Whatever his parentage, it was saving his father at the Ticino River battle that first brought young Scipio fame; it was his father’s death that led him to his destiny. After recovering from his wounds at the Ticino, the elder Scipio joined his brother Gnaeus in Spain to carry on the war against the Carthaginians in their supply base. The brothers enjoyed some success in battle and in gaining allies among the Spanish tribes, but they were both killed in separate battles in 212 BC. The remnants of their army retreated to the north bank of the Ebro, where they regrouped under the leadership of Lucius Marcius. He was soon superseded by C. Claudius Nero, who arrived with reinforcements late in 211. Nero seemed to be regarded as a temporary commander, for the Roman government was soon looking for his successor. They found him in Publius Cornelius Scipio, the younger.
Too young at twenty-four to officially hold a command rank, Scipio had it bestowed on him by public acclamation, which the Senate confirmed. There has been much debate why this occurred. Certainly there were men with more combat experience, but the government might have deemed them too valuable to spare while Hannibal was rampaging through northeast Italy. Possibly, they hoped the Scipio name, which had been so valuable in gaining allies in Spain, would generate loyalty. Scipio certainly had support within the Senate through his family connections. He seemed to have it all: family, political connections, bravery, ambition, and the charisma with which to sway the crowd.8
Perhaps the Senate withheld the names of other candidates, to give the public the impression they were confirming the only man who would actually volunteer for the job. It certainly would have deflected later criticism had Scipio failed in his mission. What seems most likely, however, is that the Senate recalled Nero because of the need for experienced commanders at home. Had the there been a greater number of qualified men, it would probably have sent someone else instead. Scipio was thus the best of the second string.9 No matter the political circumstances involved, Scipio certainly wanted the job in order to avenge the deaths of his father and uncle.
Warfare of the Time
THE ROMAN ARMY FIGHTING IN SPAIN was organized along the same lines as the forces in Italy. The infantry was deployed in three ranks according to age and experience. The front rank, the hastati, consisted of the youngest recruits, usually late teens through twenties. The principes in the center rank were veterans, usually in their thirties. The first two ranks carried shield, short sword, and javelins (pila). The rear rank, the triarii, was made up of the oldest veterans who acted primarily as a reserve and were armed along the lines of Greek hoplites, with long pikes. Light infantry or skirmishers, the velites, used missile weapons such as slings and light spears in a harassing role prior to the battle’s commencement. Cavalry forces remained secondary, but Scipio would begin to integrate them more thoroughly. In Roman legions they numbered 300, but in the more cavalry-oriented allied legions they usually numbered 600. They usually deployed on the flanks and were primarily for scouting, pursuit, and flank security.
Once in command in Spain, Scipio began altering the standard army format. After his capture of Nova Carthago, he began training his men with intensity. He had them make long marches in full armor and pay close attention to keeping their weapons and equipment in good repair. He also trained them in the use of the gladius hispaniensus, the Spanish sword.
Historians have long debated whether this weapon was first introduced by Scipio or had been used by the Roman army (at least partially) since the Gallic Wars in the 220s BC. In his biography of Scipio, H. H. Scullard argues that a lost passage from Polybius indicates that the Romans had adopted this “excellent Celtiperian sword,” which was “well-pointed and suitable for cutting with either edge” at the time of the Hannibalic War.10 The original Roman gladius was almost exclusively a stabbing weapon—used in thrusting—whereas the Spanish sword could also be used for slashing, making it much more functional in hand-to-hand combat. Probably a sword based on the Spanish style was in use by some Romans, but the high-quality iron and forging techniques were exclusively Spanish. Not until Scipio’s time (primarily after the capture of Novo Carthago) would these have been widely available.
Once the velites were expended, combat did not immediately go hand-to-hand. Each legionary carried two pila, in most cases thrown during the assault before the clash of shields. The Roman throwing spear, the pilum, was a long pointed rod of iron implanted in a wooden shaft. The base of the rod was untempered, and, as noted in the previous chapter, it would bend on impact, making it useless to the enemy. The Romans, however, would reuse enemy javelins. Some have suggested that Roman battles actually involved more long-range fighting, but given that each regular soldier carried but two pila this is hard to accept.11 If the velites were expanded in their numbers, this might seem more plausible.
More innovative than the weapons was Scipio’s rearrangement of the army’s formation. The velites became more important in his army, just as they were about to become throughout the Roman forces. In the wake of the massive losses in the battles against Hannibal, the Roman government was obliged to open the recruiting to greater numbers of the population. Traditionally, the soldiers provided their own weapons and armor and therefore had to be people of some means; the poor were not allowed to join the army. That changed in the years 214–212, when the proletarii became eligible. They were used as velites since they could afford no armor. The government, however, could provide each of them with a small shield and five pila.
In earlier days, the velites were harassing troops—used and then quickly withdrawn as the two armies neared each other. As the numbers of velites grew, so did their role. When Fabius was overseeing the war against Hannibal, skirmishing and harassment were the order of the day, so the use of missile-armed troops became more important. Scipio, by giving velites more training (and therefore discipline), began to grant them a greater role in battle. The Roman army was changing. Allowing the poor to join the army, coupled with wars that grew longer and farther away from Rome, was laying the groundwork for the professional army, very different from the one made up of citizen-soldiers, which had been Rome’s traditional means of defense.12
The Carthaginian army that Scipio went up against in Spain strongly resembled that commanded by Hannibal in Italy, but grew increasingly dependent on Spanish recruits. As we saw with Hannibal, the Carthaginians depended hugely on allied forces as well as mercenaries. The Carthaginian forces were truly multiethnic and multifunctional. They included infantry from northern Africa, Spain, and Gaul, cavalry from Spain or Numidia, slingers from the Balearic Islands, and a leavening of Greek mercenaries.13 The Spanish fielded both heavy and light infantry, based on their shield. The heavy infantry, or scutati, carried the long oval Celtic scutum while the light infantry, the caetrati, carried the caetra, a smaller and lighter buckler. The caetra was wooden, one to two feet across with a central metal boss, and was used for both parrying and attack.
The primary infantry weapons were sword and shield. There were two main sword types. The Iberians used the falcata, with a slightly curving blade that was sharpened hilt to tip on the outer edge, and occasionally on the final third of the blade on the inner curve. This gave it increased parrying ability. Very likely a local adaptation of the Greek kopis or machaera, it was a fearsome weapon. The blade was somewhat wider near the point than at the hilt, moving the center of gravity and increasing the kinetic energy when swung. Diodorus comments that these swords were of such quality that no helmet, shield, or bones could resist their strokes.14 The Celt-Iberians of northern Spain used the straight, double-edged sword that the Romans soon copied. The Spanish smiths creating these were reportedly so good, and the quality of the metal so high, that the blade could be bent almost double then spring back to its original shape. Stabbing spears and javelins rounded out the Carthaginian armory.
The Opponents
WHEN SCIPIO THE ELDER AND HIS BROTHER GNAEUS campaigned in Spain, the Romans had gained two major successes. In 217 they defeated the Carthaginian n
avy, which hampered any reinforcement from North Africa to Spain. Second, the brothers established strong ties with many of the tribes of the peninsula, although mainly above the Ebro in traditionally Roman-dominated territory. Though one of the tribes turned coat in the middle of two battles in 211—a retreat that led to the brothers’ deaths—and though some tribes drifted toward the Carthaginian cause afterward, most of the alliances they had established continued to lean in Rome’s direction.
In the wake of the defeats in 211, the Roman army retreated north of the Ebro and established a defense. The troops elected Lucius Marcius Septimus as their new commander and sent word of their situation back to Rome. Luckily for them, the three Carthaginian generals fell into immediate squabbling about which was in charge, so Septimus was able to breathe easy. In 211 C. Claudius Nero arrived with reinforcements of 14,000 infantry and 1,100 cavalry and orders to play defense. Nero, as a protege of Fabius, was comfortable with a passive role. With Hannibal still active in Italy, the government viewed Spain as a sideshow—hence, very likely, why Scipio was sent there to begin with. However, when he was elected consul and sent to Spain in 210, Scipio had different ideas.
As for the Punic generals—there were three of them—we know little other than their names. One was Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal’s brother, who at Scipio’s arrival was in central Spain besieging a town of the Carpetani tribe. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, was on the Atlantic coast at the mouth of the Tagus River in what today would be the central Portuguese coast. The third, the youngest Barca brother, Mago, was among the Conii tribes around the Pillars of Hercules (Gibraltar). Unlike Hannibal, who went to great lengths to learn about the personalities of his opposing generals, Scipio apparently had little chance to do so with these three, or at least there is no record that he did. From Scipio’s perspective, the important thing was that the three armies were separated too far from each other to provide immediate mutual support. Even more important was the fact that none of these armies was within a ten-day march of his first target, Novo Carthago.
When Scipio arrived in northeastern Spain late in 210 he brought with him an additional 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. He landed at Emporiae, sent the fleet further down the coast to the main Roman base at Tarraco, and marched along the coastline southward toward Novo Carthago. This gave time for his arrival to be announced through the area, and those tribes that held ties to his father and uncle could (and in many cases did) renew them. Thus, when he reached Tarraco he had not only brought the Roman forces up to about 28,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry but he also had laid the foundation for supplementing his army even further with local troops.
Novo Carthago
SCIPIO SPENT THE WINTER OF 210–209 BCE strengthening ties with the local tribes and gathering intelligence on his intended target. Novo Carthago was the primary port of entry for whatever assistance came from Carthage: it held the treasury, it contained a massive armory, and it was where the hostages held to assure the cooperation of the Spanish tribes were kept. Further, it was the primary manufacturing center, especially for weapons. On the surface, Scipio’s attacking the main Carthaginian base seemed rather foolish given his relatively small force. The city was encircled with walls and surrounded by water on three sides—by a harbor and a lagoon. In reality it made perfect sense—as long as it could be captured quickly. Scipio had learned that the garrison numbered a mere 1,000 soldiers. The key was to make sure that the assault did not turn into a long siege, for that would give one or both of the Barcas the chance to march to the city’s relief. Why would the Carthaginians leave their main port and supply base so lightly defended? According to Polybius, it was their rivalry. “Each went his own way in pursuit of personal ambitions, which would hardly have been fulfilled by electing to remain at New Carthage and ensure its security.”15
The key to a successful attack lay in the nature of the lagoon on the city’s northern side. After questioning local fishermen who had navigated it, he learned that in many places the lagoon was not very deep; according to Appian, it was chest high at the water’s crest and knee-high when the water ebbed, which it did every afternoon, when strong north winds blew the waters through the canal and into the harbor. If he could hold the defenders’ attention on a landward assault, a small force would be able to sneak across the lagoon and attack an undefended portion of wall.
He divulged none of his plans to any of his subordinates save one, his longtime friend and co-commander Gaius Laelius. Rumors, on the other hand, ran rampant throughout the army and the population, for which Scipio was grateful; the clot of stories would cloud the single one that was true. In the spring of 209 he led 25,000 infantry and 2,500 cavalry down the coast, leaving 3,000 infantry and 500 cavalry to hold his base at Tarraco. According to both Polybius and Livy, Scipio’s army made the march of roughly 300 miles (2,600 Greek stadia) in a week. An army marching 20–25 miles in a day in the nineteenth century was considered to be making good time. Both sources say that the fleet moved along the coast at the same speed. His arrival was certainly a surprise to the citizens and garrison of the city.
The lagoon (which no longer exists) was located on the north side, and the harbor to the south. The peninsula itself was reportedly only 300 yards wide, and Polybius asserts that the circumference of the walls was 22 miles. The city was built on five hills with a sixth outside the city at the base of the peninsula. That was where Scipio established his camp, building defenses on the side not facing the city just in case a relief force should appear and to give his army maneuvering room on the side nearest the city gates. The 1,000 soldiers inside were commanded by Mago (not the same Mago as Hannibal’s brother, who was in another part of Spain), who quickly drafted 2,000 citizens and armed them. When dawn broke and he saw the Romans preparing for an assault and Laelius bringing the Roman ships into the harbor armed with missile-throwing weaponry, Mago assigned his civilians to cover the walls while he placed half his soldiers on a hill near the harbor. The other half he kept in the citadel. As it turns out, the two veteran units were not designated to act as mobile reserves, which would have been the proper assignment, but to be in place for a last stand. This implies that Mago all but conceded the front gates and walls to the Romans.16
Before the attack began, Scipio addressed his troops, reassuring them that there was no relief force readily available, that the garrison was small, that they would be acquiring great wealth at the expense of the enemy, and (best of all) that he had been informed in a dream that the god Neptune had promised assistance. He, of course, knew of the nature of the lagoon’s fluctuating waters, but, according to Livy, “made it out to be a miracle and a case of divine intervention” on behalf of the Romans.17 Polybius uses this as an illustration of Scipio’s genius: “This shrewd combination of accurate calculation with the promise of gold crowns and the assurance of the help of Providence created great enthusiasm among the young soldiers and raised their spirits.”18
Just as the Romans were preparing for their assault, Mago launched a spoiling attack using the civilians, who came pouring out of the city gate. They gave a good account of themselves, but ultimately were both outnumbered and outclassed. When they finally broke and ran back for the city, they were barely able to get the gates closed behind them before the Romans broke through. Scipio quickly sent in 2,000 men with ladders to scale the walls, which, unfortunately for the Romans, were taller than the ladders. Again the civilians proved themselves surprisingly capable by keeping the Romans from reaching the crest; further, overloaded ladders broke and tumbled soldiers to the ground. By midafternoon Scipio called a halt. The defenders were catching their breath and hoping this signaled the beginning of a more traditional siege when the Romans started the assault again. The actions of the first attack were repeated in the second, but neither the Romans nor the defenders showed weakness or hesitation. At this point, defenders from around the walls were called to the landward defenses to aid in that quarter.
That was what Scipio had been waiting for.
As the afternoon drew toward evening, his knowledge of the lagoon waters came into play. He led 500 men across the lagoon in the shallow areas and scaled the now-undefended walls on the north side of the city. Once inside they made their way to the gates and hit the defenders from the rear. Roman soldiers were hacking at the gates from the outside when they were opened from within. The civilians broke for their homes, pursued by the Romans who also attacked the 500 soldiers on the harbor-side hill, which had been dodging missile fire and assaults. Butchery of civilians began, stopped only when Mago surrendered the citadel, which he quickly did.
Within a day’s fighting Scipio had seized the major prize of all Iberia. Scipio had made a deliberate attack using all of his forces but the cavalry. The infantry assault at the gates coupled with the pounding from the ships and the assault of marines from that quarter made his march a complete surprise. The frontal assault, pressed hard, was key to the entire action. Had he relied on merely the lagoon crossing he would have been met by stout resistance on the walls, which, according to Polybius, were manned at all points. By launching his main attack at the gates he would probably have broken through sooner or later, but that was what caused the abandoning of the defense from the lagoon side.19
Perhaps just as important as capturing the city and its assets—as well as freeing the hostages the Carthaginians had held—was what Scipio did after the battle was over and the spoils divided. He immediately began training his men in a new style of fighting, along the lines of what he had learned in action against Hannibal. The Roman way of fighting was unimaginative, in his view; Scipio trained the legions to employ tactics more flexible than the traditional Roman frontal attack, which depended entirely on the sheer weight of manpower. He had seen that fail at Cannae.20 To most senior Romans, the traditional way of fighting exhibited the hallowed concept of virtus, virtue, and the belief that deception was dishonest. Perhaps this was a variant on the Greek hoplite attitude, as we saw in the chapter on Alexander: that real men only fought face to face.
Masters of the Battlefield Page 11