Chapter 5: Time Travelers
89Forethought is the most important: Russell, 1954, p. 179.
89time travel will never become a reality: Holden, 2005.
90Norbert Bischof: Bischof, 1985.
90thesis into a monograph: Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997.
91“It’s a poor sort of memory: Carroll, 1871.
91Clive Wearing: Wearing, 2005.
91Endel Tulving: Tulving, 1985, 2005.
92the ultimate function of this capacity: Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; Tulving, 2005.
92Jennifer Thompson thought: Thompson-Cannino et al., 2009.
92the reliability of eyewitness testimony: Loftus, 1992; Schacter, 1999.
93Remembering episodes is a reconstructive process: Bartlett, 1932.
93recall your own good behavior better: D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008.
93memory systems are inherently future-directed: Bar, 2011; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007.
94two sides of the same coin?: Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007.
94similar problems imagining future events: Klein et al., 2002; Tulving, 1985.
94children’s capacity to answer such questions: Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Suddendorf, 2010b.
94Introspectively, there are some: D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004.
94In old age we tend to report: Addis et al., 2008.
94depressed and schizophrenic patients: Williams et al., 1996; D’Argembeau et al., 2008.
94Brain imaging studies have found: Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003.
94there are some important differences: Suddendorf, 2010a.
94imagine situations you have never experienced: Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007.
95Just as a theater production: Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007.
96Take Ötzi: Suddendorf, 2006.
97We differ also in how much we worry: Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999.
97John Lennon sang: “Beautiful Boy (Darling Boy).”
99shortcomings in any one of the components: Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007.
99We can learn from others’ memory: Social remembering can have negative and positive effects on memory accuracy, though both may be beneficial: Roediger & McDermott, 2011.
99much of human conversation is: Szagun, 1978.
99Stumbling on Happiness: Gilbert, 2006.
100How parents talk to their children: Parent-child conversation and children’s memory (e.g., Fivush et al., 2006) and future time concepts (Hudson 2006).
100children begin to talk about past: e.g., Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2011; Nelson & Fivush, 2004.
100infantile amnesia: e.g., Bauer, 2007; Nelson & Fivush, 2004.
101insist that they have always known it: Taylor et al., 1994.
101In one study we told children stories: Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2010.
101We presented children with a curious puzzle: Suddendorf et al., 2011.
102William Friedman: e.g., Friedman, 2005; see also Busby Grant & Suddendorf, 2009.
103What’s time?: Browning, 1896, p. 425.
104psychologist William Roberts: Roberts, 2002.
104The chimpanzee Panzee: Menzel, 2005.
104Rats appear to use: e.g., Foster & Wilson, 2006; Tolman, 1948.
104Nicola Clayton, Anthony Dickinson: e.g., Clayton & Dickinson, 1998; Clayton et al., 2001.
105such studies on other animals: For reviews, see Dere et al., 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008a.
105if it walks like a duck: Eichenbaum et al., 2005.
105episodic-like memory is neither necessary nor sufficient: Suddendorf & Busby, 2003.
106should be able to control their future prudently: Suddendorf & Corballis, 2010.
106Long-term planning: Dawkins, 2000.
106bacteria demonstrate future-directed capacities: Mitchell et al., 2009.
107The wasp always inspects the nest: Fabre, 1915.
107taste predicts later sickness: Garcia et al., 1966.
107cannot learn that a sound or a sight: Garcia & Koelling, 1966.
108select a stick of the appropriate length: Mulcahy et al., 2005.
108sometimes carry stones: Boesch & Boesch, 1984.
108Norbert Bischof and Doris Bischof-Köhler: Bischof, 1985; Bischof-Köhler, 1985.
108laboratory monkeys that were fed biscuits: Roberts, 2002.
109delay gratification for several minutes: Dufour et al., 2007.
109Perhaps the most prominent case: Mulcahy & Call, 2006a. For critique of this evidence, see Suddendorf, 2006.
109(Footnote 6) One high-profile study: Correia et al., 2007; see also Cheke & Clayton, 2012.
109(Footnote 6) In another study, two squirrel monkeys: Naqshbandi & Roberts, 2006. For a killjoy critique, see Suddendorf & Corballis, 2008b.
110subsequent studies: Osvath & Osvath, 2008. For a killjoy critique, see Suddendorf et al., 2009a.
110In another study ten chimpanzees: Dufour & Sterck, 2008.
110An unusual report: Osvath, 2009.
Chapter 6: Mind Readers
113Of all the species on Earth: Zimmer, 2003, p. 1079.
114much as we do science: Gopnik, 1993.
114simulating their experiences: Gordon, 1996.
114requires mental scenario building: Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997.
114(Footnote 1) “intentional stance”: Dennett, 1987.
115special affinity for social stimuli: e.g., Moore, 2006.
115they prefer to look at open eyes: Batki et al., 2000.
115The developmental psychologist Chris Moore: Moore, 2013.
115infants start to point: Liszkowski et al., 2004.
115motivated to keep making links: e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005.
115(Footnote 2) blind children are typically delayed: Peterson et al., 2000.
115(Footnote 3) in one study Israeli parents: Feldman et al., 2006.
117Nested processes are also involved: e.g., Dennett, 1987; Perner, 1991.
117original paper on mental time: Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997.
117William Hazlitt: Hazlitt, 1805, p. 1.
117mental disorders are extreme versions: Baron-Cohen, 2002; Crespi & Badcock, 2008.
118disorders of theory of mind: e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006.
118“On the lack of evidence”: Penn & Povinelli, 2007.
118David Premack and Guy Woodruff: Premack & Woodruff, 1978.
119Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner: Wimmer & Perner, 1983.
120Extensive research on false-belief tasks: Wellman et al., 2001.
120earlier in children who have older siblings: Ruffman et al., 1998.
120better on language tasks: Astington & Jenkins, 1999.
120deaf children: Peterson & Siegal, 2000.
120attribute them to themselves: Gopnik & Astington, 1988.
120how they come to know: O’Neill et al., 1992.
121John Flavell: Flavell et al., 1983.
121to lie is to knowingly implant a false belief: e.g., Suddendorf, 2011.
122Robin Dunbar: Dunbar, 2007.
122faux pas: Baron-Cohen et al., 1999.
123manage the impressions we give: Tedeschi, 1981.
123They form expectations: Csibra et al., 1999.
123They copy what someone else intends: Meltzoff, 1995.
123In fact, even toddlers: Clements & Perner, 1994; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005.
124Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill: Apperly & Butterfill, 2009.
124Henry Wellman, Candi Peterson, and colleagues: Shahaeian et al., 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004.
124shed tears to express: Humans are the only primates to shed tears: Bard, 2003.
124(Footnote 5) Chimpanzee mothers and infants: Bard, 1994.
125The work of primatologists like: e.g., Goodall, 1986.
125tactical deceptions in primate societies: Whiten & Byrne, 1988.
126Daniel Povinelli reported studies: Povinelli et al., 1990, 1992.
126lean inter
pretations of their behavior: e.g., Povinelli & Eddy, 1996.
126(Footnote 6) brain sizes have increased in tandem: Jerison, 1973.
127capacity to reinterpret behavior in mental terms: Povinelli et al., 2000.
127alternative explanation to this proposal: Suddendorf & Whiten, 2003.
127(Footnote 7) chimpanzee aggressively chasing a female: de Waal, 1986.
128Michael Tomasello and Josep Call: e.g., Tomasello et al., 1999; Call et al., 1998.
128Even dogs and monkeys: Emery, 2000.
128In collaboration with Brian Hare: Hare et al., 2000.
128Rhesus monkeys similarly: Flombaum & Santos, 2005.
129In an extension of Hare: Hare et al., 2001.
129some great apes appear to recognize: Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005.
129distinguish accidental from purposeful: Call & Tomasello, 1998.
129discriminate between someone who is unwilling: Call et al., 2004.
129distinguish appearance from reality: Krachun et al., 2009a.
129when a competitor cannot see them: Hare et al., 2006.
129Grey squirrels, for instance: Leaver et al., 2007.
129Similarly, scrub jays: Clayton et al., 2007. For a killjoy critique, see van der Vaart et al., 2012.
130no nonhuman animal has passed false-belief tasks: Kaminski et al., 2008; Krachun et al., 2009b.
130no other animal has anything like a theory of mind: Heyes, 1998; Penn & Povinelli, 2007.
130They may have a limited: Call, 2001a.
131what they call “shared intentionality”: Herrmann et al., 2007; Tomasello et al., 2005.
131a collaborative task with an adult: Warneken et al., 2006.
131poor at using and providing social cues: Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Liszkowski et al., 2009.
131when the options are far apart: Mulcahy & Call, 2009; Mulcahy & Suddendorf, 2011.
131virtually only to request: Povinelli et al., 1997.
131only some 5 percent: Lyn et al., 2011.
132A recent large-scale examination: Herrmann et al., 2007.
132may not be comparable: de Waal et al., 2008.
132they only reason about observables: Penn & Povinelli, 2007.
Chapter 7: Smarter Apes
133Man is most uniquely: Hoffer, 1973, p. 19.
134Bees use optic flow: Chahl et al., 2004.
135Research on intelligence: Neisser et al., 1996.
136“intelligence is what the tests test”: Boring, 1923.
136various indicators of “success”: Gottfredson, 1997.
136test scores have been increasing: Flynn, 2000.
137resulting theories of intelligence: Deary et al., 2010; Neisser et al., 1996.
137practical intelligence is quite distinct: Sternberg, 1999.
137multiple intelligences: Gardner, 1993.
138emotional intelligence: Salovey & Mayer, 1990.
138Pinker offers the following definition: Pinker, 1997, p. 62.
138(Footnote 4) William James called “having interest”: James, 1890.
139Man is a rational animal: Russell, 2009, p. 45.
139numerous biases and heuristics: Tversky & Kahneman, 1974.
140seven (plus or minus two) chunks: Miller, 2003.
140a mere three to five chunks: Cowan, 2001.
140working memory is the stage: Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007.
140embedded processes are only possible: Read, 2008.
140(Footnote 5) Alan Baddeley: Baddeley, 1992, 2000.
141half of the variability in IQ: Oberauer et al., 2005; Oberauer et al., 2008.
141steadily between ages four and eleven: Alloway et al., 2006.
141Graeme Halford: Halford et al., 2007; Halford et al., 1998.
141and theory of mind: Gordon & Olsen, 1998.
141crucial factor in human cognitive evolution: Balter, 2010.
141(Footnote 6): Recent research suggests: Oberauer et al., 2008.
142to decontextualize: Gerrans, 2007.
142Robert Sternberg suggests: Sternberg, 1999.
143The imagination is one: Darwin, 1871, p. 45.
143recursion is a key mechanism: Corballis, 2011.
143In so-called divergent-thinking: Suddendorf & Fletcher-Flinn, 1999.
144Designing is the capacity: e.g., Suddendorf & Dong, 2013.
144Some animals use tools: Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010.
144Queensland jumping spider: Wilcox & Jackson, 2002.
145Embedded thinking: Suddendorf, 1999b.
145J. David Smith and colleagues: Smith et al., 1995.
145claim the middle ground: Smith et al., 2012.
146Wolfgang Köhler’s classic experiments: Köhler, 1917/1925.
146In one study gorillas and orangutans: Mulcahy et al., 2005.
147other species manufacture tools: Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010.
147use a tool to obtain another tool: Taylor et al., 2007.
147Nathan Emery and Nicola Clayton: Emery & Clayton, 2004.
147Ravens, for example, are capable: Heinrich, 1995.
147Taylor and colleagues recently: Taylor et al., 2010.
148They made the most elementary mistakes: Povinelli, 2000.
148natural stick tools: Mulcahy et al., 2013.
148Several other results suggest: e.g., Yocom & Boysen, 2011.
148In one ingenious study: Mendes et al., 2007.
148Rooks, corvids that are not known: Bird & Emery, 2009.
148New Caledonian crows can learn: Taylor et al., 2011.
149After ninety trials only one: Visalberghi & Limongelli, 1994.
149Chimpanzees fared slightly better: Povinelli, 2000.
149Povinelli and his colleagues Penn and Holyoak: Penn et al., 2008.
149some chimpanzees can avoid the trap: Seed et al., 2009.
149New Caledonian crows were recently shown: Taylor et al., 2009.
149(Footnote 10) hidden humans as causal agents: Taylor et al., 2012.
150One study also found that a chimpanzee: Gillan et al., 1981.
150the argument by Povinelli and colleagues: Penn et al., 2008.
150stark individual differences: Flemming et al., 2008.
150such spontaneous inferences: Call, 2006.
150Call placed food in one of two cups: Call, 2004.
152Andrew Hill followed up: Hill et al., 2011.
153Tetsuro Matsuzawa and colleagues: e.g., Kawai & Matsuzawa, 2000.
154Ayumu could even beat humans: Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007.
154In follow-up research humans: Silberberg & Kearns, 2009.
154Dwight Read: Read, 2008.
154working-memory capacity in human evolution: Balter, 2010.
155“laser-beam intelligence.”: Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Premack, 2007.
155“response breadth”: Sterelny, 2003.
155A classic study on zoo animals: Glickman & Sroges, 1966.
155thirty-eight different ways: Whiten & Suddendorf, 2007.
156(Footnote 14) Rates of behavioral innovation: Reader & Laland, 2003.
156One study recorded the diversity: Parker, 1974a, 1974b.
Chapter 8: A New Heritage
157The primary difference: Dennett, 1995, p. 331.
158(Footnote 1) “linguistic relativity”: e.g., Evans & Levinson, 2009.
159Other animals cooperate: e.g., de Waal, 2005.
159bacteria outnumber human cells: Sleator, 2010.
160William D. Hamilton: Hamilton, 1964.
161researchers used this exercise: Madsen et al., 2007.
161Robert Trivers: Trivers, 1971.
161(Footnote 4) the Cinderella effect: Daly & Wilson, 1988.
162whether true altruism exists: e.g., Harman, 2010; Ridley, 1997.
162(Footnote 5) Niko Tinbergen: Tinbergen, 1963.
163may be called sociopaths: Mealey, 1995.
163As Dawkins argued so persuasively: Dawkins, 1976.
163(Footnote 6) cheater-detection mechanisms: e.g., Cosmides et al., 2005. 164
“indirect reciprocity”: Haidt, 2007.
165New forms of cultural learning: Tomasello, 1999, p. 526.
165Cumulative culture has a role: e.g., Boyd et al., 2011; Dennett, 1995; Sterelny, 2003.
165a second inheritance system: Whiten, 2005.
165Richard Dawkins suggests: Dawkins, 1976.
166debates about the precise similarities: Mesoudi et al., 2006; Sterelny, 2003.
166evolves in response to local demands: Sterelny, 2003.
166(Footnote 9) Once the island of Tasmania: Flannery, 1994; Taylor, 2010.
167a capacity for imitation from birth: Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; but see Suddendorf et al., 2013.
167By nine months infants can: Meltzoff, 1988.
167infants begin to imitate rationally: Gergely et al., 2002.
167Mark Nielsen showed: Nielsen, 2006.
168The psychiatrist Justin Williams: Williams et al., 2001.
168(Footnote 10) Our proposal has garnered: e.g., Kana et al., 2011.
169the chameleon effect: Chartrand & Bargh, 1999.
169Research suggests that when: van Baaren et al., 2004.
169(Footnote 11) behavioral synchrony is associated: Feldman, 2012.
169a study on Mayan children: Maynard, 2002.
170teaching appears to be a cross-cultural: Tomasello et al., 1993a.
171We can pass on questions: Corballis & Suddendorf, 2010.
172(Footnote 13) Elinor Ostrom: Ostrom, 2009.
172reciprocal altruism requires: Stevens & Hauser, 2004.
172Vampire bats: Denault & McFarlane, 1995.
172Cuddlier primates depend: de Waal, 1989.
172In one study chimpanzees: Melis et al., 2006a.
173preferentially from high-status individuals: Horner et al., 2010.
173In 1953 a Japanese macaque: Kawai, 1965.
173psychic connections: Shermer, 1997.
174diffusion experiments: Whiten & Mesoudi, 2008.
174In one study researchers trained: Whiten et al., 2005.
174In a recent study on orangutans: Dindo et al., 2011.
175The systematic comparison has yielded: Whiten et al., 1999.
175work on Sumatran orangutans: van Schaik et al., 2003.
175Cetaceans, as well: Rendell & Whitehead, 2001.
175New Caledonian crows: Holzhaider et al., 2010; Hunt & Gray, 2003.
176different types of social learning: Whiten & Ham, 1992.
176Even an octopus: Fiorito & Scotto, 1992.
176Learning by copying others: Byrne & Russon, 1998.
176(Footnote 14) often dubbed “emulation”: e.g., Tennie et al., 2004.
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