By the evening, the same day, news about a Congress debacle began trickling in from Gujarat, where the Assembly elections had been held earlier and the results were due that day. The Janata Morcha, a coalition of political parties, led by Jayaprakash Narayan, an Opposition leader, and Morarji Desai, who was then the leader of the Congress (O), was ahead of the Indira Gandhi-led Congress. A defeat for her party in the state looked certain and that would be a big setback not only for the party but also for Indira Gandhi personally, as she had led the entire Congress campaign in the Gujarat Assembly elections.1
Between these two developments—one in the morning and other in the evening, another piece of news had broken around 10 a.m. The Allahabad High Court passed an order that unseated Indira Gandhi as a member of Parliament. The high court judge, Justice Jagmohan Lal Sinha, held her guilty of having used the services of a government servant and securing the help of some Uttar Pradesh government officers for campaigns during her Lok Sabha elections in 1971.
Even as Gandhi was scanning Justice Sinha’s judgment that day, she could not have missed the deep irony behind the direct or indirect involvement of his close adviser for many years in developments that led to her conviction. Parmeshwar Narayan Haksar was a diplomat who worked with Gandhi for almost six years—first as secretary, then as her principal secretary, and then was hired by her to be the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission for almost two years. On 13 January 1971, Yashpal Kapoor met Haksar, who was then her principal secretary, with a request that he be relieved immediately so that he could work for Gandhi’s election campaign. Haksar apparently accepted the resignation orally and Kapoor began campaigning for Gandhi, even though the official order accepting his resignation was issued only on 25 January 1971.
However, this version was contested by others, who believed that the resignation letter was backdated and there was a technical violation in the election code that a government servant cannot work for the election campaign of a candidate. Her joint secretary in the prime minister’s secretariat then, Bishan Narain Tandon, wrote in his diary:
The truth is that Kapoor had submitted his resignation only on 25 January but he had backdated it to 13 January. Action was taken on it on the 25th. The official noting makes it clear that there was nothing to suggest that its acceptance had been mooted before the 25th. The noting is followed by the signatures of two officials and then by Haksar’s. He accepted the noting and if the resignation had been accepted on the 13–14th, he would have written so on the file. But he wrote no such thing and signed the file. Later Seshan (private secretary to Gandhi) conveyed the PM’s approval. In the light of these notings and signatures, there can be no doubt left in anyone’s mind that Kapoor’s resignation had not been accepted before the 25th.2
Justice Sinha of the Allahabad High Court also believed that Gandhi was guilty of having obtained the services of a government servant for her election campaign work and cited that as one of the reasons for declaring her election in 1971 void. Haksar was also summoned by Justice Sinha and his answers in the court on 12 February 1975 could not change the judge’s view on the matter. Jairam Ramesh cites this instance in his book Intertwined Lives: P.N. Haksar and Indira Gandhi and also notes a deeper irony behind the development. It was Haksar again who in February 1972 had advised Gandhi to clear the appointment of Justice Sinha as a permanent judge in Allahabad High Court. Three years later, the same judge would deliver a verdict that would nullify Gandhi’s elections.
Four elements in the Allahabad High Court judgment stood out starkly: One, the election of Indira Gandhi had been declared void. Two, Gandhi was disqualified from seeking re-election for a period of six years. Three, the high court order did not take immediate effect and had been stayed for twenty days. This was because immediately after the high court judgment, Gandhi’s counsel had sought time for appeal and a twenty-day grace period was granted before the order could take effect so that she could file an appeal. Four, on the expiry of the twenty-day period or as soon as an appeal against the high court order was filed in the Supreme Court and admitted, the order on declaring Gandhi’s election void would cease to be effective. Technically, therefore, Gandhi could have simply gone in for an appeal and stayed on as the prime minister and hoped that the apex court would rule in her favour, which is what broadly happened later. But not before Gandhi took the pre-emptive and unprecedented action of declaring an internal emergency in the country on the night of 25 June 1975.
A Fortnight of Intense Political Drama and Conspiracy
The fortnight that preceded the proclamation of the Emergency saw how Indira Gandhi and her close advisers set in motion a series of actions to create an impression that the prime minister had been wronged by the Allahabad High Court judgment and that she should not resign ignoring the demands that were made by the opposition parties and their leaders. Soon after the judgment, Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor, Krishan Chand, got a call from the prime minister’s house. Chand, an Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer, decided to send his secretary, Navin Chawla, to be present at the prime minister’s residence.
Chawla, a young 1968-batch Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer then, would later become a favourite bureaucrat of the Congress and be made, amidst controversy, the chief election commissioner by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2009 just before the general elections were due to be held. Chand, however, died under tragic circumstances soon after the submission of the report by the Shah Commission of Inquiry, which examined the circumstances under which the Emergency was imposed. The Indian Express carried the following news item on its front page on 11 July 1978:
The body of Krishan Chand, former Lt-Governor of Delhi, was found in an abandoned well near Shahpur Jat village. The body bore no signs of injury. A note was found stuck to a brown shoe at the periphery of the well. Another note was found in a personal file in Chand’s bedroom. The note found at the well said: “I am fed up with life. I have decided to commit suicide by drowning myself. Jeena zillat se ho to marna accha hai (it is better to die than live a life of humiliation). The note from his bedroom addressed his wife Seeta and said he was depressed due to the pending investigation into his acts during the Emergency.3
But what Chand learnt from Chawla that day after the latter’s meeting at the prime minister’s house indicated the shape of things to come after the Allahabad High Court order. And this is what he learnt from Chawla: ‘In order to cope up with the law and order situation that might develop from the threatened Opposition rallies, it was decided to organise rallies in support of the Prime minister; and for this purpose people had to be collected from various places.’4 In his deposition before the Shah Commission, which examined the circumstances under which the Emergency was imposed, Chand stated that he was told that ‘public utility services would also be mobilised for the purpose. These services included New Delhi Municipal Committee, Delhi Transport Corporation and Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking.’5 He further stated that ‘rallies and bringing of people to the House of the Prime Minister continued after the 12th of June in order to show support to the Prime minister’.6
Delhi Transport Corporation, or DTC, was at that time a Central government undertaking. Between 12 and 25 June 1975, there was a sharp rise in the number of DTC buses booked by private parties, mainly by the AICC and the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee (DPCC). These buses were used by the Congress party to ferry its supporters from across the city and the adjoining towns to take part in rallies held in support of Indira Gandhi. The report of the Shah Commission of Inquiry noted that the instructions for booking these buses came from Navin Chawla, a government officer posted as secretary to Delhi’s Lieutenant Governor. Even after two years of those bookings, the AICC and the DPCC did not clear their entire dues to the DTC—the outstanding amount was still as high as Rs 4 lakh.
The inconvenience caused to the ordinary citizens was immense and the misuse of public utilities for a political party’s gains was brazen and u
nprecedented. On 13 June 1975, DTC had taken off its entire fleet of 983 buses and diverted them to the prime minister’s residence, to help the Congress ferry its supporters to take part in the Congress rallies. Residents of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were sent in vehicles ‘commandeered by the state authorities’ for this purpose. On the same day, about 800 to 900 employees of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking were persuaded to join the rally outside Gandhi’s residence. Another rally took place on 20 June, where as many as 497 DTC buses, over half its entire fleet, were requisitioned by the Congress to transport its supporters to the residence of the prime minister. DTC rules allowed only a maximum of ninety-five buses to be booked by private parties on any given day.
Even as the Congress was organizing rallies almost on a daily basis in support of its leader, the Opposition leaders, spearheaded by Jayaprakash Narayan, decided to hold a rally on 24 June to renew their demand for Gandhi to resign. This set off a chain reaction among the close advisers to Gandhi. Sometime around the evening of 23 June, Gandhi’s personal assistant, R.K. Dhawan, indicated to Lieutenant Governor Krishan Chand that senior Opposition leaders might have to be taken into custody after the rally on 24 June. Even a list of the leaders who were to be arrested was prepared at the prime minister’s house, in consultation with the superintendent of police in charge of the criminal investigation department (CID). These were the early signs of Gandhi’s plans to take drastic measures to consolidate her control over the government.
However, the Opposition rally was delayed by a day and the new date was 25 June. But even before the rally was held, on 24 June, Justice Krishna Iyer in the Supreme Court passed his judgment on the petition that Gandhi had filed for a review of the Allahabad High Court order. Justice Iyer’s judgment came as a relief for Gandhi, as it was effectively a conditional stay on the Allahabad High Court order. Her disqualification as a member of the Lok Sabha was stayed and she was also allowed to continue as prime minister. The only restriction imposed on her was that she could not exercise her vote in Parliament. Once Gandhi and her team of advisers understood the import of the judgment they decided that the plan of action on arrests of senior Opposition leaders should take place after the public rally on 25 June. It was clear that the decision on arresting the leaders was taken even before the rally and there was no merit in the claim that the arrests and the imposition of the Emergency were a reaction to the Opposition leader’s call at the rally that the people should disobey orders that were illegal.
Indeed, it was on the morning of 25 June that West Bengal Chief Minister Siddhartha Shankar Ray met Gandhi at her residence. Gandhi suggested that in view of the all-round indiscipline and lawlessness there was need for some action. Ray reminded her that on two or three previous occasions he had suggested to her that ‘some sort of emergent power or drastic power was necessary’. As Coomi Kapoor revealed in her book The Emergency: A Personal History, Ray had sent a note to Gandhi as early as 8 January 1975, where he suggested that she should consider imposing an internal emergency in view of ‘the seriousness of the situation in the country’. On 25 June, however, Ray told her that he would come back later in the day with a proposal. Ray was back at the prime minister’s house by 5 p.m. and suggested that Gandhi could use Article 352 of the Constitution to impose an internal emergency. Soon, thereafter, the two met the President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, for about 20 minutes, where they explained the available legal provisions of imposing an internal emergency. Once apprised of the provisions in the Constitution for taking such a step, the President told Gandhi that she could make her recommendation.
The country was preparing for a long dark period in its democracy, which was still in its infancy—just twenty-eight years after it gained freedom from foreign rule. Perhaps in a bid to give this entire exercise the semblance of a democratically endorsed plan, Gandhi decided to consult other senior Congress leaders, but only after securing the President’s consent for her Emergency decision. Congress President Dev Kant Barooah was briefed on the plan of action. Already in the morning, Gandhi had got in touch with several chief ministers of the Congress-ruled states and apprised them of her plan to take tough action like arresting senior Opposition leaders. No Congress leader Gandhi met that day opposed her plan of imposing an internal emergency. The only dissenting note came from Home Minister Brahmananda Reddy, who said that India was already under an emergency rule, as the one imposed in the wake of India’s impending war with Pakistan in November 1971 was still in force and the provisions under that could be used to deal with the situation. Gandhi remained unconvinced. Reddy was summoned again to the prime minister’s house and informed that his suggestion was examined and it was found that an internal emergency was necessary. The home minister then told the prime minister ‘to do what she thought was best’.7
Subsequently, Barooah, Ray and Gandhi held another meeting and decided to write a letter to the President. The letter from the prime minister of India, marked ‘Top Secret’ and dated 25 June 1975, said it all:
Dear Rashtrapatiji,
As already explained to you, a little while ago, information has reached us which indicates that there is an imminent danger to the security of India being threatened by internal disturbance. The matter is extremely urgent.
I would have liked to have taken this to Cabinet but unfortunately this is not possible tonight. I am, therefore, condoning, or permitting a departure from the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rule 1961, as amended up-to-date by virtue of my powers under Rule 12 thereof. I shall mention the matter to the Cabinet first thing tomorrow morning.
In the circumstances and in case you are so satisfied, a requisite Proclamation under Article 352 (1) has become necessary. I am enclosing a copy of the draft Proclamation for your consideration. As you are aware, under Article 352 (3) even when there is an imminent danger of such a threat, as mentioned by me, the necessary Proclamation under Article 352 (1) can be issued.
I recommend that such a Proclamation should be issued tonight, however, late it may be, and all arrangements will be made to make it public as early as possible thereafter.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
Indira Gandhi.
Gandhi’s letter8 reached the President at around 10.30 p.m. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed had some doubts about the sequence of events that should lead to his signing the Emergency order. After a brief conversation between Gandhi and the President, the former’s personal secretary, R.K. Dhawan, walked into Rashtrapati Bhavan with a draft of the Emergency order. At around 11.45 p.m. on Friday, 25 June 1975, the President signed the order, which read:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause 1 of Article 352 of the Constitution, I, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, President of India, by this Proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by internal disturbances.
At around 8 a.m. on 26 June, Indira Gandhi walked into the studios of the All India Radio to deliver an address to the nation—to announce that she had declared an internal emergency. A Cabinet meeting had approved her proposal earlier at an emergency session convened at 6 a.m. And the President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, had already signed the proclamation of the ordinance to declare the Emergency. The previous evening, power supplies to most newspapers’ printing presses had been cut off so that newspapers could not be brought out in the morning. Opposition political leaders were already being rounded up to be either sent to jail or kept under house arrest. But what Gandhi broadcast that morning was chilling in effect and ominous for the prospect of democracy in India.
Without referring to any specific developments by name, she cited the political challenge that Opposition leaders had mounted against her to unseat her from power and referred to the public rallies these leaders, particularly Jayaprakash Narayan, addressed and called for a public disobedience movement. She also promised a new economic policy package for the people, but did not outline any of the draconian measures she had already taken o
r would take such as arresting Opposition leaders or throttling press freedom.
Indira Gandhi’s address was brief and started with the most obvious point on the declaration of the Emergency:
The President has proclaimed the Emergency. This is nothing to panic about.
I am sure you are all conscious of the deep and widespread conspiracy, which has been brewing ever since I began to introduce certain progressive measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India. In the name of democracy, it has been sought to negate the very functioning of democracy. Duly elected governments have not been allowed to function and in some cases, force has been used to compel members to resign in order to dissolve lawfully elected assemblies. Agitations have surcharged the atmosphere, leading to violent incidents. The whole country was shocked at the brutal murder of my Cabinet colleague, Shri L.N. Mishra. We also deeply deplore the dastardly attack on the Chief Justice of India.
Certain persons have gone to the length of inciting our armed forces to mutiny and our police to rebel. The fact that our defence forces and the police are disciplined and deeply patriotic and, therefore, will not be taken in, does not mitigate the seriousness of the provocation.
The forces of disintegration are in full play and communal passions are being aroused, threatening our unity.
All manners of false allegations have been hurled at me. The Indian people have known me since my childhood. All my life has been in the service of our people. This is not a personal matter. It is not important whether I remain Prime Minister or not. However, the institution of the Prime Minister is important and the deliberate political attempts to denigrate it is not in the interest of democracy or of the nation.
The Rise of Goliath Page 16