by Damien Lewis
J.G.Gordon,
Captain Royal Artillery.
28–5–46.
To: Officer Commanding,
Command Medical Store,
Harefield, Middlesex.
From: 7259601 W.O.11. Eckersall, K.P.J., R.A.M.C.
Det. 12 Company R.A.M.C.,
Command Medical Store,
Harefield, Middlesex.
Date: 28th May 1946.
Sir,
In reply to War Office Letter No. MA/OR/954 dated 24th Mar 1946, asking for information on the subject of loss of British personnel, who while P.O.W. in the Far East, were lost by the sinking of an enemy vessel by Allied action on the 26th June 1944, the following particulars are submitted:
The route was Medan to Singapore and not as quoted in the above mentioned War Office letter.
(9) The name of the vessel I am not quite sure of, it was something like “Kwewegem,” which prior to capture by the enemy, was a cargo cum passenger vessel of the K.P.M. Line. The vessel carried the enemies’ serial No. P.1406, this number is to the best of my knowledge correct however, no doubt the Allied submarine commander recorded this prior to sinking the vessel.
(10) Time of sinking—1347 hours (Tokyo time) on Monday 26th June 1944.
(11) Approximately 300 Allied personnel of British, Americans, Australian, and mixed European Nationality, also approx. 450 Dutch personnel.
(12) A total of 62 Allied personnel (other than Dutch) were found to be missing when a check was made at River Valley Road Camo, on the 28th June. A further three died as a result of the action in the P.O.W. Camp Hospital at Changi Jail, Singapore. Their names are as follows:
Sgt. Fowler, R.A.
Sgm. Conley. R.C. of Signals.
—This gives a total of 65.
P.O. Christopher, R. Navy.
The full total missing was approximately 200, including Dutch.
Of the 65 missing I am certain, as after the fall of Japan in August 1945 I compiled a list of all casualties (excluding Dutch) known in the Pakan Baroe Area P.O.W. Camps, from 1st July 1944 to August 1944. This list including full details of personnel (Excluding Dutch) lost in the sinking of the vessel in question. The details were as follows:
Nationality—Number—Rank—Name—Initials—Officer or Other Rank as applicable to the various arms of the service.
Copies of the list quoted above were taken from the Pakan Baroe Allied H.Q. Camp Office by Lieut. Colonel E.M. Hennessey, R.A.M.C. (Regular Army) and handed over to the British Representative at R.A.P.W.I. Headquarters at the Goodwood Park Hotel, Scott’s Road, Singapore, in early September 1945.
Further copies of these lists were handed over by me, together with lists of deaths in the Pakan Baroe area and in Medan area, and sick lists categorized for evacuation, to a Captain Carey, R.A.M.C. (Airborne) of the occupying forces, to whom Lt. Col. Hennessey handed over prior to leaving for Singapore in early September, after release.
Note: Dutch records were maintained by their own clerical personnel.
All other Allied statistics were compiled by British P.O.W.s.
5a. Time of leaving Medan—4pm Tokyo time, on Sunday 25th June 1944, steaming at approximately 6 knots. Vessel anchored at dark and proceeded at dawn. (8pm to 5:30am approx). Note: Owing to clocks being advanced to Tokyo time after April 1st 1942, by Japanese Order, it was light until nearly 8:30pm.
Convoy of three of four vessels, other vessels were tankers, and escorted by three small corvettes, carrying depth charges and small A.A. guns. Two Jap Bombing planes also acted as escort during steaming time.
The ship was sunk by Allied Submarine off Tandjong Bali, a small island about 7 Kilometers off shore, at 1347 hours 26th June 1944, by two torpedoes fired into the Port side from possibly a distance of 6 miles away.
The convoy hugged the coastline all the way from Medan up to the time of sinking, steaming about 4 to 5 Kilometers off shore.
There had been sinkings of other vessels in the same area as wrecks could be seen partially above the water level.
This particular ship after sinking had still approximately 12 feet of its masts showing above the water level.
5b. There were no friendly ships in the vicinity. Enemy ships in the convoy refused to pick up the P.O.W. survivors until Japanese Merchant Navy crew and native crew survivors, also Japanese Military Guards, were picked up.
All P.O.W. survivors were finally recovered from the water by approximately 1645 hours 26th June 1944, either by ships in convoy or small escort corvettes.
This excludes two or three Dutch, one of whom was a doctor, by name A.L. Yurgens, Captain 1st Class, Dutch N.E.I. Forces, who reached shore by swimming and gave themselves up to native police at the nearest village, and were finally returned to a P.O.W. Camp in the Pakan Baroe area at a later date, approximately August 1944.
5c. The vessel was not longer than seven minutes in sinking after being struck.
6a. Two or three are stated in 5b.
6b. Approximately 550 were picked up by the enemy merchant vessels and corvettes.
f. I have previously stated in answer to question No. 4 where complete particulars of personnel lost, or died as result of the action (other than Dutch) may be obtained.
For your information I have added the following details:
The final destination as a result of this move was Pakan Baroe, Central Sumatra. The reason we were conveyed by sea from Medan to Singapore was, the enemy did not at that time possess adequate road transport to convoy from Medan to Pakan Baroe by road, a 4 day journey.
The solution being, transfer P.O.W.s from Medan to Singapore in a large vessel, transfer at Singapore to small flat bottomed river craft in order to return to Sumatra and navigate the long narrow rivers which have their source in mountain ranges on the west coast of Sumatra, in order to arrive at Pakan Baroe by the sea and river route.
I trust that the information given herein will shed some light on this most unfortunate incident.
I have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
K.P.J. Eckersall
7259601 W.O.11. R.A.M.C.
Document Five
Author’s note—a report on forced labor parties working in the Sumatran jungle as POWs of the Japanese that captures the stark horror of the camps and the unbreakable spirit of resistance of the Allied internees.
Report of a POW work party in the Gaje Country, S Atjeh, Sumatra
1. On March 3rd 1944 a POW work party of 300 Dutch, 200 British left Glegeer POW Camp, Medan, Sumatra. The Allied senior officer was Capt. Van der Lande. The British senior officer was Lieutenant L. R. T. Henman, the British Medical Officer was Captain P.M. Kirkwood. The whole party was commanded by Lieutenant S. Miura of the Japanese Army.
2. On arrival at Keta Tjane at the end of a day’s truck ride Lieutenant Miura informed us that we must on the following day commence a march of 135 kilometers (approx. 85 miles) to Blangkedteren, S. Atjeh. After protest by the senior Allied officers, including medical officers, one more days grace was allowed before the march was commenced. All belongings that could not be carried had to be left at Keta Tjane.
3. This march was made in four stages with one whole days rest on the way. Food supplies consisted of rice, soya beans and meat. Owing to bad organization on the part of the Japanese the proper quantities were not always available at the stopping places. Many of the British particularly had no water bottles and in spite of warnings men drank from streams on the road and thus laid themselves open to attacks of dysentery. The men had not marched for two years or more and on the way suffered very severely from blisters. Nevertheless very few British fell out. The RN party of 45 (under Second Lieutenant H. Hedley, Mysore Regiment) completed the march in fours, with only one casualty in the last stage.
4. After about one month the British contingent (consisting of four parties—RN, Army, RAF and AIF) were finally billeted at a camp at 28 kilometer Blangkedteren Takengong Road. This road was being const
ructed by the Japanese with POW and native labor. The camp was at a height of approximately 3000 feet and consisted of bivouac attap huts built by POWs themselves immediately after arrival. Lieutenant Hedley, the RN party and some of the Army men had to spend two nights amongst native coolies in hovels made of bracken, in the midst of a sea of mud and excreta (human and otherwise) before being allowed to move into the camp at 28 kilometers. This they built as best they could with a small quantity of attap and wood cut in the jungle.
5. The men were driven out to work as soon as possible and no fit men were allowed to stay in camp other than a bare minimum for cooking and wood chopping. Work consisted of labor on a mountain road, tree felling, bridge building, stone carrying, earth removal with Java hoes and bucket, and metalling of the road surface. Average days work about nine hours in all weathers, and while carrying stones men sometimes had to walk 30 kilometers a day.
6. Sick men were continually persecuted and many men were forced to go out working when they were in no way fitted to do so. A certain percentage of men were required. If these were not forthcoming the sick were paraded (irrespective of what diseases they had) and the Japanese would choose those who in their opinion were fit for duty. Attached correspondence between Captain Kirkwood IMS and Lieutenant Miura gives an idea of the situation. Officers who protested were merely beaten up by the guards in front of the remaining POWs.
7. Food at this period consisted of 300 grams of rice and 200 grams of soya bean per day, salt fish was also provided, approximately 2 bullocks per week (amongst 500 men) and a small quantity of vegetables (see report by Second Lieutenant J. Hedley, Mysore Regiment). Many men could not eat the soya beans as they caused diarrhea (see report by Captain Kirkwood, IMS). Naturally, the diet was totally inadequate for the work being done.
8. Particularly at first there were many cases of dysentery. Those were treated in a so-called hospital at Blangkedjeeren where a Dutch Army doctor named Duringa did splendid work with practically no equipment. As soon as these patients were pronounced temporarily fit they had to walk back to the camp from which they came (23–28 km.) and bring with them a bullock which was the meat ration for the camp concerned. Delay in sending men to Blangkedjeeren Hospital was in my opinion the cause of the death of Pte. Lahay, AIF, one of the three British casualties in Atjeh.
The two letters were attached to the original of this report submitted to MI5 War Office.
(13) As a consequence many men sold their clothes and with the proceeds bought extra rice, fruit and native sugar. To do this they had to break out of camp at night. When some of them were caught the whole camp was punished by being made to stand to attention in the evening, after the day’s work for approximately 2 hours per day. The guards said that they would make arrangements for fruit to be bought legitimately but, having done so once, they would then forget their promise in true Japanese style and so no more official purchases would be allowed.
g. The spirit of the men during this period was very high, particularly after news was heard of the invasion of Europe, and this was as well, because without it there would have been far worse casualties on the march down into the plains which began on October 6th.
cii. On October 5th at 18:00 hours I was informed by Miura that on the following day we were to commence a march of approximately 85 miles which had to be completed in as short time as possible (actually the march took 81 hours including all stops for food and sleep and rest).
(8) Many of the men had no boots, many more were suffering from diarrhea or amoebic dysentery, the roads were steep and shockingly surfaced and Korean guards (until they themselves got left behind) used sticks and rifle butts on any stragglers. Capt. Kirkwood was himself suffering from amoebic dysentery but nevertheless gave every possible assistance to the sick.
13. The worst part of the journey was a night march between the hours of 20:00 hours and 04:00 hours. During this period I was marching with the Navy party and the singing by them and the Army and R.A.F. of songs such as “The Eagle they fly high in Cell,” “Lily of Laguna,” and “The beer is on the table” helped a good deal.
14. A Korean guard named Matsuoka was especially vicious during the march. On one occasion when P/O. Sparks, W. No D/JX 125134 with blistered and festered feet as being helped along by Capt. Kirkwood and P/O. Northcott, C.J. No. D/JX 137479 his guard used his rifle butt on all three of them, because they were not walking fast enough.
15. We finally arrived at Kota Tjane with 6% of our strength having fallen out against 25% of the Jap and Korean guards. The streets were festooned with bananas—but Lieut. Miura had given orders to his Sergeant that on no account were the P.O.W.’s to be given or allowed to purchase any fruit at all.
16. This man Miura provides a most interesting study. He spoke English (and Malay) extremely well and had apparently been in some large business firm in Japan, where he said he had many foreign friends. He was always anxious to try to convince me that he was trying to do everything in his power for the P.O.W.’s. Had his actual behavior, particularly toward the sick, borne out his fine words I should have been more impressed with his good intentions. “Sick men,” he said to me on more than one occasion, “are of no use to the Japanese Army. It is better for them to die.” The hospital too he said, should be made to resemble a prison as near as possible. “You yourself,” he added, “complain far too much. It is not gentlemanly.”
17. He had no control over his Korean guards who did more or less as they pleased. He did indeed at my request forbid them to take action into their own hands by inflicting physical punishment themselves, but when, as soon happened, they began to disobey this order, he seemed quite unable or unwilling to see that it was enforced. “Do not punish your men,” he told me when I asked for some powers of punishment (with regard to sanitary matters), “Always be kind. I never punish my guards.” Quite true.
18. Under the circumstances the discipline of the men was very good and for this credit must go to the officers under me (especially Lieut. Hedley and Lieut. D.S. Matthews, G.S.) and equally to the N.C.O.’s of the various parties (R.N., Army, R.A.F. and A.I.F.) These N.C.O.’s had not only to work and live with the other men, but, on return to the camp each evening, had to distribute food, collect money for canteen purchases (when allowed), detail working parties and settle all minor disputes without having any disciplinary powers at all.
R.N. Party
P/O
Northcott, C.J.R.
D/JX 137479.
P/O
Bosward, F.
D/JX 140525.
P/O
Sparks, W.
D/JX 125134.
Army Party
Sergt. Maverty, R.A.S.C. (18th Div.)
Sergt. Powell, T.F. R.A.
1454735.
(head cook)
R.A.F.
Sergt. Appleton, J.G. R.A.F.
522620
A.I.F.
Cpl. Mackay, L.
2/29 Btn. A.I.F.
I would also especially like to recommend Lieut. Hedley for the excellent work he did as ration officer on the march down from Blangkedjeren to Kota Tjane and at other times.
19. Capt. Kirkwood, I.M.S. succeeded under the circumstances in preserving the men’s health, or what was left of it, to an astonishing degree (though for most of the time he was sick himself with amoebic dysentery). In all during the eight months period only three men died.
Pte.
Hopson.
A.I.F.
Pte.
Lahay.
A.I.F.
L.A.C.
Willis.
R.A.F.
Although the hard times which the men underwent was probably the original cause of the many casualties which we suffered afterward in the Pakan Baree area. (See report by Capt. Kirkwood, I.M.S. and Capt. J.G. Gordon, R.A.)
20. The whole Atjeh party (Dutch and British) were drafted to Pakan Baree after approximately three weeks rest in a camp (Sungei Songkel) near Medan. On the way we (500 men) wer
e kept at Fort de Kock (Nr. Padang) for four days in two rooms which in normal times formed the police courts of the town in question. During these four days we were given very little to eat, the only sanitary arrangements consisted of a trench dug in the yard, and it was only possible to have a bath by standing in the bin. There was just sufficient room for each man to lie down on the floor. The sick lay in the middle of one room in a space which we cleared for them.
21. At Petai Camp (Pakan Baree area) Lieut. Miura put cost and difficulties in the way with regard to the digging of latrines. He would not allow sufficient time for the work and forbade me to use the timber (for our big latrine) from the jungle nearby. However by disobeying orders we managed to get the latrine completed, upon which he sent for me and congratulated me on its efficiency. A few days previously he had complained that the British, though they always obeyed him, did so “with a sulky face.” The next day (Nov. 23rd) he went to Pakan Baree and bought back Capt. Gordon, R.A. as Senior British Officer.
22. This officer, who had worked untiringly on the troops behalf in Medan, took over the duties of Senior British Officer from me. He was faced with the last (and most difficult) period which we went through as P.O.W.’s, and in my opinion carried out his duty until I left him in Legas in August 1945, in a most admirable manner. He has details, which I handed over to him, of the personnel of the Atjah Party and all casualties which we suffered then and in the Pakan Baree area.