The campaign of 1632 started out with bad news for the Swedes. Tilly had been replaced as imperial commander (though he still commanded the Bavarian–Catholic League troops) with Wallenstein. Fabulously wealthy with massive holdings in Bohemia, Wallenstein was a master of raising and equipping armies. Unfortunately for Emperor Ferdinand, he was without scruples or loyalty to any cause but his own advancement. That is why Ferdinand had given in to pressure from Maximillian of Bavaria to sack him shortly after Gustavus’s army had landed in 1630. To regain Wallenstein’s services the emperor would have to pay dearly in lands and power, but he was desperate after the Swedish offensive had both crushed the imperial army at Breitenfeld and advanced easily through central Germany. Wallenstein agreed first only to a three-month commission to raise an army; accepting command would come later with more imperial concessions. The emperor was desperate, and Wallenstein took advantage of that the situation, demanding unconditional control over the army and whatever territory he conquered, as well as assurance that the emperor would issue no military commands without Wallenstein’s approval.55
The second problem the Swedes faced in 1632 was manpower. Gustavus, Tilly, and Wallenstein were all raising armies, so mercenaries could pick and choose where they wanted to give their services. Thus, Gustavus had been unable to recruit the 200,000-man army he had hoped for, and he was forced to enter into a short-term truce with Maximilian of Bavaria in order to buy himself some time to expand his ranks. Unfortunately, Marshal Horn violated the truce by seizing Bamberg, a Bavarian possession. Tilly massed superior forces at Bamberg and forced Horn’s retreat on 9 March. This hurt Gustavus’s reputation and pushed him into action sooner than he had planned in order to reestablish his military credibility.
The Swedish army was also suffering from the loss of Saxon support. John George had shown his true colors once in possession of Prague by losing his nerve and opening negotiations with the emperor. Nothing came of it, but with Wallenstein returning to his home country with his new army, John George had to decide between the immediate threat of the imperial forces or the distant threat of Gustavus’s wrath and his seemingly invincible army. When Wallenstein communicated to John George that he could return to Saxony unmolested, the elector abandoned Prague and went home. His army commander, Arnim, did nothing to stop him, and Gustavus’s representative, Count Heinrich Thurn, had no sufficient force to do so either. This, coupled with Horn’s mistake at Bamberg, undid Gustavus’s original 1632 strategy. He had hoped to invade though Saxony into Bohemia or, barring that, move north to fight Pappenheim. He now decided to march into Bavaria and fight with Tilly’s reconstituted army. Thus, he could defeat a weaker army before concentrating on the larger one.56
Gustavus retraced his path from Frankfurt-am-Main back to Würzburg and then on to Nuremburg, which welcomed him with open arms. Joining with scattered detachments summoned to the campaign, he marched southward to Donauwörth on the Danube, where he quickly ejected Tilly’s garrison. Gustavus seized the high ground and placed Tortensson’s artillery to bombard the city. The imperial force lost 800 dead in the cannonade and a further 500 prisoners as they abandoned the place.57 Leaving 2,000 men behind to hold the town, Gustavus marched toward Tilly’s army. Tilly had chosen a good defensive position near the town of Rain between the northward-flowing Lech and Ach Rivers, which empty into the Danube. The Lech was in flood, and Tilly had destroyed all the nearby bridges as well as any boats that could be used to either ferry troops across or build a pontoon bridge.
Tilly could hardly have had a stronger position. On the east side the riverbanks were either woods or marsh. Most of his 22,000 men were in a fortified camp at the town of Rain some 800 yards from the river; a redoubt was built halfway between that camp and the Lech. This earthwork was fronted by spiked chevaux-de-frise barricades to the south and west and manned by two infantry battalions and a dozen guns, with heavier 12-pounders in the main camp. All the artillery had the riverbank easily in range. Tilly occupied Rain with a portion of his right wing and Augsburg to the south with a strong detachment. He then distributed the remainder of his army at the points between the two places where the river might be crossed. Small bodies of cavalry were placed at intervals to give warning as to enemy movements. The distance north to south was sixteen miles.58 Certainly no one in his right mind would force a river crossing in the face of such opposition.
Gustavus’s subordinates agreed with Tilly on that point, but Gustavus did not want to spend the time to go farther south looking for a bridge. He thought a delay would give Wallenstein time to join with Tilly and create an overwhelming force. (He was unaware that the new imperial commander had no intention of marching to Tilly’s aid, although he did send a contingent of 5,000 men as reinforcement.) Gustavus knew that the bulk of Tilly’s force would be new conscripts or militia, so he banked on their inexperience to allow him to force a crossing.
The point Gustavus chose was near the town of Oberndorf, where the Lech made a westward bend and an island was in the center of the river. Gustav deployed his army along the river facing Tilly’s redoubt outside Rain. Instead of attacking, the Swedes dug in, creating three redoubts of their own by the evening of 13 April. Once constructed, they could hold 24 heavy guns that could pound Tilly’s entrenchments; the largest guns would be able to reach the main camp farther to the rear. The 14th saw an inconclusive artillery duel with little damage done to either side.
All of this, however, was a feint. Gustavus had instructed his men to drag boats from the Danube and tear apart local houses for building material, and throughout the night of 14–15 April prefabricated pieces of bridgework were hauled out of Oberndorf to the riverbank opposite the island. An initial force of 334 Finns rowed across to the island and dug in on the east side. By 5:00 a.m. on 15 April the Swedes were ready. The bridge sections were in place, and the Swedes had also constructed supporting earthworks holding 18 guns and 2,000 musketeers. Tilly had been completely deceived.59 At 8:00 a.m. men began swarming across the bridge until three brigades were on the island.
As this was happening, however, some of Tilly’s patrols discovered the action and reported to him. He quickly brought reserves toward the crossing point. Again the Finns were the leading element across to the far side of the Lech, where they began to dig in under fire. Gustavus’s artillery kept Tilly’s men from advancing, but not from felling trees and building a defensive position. To assist the men finishing the bridge and crossing the Lech, Gustavus had stacks of wet hay, green wood, and gunpowder burned to create a thick smoke that blew across the river into the imperial faces.
Both sides reinforced their positions throughout the day. Tilly directed Count Johann von Aldringer to move round the swampy ground, charge with his cavalry those who had already crossed, and seize the bridgehead. Aldringer obeyed the order with alacrity. He turned the marsh and led his men with daring. But the Swedes had second-guessed him and had formed up to await his attack. The cavalry charge, though pressed with vigor, was turned back.60 Aldringer was wounded in the head during the fighting, and Tilly stepped up his activities among the troops, exposing himself to fire to stiffen their morale. During the intense fighting that followed the imperial forces suffered serious losses, and Tilly, continuing to expose himself to enemy fire, was struck in the knee by a 3-pounder cannon ball.61 With the two senior commanders wounded and removed from the field, command fell to Maximilian of Bavaria.
With the fighting so intense at the bridgehead, Gustavus ordered 2,000 cavalry to ride upstream, ford the river, and attack the imperial flank from the south. Imperial cavalry met this thrust but were driven back after some hard fighting. By 6:00 the setting sun brought the battle to an end. Maximilian, with little military training, decided to withdraw the imperial army during the ensuing darkness. He knew that if he abandoned his position he would be exposing his home province of Bavaria to Gustavus’s occupation and potential destruction. Nevertheless, he decided saving the troops was too important, and made the call to
abandon the field and Bavaria. It was a masterful retreat, so well conducted the Swedes did not know it was taking place. Not a man or gun was lost in the withdrawal.62 However, imperial forces left behind almost 3,000 dead; Swedish casualties numbered around 2,000.
Gustavus’s crossing of the Lech can stand as a model for such an operation. Whereas much of the battle at Breitenfeld was reaction on his part, the Lech showed his ability to read the terrain, use it to his advantage, and implement surprise. This was a deliberate attack that fully fills its definition: a synchronized operation that employs the effects of every available asset against the enemy defense. Gustavus set the tempo by deploying in full view of the enemy and then holding their attention while implementing his main concentration against a weakly held point. The bridging of the river and the landing on the imperial side was a total surprise, and a deliberate smoke screen probably had not been used in Europe since the Mongols invaded Hungary. His only failure was his inability to exploit or pursue his enemy, because of the skillful retreat of Maximilian’s troops. He did, however, achieve his goal of opening a path into Bavaria, which he proceeded to pillage.
The successful passage of so well defended a position added to Gustavus’s growing reputation. He could have crossed his army farther downstream and attacked from the south without having to fight it out on a bridgehead, but Gustavus himself was impressed with the earthworks the imperial army had constructed and could not believe anyone would abandon such a strong position. So a difficult battle awaited him no matter what the avenue of approach. In an analysis for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Major Mark Connor writes, “Though one of his least famous actions, the passage of the Lech River is a shining example of his ability to recognize his army’s condition, establish its goal, and concentrate decisive combat power—all the while protecting his soldiers.”63 The key was the misdirection Gustavus employed, which probably would have made Subedei smile.
GUSTAVUS NEXT HAD TO MEET the redoubtable Albrecht von Wallenstein, once again the commander of imperial forces. Born in 1583 to poor but noble parents, Wallenstein served in wars against the Turks and Hungarian rebels, coming to the notice of the Hapsburg monarchy. In 1609 he married a wealthy widow; she died in 1614, leaving him a very rich man. He married into more wealth in 1617 and financed a cavalry squadron that same year to fight against the Venetians. By the time the Thirty Years War broke out in his home country of Bohemia the following year, he was a powerful and influential man in the eastern Holy Roman Empire.
In the early years of the war Wallenstein fought for the imperial cause and rose in rank to become Duke of Friedland in 1625. He gained more land and income as the war progressed, becoming Duke of Mecklenburg after helping to defeat the Danes in 1628. His increased military and political standing proved threatening to many of the imperial nobility, since he had no loyalty to empire or church. Through the urging of many of the nobles, primarily Emperor Ferdinand’s son Maximilian of Bavaria, Wallenstein was removed from his command in 1630, just after Gustavus had landed on the Baltic shore. Wallenstein went home, managed his estates, and bided his time, for he knew the time would come when Tilly would fail and the emperor would be in need.
At Rain, Wallenstein was in no mood to march to Tilly’s aid, and his command position made him answerable to no one. Much more a strategist than a tactician, Wallenstein grasped that Gustavus continually kept his mind on his lines of communication back to Sweden. Liddell Hart comments: “Wallenstein, the first grand strategist, appear[s] to have grasped the principle of unity of command, appreciating that to counter Gustavus, the absolute chief of a military monarchy, equal power and freedom of action was essential.”64 Although the Swedes ran rampant through Bavaria, Wallenstein did nothing to stop them. After all, that was Maximilian’s territory; after Maximilian had played a key role in having Wallenstein removed from command two years earlier, why should he care what happened to Bavaria? Wallenstein was busy expelling the Saxons from Bohemia, which not only secured his own base, but threatened Swedish supply lines and bases. Thus, he saved Vienna without having to defend it.
Wallenstein had raised an army of 40,000. Like Gustavus, he realized the value of regular pay and supply for the troops’ morale, and his territory of Friedland provided plenty of both. In early summer he summoned Maximilian to bring his Bavarian army to join him. The two joined forces at Eger and with 60,000 men moved toward Nuremberg. Gustavus had at first planned to march on Saxony to revitalize John George, but news of the huge imperial army gave him second thoughts. Instead he retreated into Nuremberg’s friendly environs, but with only 20,000 men. Wallenstein approached the city in July 1632 but did not use his three-to-one manpower advantage for an assault. Instead, he established himself in a strong encampment on rugged ground around the castle of Alte Veste to the southwest. There he waited on hunger to do its work, although Gustavus had laid in two months worth of supplies. There were, Wallenstein calculated, insufficient supplies for men and horses, so Gustavus would have to fight or starve. Either way Wallenstein was in a good position, for he was able to maintain his own supply situation fairly well for a time.65 In August Gustavus’s chancellor Oxenstierna arrived with a further 30,000 men; Wallenstein did nothing to stop their juncture. He believed that more men in the city meant quicker starvation, even though he was finding it increasingly difficult to keep his 60,000 as regularly fed as he had hoped.
The Battle of Lützen
GUSTAVUS WAS FINALLY FORCED to challenge the imperial forces. In early September 1632 he launched an attack on Alte Veste, but the rough terrain made it difficult for his men to maneuver and bring their artillery to bear; after severe losses Gustavus withdrew back into Nuremberg. His reputation had taken a beating as much as his army had, and with poor food and morale his German soldiers began deserting and his allied leaders became disaffected. He finally abandoned the city after trying futilely to interest Wallenstein in a peace treaty. He headed for Austria, hoping to consolidate his hold on the Danube and prepare for the following year’s campaign.
Maximilian urged a pursuit, but Wallenstein was looking at a bigger picture. With his joint armies he intended to race for Saxony; thus either he would come upon John George and Arnim alone and force them to make terms, or he would draw Gustavus off from Austria. But Maximilian had had enough of Wallenstein, and he took the rest of his army home to reoccupy and hopefully rebuild Bavaria.66 With his army reduced by one-third by Maximilian’s retreat, and then reduced further by starvation and desertion (after all, there was no victory in which to gather loot), Wallenstein himself was seeing his army dwindle to about 30,000—roughly the same as Gustavus’s if John George joined him. Learning that the Swedes were heading once again for the Danube, Wallenstein followed his plan to march on Saxony in early October. So each planned to raid, make a foray into the each other’s base, and, he hoped, put his adversary on the defensive.67
Gustavus once again showed his abilities, even after the recent setback at Alte Veste. Learning of Wallenstein’s move, Gustavus reversed course and followed him speedily, force marching his men some 400 miles in seventeen days to catch the imperial troops before they could meet the Saxons. In early November Wallenstein captured Leipzig, joining forces with Heinrich Holk and Pappenheim (who had been campaigning in the north). Gustavus met his ally Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar, with reinforcements at Erfurt, some 50 miles southwest of Leipzig; together they had just under 20,000 men. They rested there for five days before slowly moving toward Leipzig. On 8 November they captured the village of Naumburg and began erecting earthworks; they were now 20 miles from Leipzig.
Wallenstein, who had intended to march on Torgau to seize the bridge there and isolate the Saxon army, now turned back to meet the Swedes. Outside Weissenfels, on 12 November, his army deployed as Gustavus rode nearby with a cavalry reconnaissance. Gustavus withdrew to Naumburg to strengthen his defenses while sending a message to Duke George of Lüneburg to bring his 2,000 cavalry from Torgau to join him. Seei
ng the Swedish defenses, Wallenstein withdrew toward Leipzig. What happened next is open to some debate. William Guthrie’s 2002 detailed account of the battle follows the traditional viewpoint: “[Wallenstein’s] next decision is difficult to understand; in fact it was one of the most bizarre of the war. On November 14, Gustav heard, to his mingled joy and disbelief, that the Imperial army had broken up into corps and gone into winter quarters. … Wallenstein, it would seem, assumed that the camp at Naumburg was the Swedish winter quarters, that the king was suspending operations for the year.”68 The imperial commander spread his men out in various directions to spend the next few months pillaging the Saxon countryside to stay alive and at the same time needle John George. He was sure that if the Swedes moved, he could rally his army soon enough to fight. Guthrie notes that Wallenstein was suffering from gout and also was in a deteriorating mental state; he believed that the Swedes were suspending operations “because he wanted to believe it.”
Others argue that Gustavus’s entrenchment was merely a feint meant to confuse Wallenstein, and that the imperial decision to divide the army and live off the land until battle loomed was a surprise. Wallenstein, however, was not going into winter quarters.69 He could not dislodge Gustavus from his strong position, and he could not feed his army on local supplies. Further, Pappenheim had been successful in controlling northern Saxony, and wanted to return to there and resume his independent command. Wallenstein agreed, on the condition that he capture Halle (some twenty miles to the northwest of Leipzig) on the way. Pappenheim departed with 5,000 men, about 2,000 of whom were cavalry. Wallenstein was in command of 15,000–18,000, and Count Matthias Gallas was marching from Bohemia with a further 6,000–7,000 to establish himself at Grimma, some 20 miles southeast of Leipzig. So with a respectable force on hand and two other forces within a day’s march, he seemingly felt secure.
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