteran field divisions. Therefore, in the light of this, he was exercising every possible precaution and was calling up additional troops.
3. 839 mentioned that the Brenner Pass was becoming increasingly precarious…. He said that if the Italian approaches to Simplon and Gotthard were destroyed, Nazi pressure would be rendered less effective.27
Guisan thus all but suggested that the Allies bomb the transportation routes on the Italian side of Switzerland which led to the Simplon and Gotthard passes through the Swiss Alps. Switzerland was bound by longstanding treaties to allow commercial transit through these passes but not to facilitate troop movements of belligerents. The Swiss resisted Axis pressure to use these passes for troops going between Germany and Italy, and were ready to destroy the tunnels immediately upon an Axis invasion. The Swiss never relented on this issue, but as Guisan mentioned, the pressure was increasing because the Brenner Pass between Austria and Italy was becoming insufficient for the Germans.
Dulles reported that no other source had indicated the number of organized German divisions north of the Swiss border as Guisan had asserted, although there were several hundred thousand convalescents or trainees. Knowing the German tactic of disinformation about surprise attacks, the Swiss could hardly afford to take chances. Dulles continued: “We, however, do have reports which state that more and more Nazi deserters are coming over; this, of course, would require larger patrols along the Swiss border.” There were also rumors that, “in view of the developments in Italy and France, the Swiss are weighing the possibility of preparing some defense at the frontiers, instead of immediately withdrawing to Réduit in the event of attack, and as a result, are planning that the forces outside of Réduit are to be increased.”28 The Swiss obviously believed Allied campaigns might induce Germany to intrude into Switzerland, and they reacted quickly. Swiss forces which were previously concentrated in the Réduit (the central Alpine redoubt) were relocated to the borders with France and Italy, which had the greatest danger of incursion by German forces.29
Dulles later wrote that Guisan’s report about “sizable Nazi concentrations in the general region of the northeastern border of Switzerland” were not confirmed by American sources. “The Nazi divisions in that sector seem to be mainly Ersatz divisions which are being established and they have comparatively little strength.” Dulles speculated that “the SD [German intelligence] planted this report on our local friends.”30 The Swiss left nothing to chance and prepared for attack whenever threatened.
During the unfolding of the Allied campaigns, Guisan informed Dulles of the following shocking intelligence: “A report concerning Nazi preparations for bacteriological warfare was being carefully checked by 839’s SI [Guisan’s Secret Intelligence] services. According to rumor, scientific experiments were conducted in laboratories at Lyon; the product was produced then forwarded to Leipzig.”31 This kind of detailed intelligence about the possibility of such a devastating weapon was of critical importance to the Allies, and of course to Switzerland. Whether true or false, such intelligence would have to be met with all due precautions.
Similarly, Swiss intelligence shared with the OSS information on Germany’s advances in aerial technology. A German Messershmitt-110 twin-engined fighter, which had been fitted with secret advanced technology, landed in Switzerland by mistake. The Swiss obviously examined the technical features thoroughly. The plane was equipped with a nightfighting mechanism which, Dulles was informed, “the Nazis are vigorously trying to protect.” It included 16 dipole antennae on the nose of the airplane which receive and transmit on a wavelength of 60 centimeters. “They produce an extremely narrow beam which makes it possible for the pilot to locate on an oscillograph any hostile bombing planes which are flying on the direct course of his plane.”32
The above exemplifies the value of Switzerland as America’s window on the Reich. Dulles was also as interested in active psychological warfare as he was in simply gathering and reporting intelligence. He repeatedly returned to the need to clarify the “unconditional surrender” slogan in a manner to encourage German resistance to Hitler. In a message transmitted via General Donovan to President Roosevelt on July 15, 1944, Dulles wrote that, since Nazi Germany’s end was in sight, the United States should make it clear that “unconditional surrender” applied “to the Nazis and the German war machine, but not to the German people if they took it upon themselves to overthrow their criminal government.” Without such clarification, Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels would continue to broadcast that an Allied victory would mean “unconditional annihilation” for Germany. Dulles believed fanatical German resistance would only prolong the war and cost the lives of thousands of Allied soldiers.33
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p; Dulles’ advice again went unheeded, despite the nearly successful assassination attempt against Hitler on July 20. The Führer survived the explosion of the bomb planted by Claus von Stauffenberg and instigated a new reign of terror against any semblance of a German opposition, executing thousands.34 Some of the conspirators managed to escape to Switzerland. Gisevius, the Abwehr agent who was a chief informant for Dulles, participated in the attempted coup but eluded capture in Berlin when it was crushed. Dodging the Gestapo for several weeks, he slipped over the border into Switzerland, where he would later write a history of the anti-Nazi resistance.35 Gisevius was assisted by Mary Bancroft, a Dulles aide in Bern who later wrote her own autobiography recounting her espionage adventures in Switzerland.36
Within days of the assassination attempt, Dulles noted, the Gestapo knew that Abwehr agents were involved in the “Breakers” action and sought to liquidate the perpetrators and assimilate the whole Abwehr organization into the SD. SD chief Walter Schellenberg went so far as to furnish Swiss intelligence chief Roger Masson with a list of Abwehr agents in Switzerland “with the idea of having them expelled. However, we think it unlikely the Swiss will take any action….”37 Switzerland continued to be a safe haven for anti-Hitler conspirators.
Safe haven, however, did not translate into a carte blanche for anti-German resistance. Switzerland had to maintain her formal neutrality in order to survive and to protect humanitarian organizations such as the Inter national Committee of the Red Cross which operated out of the country. Dulles wrote in mid-August 1944 about the realities: “Although the Swiss are not particularly concerned about what goes on across French and Italian borders, so long as these are carried out with a certain amount of discretion, they are extremely energetic in seeing that nothing like this takes place on the German border…. The Swiss are anxious to avoid border incidents with the Reich and will go to any lengths to prevent them.”38 Secret liaison with the German opposition and informants had to be carried out with the utmost discretion and secrecy. “Switzerland is [the] most incorruptible neutral nation in existence, and we must exercise the greatest tact in getting anything done here.”39
Swiss and the Nazis Page 36