4. So that you can combine your experience of them with the experience I offer you.
5. There are those who exalt the human species to the skies, and represent man as a paragon;
6. And there are those who insist on the worst of human nature, and can discover nothing except vanity and folly in man, making him no better than other animals.
7. A delicate sense of morals is apt to give one a disgust of the world, and to make one consider the common course of human affairs with indignation and dislike.
8. For my part I think that those who view mankind favourably and sympathetically do more to promote virtue than those who have a mean opinion of human nature.
9. When a man has a high notion of his moral status, he will naturally endeavour to live up to it, and will scorn to do a base or vicious thing, which might sink him below the figure he makes in his own imagination.
10. Accordingly we find that all the best moralists concentrate on the idea that vice is unworthy of us, as well as being odious in itself.
11. In disputes concerning the dignity or meanness of human nature it is right to begin by accepting that there is a natural difference between merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom and folly.
12. Yet it is evident that in assigning approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by comparison than by any fixed standard in the nature of things.
13. When we call an animal big or small, we always do so on the basis of comparing that animal and others of the same species;
14. And it is that comparison which regulates our judgement concerning its size.
15. Suppose this dog and that horse are the same size; we will wonder at the dog for being large, the horse for being small.
16. When I hear any dispute I always ask myself whether it is a question of comparison that is at issue;
17. And if it is, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of things that are widely different.
18. In forming our notions of human nature we are apt to compare men and animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our senses.
19. Certainly this comparison is favourable to mankind. In man we see a creature whose thoughts are not limited by narrow bounds of place or time;
20. Who carries his inquiries into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the stars;
21. Who looks backward to consider the history of the human race;
22. Who casts his eye forward to see the influence of his actions on posterity,
23. And the judgement that will be made of his character a hundred or a thousand years hence;
24. We see a creature who traces causes and effects to a great length and intricacy,
25. Extracts general principles from particular appearances,
26. Improves his discoveries, corrects his mistakes and makes his errors profitable.
27. On the other side we see an animal – a being the very reverse of this, limited in its observations and reasonings to a few objects which surround it;
28. Without curiosity, without foresight; blindly conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a short time, its utmost perfection, beyond which it is unable to advance a single step.
29. Thus we see what a wide difference there is between humans and the other animals!
30. And how exalted a notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison to the latter therefore!
31. Yet there are two means commonly employed to destroy this conclusion:
32. First, by making an unfair representation of the case, and insisting only on the weaknesses of human nature,
33. And second, by forming a comparison between man and imagined beings of the most perfect wisdom.
34. Among the other excellencies of man, one is that he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himself;
35. And therefore he is not limited in his conception of wisdom and virtue, but can imagine both in the greatest degree.
36. He can easily exalt his notions and conceive an extent of knowledge, which, when compared to his own, will make his own appear very contemptible,
37. And will cause the difference between human sagacity and that of animals almost to disappear.
38. Given that all the world agree that human understanding falls infinitely short of perfect wisdom,
39. It is proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not dispute where there is no real difference in our sentiments.
40. Man falls much more short of perfect wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man;
41. Yet the latter difference is so considerable that nothing but a comparison with the former can make it appear of little moment.
42. It is also usual to compare one person with another; and finding very few we can call wise or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptuous notion of people in general.
43. To see the fallacy of this way of reasoning, we may observe that the honourable appellations of wise and virtuous are not annexed to any particular degree of those qualities of wisdom and virtue;
44. But arise only from the comparison we make between one person and another. When we find a man who attains an uncommon pitch of wisdom, we pronounce him wise:
45. So to say that there are few wise people in the world, is really to say nothing; since it is only by their scarcity that they merit that appellation.
46. Were the lowest of our kind as wise as the greatest that history contains, we should still have reason to say that there are few wise people.
47. For in that case we should exalt our notions of wisdom still higher,
48. And should not pay a singular honour to anyone who was not singularly distinguished by his talents.
Epistle 2
1. As it is usual to compare man with the other species above or below him, or to compare the individuals of the species among themselves;
2. So we often compare together the different motives of human nature, in order to regulate our judgement concerning it.
3. And indeed this is the only kind of comparison which is worth our attention, or decides anything in the present question.
4. If our selfish and vicious principles were much more dominant than our social and virtuous principles, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptuous notion of human nature.
5. But there is much that is mere dispute about words in this controversy. When a man denies the sincerity of public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss what to think of him.
6. Perhaps he never felt this emotion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts about its reality.
7. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendship, if no interest or self-love intermix itself, I am then confident that he abuses terms, and misunderstands the ideas they denote;
8. For it is impossible for anyone to be so selfish or stupid as to make no difference between one man and another, and to give no preference to qualities which invite his approbation and esteem.
9. Is he also as insensible to anger as he pretends to be to friendship? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindness or benefits?
10. Impossible: he does not know himself: he has forgotten the movements of his heart;
11. Or rather, he makes use of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and does not call things by their proper names.
12. What does he say of natural affection? Is that also a species of self-love?
13. ‘Yes,’ he says: ‘all is self-love. My children are loved only because they are mine:
14. ‘My friend for a like reason: and my country engages me only so far as it has a connection with myself.’
15. So if the idea of self were removed, nothing would affect him! He would be altogether inactive and insensible:
16. Or, if he ever gave himself any movement, it would only be from vanity, and a desire of fame and reputation to his own
self.
17. I reply that I am willing to accept his interpretation of human actions, provided he admit the facts:
18. That self-love which manifests itself in kindness to others has a great influence over human actions,
19. And even greater, on many occasions, than that which remains in its original shape and form.
20. For how few are there, who, having a family, children and relations, do not spend more on the maintenance and education of these than on their own pleasures?
21. This, indeed, he justly observes, may proceed from their self-love, since the prosperity of their family and friends is one of their pleasures, as well as their chief honour.
22. But if he is one such of these selfish men, still he will have everyone’s good opinion and goodwill, because he cares for his family in this way;
23. Or not to shock his ears with these expressions, the self-love of everyone, and mine among the rest, will then incline us to serve him, and speak well of him.
24. In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those who have insisted so much on the selfishness of man.
25. In the first place, they found that every act of virtue or friendship was attended with a secret pleasure; from which they concluded that friendship and virtue could not be disinterested.
26. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The virtuous sentiment produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it.
27. I feel a pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake of that pleasure.
28. In the second place, it has always been found that the virtuous are far from being indifferent to praise;
29. And therefore they have been represented as a set of vainglorious people, who had nothing in view but the applause of others.
30. But this also is a fallacy. It is very unjust to find a tincture of vanity in a laudable action and to depreciate it on that account, or ascribe it entirely to that motive.
31. The case is not the same with vanity as with other passions.
32. Where avarice or revenge enters into any seemingly virtuous action, it is difficult for us to determine how far it enters, and it is natural to suppose it the sole actuating principle.
33. But vanity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions is so close to loving laudable actions for their own sake,
34. That these passions are more capable of mixture than any other kinds of affection;
35. And it is almost impossible to have the latter without some degree of the former.
36. Thus in general, to love the glory of virtuous deeds is a sure proof of the love of virtue itself.
Epistle 3
1. And now, my dear son, to your own progress in the love of virtue!
2. I shall neither deny nor grudge you any money that may be necessary for either your improvement or your pleasures:
3. I mean the pleasures of a rational being. Under the head of improvement, I mean good books, education and lodging;
4. By rational pleasures I mean charities, presents, entertainments and other incidental calls of good company.
5. The only two articles I will never pay for are low riot, and the idle lavishness of negligence and laziness.
6. A fool squanders away, without credit or advantage to himself, more than a man of sense spends in getting both.
7. The latter employs his money as he does his time, and never spends anything of the one, nor a minute of the other, except in something that is either useful or rationally pleasing to himself or others.
8. But the fool buys whatever he does not want, and does not pay for what he does want.
9. He cannot withstand the charms of fripperies and low pleasures; others conspire with his own self-indulgence to cheat him;
10. In a very little time he is astonished, in the midst of ridiculous superfluities, to find himself lacking the real comforts and necessaries of life.
11. Without care and method, the largest fortune will not, and with them, almost the smallest will, supply all necessary expenses.
12. As far as you can possibly, pay ready money for everything and avoid credit.
13. Pay that money yourself, and not through the hands of others, who always require their portion.
14. Where you must use credit, pay it regularly every month, and with your own hand.
15. Never, from a mistaken economy, buy a thing you do not want, because it is cheap; or from pride, because it is dear.
16. Keep an account in a book of what you receive, and what you pay;
17. For no man who knows what he receives and pays ever runs out.
18. In economy, as well as in the rest of life, have the proper attention to proper objects, and the proper contempt for little ones.
19. A strong mind sees things in their true proportions; a weak one views them through a magnifying medium,
20. Which, like the microscope, makes an elephant of a flea: magnifies all little objects, but blinds one to great ones.
21. The sure characteristic of a sound and strong mind is to find in everything the proper boundaries of things.
22. In manners, this line is good breeding; beyond it, is troublesome ceremony; short of it, is unbecoming negligence and inattention.
23. In morals, it divides puritanism from vice: and, in short, every virtue from its kindred vice or weakness.
Epistle 4
1. Many young people are so light, so dissipated and so incurious, that they can hardly be said to see what they see, or hear what they hear.
2. That is, they hear in so superficial and inattentive a manner that they might as well not see nor hear at all.
3. For instance, if they see a public building, as a college, a hospital, an arsenal, they content themselves with the first glance,
4. And take neither the time nor the trouble of informing themselves of the material parts of them;
5. Which are the constitution, the rules, and the order and economy in the inside.
6. You will, I hope, go deeper, and make your way into the substance of things.
7. You are now come to an age capable of reflection, and I hope you will do what few people at your age do: exert it for your own sake in the search of truth and sound knowledge.
8. I will confess, for I am not unwilling to discover my secrets to you, that it is not many years since I have presumed to reflect for myself.
9. Till sixteen or seventeen I had no reflection; and for many years after that, I made no use of what I had.
10. I adopted the notions of the books I read, or the company I kept, without examining whether they were just or not;
11. And I rather chose to run the risk of easy error, than to take the time and trouble of investigating truth.
12. Thus, partly from laziness, partly from dissipation, and partly from thinking I was rejecting fashionable notions,
13. I was hurried away by prejudices, instead of being guided by reason; and quietly cherished error, instead of seeking for truth.
14. But since I have taken the trouble of reasoning for myself, you cannot imagine how much my notions of things are altered, and in how different a light I now see them.
15. Yet no doubt I still retain many errors, which, from long habit, have grown into real opinions; alas.
16. Without any extraordinary effort of genius, I have discovered that nature was the same three thousand years ago as it is at present;
17. That men were but men then as well as now; that modes and customs vary often, but that human nature is always the same.
18. And I can no more suppose that men were better, braver or wiser, fifteen hundred or three thousand years ago,
19. Than I can suppose that the animals or vegetables were better then than they are now.
20. Use and assert your own reason; reflect, examine and analyse everything, in order to form a sound and mature judgement;
21. Let no authority impose upon your understanding, mislead your actions or dictate you
r conversation.
22. Be early what, if you are not, you will when too late wish you had been.
23. Consult your reason betimes: I do not say that it will always prove an unerring guide; for human reason is not infallible; but it will prove the least erring guide that you can follow.
24. Books and conversation may assist it; but adopt neither blindly and implicitly; try both by that best guide, reason.
25. Of all the troubles, do not avoid, as many people do, the trouble of thinking: it is the best and most useful trouble in the world.
26. The herd of mankind can hardly be said to think; their notions are almost all adoptive; and, in general, I believe it is better that it should be so,
27. As such common prejudices contribute more to order and quiet than their own separate reasonings would do, uncultivated and unimproved as they are.
Epistle 5
1. The day, if well employed, is long enough for everything.
2. One half of it, bestowed upon your studies and your exercises, will finish your mind and your body;
3. The remaining part of it, spent in good company, will form your manners and complete your character.
4. What would I not give to have you read Demosthenes critically in the morning, and understand him better than anybody;
5. At noon, behave yourself better than any person at court;
6. And in the evening, trifle more agreeably than anybody in mixed companies?
7. All this you may do if you please; you have the means, you have the opportunities.
8. Employ them while you may, and make yourself that all-accomplished man that I wish to have you.
Epistle 6
1. In order to judge of the inside of others, study your own; for men in general are very much alike;
2. And though one has one prevailing passion, and another has another, yet their operations are much the same;
3. And whatever engages or disgusts, pleases or offends you, in others will engage, disgust, please or offend others, in you.
4. Observe with the utmost attention all the operations of your own mind, the nature of your passions, and the various motives that determine your will;
5. And you may, in a great degree, know all mankind.
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