Caesar, meanwhile, had to find a way to feed his men. The summer had arrived and grain was plentiful, but the Greek populace hesitated to voluntarily give him aid in the wake of the recent battle. The first town to openly refuse was Gomphi in Thessaly; Caesar responded by storming the town and slaughtering the inhabitants. As is so often the case in the wake of such an action, other towns became more cooperative.
The Battle of Pharsalus
THE LONGED-FOR BATTLE CAME SOON THEREAFTER, at Palaepharsalus, outside modern Pharsala, Greece. Like Cannae, the exact location of the battlefield is disputed because of a river bisecting a plain; whether they fought on the northern or southern side is unclear. All that the contemporary sources clearly state is that the armies lined up perpendicular to the river with the water on their immediate flanks. Again, multiple sites have been proposed, but the bulk of modern research favors the north side, with Caesar’s forces facing westward on level ground while Pompey’s forces encamped on rising ground facing east. That assumes, as most modern interpreters do, that the actual battle site was near Palaepharsalus rather than Pharsalus. If the latter, then the armies would have been south of the river facing the opposite direction.63
At the beginning of August 48 BC, Pompey’s army arrived and established camp on a rise just west of Palaepharsalus. Now that he had met Caesar’s army, as his advisors had pressed him to do, however, Pompey seemed to be in no hurry to actually fight. Caesar writes that he “decided to test Pompey’s intention, or willingness, to fight” by bringing his army out of camp and forming them up for battle, at first on his home ground at a good distance from Pompey’s camp, but as the days went by progressing steadily closer to the hills where the Pompeians were.64 In response, Pompey’s army formed up each day at the base of the hill on more favorable terrain, daring Caesar to attack. Beginning to run out of food, as well as running out of patience with Pompey, on 9 August Caesar began to gather his forces to move on to a new supply center. As they were preparing to break camp, Pompey’s army descended from the hillside onto the plain. Caesar was quick to respond; ever since the defeat at Dyrrhachium, his troops had longed for a fight in order to regain both their self-respect and that of their commander.
Both Roman armies deployed in traditional fashion: three units wide and three lines deep. According to Caesar, Pompey’s army was made up of three groups: Cilicians (from southern Asia Minor) and Spaniards brought over by Lucius Afrianus on the right wing anchored on the Epineus River, implying but not specifically stating they were under the command of Afrianus; Syrians in the center under the command of Scipio; and two Roman legions Caesar had turned over to Pompey upon entering Italy after the Gallic War, now under Pompey’s direct command on the right. Plutarch and Appian describe them differently. Plutarch’s Caesar and Pompey place Pompey on the right flank, with Scipio in the center and Domitius [Ahenobarbus] on the left. Appian mostly agrees with this, but places Lentalus on the right while Pompey and Afrianus guarded the camp.65 Caesar claims that Pompey trusted his Cilician-Spanish troops the most, but they did not face Caesar’s favorite 10th Legion on the right. Caesar also asserts that he was opposite Pompey. Left to right Caesar’s three contingents were commanded by Antony, Domitius Calvinus, and Publius Sulla while Caesar stationed himself on his own right flank. Once the battle began, as we shall see, where Pompey may have been positioned would prove of little consequence.
The difference in their respective numbers is, as usual, a subject of debate. Caesar claims he had only 22,000 infantry and about 1,000 cavalry. He again neglects to mention any numbers for auxiliaries. He puts Pompey’s force at 45,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, with about 2,000 reenlisted veterans whom he sprinkled throughout the lines and about 3,000 guarding the camp. Warry agrees with Caesar’s count, but adds a further 5,000–10,000 auxiliaries and allies. Cary and Scullard agree with the number of Caesarians, but place the Pompeian force at 40,000, following Appian. David Boose and Richard Gabriel prefer Delbrück’s count of 30,000 for Caesar and 40,000 for Pompey, with cavalry numbers of 2,000 and 3,000 respectively. Additionally, Pompey had a large group of archers and slingers (Warry claims 4,200) supporting his cavalry.66 Pompey proposed the cavalry as his arm of decision. He concentrated his horse forces on his far left, placing them under the command of Labienus, Caesar’s one-time chief lieutenant in Gaul. Pompey explained to his subordinates that would “outflank [Caesar’s] line, take it in rear, throw his army into confusion, and rout it before a single weapon of ours is hurled at the enemy. In this way we shall finish off the war without any danger to our legions and virtually without bloodshed. This is really not difficult, as we are so strong in cavalry.”67
Seeing Pompey’s massed cavalry, Caesar responded with his customary unconventionality. He withdrew eight cohorts (one-tenth of his force) from the rear lines and placed them at a forty-five degree angle from the 10th Legion, behind his own cavalry, which was facing Pompey’s. He also implemented a lesson he had learned in Gaul, taught him by his enemies as well as by his Germanic allies: mingle light infantry among the cavalry for harassing purposes. These two moves proved decisive in the battle.
Caesar, after giving his normal prebattle speech, ordered the trumpets sounded and the attack to begin. He sent forward the first two of his three lines, maintaining a reserve. As was typical, his men raised a battle cry and plunged forward, but quickly noticed Pompey’s army standing still. Pompey had ordered his infantry to stand fast rather than close with Caesar’s troops. This would husband their energy, while Caesar’s men exhausted themselves charging across no-man’s-land. At this point, one sees the advantage of a veteran army. Rather than play into Pompey’s hands, Caesar’s men stopped halfway across the battlefield, dressed their lines and caught their breath, out of the range of any missile attack. Then, having recovered themselves, they charged again into the enemy lines. Just seeing this calm, parade-ground sort of action on the part of the enemy must have had a dispiriting effect on those less experienced soldiers in Pompey’s army. At the point of contact, normal hand-to-hand Roman warfare began.
Pompey then ordered his cavalry charge. His plan was sound, and got off to a good start. His assault was soon forcing back Caesar’s horsemen, though the charging cavalrymen were not prepared for the stones and arrows emerging from the skirmishers among their enemy. Caesar’s horse troops slowed the charge somewhat before withdrawing from the field. Ready to resume full speed, Pompey’s charging cavalry were not prepared to find themselves immediately facing a line of heavy infantry. The missile attacks had broken up the formation somewhat, and it now became hopelessly bunched as the horses at the front began pulling up before the advancing infantry’s spear points. Here Caesar played another trick that depended on the inexperience of Pompey’s cavalry: he ordered the men in the refused flank not to throw their pila but to stab at the riders’ faces with them. As in modern bayonet training, the goal was to unnerve their opponent by stabbing at the most exposed and vulnerable part of his body.68 According to Plutarch, Pompey’s cavalry “numbered seven thousand, the flower of Rome and Italy, preëminent in lineage, wealth, and courage.” Citizen cavalry was virtually a thing of the past by this time, and these young horsemen proved less than preeminent in courage. Caesar “expected that men little conversant with wars or wounds, but young, and pluming themselves on their youthful beauty, would dread such wounds especially, and would not stand their ground, fearing not only their present danger, but also their future disfigurement.… [T]hey could not endure the upward thrust of the javelins, nor did they even venture to look the weapon in the face, but turned their heads away and covered them up to spare their faces.”69 Thus, fleeing horsemen from the front not only broke the charge of those following, but spread fear in the rear ranks. Pompey’s cavalry fled while Caesar’s heavy infantry and recovered cavalry pursued.
The flight of Pompey’s cavalry ruined his battle plan. The light infantry arrayed behind them were quickly cut down, and Caesar’s refused flank now became a swin
ging gate pivoting onto Pompey’s infantry flank and rear. At this point two things happened that sealed Caesar’s victory. First, Pompey realized that his plan had failed, and he fled the field for his camp. Plutarch recounts: “After his infantry was thus routed, and when, from the cloud of dust which he saw, Pompey conjectured the fate of his cavalry, what thoughts passed through his mind it were difficult to say; but he was most like a man bereft of sense and crazed, who had utterly forgotten that he was Pompey the Great, and without a word to any one, he walked slowly off to his camp.”70 Simultaneously, Caesar ordered in his third line, the reserves. The fresh troops relieving the front two lines provided a burst of energy that broke Pompey’s line. With their supposedly unstoppable cavalry and their commander in flight, the infantry turned and fled as well.
Caesar’s troops followed closely as he urged them on. The heat of the day was coming on, and he did not want them to allow the fugitives any rest. Pompey rode away unpursued to the coast and caught a boat for Egypt, where Ptolemy had him executed. In his wake, he left behind a shattered army. Caesar claims that 15,000 enemy troops were killed and 24,000 captured, compared with a loss to his own army of but 200. Appian gives somewhat greater numbers:
The losses of Italians on each side—for there was no report of the losses of auxiliaries, either because of their multitude or because they were despised—were as follows: in Caesar’s army, thirty centurions and 200 legionaries, or, as some authorities have it, 1200; on Pompey’s side ten senators … and about forty distinguished knights. Some exaggerating writers put the loss in the remainder of [Pompey’s] forces at 25,000, but Asinius Pollio, who was one of Caesar’s officers in this battle, records the number of dead Pompeians found as 6000.71
Most modern scholars are more in agreement with this count than that of the usually exaggerating Caesar.
Appian also describes in detail Caesar’s quick action to assure Pompey’s legionaries they would not be harmed and that only the auxiliaries would suffer. Many legionaries therefore surrendered on the battlefield or near Pompey’s camp, though many fled to the hills behind the camp where they were surrounded and surrendered the following day.
Pharsalus was the result of an approach march by both armies, resulting in a pitched battle. Both sides were satisfied with the battlefield and spent a week in challenging each other to fight. Once the battle began, Pompey launched a deliberate attack with concentrated forces, but had no answer for Caesar’s counterattack once the cavalry fled the field. Neither commander really controlled the tempo of the battle. Caesar displayed audacity, as usual, in his decision to weaken his already inferior numbers to create a hidden refused flank, which clearly surprised Pompey’s cavalry and proved the key to the victory. With momentum on his side, Caesar exploited the situation psychologically by offering immediate terms to Italian soldiers, breaking their will to fight or flee. He further exploited the situation by slaughtering the foreigners who had aided Pompey. The pursuit was rapid and effective, gaining yet more surrendered (and pardoned) legionaries.
Caesar’s Leadership
CAESAR FOLLOWED HIS BRILLIANT VICTORY at Pharsalus with a foolish pursuit of Pompey, chasing him to Egypt with a mere 3,000 soldiers. He found himself cut off in the face of far superior numbers of Egyptian troops and required rescue by Mithradates. The months he spent in isolation in Egypt gave Pompey’s supporters in Italy, Africa, and Spain time to organize themselves and continue the war. Caesar was thus obliged to spend even more time fighting and defeating them before he could return to Rome and assume leadership of the government in person. His assassination in 44 BC led to even further civil war, which was finally settled by Caesar’s adopted son, Octavian, with the aid of Caesar’s lieutenant Mark Antony.
Even though Pompey had been nicknamed “the Great,” it was Caesar who earned the reputation. Regarded by many as Alexander’s equal and by others as the greatest general in history, Caesar certainly mastered many of the principles of operations.
Looking at Caesar’s two campaigns, one sees that he was able to pursue two completely different objectives. In Gaul, each year provided a new target for Caesar to aim at. With his ultimate grand strategic goal of subduing all of Gaul, he proceeded in a very long campaign, but one that maintained organization and focus. His objectives were always particular tribes, starting with the Helvetii in his first campaign. Each fighting season thereafter took him to a new enemy, whether it be the Belgae, the British, or the Germans—whichever target needed subduing or offered a chance for political gain. Only in 51 BC did a concentration of enemies gather against him; at this point, his objective became the leader of the opposition, and capturing towns mattered only insofar as they provided supplies or bases: Vercingetorix, wherever he was, became the objective. Caesar had already proved to Gaul that his army could defeat any single tribe, but defeating the coalition under a single commander finally convinced the population to end serious resistance.
In the Civil War, the individual was again the objective: Pompey, his former ally. Even Caesar’s failure to follow Pompey to Greece but instead campaign in Spain was designed to weaken Pompey’s power and reputation. Only Caesar seemed to realize that Pompey was past his prime, that “the Great” had become “the Politician” and “the Hesitator.” Defeating Pompey’s generals in Spain was a reflection of his enemy’s decreasing stature. So, too, was besieging a force much larger than his own at Dyrrhachium. Every time Caesar acted and Pompey reacted, it was a diminishing of Pompey’s prestige and his self-confidence. At Pharsalus, Pompey, for all his brave talk to his sycophants, seemed to know in advance that he would not win.
Caesar was also master of the offensive. He showed time and again in Gaul that he would attack, and do so quickly. Strategic speed became operational advantage, a tactic Napoleon mastered again eighteen centuries later. Caesar’s major operational advantage was speed. He regularly moved his army faster than his enemies moved theirs, concentrating and striking before they could act or react. That allowed Caesar to defeat larger armies. For him, speed was a “force multiplier,” increasing the effectiveness of his legions and allowing him to use his army more effectively.72 Michael Grant notes, “He could do everything with extraordinary speed. The orator Cicero, who hated him utterly, described his rapidity at the beginning of the Civil War as something horrifying and monstrous. Caesar lived at a faster tempo than the people who had to contend with him, and this gave him an enormous advantage.”73 Only during sieges did this characteristic lag, but given the rapid construction of Caesar’s siege lines, perhaps it does apply.
In his campaigns, Caesar seemed to always be in movement to contact, even when he should not have been, as in his Egyptian troubles after Pharsalus. Dodge describes Caesar as “over-daring and over-cautious by turns,” suggesting that “had not Fortune on many occasions rushed to the rescue Caesar would never have lived to be Caesar.”74 Goldsworthy also notes the problems of being overdaring: “Caesar was a great improviser rather than a great planner, a man who was bold to the point of recklessness, so that his most brilliant achievements often involved extricating his army from a crisis created by his own rashness.”75
Both Alesia and Pharsalus are terrific examples of Caesar’s use of economy of force. How does one hold a position, even with strong defenses on both sides, from an enemy many times one’s own strength? Caesar showed at Alesia how to use just enough manpower for the job at hand. He depended on the strength of his walls and booby traps to hold the bulk of the Gallic relief force at bay and keep Vercingetorix within the contravallation. But when the last big assault took place, it was Caesar’s judicious assignment of troops that won the day. Even under attack by tens of thousands, from the west and southwest, he held troops in reserve. When the sally from Alesia looked like it might break through the inner walls, he committed six cohorts, then seven, just enough to beat back the immediate threat. When Labienus was about to be overwhelmed, he led the last of the infantry reserves himself and threw in his Germanic cavalry to b
reak the assault and win the day.
At Pharsalus, again facing superior numbers, Caesar weakened his main line to create both a reserve and a defensive-counterattacking fourth line. To do this requires not only courage but a confidence in one’s knowledge of both the enemy and one’s own men. Caesar knew his infantry would hold Pompey’s main line; he knew his enemy cavalry’s lack of combat experience would work against them. Perhaps no better example of how to know and use your own men while manipulating superior opposing numbers exists until Lee’s victory at Chancellorsville.
One sees in all of Caesar’s battles (perhaps because his writings make it so) a distinct unity of command: there is one commander, one brain, one leader. There are subordinates who have their duties, and even some freedom of action, but in battle Caesar dominates. At Alesia, given the nature of the battlefield, Gallic unity of command was impossible. In the Roman lines, there was much individual effort and bravery, but no action without Caesar’s orders. Even when he could not control the whole battle when he went into action himself, the rest of the army stood fast and defended their assigned posts. At Pharsalus, the difference between Caesar and Pompey clearly illustrates this point. Pompey listened to advisors, despite the fact that few had any military experience at all, and allowed himself to be forced into action. As Dodge observes, “The great weakness in Pompey’s army was the lack of one head, one purpose to control and direct events. Caesar, on the other hand, was his army. The whole body was instinct with his purpose.”76
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