by Donald Keene
Mention of the imperial ancestors may recall the mentions of God that figured so prominently in the czar’s utterances, but Meiji did not assert that it was because the gods of Shintō were on his side that the Japanese had been victorious. President Roosevelt was more direct in his expression of joy: he opened a letter to Kaneko on May 30 with banzai, followed by three exclamation points.16
With the destruction of the Russian fleet, it was generally agreed that the time was ripe for peace talks. On May 29, the day after the victory, Roosevelt discussed with Minister Takahira the possibility of peace negotiations with the Russians. On May 31 Foreign Minister Komura telegraphed Takahira, instructing him to request Roosevelt’s aid in arranging such negotiations. Komura’s message, formally presented to Roosevelt on the following day, asked him “directly and entirely of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiations.”17
Roosevelt was entirely willing to undertake this responsibility, but he warned Takahira that the Russians were unlikely to respond to peace overtures if the Japanese demanded an indemnity. He reminded him also that even though the Japanese army and navy had been everywhere successful, they had not penetrated Russian territory. He told Takahira that if the Japanese hoped for an indemnity of the kind Germany had received after the Franco-Prussian War, it would not happen until Japanese troops surrounded Moscow.
Roosevelt was even blunter with the Russians. He summoned the Russian ambassador, Count Arturo Cassini, and declared that the war was absolutely hopeless for the Russians.18 Cassini expressed concern over the merciless demands the Japanese were likely to make but promised to transmit to St. Peters-burg the president’s message advising peace. At this juncture, to Roosevelt’s surprise, the kaiser supported his efforts. We know the kaiser’s mood from a letter he sent his cousin, the czar, on June 3:
From the purely military strategic point of view the defeat in the straits of Corea ends the chances for a decided turn of the scales in your favour: the Japanese are now free to pour any amount of reserves, recruits, ammunition, etc. into Manchuria for the siege of Vladivostok, which will hardly be able to resist very long without a fleet to support it…. Formally it is of course possible, even under these adverse circumstances, to continue the war for any amount of time. But then on the other hand the human part must not be overlooked. Your country has sent thousands of its sons to the front, where they died, or were taken ill and were left crippled for the rest of their lives…. Is it compatible with the responsibility of a ruler to continue to force a whole nation against its declared will to send its sons to be killed by hecatombs only for his sake?19
The kaiser offered to do what he could to bring about peace but added toward the close of his letter:
I may perhaps turn your attention to the fact that no doubt the Japanese have the highest regard for America before all other nations. Because this mighty rising Power with its tremendous fleet is next to them. If anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Roosevelt.20
The reason for the kaiser’s change of attitude was suggested by remarks he made to the American ambassador, who reported to Washington: “He looks upon continuation of the war, from the Russian side, as hopeless. The people are strongly opposed to it, they will not sustain it longer, and unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar.”21 Roosevelt was pleased by this unexpected communication from the kaiser, who had not previously been known as a peacemaker. For all his bluster, the kaiser no doubt feared that an uprising by the Russian people against the czar would represent a danger to all monarchs.22
The kaiser’s letter may have had an effect on the czar. Although the czar’s message to Roosevelt, delivered by Ambassador Cassini on June 6, said that Russia did not seek peace or mediation, on the same day, during the discussions with high-ranking nobles and military officers, the czar finally agreed to negotiate for peace. The next day, he told the American ambassador that he would consent to the president’s suggestion that Russia and Japan have a meeting without intermediaries “in order to see if we can make peace.”23
On June 8 President Roosevelt sent identical letters to the American ambassadors in Tōkyō and St. Petersburg. asking them to convey to the two governments his willingness “to do what he properly can if the two Powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting” of negotiations to end the war. The Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs on June 10 sent a reply stating its readiness to “appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia at such time and place as may be found to be mutually agreeable and convenient for the purpose of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and exclusively between the two belligerent Powers.”24
The Russian reply, conveyed to the American ambassador, stated, “With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, ‘In order to see if it is not possible for the two Powers to agree to terms of peace,’ the Imperial Government has no objection in principle to this endeavour if the Japanese Government expresses a like desire.”25 However, the word “like” was not in either the original French text or the Russian translation. Without this word, the Russian reply meant that they were willing to participate if the Japanese first expressed the desire for a meeting. In order not to upset the Japanese by the arrogance of the Russian note, the Americans had deliberately softened the expression.26
The haughtiness of Foreign Minister Lamsdorf (although he was a supporter of Count Witte and favored peace) would continue to try the patience of President Roosevelt, whose irritation with the Russians mounted until on June 16 he wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, “Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I’m utterly unable to say whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotiations at any moment.”27 Roosevelt many times voiced similar sentiments. Even though these were not publicly expressed, his hostility to the Russian government was surely sensed. It is difficult to understand why the Russians were willing to attend a peace conference called by a president who was so obviously anti-Russian.28
The site of the conference was the first problem. Roosevelt at first proposed The Hague in Holland. Japan, rejecting this site, proposed Chefoo, a port on the northern coast of the Shantung Peninsula, across the Gulf of Chihli from Port Arthur. Washington was Japan’s second choice. The Russians’ first choice was Paris, but Washington was also their second choice. Roosevelt therefore settled on Washington. Just as he was informing the Russian ambassador of his decision, a cable came from Lamsdorf saying that he preferred The Hague because Washington was so distant and so hot in summer. However, Komura not only had rejected The Hague but had declared that the Japanese would not go to any site in Europe.29 Roosevelt refused to reopen the question. Lamsdorf sent a memorandum to the czar asking his opinion. Fortunately, the czar wrote in response, “I decisively do not see any objections to Washington as a place for the meeting for the preliminary discussions between our and the Japanese plenipotentiaries.”30 This ended the discussion, but the words “preliminary discussions” suggested the czar did not expect decisions of importance to emerge from the peace conference.
The time of the conference was the next problem. It would take the Japanese delegation at least a month to reach the east coast of the United States. This meant that the conference would have to take place in the summer. In order not to subject the delegates to the unbearable heat of a Washington summer, Roosevelt considered alternative, cooler sites, finally choosing the Portsmouth Navy Yard in New Hampshire. Both Japan and Russia accepted Portsmouth as the site of the conference.
Roosevelt proposed beginning deliberations during the first ten days of August in order to allow the Japanese sufficient time to reach Portsmouth. The czar, though at first reluctant to consent to peace negotiations, was now eager to have negotiations start as soon as possible, as he fe
ared that the Japanese might take advantage of a delay to seize Sakhalin.31 There was reason for this fear, for according to Kaneko, Roosevelt had recommended that Japan immediately invade Sakhalin to improve its prospects at the conference table.32
The choice of plenipotentiaries was not easy for either side. Itō Hirobumi was the obvious choice to head the Japanese delegation, but he had been known before the outbreak of war as an advocate of accommodation with Russia. His friends warned him that his sympathy for Russia would be blamed if the Japanese delegation failed to win the peace terms demanded by the public. Itō was fortunately spared the headache of choosing whether to serve when the emperor informed Prime Minister Katsura Tarō that he needed Itō in Tōkyō for consultation during the peace negotiations.33
The choice of Russian plenipotentiaries was complicated by the czar’s interference. Although Lamsdorf argued convincingly that a specialist on financial and economic matters was essential, Nicholas remained opposed to Witte, clearly the best-qualified man. The situation in Russia at this time took a sudden turn for the worse when there was a clash between striking workers and government troops in Odessa on June 25, followed by a mutiny aboard the battleship Potemkin two days later. The Potemkin mutiny was symptomatic of the unrest in Russia. This unrest was fostered by Japanese agents who gave money to opponents of the czar’s government (including Lenin) and were especially active in Finland and Poland, parts of the Russian Empire that yearned for independence.34
The Japanese and Russian delegates began their deliberations on August 10. On the following day the Japanese presented a formal list of twelve demands, including Russia’s recognition of Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea; evacuation of Manchuria by the Russian army; transference of the Port Arthur leasehold from Russia to Japan; cession of Sakhalin to Japan; payment to Japan of the expenses of the war; and restriction of Russia’s use of the railway connecting Manchuria to Vladivostok to commercial and industrial purposes.35
The Russian reaction to the Japanese demands was one of dismay. Witte told a colleague, “The Japanese conditions were more heavy than anything it was possible to expect.” In fact, however, only two of the demands caused trouble in the ensuing negotiations: the cession of Sakhalin and the payment of an indemnity. The czar asserted again and again that Russia would never pay one ruble in indemnity nor yield one square inch of Russian soil. His refusal in both instances was based on considerations of honor rather than practical policy. He wrote on an initial draft of the instructions to the Russians going to the conference, “Russia has never paid an indemnity; I shall never consent to this.” The word “never” was underlined three times.36
The czar was equally opposed to yielding Sakhalin. Russia had owned Sakhalin only since 1875 when a treaty with the Japanese gave them possession of the island in exchange for the Kuriles. Its desolation had been known to the Russians ever since the report published by Anton Chekhov, who visited the prison colony in 1890. Yet the czar, the ruler of an immense country that stretched over Europe and Asia, was ready to prolong a disastrous war in order not to give up a square inch of wasteland.
Komura Jutarō also seems to have been driven by a concept of honor. In April when a cabinet conference decided on concrete terms for peace (to which the emperor gave his assent), there were only three “absolutely indispensable” items: (1) to have Russia acknowledge Japan’s complete freedom of action in Korea, (2) mutual military evacuation of Manchuria within a period to be specified, and (3) transference to Japan of Russia’s Port Arthur leasehold and the branch railway running from Port Arthur to Harbin.37 There were also four “items not absolutely indispensable but to be secured insofar as possible,” including an indemnity and the cession of Sakhalin. If Komura had been satisfied with obtaining the three “absolutely indispensable” items, the negotiations would have gone smoothly, but his insistence on an indemnity and his failure to inform the Japanese government of the czar’s willingness to compromise on Sakhalin (he was willing to divide the island between Japan and Russia) very nearly resulted in a collapse of the negotiations and a resumption of the war.38 On August 26 Komura sent a telegram to Tōkyō announcing his intention of breaking off the negotiations.39
On August 28 the prime minister held a meeting of cabinet members and three genrō—Itō Hirobumi, Yamagata, and Inoue Kaoru. Although they regretted that Russia had failed to respond to Japanese efforts to reach a compromise, they agreed that the only alternative to continuing negotiations was war. They recognized that it might not be difficult to capture Harbin before the year was out but that this would require additional military forces, and Japan lacked the financial reserves to equip and send them into the field. Moreover, even supposing that Harbin and, eventually, Vladivostok were captured, this would still not deal Russia the coup de grâce. They concluded, after hours of debate, that it was essential to make peace, even if it meant Japan would have to abandon an indemnity and the acquisition of Sakhalin.40
That afternoon a meeting of the three genrō and cabinet ministers was held in the presence of the emperor. They decided to cable Komura that although the cabinet was aware of both the Russian refusal to compromise and the great difficulty of continuing negotiations, military and economic conditions compelled Japan to negotiate for peace, regardless of the loss of an indemnity and Sakhalin. In any case, Japan’s basic objective in fighting the war—the settlement of important problems relating to Korea and Manchuria—had been achieved. Komura was directed to yield first on the indemnity, asking in return that the Japanese occupation of Sakhalin be accepted as a fait accompli. If the Russians refused to budge on Sakhalin, Komura should ask President Roosevelt to recommend to the Japanese that they withdraw their claim for territory for the sake of peace and humanity.41 This last was obviously intended as a face saving device to spare the Japanese the embarrassment of unilaterally withdrawing their claim.
Members of the Japanese delegation were so shaken by these instructions, which seemed to be a confession of defeat at the conference table, that they began to weep and sob. On August 28 Witte also received a discouraging telegram. Lamsdorf relayed the czar’s words: “Send Witte my order to end discussion in any case. I prefer to continue the war than to await gracious concessions on the part of Japan.”42 The two Russian delegates, Witte and Rosen, disagreed about whether to obey this imperial command. Witte decided to ignore it and to repeat his offer to make peace by giving up the southern half of Sakhalin.
At a secret meeting held on August 29, Witte agreed to the cession, and Komura, following instructions from Tōkyō, accepted the arrangement. They also agreed on the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria and the disposition of the Manchurian railways.43 All problems had been settled. When Witte emerged from the conference room, he announced that peace had been achieved, that the Japanese had agreed to everything.44
Later that morning at the formal session, Komura, following instructions, asked for the whole of Sakhalin. Witte refused, whereupon Komura stated that Japan, for the sake of peace and humanity, would accept the Russian offer to divide the island at the fiftieth parallel. This was just so much playacting for the benefit of spectators, but the session ended with Witte’s recommendation that immediate steps be taken to conclude an armistice, lest soldiers be unnecessarily killed. The peace treaty was not signed by Komura and Witte until September 5. In the meantime, word that a settlement had been reached quickly spread. The czar was stunned to learn of the agreement. He wrote in his diary, “At night there came a telegram from Witte with the news that the negotiations about peace have been brought to an end. All day after that I went around as in a trance.”45
The Russians’ first reactions were almost all unfavorable, none more so than those of the English wife of a Russian prisoner: “Peace of the new diplomacy! Peace of the Twentieth Century! Peace as she is made in America! Peace as she is hammered out at the American Cronstadt! All the traditions are broken with. Japan and Russia have not made peace—nor wanted i
t. Oh, no! That terrible American President, Il Strenuoso, he has made it. He wanted it, he would have it. And I believe him capable of locking the conferees in a room and starving them into obedience.”46
Most Russians who had not actually witnessed the fighting thought it was absurd that peace should be made when the Russian armies in Manchuria were in better condition to fight the Japanese than ever before. The American ambassador to Russia, George Meyer, wrote in his diary that although Roosevelt had earned the gratitude of the world for his role in the peace negotiations, he should not expect gratitude from the Russians, who believed that without his interference they would have won the war.47 But a Russian officer who had held a high position on the general staff throughout the war said that the two armies were so strong and so dug in that an attack by either would almost certainly end in disaster and terrible losses.
The Russian delegates did not doubt that they had performed a miracle. They had managed to avoid paying an indemnity, and the only territory they had yielded was half of a bleak island that the Japanese had already occupied. It is small wonder that they drank champagne toasts at the celebration after the signing.
The Japanese did not attend the celebration. Komura and his colleagues had signed a treaty quite against their own wishes because they had been so ordered, and they could easily imagine the stormy reception they would receive after their return to Japan.
The happiest person was probably President Roosevelt. Praise came from France, Germany, and even England, although some Britons at first expressed astonishment that their ally Japan had yielded so much. Just at this time, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for five years, and one publication stated that the reassurance the Japanese received by the renewal caused them to moderate their peace terms. Whatever criticism was made of Roosevelt, it quickly subsided, and he received telegrams of thanks from both Meiji and Nicholas. Just before the peace treaty was signed, he wrote the American minister in Peking, “I was pro-Japanese before, but after my experience with the peace commissioners I am far stronger pro-Japanese than ever.”48 He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for his efforts to end the war.