At this point Belisarius sent nonessential personnel out of Rome to Naples, something he probably should have done earlier in order to stretch his supplies. Luckily, they were not attacked as they fled south. He also kept supplementing the food supply by sending out his Moorish soldiers at night, when the Goths did nothing but post guards at their camps. The Moors gathered supplies and ambushed the occasional Goth soldier or patrol. This served not only to supplement the food supply, but to bolster Roman morale while harming that of the Goths. In response, Vittigis sent a large force to capture the city and harbor at Portus, which denied the besieged any succor by ship. Belisarius knew the loss of the harbor would be important, but he simply did not have the manpower to spare in order to protect it. The nearest port available to Belisarius was now Antium, a day’s travel to the south. It was from there that, three weeks after the Goths captured Portus, he received a reinforcement of 1,600 cavalry dispatched from Constantinople before the siege began.
With the extra manpower now available, Belisarius was not about to let his men stand idle. He sent cavalry units out to nearby hills. When the Goths massed to charge them, the Byzantine arrows caused great damage while the attackers were at some distance. Procopius writes that “since their shafts fell among a dense throng, they were for the most part successful in hitting a man or a horse.” When the cavalry had expended their arrows, they rode for the city gates with the Goths in pursuit. “But when they came near the fortifications, the operators of the engines began to shoot arrows from them, and the barbarians became terrified and abandoned the pursuit.”66 All of this encouraged the citizenry to get in on the action. They begged Belisarius to let them participate in battle. Procopius tells how Belisarius finally relented to their entreaties, as he had done against his better judgment at Callinicum against the Persians. The disaster was much the same. After early success with his cavalry, Belisarius allowed a phalanx of civilians to sweep the outnumbered Goths from their position on the Plain of Nero. Unfortunately, the loot of the camp became more interesting than the pursuit of a defeated enemy; the Goths re-formed and recaptured their camp. The untrained civilians dropped everything and fled for the city, only to find the gates closed to them and the hotly pursuing Goths. Belisarius and the cavalry saved the day, but the battle could be called nothing better than a draw.
In midsummer an envoy arrived from Constantinople with a large sum of money to pay the troops. Belisarius launched a diversionary attack out of two northern gates while a bodyguard escorted the money into the city from the south. That raised morale temporarily, but soon the citizens were once again complaining; the best Belisarius could do was promise (and hope) that reinforcements were on their way. In the fall he sent Procopius to Naples to recruit more soldiers, then sent his wife, Antonina (who had traveled with him on this campaign), to use her organizational abilities to work on supplying ships and food. Meanwhile, he gambled that the Goths would be feeling the pressure of short rations as well. Belisarius sent raiding parties into the countryside to attack Gothic supply trains and threaten towns along the lines of communication. By intercepting enemy supplies he would not only alleviate the situation in Rome, “the barbarians might seem to be besieged rather than to be themselves besieging the Romans.”67
Indeed, the promised reinforcements did arrive: 3,000 Isaurians, 800 Thracians, and 1,000 Byzantine cavalry, plus 500 soldiers Procopius had recruited or relieved from garrison duty. Antonina had gathered a fleet of ships and a large store of grain. The supplies and cavalry started for Rome, with the ships intending to land at the port of Ostia, across the Tiber from the harbor at Pontus that the Goths had captured. It was now late February or early March 538. Learning that both men and supplies were approaching, Belisarius planned one more major diversion. Throughout the siege the Porta Flaminia had been walled up with stone; Belisarius had done this to make the gate assault-proof from the Goths’ camp just outside. During one night in March, he had the stones quietly removed until the gate was passable. The next morning he ordered a thousand men to sally from the Porta Pinciana, the next gate to the east from the Porta Flaminia. They were ordered to charge the nearest Gothic camp, then “flee” when counterattacked. This they did. As the Goths were in hot pursuit, Belisairus ordered another force to burst through the Porta Flaminia and strike the pursuing Goths in the rear. The Goth’s ensuing confusion was compounded by the Romans turning from their flight and attacking, as well as the addition of fresh troops from just inside the Porta Pinciana. The few Goths who survived fled to their camps and feared to emerge.
This brought the defense of Rome to a successful end. Vittigis offered a three-month truce, which allowed free passage of food and reinforcements into the city. Belisarius also sent more forays into the countryside to harass the Goths. Ultimately Vittigis abandoned the siege and fled for Ravenna.
Although Belisarius was the greatest field commander of his day, most at home in the open pitched battle, of which he was the master, the siege of Rome proved he was hardly one-dimensional and may have been the highlight of his career.68 Indeed, Belisarius seemed to do everything right. He spent the three months prior to the Goths’ arrival repairing the city walls and placing his engines of war. The Goths, by encamping only on one side of the city, allowed Belisarius to maintain the bulk of his forces in one area. His use of local citizenry intermixed with his troops gave increased security by expanding his numbers while still allowing the soldiers to keep a close eye on the civilians. Thus, while there were deserters, there was no serious attempt by the locals to collaborate with the besiegers. Further security was maintained later in the siege by Belisarius’s decision to have the Moors patrol outside the walls at night, both scavenging and ambushing unwary Goths.
The strongest aspect of the defense was its activity. Belisarius carried the fight to the Goths more often than they attacked the city. This use of attack and feigned retreat worked over and over. Only the attack using the Roman civilians was not a success, When attacked, Belisarius was able to shift men to various portions of the wall when hard-pressed, and by holding that redeployment authority solely in his own hands he maintained unity of command. Finally, Belisarius’s flexibility showed constantly, as he used raiding parties against Gothic supply lines and lured attacking Gothic forces into ambushes either by secondary sallies or by luring them into range of the defenders’ fire from the walls.
Belisarius’s Generalship
ECONOMY OF FORCE WAS EASILY BELISARIUS’S greatest strength, primarily because it was forced upon him by his parsimonious and suspicious emperor. He was outnumbered in every battle he fought, and as his career progressed he was given fewer and fewer men to accomplish his missions. (He commanded 25,000 at Dara, 15,000 against the Vandals in North Africa, and 7,500 in his invasion of Italy.) In the Battle of Dara he placed sufficient forces on either flank for defense, but used his mobile Hunnic cavalry in the center as the deciding factor on both flanks. At Rome, he focused his manpower at the gates and spread his force along the walls only when under attack. His infantry archers could man the walls while his cavalry could launch raids outside. In the greatest show of this principle, Belisarius intentionally depleted his defending force in order to send multiple columns into the countryside to disrupt the Gothic supply lines. He thus focused enemy attention away from the city and depleted their food supply while supplementing his own. His deployment of small cavalry forces to hilltops to draw Gothic attacks into missile fire always inflicted many more casualties than he suffered. His only violation of this principle came when he included the citizenry in an attack outside the city. Although the day was a setback, it could have been disaster.
The best example of Belisarius’s mastery of unity of command came early in the siege of Rome, when a false report spread through the city of an enemy break-in. Belisarius responded by ordering each contingent to man its designated area and ignore any such report. He made sure that his subordinates knew that the moving of reserves from point to point was his responsibil
ity, not theirs. All the planning for offense and defense came from him. At Dara he was technically a cocommander, but since Procopius mentions Hermogenes only in passing we can assume that Belisarius, though the younger man, was in command and that the deployment and movement of forces was in his control. He did show his ability to take suggestions, however, when he agreed with the Herulian commander’s idea of hiding his force behind a hill in order to take advantage of the cover for an attack on the Persian cavalry’s rear.
Unfortunately, Belisarius failed to exercise this principle in his two defeats. At Calliculum and in the major attack at Rome, Procopius tells us that Belisarius submitted against his better judgment to entreaties from his soldiers at the former and the civilians at the latter. While open-mindedness is certainly a virtue, a leader has to know his mission and give orders that fulfill it, no matter what his men or subordinates may think. Chasing the Persians out of Byzantine territory was his mission, and at Callinicum there was no need to engage an enemy that was voluntarily disengaging through a strategic withdrawal. At Rome, Belisarius’s mission was to use minimal manpower to defend the huge stretch of Rome’s city walls, and an assault with a large and untrained force of locals could have little advantage other than for morale purposes. In both cases Belisarius forsook unity of command and risked major disaster.
The principle of maneuver was undoubtedly one of Belisarius’s strengths. It is a tribute to his ability to maneuver that in both the battles discussed (as well as his first victory in North Africa), he won against attacking armies. At Dara, his use of cavalry created ambushes against superior forces on both flanks. At Rome, he displayed more ability to maneuver on the defense than did Vittigis on the offense. He consistently placed the Goths at a disadvantage by forcing them into no-win situations. During the main Goth assault on the walls, he not only shifted manpower as necessary within the city to meet attacks from various points but also followed up the Gothic assault with one of his own to chase the retreating enemy and destroy their siege engines. These actions always took place from the gates facing the enemy, for quick striking and quick withdrawal. Belisarius’s deployment of relatively small cavalry forces on hilltops to draw Gothic cavalry into long-range arrow fire worked every time he tried it.
Using the unguarded gates, his dispatch of night patrols not only strengthened security but also brought in much-needed food and obliged the Goths to stay in their camps. Strategically, his dispatch of cavalry forces to harass the enemy supply line and attack enemy towns created far more discomfort for the besiegers than for the besieged. Basil Liddell Hart writes, “Though the strain on the defenders was severe, the strength of the besiegers was shrinking much faster, especially through sickness. Belisarius boldly took the risk of sending two detachments from his slender force to seize by surprise the towns of Tivoli and Terracina, which dominated the roads by which the besiegers received their supplies.”69 Even in the one major mistake of the siege, his attack with the civilian infantry, Belisarius’s quick action with his cavalry saved the bulk of the citizens by covering their retreat into the city.
Liddell Hart describes Belisarius as being a master of the defensive-offensive strategy. “Belisarius had developed a new-style tactical instrument with which he knew that he might count on beating much superior numbers, provided that he could induce his opponents to attack him under conditions that suited his tactics. For that purpose his lack of numbers, when not too marked, was an asset, especially when coupled with an audaciously direct strategic offensive.”70 Thus, Belisarius would advance strategically to a point where he would provoke an enemy response, and then on the battlefield would stand on the defensive until his enemy made a mistake or retreated, upon which he would turn to the offensive. Centuries later, Clausewitz would restate this very principle: “Once the defender has gained an important advantage, defense as such has done its work.… A sudden powerful transition to the offensive—the flashing of the sword of vengeance—is the greatest moment of the defense.”71
Belisarius knew the strengths and weaknesses of his troops and their weaponry, and maximized what he had to take advantage of his opponents’ weaknesses. This is best shown at Rome, where his horse archers repeatedly bested the Gothic heavy cavalry armed only with lances and swords. They could, however, fight toe-to-toe if necessary, as they did at the beginning of the siege at the abandoned river fort. His personal leadership in the midst of combat was a major influence in maintaining morale. His actions were always well planned; he always spent as much time as possible gauging the situation before committing his men to action.
Belisarius also developed into a master of deception. As his career progressed, deceptive operations became increasingly important in his plans. Capitalizing on his trenchworks at Dara and thereby obliging the Persians to divide their cavalry, as he wanted them to, showed great talent for a young commander, but also the ability to learn from his enemies. He also was able to consistently lure the Goths into ambushes outside the Roman walls with feints in one area that opened another area for a lightning attack. Belisarius’s practice of the art of deception reflects his imagination and intellect.72
After the siege of Rome was lifted, Belisarius swept up the Italian Peninsula all the way to Ravenna, aided with more reinforcements led by Justinian’s other favorite, Narses. He accepted the Gothic surrender in 540 and was then transferred back to Persia to deal with the breaking of the “Everlasting Peace” that had been signed after his last campaign there. In 544 he was back in Italy suppressing a Gothic uprising. He was besieging Ravenna when the Goths offered the throne of Italy to him, rather than to the Byzantine Empire. Belisarius played along with the offer until he was inside the city; then he took it captive and signed the surrender in the name of Justinian and the empire. The mere offer, however, was enough to spark Justinian’s paranoia, and Belisarius was recalled to Constantinople in 548. After some time in disgrace and forced retirement, he was the only one the emperor could call on when the capital city was threatened by a force of Huns in 559. Now in what would be considered old age, he led a few hundred men against a force of 8,000 and won a miraculous victory.
Like many generals, Belisarius was at times lucky when it came to the ability (or lack thereof) of his opposing commander. Still, given his long string of victories with minimal forces, it is difficult to find fault with his generalship: how many leaders could make such a virtue of necessity, fashioning tactics to suit his smaller armies in order to inflict such a long string of defeats on such a wide variety of opposing generals and armies with superior numbers?
8
The Two-Headed General: Chinggis Khan (1162?–1227) and Subedei (1176?–1248)
Mongol Emperor and Mongol Chief of Staff
When Chingiz-Khan rose from the grade of childhood to the degree of manhood, he became in the onslaught like a roaring lion and in the melee like a trenchant sword; in the subjugation of his foes his rigour and severity had the taste of poison, and in the humbling of the pride of each lord of fortune his harshness and ferocity did the work of Fate.
—Ata-malik Juvaini, Genghis Khan:
The History of the World Conqueror
If they sprout wings and fly up toward Heaven, you, Subetei, become a falcon and seize them in mid-air. If they become marmots and claw into the Earth with their nails, you become an iron rod and bore through the Earth to catch them. If they become fish and dive into the depths of the Sea, you, Subetei, become a net, casting yourself over them and dragging them back.
—The Secret History of the Mongols
MOST EMPIRE BUILDERS have unusual births, or at least claim such is the case. Alexander was said to have come from a line of gods and heroes and, according to his mother, was sired by Zeus. According to almost all the translations of The Secret History of the Mongols, the oldest-surviving Mongolian work of literature, published shortly after Chinggis Khan’s death,1 Chinggis traced his lineage to the union of a blue-gray wolf and a fallow doe.2 Also along the line was a woman who was im
pregnated three times by a man who appeared through her tent’s smoke hole, rubbed her belly with heavenly light, and left on sunbeams. Most notable, perhaps, about Chinggis’s birth was the story that “he emerged clenching a blood clot the size of a knuckle-bone die in his right hand,”3 although the meaning of that sign is disputed. Born to Yesugei the Brave and Hogelun Ujin, the baby was named Temuchin. Yesugei was a minor chieftain of the Mongols, a tribe living between the Onon and Kerulen Rivers near Lake Baikal. Chinggis Khan’s mother, Hogelun, of the Onggud tribe was newly married to a young man from the Merkid tribe to the west, when Yesugei kidnapped her, an act that would provoke a revenge attack years later.
When Temuchin reached age nine, his father took him to visit the Ongguds in order to arrange a marriage. Along the way they met Dei the Wise of the Onggirad tribe, who offered one of his daughters for Temuchin; Dei had just had a prophetic dream about this chance meeting and betrothed his ten-year-old daughter Borte to Yesugei’s eldest son. Temuchin was left with Dei for a year. Unfortunately, Yesugei encountered a Tatar camp on his way home. They extended the traditional hospitality, but once they recognized him as a Mongol warrior against whom they had fought, the Tartars poisoned him. Yesugei reached home but died within a few days. One of his last orders was to send for Temuchin, who arrived after his father’s death.4 Temuchin did not inherit his father’s followers. Mongol society was fluid, and a tribe depended on the strength of its leader for stability and protection. Steppe nomads willingly joined other leaders they regarded as accomplished warriors, and Yesugei’s followers were unwilling to remain with the young Temuchin. After all, he could offer nothing in the way of protection or loot.5 Abandoned by his father’s followers, Temuchin was left with only his mother, Hogelun, his three brothers, and a sister. Because of bad blood between Yesugei and some of his relatives, Hogelun and the children were shunned by the tribe, even though according to tribal law she could have become the wife of Yesugei’s youngest brother.
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